University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
The Montana Constitution Collection
1971

Report Number 15: Taxation and Finance
Montana. Constitutional Convention Commission

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/montanaconstitution

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Montana. Constitutional Convention Commission, "Report Number 15: Taxation and Finance" (1971). The
Montana Constitution Collection. 34.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/montanaconstitution/34

This Commission Studies is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It
has been accepted for inclusion in The Montana Constitution Collection by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

REPORT

\ I Mitt It

542
REPI5
C72T

15

Montana
Constitutional

Convention
Studies

^%S

&

Taxation

and
Finance
/97l-\<fft

Prepared By:

Montana
Constitutional

Convention

Commission

Sllfiii
00008587

Date Due

*

S

342
Rep. 15

C72t
Constitutional
Montana.
Convention Commission
Taxation and Finance
S

I

342
Rep. 15
C72t
Montana.

Constitutional Convention
Commission
Taxation and Finance

STATE DOCUMENTS

MONTANA

STATE LIBRARY

MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1971-1972

TAXATION AND FINANCE
By ROGER A.

BARBER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY NO. 15
PREPARED BY

MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION

MONTANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION
COMMISSION MEMBERS
Vice Chairman

Chairman
ALEXANDER BLEWETT
Great Falle

EUGENE H. MAHONEY
Thompson Falls
JACK S. BRENNER
Grant

CHARLES A. BOVEY
Great Falls
MRS. FIRMAN
Missoula

H.

BROWN

ARTHUR C. HAGENSTON
Glendive

CHARLES L. HARRINGTON
Butte

CLYDE L. HAWKS
St. Xavier

EUGENE PHILLIPS
Kalispell

CLYDE A. RADER
Hardin

C.

Missoula

LEONARD A. SCHULZ
Dillon

WILLIAM G. STERNHAGEN
Helena

RANDALL SWANBERG
Great Falls

BRUCE R. TOOLE
Billings

DR. ELLIS WALDRON

R.

H.

"TY" ROBINSON

Missoula

COMMISSION STAFF
DALE A. HARRIS
Executive Director

JERRY R. HOLLORON
Assistant Director

ROGER A. BARBER
Counsel

SANDRA R. MUCKELSTON
Counse I

P. RICK APPLEGATE
Research Analyst

KAREN D. BECK
Research Analyst

RICHARD F. BECHTEL
Research Analyst

NANCY M. MALEE
Research Analyst

JAMES T. GRADY
Research Analyst

BRUCE R. SIEVERS
Research Analyst

BARTLEY O. CARSON
Executive Secretary

KAREN C. NYBERG
Convention Arrangements

JUANITA FONTANA
Librarian

GINNY WATERMAN
Secretary

DEE ANN CHRISTIANSEN
Secretary

ALICE BERNER
Secretary

JANE B. JONES
Secretary

ROSEMARY S. ACHER
Secretary

PREFACE

The delegates to the 1971-1972 Montana Constitutional Convention will need historical, legal and comparative information
Recognizing this need, the
about the Montana Constitution.
1971 Legislative Assembly created the Constitutional Convention Commission and directed it to assemble and prepare
essential information for the Convention. This series of
reports by the Commission is in fulfillment of that responsibility.
This study on taxation and finance in Montana was written by
Roger A. Barber, counsel and research analyst on the Commission staff. The Commission has authorized publication of the
report as approved by the Research Subcommittee on Taxation
and Finance consisting of Commission members Arthur C. Hagenston, Glendive, chairman; Jack S. Brenner, Grant; C. Eugene
The report
Phillips, Kalispell, and Clyde A. Rader, Hardin.
concerns not only what the present Montana Constitution says
about taxation and finance, but how those provisions are
In addition, constitutional provisions
working in practice.
and trends from other states are used for comparative purposes
.

The Commission extends its appreciation to state officials
who cooperated in the preparation of the study. This report
is respectfully submitted to the people of Montana and their
delegates to the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention.

ALEXANDER BLEWETT
CHAIRMAN

Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr,
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SUMMARY

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The power to tax is an inherent right of every state. While
the federal government is a government of enumerated powers,
operating under a constitution which spells out rights and
duties, the states act under inherent powers, limited only
by provisions in their sovereign constitutions.
In other
words, the federal government can exercise only those powers
granted to it in the United States Constitution.
State
governments can exercise any power not prohibited or limited
by the state or federal constitutions.

Because the power to tax is an inherent right of every state,
the state constitution could be silent on the subject of
taxation, and the state still would possess that power. Any
provision in a state constitution dealing with taxation is
either (1) redundant, repeating some right or power already
possessed by the state, or (2) limiting, preventing the
state from acting in a particular way. As one commentator
put it:
In its simplest form, the problem of what to include
in the article on taxation and finance is a test of
one's belief in our system of representative democracy.
It is difficult to reconcile a position demanding a

series of constitutional prohibitions or limitations
upon the legislature's exercise of discretion in
respect to taxation and finance with a real belief in
democracy.
Those who argue for constitutional checks
are admitting a lack of belief in the capacity or desire
of the elected representatives of the voters to
establish and maintain an adequate and equitable system
of financing public expenditures.

CHAPTER II
TAX BASE

The Montana Constitution specifies four kinds of taxes for
the state fiscal program property taxes, license taxes,
income taxes and mining taxes.
But those tax programs are
not an exclusive list.
Other forms of taxation can be used

—
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for the state revenue program.
On at least three occasions,
the Montana Supreme Court has specifically upheld the constitutionality of tax programs not listed in the Montana
Constitution. Upheld were a graduated income tax (before
that revenue measure was added to the Constitution by amendment)
an inheritance tax, and a liquor tax.
;

That unlimited power to initiate revenue programs can be
traced to the state's inherent sovereignty. The power to
tax and the kinds of taxes to be used in a state revenue
program do not have to be specified in a state constitution.
As the Montana Supreme Court has said, the "methods of taxation mentioned or provided.
[in the Constitution] are
not exclusive, and.
.the legislature has the power to adopt
other methods of taxation which are not prohibited by some
other section of the Constitution."
.

.

.

While the power to establish revenue programs is broad, it
The
can be limited by other provisions in the Constitution.
present Montana Constitution handcuffs the legislative tax
program in at least two regards:
(1) lotteries are prohibited
by the Constitution, so a state-run lottery cannot be used as
a revenue device; (2) the method of taxing mines and mining
claims is specified in the Constitution, so the legislature
is not free to establish any method of property taxation for
that class of property.
Three alternatives are open to constitution writers:
1.
Specific taxation programs could be authorized in
The list would not be exclusive, and other
the constitution.
taxes could be added by the legislature.

Specific taxation programs could be listed in the
2.
constitution, with a provision that only those programs could
similarly, the constitution could
be used by the state;
prohibit certain kinds of taxes.
3.
A broad policy statement could be included in the
constitution, without any specific mention of kinds of taxes;
or the power to tax need not be mentioned at all.

CHAPTER III
PROPERTY TAX
Property taxes supplv only 7.2 percent of total state tax
revenues, but they are the primary source of funds for local
-2-
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governments, which receive 9 5.8 percent of their revenues
That lack of use at the state level and
from property taxes.
over-dependence at the local level is typical of property taxation across the United States.

Prudent administration of property taxation is important for
obvious reasons at the local level, but the state is
affected by inefficiency and inequality of administration,
For example, state aid to education is based on property
too.
tax revenues, so equitable distribution of aid depends upon
equitable assessments.
Details on property tax administration are set out in the
Montana Constitution.
That document creates a two-level
system, composed of county assessors and county boards of
equalization at the local level, and the State Board of EqualiThe property taxation process is
zation at the state level.
complicated in Montana, involving four steps before the
property tax bill is determined. Montana also is plagued
by problems of underassessment and non-uniformity common
to most states.
One study concluded, for example, that non-farm residential
property is assessed at from 28.7 percent to 31.7 percent
of its sales value, the "standard" for all property valuation in Montana.
Another study revealed that 87 percent of
the sample areas in Montana did not meet acceptable standards
of uniformity in property valuation.
Countless reasons,
some pinpointed, some only speculative, have been given for
this somewhat dismal record.
Many studies trace part of the problem to the enormous presIf he does,
sure on the assessor to undervalue property.
the assessor can gain certain benefits from state aid programs, use his valuation powers as an election tool and shift
the need to increase taxes to some other political entity.

The office of assessor is an enormously important and powerIn Montana, the
ful one at the local government level.
office is created by constitutional provision, without specification of any particular qualifications except those
required for voting.
Many studies have bemoaned this absence
of qualifications; one, for example, concluded that to
entrust "this job to a nonprofessional is like assuming that
almost any reasonably intelligent citizen can audit a
municipality's accounts, handle its engineering, or administer its public health."

-3-
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The State Board of Equalization has specifically recommended
that all references to the county assessor be removed from
the Constitution, allowing the legislature to establish
Qualifications and examination procedures for the position.
Some studies also have urged that enlarged assessment
districts be set up to ensure a budget and staff of proThose districts would not conform to
fessional stature.
county lines, primarily because most counties do not have the
Elecresources to support a professional assessment office.
tion of assessors is still the primary method of selection
in the United States, however, and assessment districts are
still defined by county lines in most states.

The county commissioners sit as county boards of equalization by constitutional mandate "to adjust and equalize the
valuation of taxable property within their respective
counties." The boards seldom exercise their eaualization
powers, according to one study, but sit primarily as a board
of review and appeals.
At least one state tax official has
criticized this function of the county commissioners, primarily because of their alleged lack of qualifications and the
multiple duties which they must perform, leaving little time
for property tax equalization and review.
The State Board of Equalization also is created by constitutional mandate, and at the time of the 1889 Convention, was
Since that time,
established to administer the property tax.
the state board has been charged with the administration
of Montana's entire revenue collection program.
The board
is an assessing, administrative and quasi- judicial agency.

Such utilization of a multi-member board to administer a
state's tax program is unusual. At least thirty-five states
The Execuhave a single administrator for their tax agency.
tive Reorganization Commission recommended that Montana
follow that trend by creating a single administrator for the
When the reorganization statute
new Department of Revenue.
was passed in 1971, however, the State Board of Equalization
was retained as the administrator for the new department.

One of the biggest complaints leveled at the present system
of tax administration at the state level is the fact that
the State Board of Equalization serves as an administrative
board, making rulings concerning tax assessment and valuation;
then it sits as a review board, hearing appeals from its own
administrative decisions. That dual-purpose approach does
not lend itself to an objective review process, commentators
charge.

-4-
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The single, most important question the Convention will want
to consider is whether property tax administration detail
If the Convention decides
should remain in the Constitution.
that some of the provisions should be retained, it will want
to determine the scope of constitutional treatment, and the
areas that are better left to statutory law.

CHAPTER IV
PROPERTY TAX EXEP4PTI0NS
Property tax exemptions in the Montana Constitution are of
a relatively common variety, appearing frequently in the
constitutions of other states. Exempt property in Montana
includes property of the United States, the state, counties,
cities, towns, school districts and municipal corporations;
public libraries; agricultural and horticultural societies;
educational property; religious property; hospitals; nonprofit
cemeteries; charitable institutions, and mortgages.
The Montana Supreme Court has ruled that the property exemption list included in the Constitution is an exclusive
one "the legislature may extend the exemption to the property enumerated, but it cannot go further and include any
other." Tax relief, if not outright exemption, has been extended to additional classes of property in Montana, however,
under the Property Classification Act.
Under the provisions
of that law, taxable value of some property is set at a low
percentage rate, providing a form of property tax exemption.

—

Exemptions for government property are defended because
governments themselves do not pay the taxes; it is impractical for them to tax themselves.
Traditionally, governments
also have granted exemptions to nonprofit, charitable,
Those kinds of
religious and educational institutions.
exemptions are justified on grounds that (1) the institutions perform services which the government otherwise would
have to perform; (2) they advance cultural and social causes,
and (3) some of these institutions foster morality and other
desirable forms of social behavior.
In addition to the kinds of exemptions provided in Montana,
other states exempt additional classes of property.
It must
be remembered that these exemptions cannot be utilized in
Montana under the present Constitution.

-5-
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The common kinds of property exemptions in other states
include:

Household property, which the Montana Legislative
1.
Council has recommended for exemption. The rationale for such
exempt status includes the difficulty of locating and assessing all such property; the discrimination inherent in a system
that taxes all property owned by one taxpayer, while his
neighbor may not be taxed at all, and reliance on selfreporting, which encourages taxpayer dishonesty.
Business personal property, which is subject to most
2.
of the same criticisms directed at household personal propInventories fluctuate during the business year, and it
erty.
is relatively easy to "arrange" to have a small inventory
Most states try to reach this kind of
on assessment day.
property through a sales tax, an increased corporate income
tax or a gross receipts tax.

Intangible property like money, credits, stocks and
3.
bonds, which also has been suggested for exempt status by
Arguments in support of
the Montana Legislative Council.
the Council's recommendation include the easily concealed
nature of such property, its high mobility and the marked
exodus of this property shortly before assessment day.
Veterans' exemptions, which are utilized in about
4.
thirty-two states. Although such exemptions are intended to
reward military service, particularly when that service has
resulted in disability or death, the exemptions have been
widely criticized. Frequently cited arguments include the
discrimination against propertyless veterans, the inefficiency of this method of reward, compared to other forms of
public recognition, and the increased burden imposed on other
taxpayers who do not enjoy such exempt status.

Senior citizens' exemptions, which have been justi5.
fied because the elderly are frequently in low-income groups.

spend a larger percentage of their income on housing and
usually oppose any increase in property taxation because the
However, most
services so funded do not benefit them.
commentators agree that property tax exemptions are not an
efficient or equitable way to benefit elderly taxpayers.
Increased benefit payments are seen as a better solution.

Homestead exemptions, which were once a popular "tax
6.
break," but have been rejected by most states since the early
1940s.
These exemptions are subject to the same criticisms
as veterans' and senior citizens' exemptions.

€-
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The state constitution could include a special list of
exemptions, similar to Montana's present document.
That list
could be an exclusive one, like Montana's, or the constitution could provide that the legislature may make additional
exemptions.
On the other hand, the constitution could be
silent on the subject of exemptions, leaving the matter to
the legislature.
Or the constitution could prohibit all
forms of tax exemption.

CHAPTER V
TAX RATE LIMITATIONS
The only tax rate limitation in the Montana Constitution is
a two-mill ceiling on each dollar of valuation for state
property tax purposes.
Numerous other tax rate limitations
have been established by the legislature, but as part of a
statutory scheme, those limitations do not have the inflexible, permanent effect of constitutional provisions.

The two-mill general levy for state purposes is not a major
component of the state revenue system. As already noted,
property taxation is primarily a local government revenue
source.
The two-mill state lew ostensibly is used only as
a stopgap or emergency measure when other state revenue
sources have not supplied all of the anticipated revenue.
But the two-mill levy has been used with unremitting regularity in recent years--so frequently, that it has almost become
a regular feature of the state fiscal program.
However, the
governor's decision not to impose the two-mill tax in 19 71
broke the chain of expectancy.

At present, the two-mill limitation on state property taxes
does not seriously hamper the state revenue program.
Property taxes simply are not a major feature of the state's
fiscal resources.
But a recent California Supreme Court decision, now on appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
could change the effect of that limitation.
The California
court ruled that that state's reliance on local property
taxation to finance its school system was a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Local
property taxes raise substantially different sums of money
in each school district with resulting differences in the
type and duality of education so financed.
If the United States Supreme Court agrees with the California
decision, Montana's system of school finance will be directly
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affected.
Commentators seem to agree that the one alternative would be to shift the responsibility for education to
In that case, Montana might have to impose
the state level.
a uniform state property tax for education purposes, and
the rate likely would have to be above the two-mill limit
to meet educational needs.
The constitutional limitation
could become an insurmountable roadblock.

Property tax limitations are found in about a third of the
Some state constitutions also limit
state constitutions.
the rates on income, death, inheritance and severance taxes.
Rate limitations have been defended on grounds that (1) they
check government spending, forcing governments to use revenues economically; (2) they expand the tax base, requiring
governments to find new sources of revenue, and (3) they
But such limitamay attract new businesses into the area.
tions have been criticized because (1) they are inflexible
and difficult to change; (2) taxation rates should respond
to change, attuned to the fluctuations in the economy, and
(3) governments will resort to nuisance taxes if they are
forced to find new revenue sources.

CHAPTER VI
MINING TAXATION
One of the most controversial provisions in the Montana Constitution, and one of the few specific provisions that many
citizens know about, is the mining tax clause. The section
establishes the procedures for valuating mines and mining
claims for property taxation purposes.
The provision is controversial because some students of
Montana history believe it was included in the Constitution
under questionable and conspiratorial circumstances at the
1889 Convention.
But historians cannot agree, some claiming
that mining interests controlled the Convention and got
special constitutional considerations and others urging that
the provision was a natural response to the conditions of the
state at that time.

Whatever its historical significance, the mining tax clause
has aroused bitter passions and heated arguments since its
inclusion in the Constitution.
The most famous of those
"disagreements" occurred in the 1920s, v/hen critics charged
that minina interests in the state were not paying their fair
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share of taxes, even under the special constitutional tax
The most famous of those criticisms was prepared by
break.
Lewis Levine, an economics professor at the University of
Montana in Missoula. Due, in part, to Levine' s charges,
Montana voters passed an initiative to impose a gross proceeds
metal mines tax on mining property in Montana--an effort to
make mining interests pay according to their worth.
The controversial sections in the constitutional mining tax
provisions include the stipulation that mines and mining
claims will be taxed at the price paid the United States
government, which, in most cases, means between $2.50 and
$20 per acre, and the net proceeds provision, which is a complicated system to determine taxable worth of mining producNet proceeds is ascertained by subtion during the year.
tracting from gross production (1) all royalties; (2) all
expenses for necessary labor, machinery, and supplies, and
(3) the cost of improvements, repairs and betterments on the
mining property. Net proceeds is determined by the State
Board of Equalization, apparently from information supplied
by the mining companies themselves.
The important consideration for the Convention is whether
such a taxation system should be frozen in the Constitution.
Net proceeds is not the only method of determining taxable
value of mining property, but as long as the mining tax provision remains in the Constitution, it is the only method
which can be utilized in Montana. Mining property is the
only property in the state which enjoys special constitutional treatment; the propriety of that treatment is a major
consideration for the Convention.

CHAPTER VII
LIVESTOCK MILL LEVIES
A special four-mill levy on livestock is created in the Montana
Constitution to pay bounties on wild animals and for stock
The Montana Supreme
inspection, protection and indemnity.
Court has ruled that such a levy must be specifically established in the Constitution because it is imposed on a special
(The
class of property to the exclusion of all others.
Montana Constitution requires that all property, except that
specifically exempted from taxation, must bear the burden
If some class of property is singled out for
of taxation.
special treatment, that special treatment must be spelled out
in the Constitution.
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Confusingly, however, the four-mill limit is not the standard
followed by the State Board of Equalization when imposing the
The state board has been levying
special livestock levy.
between ten and twelve mills on livestock for several years.
Authority for its action can be traced to a 19 5 3 Attorney
General's opinion.
In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the constitutional provisions meant that four mills could be levied
on the assessed value of livestock and since taxable value
is the standard now used by the state, the mill levy could
Taxable value is three times greater
be adjusted accordingly.
than assessed value, so a mill levy three times greater than
the four mills is permissible.

The provision and the practices of the State Board of Equalization are confusing and the justification by the Attorney
General seems artificial at best. A decision by the
Montana Supreme Court makes removal of the provision difficult,
however, if the state wants to continue the special levy for
livestock protection in its present form.

—

CHAPTER VIII
UNIFORMITY CLAUSES
The uniformity clause in Montana's Constitution reads as
.shall be uniform upon the same class of
follows:
"Taxes.
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levyThe Montana Supreme Court, in interpreting that
ing the tax."
clause, ruled that it applies only to property taxes a decision that is followed in most other states, too.
.

—

That decision does not mean that other forms of taxation are
entirely exempt from uniformity requirements. The Montana
Court has also declared that principles of uniformity and
equality cannot be disregarded altogether; other taxation
systems cannot be set up with unreasonable or discriminatory
provisions.
In other words, some degree of uniformity is
required for all taxation systems in Montana, but the requirements for property taxation systems are somewhat more
stringent.
The uniformity clause in Montana has received a rather liberal
In fact, Montana
interpretation by the Montana Supreme Court.
has an extensive, comprehensive property tax classification

-10-

)

SUMMARY
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in the Constitution.
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A "public purpose" requirement for state taxation systems
is mandatory under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Therefore,
the "public purpose" clauses in the various state constitutions are repetition of the Fourteenth Amendment due process
requirement.
The state clauses do not impose any new
limitation on the state taxing power, but simply restate a
principle required by the U.S. Constitution.
However, lending provisions in state constitutions, which
reflect the "public purpose" philosophy, have thwarted
certain legislative taxation programs. Montana's lending
provision provides that "neither the state, nor any county,
city, town, municipality, nor other subdivision of the state
shall ever give or loan its credit in aid of, or make any
donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual,
association or corporation."

There is some question whether these lending provisions are
merely a reiteration of the "public purpose" doctrine, or
an additional, more stringent limitation on state taxation
programs. Whatever the answer to that confusion, state
courts have developed at least five loopholes to get around
the lending requirement.
They are that (1) the entity
performing the act is not within the constitutional proscription; (2) the recipient of the property or credit is
not within the constitutional prohibition; (3) the appropriation was not in the form of a prohibited donation; (4)
the extension of credit was not made in an improper manner,
i.e. revenue bonds, and (5) the transaction is not within
the policy of the constitutional prohibition.
The Montana Supreme Court appears to have allowed all five
exceptions on at least one occasion, thereby avoiding the
"literal" consequences of the constitutional lending provision.
It is difficult to determine if those court decisions have nullified the effect of the lending prohibition,
however.

Many commentators argue that a simple "public purpose" clause
is adequate to cover the situations anticipated in the lending
prohibition.
They contend that if the state taxation program
is for a public purpose, it makes no difference that the
recipient is a private individual or association. At the
same time, it could be argued that "public purpose" already
is required by the Federal Constitution, so any kind of
state provision embracing that concept is redundant.
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CHAPTER X
EARMARKING OF REVENUES

Earmarking is a device which dedicates revenue from a specific
Provisions
tax to finance particular government functions.
in the Montana Constitution earmark proceeds from public
lands, income taxes, highway revenues, the four-mill livestock
levy and public debt levies.
In 196 3, 5 3 percent of all state revenue in Montana was earThose earmarked funds totaled about $33.7 million,
marked.
and of that sum, 73 percent, or about $24.7 million was
dedicated by constitutional mandate. The other 27 percent
Across the United States,
was earmarked by statutory law.
the national average for earmarked state revenues stood at
41 percent of all state funds, so Montana ranked well above
average.

Montana's anti-diversion amendment, which dedicates highway
revenues to highway purposes, accounts for a substantial
In 1970,
portion of the earmarked revenue in the state.
highway user taxes brought in $29 million for the State Highway Department and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. When
preparing budget allocations for the Highway Department and
when making the appropriation, the governor and the legislature simply estimate the amount of revenue that will come in
Because of this lack
under the anti-diversion amendment.
of control over state funds, the Montana Legislative Council
recommended in both 1962 and 1968 that the anti-diversion
provision in the Constitution be repealed.
Such dedication clauses are popular in constitutions across
the United States, however, and have the strong support of
interest groups and taxpayers.

Under the income tax earmark for schools, a substantial
amount of money is supplied to the state foundation program
for education.
At present, the amount of income taxes
earmarked for education is set at 25 percent by statute. That
revenue source supplied $10.5 million for the public schools
in 19 70.
The state also must appropriate funds from the
general fund to meet its obligation under the state school
equalization plan; that general fund appropriation consistently has exceeded the amount of money supplied by earmarked
income tax funds.
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It is questionable whether any percentage of the income tax
funds would have to be earmarked by statute for public educa-

Income taxes and corporate license taxes are the maintion.
As long as state money is approstay of the general fund.
priated from the general fund for public education, it almost
certainly is coming from income taxation.
Earmarking, as a feature of state revenue systems, has been
(1) it requires those
defended on the following grounds:
who receive the benefits of a governmental service to pay for
it; (2) it assures a minimum level of expenditures for a
desired governmental function; (3) it contributes stability
to the state's financial system; (4) it assures continuity
for specific projects, and (5) it induces the public to
support new or increased taxes. The device has been criticized
(1) it hampers effecextensively on the following grounds:
tive budgetary control, in some cases seriously; (2) it leads
to a misallocation of funds, giving excess revenues to some
functions while others are undersupported; (3) it makes for
inflexibility of the revenue structure, compounding the
legislature's ability to respond to changing conditions;
(4) it tends to retain statutes after the need for which they
were established has passed, and (5) it infringes on the
policy-making powers of the executive and legislature, because
it removes a portion of governmental activities from periodic
review and control.

CHAPTER XI
PUBLIC SCHOOL LANDS, OTHER LAND GRANTS AND LAND GRANT FUNDS
The United States government granted a substantial legacy in
public lands to the state when Montana was admitted to the
Union in 1889. The land grant practice of the federal government dates back to 1785, when the Continental Congress adopted
the famous Northwest Land Ordinance providing for a survey of
public lands and reservation of section 16 of each township
for the maintenance of public schools.
By the time Montana joined the Union, Congress was dedicating
of each township to public schools.
16 and 36
two sections
In addition, Congress was providing land for state universities, normal schools, public buildings, prisons and charitable
institutions. As a result of these federal land grant
programs, Montana received more than 5.8 million acres from
the United States, an invaluable resource for state govern-

—

—

ment.
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These public land grants were surrounded by several conditions when they were given to the state, including management
practices for the lands, use of proceeds from the sale or
rental of the lands and dedication of the lands and their
Those conditions had to be
income to particular purposes.
accepted by the state before Montana could be admitted to the
Union; the 1889 Constitutional Convention included its
acceptance in the Ordinances of the state Constitution.

—

Proceeds from the public school lands sections 16 and 36 of
each township were earmarked for the support and maintenance
of the public schools of the state.
Similar earmarking
accompanied other federal land grants for state institutions.
Those dedication provisions are contained in the Congressional Enabling Act for the state, which only Congress can change,
and the Ordinances and the 1889 Constitution, which only
the people of Montana can change.
The dedication of these
funds in the state constitution has been questioned recently,
however, principally because some federal commissions have
questioned the restrictions placed around federal land grants
to the states.
If the federal government were to change
those restrictions, they would still be in force in Montana
because they are contained in the state Constitution.

—

The Interest and Income money from the public school lands
is distributed according to a formula specified in the Constitution: 95 percent of the money is apportioned annually to
the school districts of the state in proportion to the number
of children and youths between the ages of six and twenty-one
residing in the school district. The money is distributed
to elementary school districts only, without consideration
for the financial status of the district.
The Interest and
Income formula is in direct contradiction to the state
equalization program for public education, which distributes
state funds on the basis of need.
The Constitutional Convention might want to consider removing the constitutional
formula for distribution of Interest and Income funds, leaving the question to the legislature so the money could be
more equitably integrated into the foundation program. At the
least, the Convention may want to consider changing the
formula so that it more accurately reflects the school population.
By constitutional decree, management of the public lands is
left to the Board of Land Commissioners, composed of the

governor, superintendent of public instruction, secretary of
state and the attorney general.
Several provisions in the
Enabling Act and the Montana Constitution establish principles
for the management, rental, sale and protection of those
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public lands. For many years, the Hoard of Land Commissioners, with its subordinate Department of State Lands, also
handled the investment of funds from the sale and rental of
However, the Executive
public land and public land resources.
Reorganization Act of 1971 transferred that function to a
Board of Investments, upgrading the professional personnel and
expertise necessary for proper investment programs.

CHAPTER XII

MONTANA TRUST AND LEGACY FUND
The final article in the Montana Constitution is devoted to
an extensive and detailed plan for permanent trust funds and
Entitled "Montana Trust and
investment of public money.
Legacy Fund," the article is unique among state documents;
no other state establishes a complete investment plan in its
constitution.
The Trust and Legacy Fund article was added to the Constitua state
It created three permanent funds
tion in 1924.
permanent school fund, a state permanent revenue fund and a
permanent revenue fund for the University System--to be
established by gifts, grants, legacies and bequests of at
least $250.
The investment funds from the public land grants
for schools and state institutions were added to the Trust
The legislature also
and Legacy Fund by amendment in 19 38.
was authorized to include all state investment funds in the
Trust and Legacy Fund program. The obvious intent of this
consolidation was to create one single, unified investment
fund for state public investment money.

—

The reasons for creating the Trust and Legacy Fund and the
attempt at a uniform investment policy undoubtedly were
noble.
But the provisions have not lived up to their commendable goals.
In fact, Article XXI stands as one of the most
impotent provisions in the Montana Constitution.
The three permanent revenue funds established by the Trust
and Legacy Fund article do not exist in fact, they have
never existed. The reason for their absence is obvious.
Under provisions of the article, interest from the state
permanent revenue fund cannot be distributed until the principal reaches $100 million; interest from the state permanent
school fund cannot be distributed until the principal
reaches $500 million, and interest from the permanent revenue
fund for the University System cannot be distributed until
the principal reaches $100 million.

—
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No person who wanted to make a gift of money to the state or
its schools would tie up his money by giving it to the three
permanent funds.
It would never benefit the object of his
benevolence. An outright gift to the schools or the state
is the easiest way to benefit those entities.
Even the public
school fund, which was created by a substantial grant of
public lands and has been in existence since statehood, is no
where near the minimum levels specified for the three funds.
The principal for the public school fund now stands at $52.9
million.
If the public school fund had not been incorporated into the
Trust and Legacy Fund by the 19 38 amendment, the Fund would
practically be a nonentity today. Public school money constitutes DO percent of the Trust and Legacy funds; the
remaining money comes from other state agencies and institutions
.

The obvious intent of the Montana Trust and Legacy Fund, as
already mentioned, was creation of a unified investment
program for state funds. The State Board of Land Commissioners was designated by the legislature as the state agency
responsible for public fund investment. The legislature,
starting in 1953, tried to follow through on the permissive
language of the Trust and Legacy Fund article by passing a
unified system of public money investment.
But numerous
state agencies continued to invest their own money, all but
ignoring the State Land Board except for getting an occasional "rubber stamp" approval of investments already made.
The latest step toward this elusive unification plan was taken
in 1971, when the Executive Reorganization Act created a
Board of Investments to handle all public fund investment for
the state.
Most importantly, this step was taken by legislative enactment—not by constitutional decree.
If a unified
investment nrogram is goinq to be established for the state,
it probably will be done at the statutory level.

The Montana Trust and Legacy Fund article is a battered,
confusing, antiquated provision.
At the very least, it stands
as an anomaly, the only investment program of its kind in the
United States with constitutional treatment.
It is a verbose,
complex article, containing sections that have no function
and regulations that have little purpose.
Most significantly,
the investment philosophy of that article appears finally to
have been accomplished by statute, which probably says more
than anything else about the constitutional propriety of
the Trust and Leqacy Fund provision.
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CHAPTER XIII
INVESTMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY
Three provisions in the Montana Constitution appear to limit
opportunities for nublic fund investment. Article V, Section
37 apparently prohibits the state from investing any public
money classified as "trust funds" in stocks and bonds of
private corporations. Article XIII, Section 1 appears to
prohibit the state from becoming "a subscriber to, or a
shareholder in any company or corporation." Article XXI,
Section 8 sets down a list of investments for the Trust and
Legacy Fund.
None of these provisions has ever been interpreted on this point by the Montana Supreme Court, however,
so their effect is not known.
In any event, administrative and legislative practice has
been to ignore the apparent prohibitions in Article V, Section
37 and Article XIII, Section 1 but to honor the prohibition
in Article XXI, Section 8.
Of the three limitations, the one restricting state ownership
in corporate stocks and bonds is most common in other state

constitutions.
Most state courts have confined the constitutional restriction to those expenditures or investments
by the state designed to foster and promote private enterprise, as distinguished from the mere investment of state
money as a business transaction.
The Montana Legislative Council has recommended that Article
XIII, Section 1 be amended to sanction investment in corporate stocks, and that Article XXI, Section 8 be repealed to lift
the exclusive portfolio nature of that provision.
The Council
was concerned about the depressive effect those provisions
have on the growth of public investment funds, particularly
during periods of inflation. The Council also argued that the
reasons for fearing private stock ownership are no longer valid
and that the nature of private investors and a public investment fund are so fundamentally different that the reasons for
individual leeriness simply do not apply to government ownership.

The trend across the United States seems to be to permit
If republic fund investment in corporate stocks and bonds.
strictions are imposed on the public investment program, those
restrictions are statutory in nature. Another more modern
provision is establishment of a "prudent man" rule to guide
public fund investment.
Briefly stated, the rule provides
that money in the custody of a state, county or municipal
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agency shall be invested with that "degree of judgment and
care, under circumstances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not for speculation but for
investment,
If investment limitations were removed from the Constitution,
the guarantee surrounding the public school fund would not
That guarantee, which requires the state
be affected.
to protect the fund from loss or diversion, is separate and
distinct from the investment limitations imposed by the Constitution.
Sound investment practices will supply the same
guarantee as any kind of conservative investment portfolio.
The Supreme Court, on at least one occasion, has indicated
that that guarantee is not violated by investment practices
that include a little speculation to gain a bigger profit.

CHAPTER XIV
STATE DEET
The constitutional debt limitation requires that the state of
Montana not create any liability of more than $100,000, unless
the voters approve it.
The fixed-dollar amount, like
Montana's $100,000 limitation, is the most common debt provision in state constitutions.
But it has been attacked in
recent years because such dollar amounts were set in a different economic era, often arbitrarily, and do not reflect the
fiscal capacity of states today.
»

Two new limitations have been developed to better reflect
the state's ability to pay.
They are (1) a limitation set
as a percentage of property valuation in the state, and (2)
a limitation set as a percentage of average revenues in the
state.
But whatever method is utilized, the debt limitation has been
ignored or bypassed by state governments. A comparison of
outstanding debt in the several states with their constitutional debt limitation reveals that the former figure exceeds
the latter in most states.
Montana is no exception.

States have used at least four loopholes to avoid the consequences of their debt limitations.
Those exceptions are
(1) revenue bonds and the special-fund doctrine;
(2) public
corporations, authorities and commissions; (3) lease-purchase
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agreements, and (4) delegation of state functions to political
subdivisions.
To date, Montana has used only the revenue
bond technique to get around the literal consequences of its
In 1970, Montana had $67 million
$100,000-debt limitation.
in revenue bonds outstanding.

Those bonds are excluded from state debt requirements because
they do not tie up state funds to meet the indebtedness.
Money to pay off the bonds comes from user fees or rentals on
buildings.
However, revenue bonds have come under increasing
criticism in recent years because interest rates on the bonds
are higher than if the bonds were backed by the full faith
and credit of the state.
Such increased interest payments
cost the state more to finance its long-term indebtedness a
handicap that some commentators argue destroys any benefits
derived from revenue bond financing.

—

Another loophole was provided by the Montana Supreme Court,
when it ruled in 1958 that voter approval of state indebtedness over $100,000 only applied to debts that would be
retired with property tax revenues. The state was free to
establish other debts without a vote of the electorate as
long as non-property tax revenues were used.
That decision was overruled by the Montana Court on November
The Court declared that the distinction
23, 1971, however.
made in 1958 was unconstitutional, and that all future debts
of Montana, over $100,000, would need prior voter approval
regardless of the tax source used to meet that debt. The
decision nullified two acts by the 1971 Legislature, one to
issue $5.5 million for the Long-Range Building Program and
another $7.7 million for a new highway headquarters complex.
The building bonds were to be financed from the state income
tax, the corporate license tax, cigarette taxes and gasoline
license taxes.
Many commentators argue that state debt limitations should be
eliminated.
The basis for that conclusion is that the
states ignore the limitations anyway, developing so many exceptions to the constitutional requirements that no effective
restraint exists any more.

CHAPTER XV
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION
A relatively unresponsive tax source coupled with inflation
and requests for increased services have created a financial
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bind for local governments, both nationally and in Montana.
Some of the difficulties can be traced to state constitutional provisions on local taxation and debt.
The 1889 Constitution gives the legislature virtually complete control over local taxation.
In other words, a city
or county can levy only those taxes specifically authorized
by the legislature; in Montana, the legislature largely has
limited local taxation to levies on property.
Montana, in a sense, represents a "middle" position among
the fifty states in terms of constitutional provisions on
local taxation.
On the one hand, the Montana Constitution,
unlike those in many states, does not specifically restrict
the property tax levying powers of local government in
terms of maximum mill levies.
On the other hand, neither
does the Montana document directly grant any taxing powers
to local government something that is done in a few states,

—

CHAPTER XVI
STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A provision in the Montana Constitution severely limits any
state tax devised to provide revenue for town, city or county
governments. That provision effectively circumscribes state
aid to counties and municipalities at a time when such revenue
sharing is of major importance across the United States.
In
1969, states distributed $9.8 billion in state revenue to
local governments, not including aid to education.
In some
states, state aid accounts for 40 to 50 percent of the total
local budget.

Montana is not in that vanguard, however.
In fact, Montana
ranks forty-seventh among the fifty states in per capita state
aid to counties and municipalities.
Montana is one of four
states that does not provide any general local government
aid.
The aid that is_ provided by the state to local governments in Montana is all earmarked for a particular function.
A trickle of state aid has been leaking through an exception
carved in the constitutional provision by the Montana Supreme
Court.
The Court ruled that that provision does not apply
to license taxes created by the state for local government
revenue purposes. At least five such license taxes have been
established under that exception: liquor license tax, insurance license tax, beer license tax, gasoline license tax and
motor vehicle license and registration fees tax.
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In addition to the license tax revenues, the state also
supplies money to local governments under a "state purpose"
State aid programs that fit under that category
theory.
include welfare aid and water pollution control funds.
Education is the big winner in the state aid program, howIn fact, if education is not figured as part of the
ever.
state aid program, Montana's assistance to local governments
is nearly nonexistent.

At least four other states have the same constitutional proIt is difvision concerning state aid that Montana does.
ficult to compare the effect of those provisions, since the
tax base in every state is fundamentally different. At least
two of those states Colorado and California—have developed
a test that thwarts any serious limitations created by the
Those states operate under
state aid prohibition, however.
a "state purpose" test much like that used to justify the
welfare and water pollution programs in Montana. Those state
purpose tests have allowed state aid to local governments
for welfare, transportation, state pension funds, police protection, highways and education.

—

The Montana Supreme Court declared that the purpose of the
state aid prohibition was to "secure to the people of these
cities that measure of local government which they enjoyed
But
at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted."
such autonomy is not frequently associated with Montana's
local governmental units; in fact, those governments are mere
adjuncts or political subdivisions of the state, exercising
only those powers granted directly or by necessary implication from the state.

CHAPTER XVII
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT
The Montana Constitution, like those of most other states,
The
limits the amount of debt local government may incur.
Montana provisions impose three major conditions on county
and municipal debt:
1.
Generally, the legislature may not authorize any
city or town to incur total indebtedness that exceeds 5
percent of the assessed value of the property within the
local unit.
2.

The legislature may allow municipalities, with the
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approval of their voters, to exceed the 5 percent limitation
to construct a sewer system or procure a water supply.
3.
No county may incur any indebtedness or liability for
single purpose in an amount exceeding $10,000 without
the approval of the voters.

a

The last of those three conditions has been widely attacked
Other state constitutions also contain
as unrealistic.
referendum requirements for indebtedness, but few seem as
restrictive as the $10,000 limit.
The use of property values as a base for debt limitation is
common in state constitutions and also is a common target
There appears to be general agreement that
for critics.
property value is a poor basis for debt limitations, but there
Constiis no similar agreement on what basis would be best.
tutional debt limitations, such as Montana's, also are
criticized because of the many forms of indebtedness they
do not cover.
Revenue bonds, for example, commonly are exempt
from constitutional debt limitations in most states, including Montana.

—

For those and other reasons, many observers favor taking local
government debt restrictions out of the constitution and
leaving them in the more flexible arena of statutory law.

CHAPTER XVIII
PUBLIC AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

At least three provisions in the Montana Constitution prohibit
public aid to parochial schools. The importance of those
provisions must be considered in the context of the Federal
Constitution, which also places certain limitations on a
state's power to support secular enterprises.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
The
U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, taking
precedent over state laws.
But that free exercise clause
only speaks to prohibited actions by the United States Congress.
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided that certain
Bill of Right freedoms are fundamental and essential to
ordered liberty, however, and has applied them to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Specifically, the Supreme
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Court has ruled that every state "shall make no law resnecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."
In connection with that free exercise provision, the Supreme
Court has had to rule on several kinds of state aid to
parochial schools. The Court has decided that transnortation
aid to parochial school children and the loaning of textbooks to parochial schools does not violate the First AmendBut in 19 71, the Court struck down two state programs
ment.
that provided direct state aid to assist parochial schools
with teachers' salaries, the purchase of textbooks and other
In essence, the Court has estabinstructional materials.
lished limitations on the kinds of state aid that are permissible under the First Amendment neutral, service-oriented
aid is proper, but direct involvement in parochial school
finance is not.

—

State constitutional provisions can further limit the kind
Even
of aid that a state can provide parochial schools.
permissible types of aid under the Federal Constitution may
Montana's aid probe prohibited by state constitutions.
visions have not been interpreted frequently by Montana courts
In fact, the Montana Supreme Court has decided only one case
That case voided a
under the educational aid provision.
program for parochial school aid in Deer Lodge County similar
in scope to the aid programs that were outlawed by the United
The Montana case was decided
States Supreme Court in 19 71.
before the United States decision, however, and the Court
relied solely on the Montana constitutional provisions. The
Montana court also alluded to an Attorney General's opinion
which declared that transportation aid to parochial school
children would be permissible in Montana only as long as
the parents of the children reimbursed the school district
That opinion goes farther than
for the transportation costs.
the U.S. Supreme Court has gone on transportation programs,
and the court's decision seems to imply that the Montana aid
provisions are more restrictive than the U.S. constitutional

provisions
A state constitution can establish stricter limitations and
standards for public aid to parochial education, as has
evidently been done in Montana. On the other hand, it could
be silent on the subject, permitting the kinds of aid that
are permissible under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
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CHAPTER XIX
THE STATE BUDGET AND REPORTS
The Montana Constitution does not specifically name the
governor as the chief budget officer of the state; it does
suggest that preparation of a budget is one of his responsiAnd the legislature, by statute entitled
bilities, however.
the Budget Act, has established the governor as the chief
budget officer.

Preparation of the budget is assigned to the governor in an
overwhelming majority of states, usually by statute, with
less than fifteen states creating the executive budget by
constitutional mandate. Newer state constitutions are among
the fifteen.
The Montana Constitution only hints that the state budget
should be biennial to match the biennial legislative sessions.
Again, the statutory Budget Act specifies the details of
the budget in this case, that it should be biennial.
Although Montana's budget is biennial in scope, each biennium
is broken down into fiscal year appropriations.

—

Ordinarily, annual budgets are used in states with annual
legislative sessions and biennial budgets in states with
biennial sessions.
Thus, the question of annual v. biennial
budgets is primarily a policy decision made after the form
of legislative sessions is decided.

A provision in the Montana Constitution requires the legislature to balance estimated revenue with actual appropriations.
It does not require the state to operate on a
balanced budget because there is no guarantee that actual
revenue will equal appropriations authorized by the legislature.

A governor's item veto over appropriations is included in
the Constitution.
According to court interpretation, the
item veto does not include the power to reduce appropriations,
however.
The veto is further limited by Montana's current
budget practice of making lump sum appropriations to agencies
instead of item appropriations.

The Montana Constitution contains numerous provisions that
regulate or limit the state appropriation and expenditure
process.
The Convention may want to consider leaving these
provisions to be enacted as legislative rules or statutory
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One common provision, which requires that all state
law.
money be paid into the state treasury and withdrawn only by
specific appropriation, has been included in the Model State
Constitution and other modern constitutions.
The Constitution reauires various reports from state
But for the most part, the reporting
officers and agencies.
provisions are ignored and, in effect, have been superseded
by legislation requiring more frequent and comprehensive
reportinq of agency activities and finances.

CHAPTER XX

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Surrender provisions are contained in at least two sections of
Those provisions prevent the state
the Montana Constitution.
from surrendering or suspending its power to tax. The provisions were included in most state constitutions following
the period of railroad expansion across the United States.
States induced the railroads into their territories by offering tax incentives to the powerful companies
incentives that
often included an agreement not to tax.
Such provisions have
frequently been incorporated in new state constitutions to
limit the state's bargaining position.

—

Another provision in the Montana Constitution prohibits the
state from discharging any obligation or liability owed the
state.
However, at least one statutory law allows the
state controller to discharge accounts receivable. The constitutionality of that statute can be seriously questioned,
But the advisability
in view of the anti-discharge provision.
of that constitutional provision is also a proper subject of
discussion.
Discharge of bad debts is a common business
practice; why the same opportunity should not be open to the
state is questionable.
Lotteries are prohibited by the Montana Constitution. While
the propriety of such lotteries is basically a policy question,
at least five states use state-run lotteries to supplement
their revenue programs.
Most of the mon^y raised by those
lotteries is earmarked for particular government programs,
like education, local government aid or tax relief to the
elderly.
With the present constitutional provision, a stateoperated lottery cannot be instituted in Montana, however.

-26-

SUMMARY

Another constitutional provision establishes certain details
for state purchasing and printing needs.
The Montana Legislative Council has recominended repeal of that section,
arguing that "subjects such as this are statutory rather than
constitutional in nature."
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I

INTRODUCTION
Three articles in the Montana Constitution are devoted exclusively to taxation and finance:

Article XII, Revenue and Taxation
Article XIII, Public Indebtedness
Article XXI, Montana Trust and Legacy Fund
In addition, numerous other fiscal provisions are scattered
throughout legislative and executive articles V and VII.

INHERENT POWERS

From a strict viewpoint, a state constitution could be silent
on the subject of taxation, and the state still would possess
that power.
The power to tax is an inherent right of every
state.

State taxation powers have been described as follows by the
Montana Supreme Court:

Constitutions of a state are distinguished from the
"The
constitution of the United States in this:
government of the United States is one of enumerated
powers; the national constitution being the instrument which specifies them, and in which authority
should be found for the exercise of any power which
In
the national government assumes to possess.
this respect it differs from the constitutions of
the different states, which are not grants of powers
to the states, but which apportion and impose restrictions upon the powers which the states inherently
Therefore a state legislature is not
possess."
acting under enumerated or granted powers, but rather
under inherent powers, restricted only by the provisions of their sovereign constitution.^
.

.

.

In other words, the federal government can exercise only those
State governpowers granted it in the federal constitution.
ments, on the other hand, can exercise any power not prohibited or limited by the state or federal constitutions.
Thus, any provision in a state constitution which deals with
taxation is either

—

1.

—

redundant, repeating some right or power that the
-29-
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INTRODUCTION
state already possesses; or
2.

limiting, preventing the state from acting in

a particular way.

This report deals with those two characteristics.
Many provisions of the Montana Constitution are useless or obsolete

reiterating a power the state already possesses by its very
existence. Many other provisions serve as limitations on
the legislature's power to tax, and were specifically included in the Constitution for that purpose.
One commentator bluntly described constitutional limitations
on the taxing power as follows:
In its simplest form, the problem of what to include
in the article on taxation and finance is a test of
one's belief in our system of representative democracy.
It is difficult to reconcile a position demanding a series
of constitutional prohibitions or limitations upon the
legislature's exercise of discretion in respect to
taxation and finance with a real belief in democracy.
Those who argue for constitutional checks are admitting a lack of belief in the capacity or desire of the
elected representatives of the voters to establish and
maintain an adequate and equitable system of financing

public expenditures.
In less emotional terms, the degree of faith to place in
elected representatives will be the final, fundamental decision when considering constitutional questions on taxation.
The legislature could enjoy unlimited fiscal powers. Or constitutional provisions could seriously restrict those powers.

The 19 55 report of the President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Kestnbaum Commission) observed:

Some of the fiscal problems facing state and local
governments today stem from the failure of the states
to remove constitutional and statutory limitations
It is
that circumscribe their freedom of action.
often because of these limitations that state and
local governments turn to the national government for
The states have restricted themselves
assistance.
in the use of taxing and borrowing powers, and they
have earmarked revenues for specific purposes in ways
that deprive legislatures and executives of budgetary
control and fiscal flexibility.

Complex fiscal restrictions are traceable to abuses in the
-30-
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field of finance during the first half of the
century and to subsequent taxpayer demands for nineteenth
protection
against sins ranging from imprudent fiscal practices
to qross
financial mismanagement and fraud.
It is questionable whether these restrictions have served their purpose.
It is
appropriate for the Constitutional Convention to consider
removing from the Montana Constitution at least those
restrictions that unnecessarily prevent sound fiscal
planninq
management and organization.

The state's capacity to administer its fiscal
affairs is
hampered by obsolete terminology; constitutional limits
on
types of taxes, maximum tax rates, authority to
incur state
and local debt, state aid to local government and
borrowing
discretion; constitutional requirements for popular
referenda to approve taxes and debt; earmarking of special
fundsconstitutional procedures for administration of state funds
and constitutionally-mandated legislative procedure
for consideration of money bills.

FLEXIBILITY
Like all constitutional provisions, sections dealing
with
taxation and finance tend to create rigidity and fossilization in state and local governments.
They prevent the necessary innovative and flexible programs essential to
a viable
government and tie the hands of government, thwarting change.

Constitutional rigidity is particularly troublesome in the
taxation area.
Economic and social needs are constantly changinq
Government expenditure is the most important method of
meeting those needs.
But the constitution may prevent genuine,
committed government response.
Numerous provisions are included in the present Montana
Constitution that increase rigidity.
The framers of the Constitution purposely tied the hands of the legislature.
They did
not want the legislators to act in particular ways;
they
wanted to place the taxation power within certain boundaries.
One writer put the problem this way:

Briefly stated, the longer and more complex the provisions relating to the power to tax, to incur debt, and
to expend funds, the greater will be the likelihood
of
legal complications.
Simplicity is important, with
regard for the question of unlimited or limited taxing
authority.
It is essential as a means of removing
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doubts over the meaning of words and phrases, the interpretation of which frequently puts the determination of
public policy in the hands of the judiciary, rather
than the legislative body or the people.
The need for flexibility is and should be clearly evident,
Unless state governments can, and will, adapt themselves
to the changing economic and social environments, their
importance in the total structure of American government
will diminish
.the focus of power moves to that
level of government which has fiscal capacity to act,
and which does act
.people tend more and more to
rely upon the unit of government which produces the services they need and want.
.

.

.

.

.

.

FEDERAL LIMITATIONS
The United States Constitution, as the supreme law of the land,
also places limitations on a state's power to tax.
Those
limitations can be summarized as follows:

Two specific taxation limitations:
1.

States may not levy import or export duties.

2.

States may levy tonnage taxes only with the consent

of Congress.

Five general restrictions on state powers:
1.

Federal treaties take precedence over state laws.

2.

States may not impair the obligation of contracts.

3.
Each state must give citizens of other states the
same privileges and immunities given to its own citizens.

4.
No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.
5.

No state shall deny equal protection of the laws.

Three restrictions implied by the courts:
1.
States may not tax property or instrumentalities
of the federal government.
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States may not burden interstate commerce by dis2.
criminatory taxes.
3.
States may not impose taxes infringing liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution.

SUMMARY

When considering particular provisions in the present Constitution or proposed provisions for a new constitution, delegates should keep two questions in mind:
1.

Should the power to tax be limited in this way?

Should flexibility be sacrificed for a constitutional
2.
provision, or is the matter better left to statute?
This study on taxation and finance was approached with those
questions in mind.
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CHAPTER II

TAX BASE

MONTANA PROVISIONS
The Montana Constitution establishes a basis for legislative
taxation in the following provisions:

—

1.

Property taxes (Art. XII, Sec. 1)
The necessary
revenue for the support and maintenance of the state
shall be provided by the legislative assembly, which
shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property,
except that specially provided for in this article.

2.

License taxes (Art. XII, Sec. 1)
The legislative
assembly may also impose a license tax, both upon
persons and upon corporations doing business in the

—

state.

—

3.

Income taxes (Art. XII, Sec. la) The legislative
assembly may levy and collect taxes upon incomes of
persons, firms and corporations for the purpose of
replacing property taxes. These income taxes may be
graduated and progressive and shall be distributed to
the public schools and to the state government.

4.

Mine and mining claim taxes (Art. XII, Sec. 3) All
mines and mining claims both placer and rock in
place, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper,
lead, coal or other valuable mineral deposits, after
purchase thereof from the United States, shall be
taxed at the price paid the United States therefor,
unless the surface ground, or some part thereof, of
such mine or claim, is used for other than mining purposes, and has a separate and independent value for
such other purposes, in which case said surface ground,
or any part thereof, so used for other than mining
purposes, shall be taxed at its value for such other
purposes, as provided by law; and all machinery used
in mining, and all property and surface improvements
upon or appurtenant to mines and mining claims which
have a value separate and independent of such mines
or mining claims, and the annual net proceeds of all
mines and mining claims shall be taxed as provided by

—

,

law.
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The legislature has enacted statutes to carry out those constitutional provisions:
1.

Chapters

Property taxation has been established in Title 84,
2 through 9, Revised Codes of Montana
1947.
,

2.
License taxes are created in Title 84, Chapters 10
through 37.
3.
Income tax regulations are established in Title 84,
Chapter 49.

4.
Mine and mining claim tax procedures are provided
for in Title 84, Chapter 54.

ADDITIONAL STATE TAXES
Montana's state tax program is not limited to those taxes
enumerated in the Constitution, however. The state is free to
impose any kind or type of tax, as long as that tax is not
prohibited by the Constitution. This "unlimited tax base"
concept has been explained by the Montana Supreme Court on
several occasions.
In 1933, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a graduated income tax before that tax
specifically was authorized by constitutional amendment.
In
upholding the legislature's action, the court said:
"We entertain no doubt that such a tax can be constitutionally imposed. The power of the legislature over
the subject of taxation, except as limited by constiIt is for that
tutional restrictions^ is unbounded.
body, in the exercise of its discretion, to select
It may impose all the taxes
the objects of taxation.
upon lands, or all upon personal property, or all upon
It may raise revenue by caphouses or upon incomes.
itation taxes, by special taxes upon carriages, horses,
servants, dogs, franchises, and upon every species of
property, and upon all kinds of business and trades."
This language used by our own supreme court was applied
to the then recently enacted inheritance tax law, but
it will be observed that the declaration of the New
York Court so cited with approval was broader in its
application than the mere subject under consideration.
Specific mention was made of incomes. And thus it may
be said that the learned judge, undoubtedly familiar with
our constitutional provisions, had in mind even at that
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early day that an income tax would not be unconstitutional in the state of Montana. 2

Three years later, in upholding the Liquor Control Act which
established procedures for the sale and regulation of
liquor in the state, the court noted:
It is contended that Chapter 10 5, Laws 19 33, is invalid
under section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, in
that it provides revenue for the support and maintenance of the state by means other than the taxation of
It is argued that this is
property or a license tax.
the result which obtains when we read the section in
question together with section 29, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that the provisions of
the Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory unless
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.
It is said in support of this contention, that, in
construing the two sections of the Constitution together, the rule " Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius ,"
applies, and therefore the legislature is powerless
to provide any other methods of taxation or means of
raising revenue aside from the systems mentioned in
section 1 of Article XII.

The court, however, did not support that contention.
a previous case, it stated:

Citing

"Section 1, Article XII, is not a limitation upon the
legislative power, but is a solemn mandate to the
It was not a case in either instance
legislature."
where by the mere mention of a subject in the Constitution the court held that all others of a similar class
were excluded. The maxim being only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command, we now hold,
as we have held in the past, that the two methods of
taxation mentioned or provided for in section 1 of
Article XII, are not exclusive, and that the legislature has the power to adopt other methods of taxation
which are not prohibited by some other section of the
Constitution *~
.

Thus, the four taxes listed in the Constitution (property, income,
The legislalicense and mines) are not an exclusive group.
ture may enact revenue programs not mentioned in the Constitution, such as the inheritance tax or the sales tax.
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impose any tax even
The important point is that Montana could
without
Constitution,
the
in
mentioned
specifically
those
The Constitution
vnr PS S constitutional authorization
of revenue procould be completely silent on kinds or types
not be affected.
grams, and the state's tax system would
.

inherent in the
The reason is simple: the power to tax is
explained
6
Court
Supreme
Montana
The
sovereign state.
inherent powers as follows:

limitation
.our Constitution is not a grant but a
has often
court
This
legislature.
the
of the powers of
the Constinoted the fundamental distinction between
the United
tution of a state and the Constitution ofexpressive:
most
is
language
following
The
States.
under enumerated or
"A state legislature is not acting
restric-

powers
granted powers but rather under inherent
Constitution.
ted only by the provisions of the sovereign
the
through
people
the
legislation,
of
matter
In the
as
far
so
in
except
power,
plenary
legislature have
who denies
inhibited by the Constitution, and the personable to
be
the authority in any given instance must
provision of the
point out distinctly the particular
the power exerprohibits
or
limits
Constitution which
7
cised."
The power to tax, and
The point is worth emphasizing again.
*°
state
a
in
utilized
the kinds of taxes
wers
Those
powers
constitution.
state
not have to be included in a
according to the United
a?e inherently possessed by the state,
Supreme Court.
States Supreme Court and the Montana

"Yf^P"?™;

LIMITATIONS
broad powers of taxAlthough the Montana legislature enjoys
in the Co
Provisions,
by
ation, those powers may be limited
The power or
said.
has
Court
Supreme
Montana
The
stitution.
taxation, except as limited
?he legislature over the subject of
One obvious
unbounded
is
hv constitutional restrictions
on the state s tax p o
example of a constitutional lim itation on
*
gram is the constitutional prohibition
^sent
possible under the present
run lottery to raise revenue is not
Montana Constitution.
,

1

»

^f^f

-40-

'

TAX BASE

ALTERNATIVES
Three alternatives are open to constitution writers:
1.
The power to tax, including specific revenue proThat
grams, could be included in the state constitution.
enumerated list would not be exclusive, however.

2.
The constitution could list specific revenue measures and provide that only those specified programs could be
or the constitution could prohibit
used by the state;
certain taxes.
3.
A broad policy statement on the power to tax could
be included in the constitution without any specific mention
of particular kinds of taxes; or the power to tax need not
be mentioned at all.

The first alternative is the method employed in the present
Montana Constitution.
The second alternative is the only one which effectively
limits the power of the state to impose taxes.
Nebraska's
"The
Constitution [Art. VIII, Sec. la] provides an example:
state shall be prohibited from levying a property tax for
state purposes."
The Montana mining tax provision also illustrates the effect
While the Montana
of provisions similar to alternative two.
legislature is otherwise free to impose any kind of tax it
wishes, it can only tax mines or mining claims in the manner
specified by Article XII, Section 3.

The third alternative is illustrated by the following provisions from constitutions of other states:

—

Alaska (Art. IX, Sec. 1) The power of taxation shall
never be surrendered. The power shall not be suspended or contracted away, except as provided in this
article.

—

Illinois (Art. IX, Sec. 1)
The General Assembly has
the exclusive power to raise revenue by law except as
limited or otherwise provided in this Constitution.
The power of taxation shall not be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.

Connecticut has no taxation article in its constitution.
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CONCLUSION

Although the Montana Constitution authorizes certain taxes
in its revenue article, those taxes are not an exclusive
The state is free to levy any kind of tax it wants to,
list.
orovided it is not specifically prohibited from doing so by
the Constitution.
In that respect, Montana's revenue article operates just like
other state constitutions that are silent on types or kinds
of taxes that may be used for the state's tax base.
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CHAPTER III
PROPERTY TAX
When the Constitution was written in 1889, property taxation
was the backbone of the state fiscal program. Appropriately,
therefore, the first provision in the Montana Constitution's
revenue article authorizes property taxation:
The necessary revenue for the support and maintenance
of the state shall be provided by the legislative
assembly, which shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all
property, except that specifically provided for in
this article.
[Montana Const. Art. XII, Sec. 1]
The emphasis on property taxation is understandable.
Property was a logical "yardstick" of wealth; it was a simple
unit of measurement for the earliest taxation systems in the
United States. Property taxation was the primary source
of funds for most states in the nineteenth century.

PROPERTY TAX TODAY

Montana receives 56.4 percent of its total tax revenue from
state and local property taxes, fourth highest among all
states. 1 But as is typical in most states, property taxation in Montana is primarily a local government revenue source,
Property taxes account for only 7.2 percent of total state
tax revenues,
but they provide 9 5.8 percent of total tax revenue for local governments. The Montana Fiscal Affairs Study
reported:
Relative to both population and personal income
received, Montana property tax collections exceed those
of the average state considerably.
.per capita
property tax revenue in fiscal 1968 was $191.61 in
Montana, sixth highest among the fifty states and 38
percent above the United States average of $138.83.
Montana also ranked second in the nation, 54 percent
above the average, with $68.48 of property tax revenue
per $1,000 of personal income.
.

.

Local governments obviously have an interest in efficient and
equitable administration of the property tax.
But despite
the state's limited use of the tax, it, too, is affected by
inefficiency and inequality. The Fiscal Affairs Study reported:
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.[S]tate grants-in-aid for education emerged after
World War II, and this compels the state to assume
more certain responsibility for the effective and
In Montana, state
equitable use of the property tax.
aid to local schools is obviously one reason for state
interest in equalized local assessment because equitable distribution of aid depends upon equitable assessments 5
.

.

.

In summary:

The Montana property tax is used for a myriad of purIt has been used for
poses at the state and local level.
no less than ten specific purposes at the state level
with specified mill levies for each purpose. At the
county level there are about thirty different levies which
have been imposed at one time or another during the past
twenty-five years. Cities and towns make more limited
use of the property tax than the counties
During the
past twenty-five years, cities and towns have used nearly fifteen different levies.
School districts also use
the property tax.
School districts impose at least ten
different levies."
.

PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION IN MONTANA
Property taxation has always been relatively difficult to administer, certainly not as simple as the reporting system for
income taxes or the collection of license taxes.
In Montana,
the situation is no different.
The Montana Constitution provides in detail for property tax
administration. A major question facing the Constitutional
Convention is whether this detail should be retained in the
Constitution.
Its removal would allow the legislature to provide by law for administration of the property tax, just as
the legislature now is free to provide for administration of
all other taxes.

Under the present constitutionally-mandated system, the
Montana property tax is administered jointly by state and
local officers. At the local level, the chief tax official
is the county assessor, who is responsible for assessment of
all property in the county except that assessed by the state.
The county board of equalization at the local level reviews
and equalizes assessments made by the assessor.

-46-

PROPERTY TAX

At the state level, the State Board of Equalization is an
assessing, administrative and quasi- judicial agency.
It is
responsible for the assessment of intercounty property of
It also supervises
railroads? and other classes of property.
county assessors and county boards of equalization and serves
as a board of appeals for property owners dissatisfied with
valuations made in the counties.
The roles of these threv2 "administrators"--the county
assessors, the county boards of equalization and the State
Board of Equalization--will be reviewed in detail in this
But first it is important to understand the
chapter.
property taxation process to visualize the steps the administrators must go through to compute the final tax on a
piece of property.

—

Taxing Process
The taxing process is completed in four steps, as follows:

—

[Step 1]
determining appraised value the appraised
value is the full cash value.
(Actually, according
to the director of the property tax program, the
appraised value is 95% of full cash value. The 95%
figure is used because appraising is not an exact
science and there is a margin of error. For these
reasons, the Board has determined that it is preferable to slightly undervalue property rather than overvalue it.)
In determining full cash value, the Board
and county appraisers utilize many printed valuation
schedules, and the Board has adopted a uniform method
of "classifying" (according to productivity and other
factors) real property and timberlands.
:

[Step 2]
determining assessed value--after the
property is appraised, the value is reduced by a
percentage which is set by Board regulations to determine assessed value. The assessed value of urban real
property is 40% of market value, for example.
:

—

[Step 3]
determining taxable value the percentages
specified by the classification law (Section 84-302,
R.C.M., 1947) are applied to the assessed value to
determine taxable value.
:

—

[Step 4]:
determining tax due local and state mill
levies are applied to taxable value to compute the
actual tax due.
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The percentages used in determining taxable value (see Step 3
above) are provided in the classification law, Revised Codes
of Montana 1947, Section 84-302, as follows:
,

The annual net proceeds of all mines and mining
Class 1:
claims and the value of any rights of entry for the purpose
of digging, exploring or prospecting for minerals have taxable value equal to 100 percent of their assessed value.

All household goods and furniture, motor vehicles,
Class 2:
boats and harnesses are taxable on 20 percent of their
assessed value.
Livestock, poultry, and the unprocessed products of
Class 3:
both, stocks of merchandise and all furniture and fixtures
used in conjunction with stocks of merchandise, and all office
or hotel furniture and fixtures are taxable on 33.33 percent
of their assessed value.
Class 4: All land, city and town lots, and improvements,
manufacturing and mining machinery, equipment and supplies
and mobile homes are taxable on 30 percent of their assessed
value.

Class 5:
All monies and credits, operating property of
electric and telephone cooperatives, unprocessed agricultural
products and residences of disabled veterans are taxable on
7 percent of their assessed value.
Class 6:
Monies, credits, moneyed capital and bank shares
are taxable in part at 7 percent of their assessed value and
in part at 30 percent of their assessed value.
Class 7:
New industrial property less than three years old
is taxable on 7 percent of its assessed value.

Class 8:
Improvements on real property valued at not more
than $17,50 0, owned and occupied by certain widows, widowers
and recipients of retirement benefits, are taxable on 15
percent of their assessed value.
Class 9:
Freeport merchandise, in transit through the state,
is taxable on 1 percent of its assessed value.
Class 10: All property not in the first nine categories is
taxable on 40 percent of its assessed value. 9
The following illustration may help clarify the entire taxation

-48-

)

:

PROPERTY TAX
process, from Step 1 (determining the full cash value of
property) to Step 4 (computing the actual amount of taxes
owed)

lu

Step

1:

$25,000 residence at market or full cash
value (appraised value)

Step

2:

$25,000

(appraised value)

x 40%
$10,000

(assessed value)

Step

3:

$10,000
x 30%
$

Step

4:

3,000

(assessed value)
(determined by classification law)
(taxable value)

3,000 (taxable value)
x 256 01 mills (mill figure will vary from place
It represents total property
to place.
taxes for state, county, municipal,
school and special district purposes in
each area.
$768.03 (property tax bill)
$

.

With this four-step process in mind, the actual workings of
the property tax system can be examined.

Underassessment and Uniform Assessment
Two major and almost universal problems of property tax administration are underassessment and the lack of uniform
When used in this context, "assessment" means
assessment.
determining the actual or cash value of property, and not the
more particularized meaning assigned the term under Montana
In other words, underassessment results
taxation procedures.
when property is appraised at less than the level required by
Absence of uniform assessment exists when all
statute.
classes of property within a taxing jurisdiction are not
appraised at the same level.

Underassessment
The Montana Legislative Council in a 1960 study concluded
that property in Montana is greatly underassessed:

The Census shows Montana's assessment of real property as 8% of its value as indicated by sales prices;
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however, this figure was determined by using taxable
value rather than assessed value. The figure reflects,
therefore, not only the performance of the assessor
but the effects of our property classification law as
The combination of underassessment and our classwell.
ification law means that mill levies are applied to only
about 8% of the market value of real estate.

The performance of the assessors can be more accurately
demonstrated by adjusting the Census figures to show
assessed values as a percent of sales prices. This
reveals that in Montana non-farm residential property is
assessed from 28.7% to 31.7% of its sales value. 11

Several factors contribute to underassessment, according to
the Council:

Assessments are slow to respond to price increases
1.
For instance, real property is frequentin the money market.
ly assessed at its value several years ago and does not
reflect current increased valuations.
2.

Assessors are tempted to underassess to benefit their

counties

Where the state imposes a property tax levy or where
state aid to schools is apportioned on the basis of
yields from fixed mill levies, assessors are under considerable pressure to compete among themselves for
By assessing at less than the average
underassessment.
level, the county assessor can shift state property
taxes to other counties and increase apparent need for
state aid to schools.
The assessor, as an elected official, can use under3.
assessment as an election tool.
The assessor, who among all local officials receives the
most complaints about taxes, can use underassessment
Because the individual will often conto parry them.
sider himself as having received a "break,"
underassessment is popular with property owners. This
is an important consideration to a man who must retain
his office through election. 13
4.
The assessor can also shift the responsibility for
increased taxes.

The assessor may wish to keep assessments in line
with price increases, but he knows that if he does so
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and local governing agencies fail to decrease mill
levies, protest as he might, he will probably incur
public wrath for tax increases. If he can hold the line
on assessments and local legislative bodies are forced
to resort to increased mill levies, responsibility for
tax increases will be shifted to them. 1*

Perhaps the most damning indictme.it against underassessment
is that it turns the county assessor into a one-man legislature.

For example, in Montana salaries of many local officials
are tied by statute to population and taxable valuation
By assessing at less than the legal limit,
of counties.
the assessor alters the effect of these statutes and
Similarly,
reduces the salaries of some officials.
fractional assessments also alter existing statutory
taxing and bonding limitations by making them more
restrictive than contemplated by law. This misrepresents the fiscal capacities of local governments and
leaves some of them with little or no financial elbow
vonm
J- ~>

An index has been formulated to determire the degree of deviation from the absolute uniformity compatible with good
assessment. The degree of deviation is measured by the coefficient of dispersion which is an index of uniformity. The
higher the index, the less uniform are assessments.
,

The 1960 Legislative Council study reported the coefficients
of intra-area dispersion for twenty-three sample assessment
areas in Montana were as follows:

Coefficient of Dispersion
less
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
50

.

than 15.0
to
to
to
to
to
to
or

Number of Areas
1
2
2
4

19.9
24.9
29.9
34.9
39.9
49.9

4

1
3
6

more
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The Council noted:
[0]nly three areas fall within the desirable zone of less
Six of the twenty- three areas, or more than
than 20.
1/4 of the sample, have coefficients of dispersion
of 50 or more.
Eighty-seven percent (87%) of the areas
fall above 20.
The medium for the twenty-three areas
is 32.8; for the nation as a whole it is 29. 9. 16
In a study based on figures prepared by the Bureau of the
Census in 1967, one writer concluded "a reasonable degree of
uniformity of assessment exists wit hin counties, but a
serious absence of uniformity exists betwee n counties." 17
That writer said:

Assessment for 10 selected areas showed an average
uniformity of 22.5 percent within counties, as compared
with the national average of 19.2 percent, measured
in terms of the coefficient of intra-area dispersion.
But data on inter-county assessment uniformity showed
an average uniformity of 43.0 percent, tying New
Hampshire and Texas for the highest in the nation. 18
Part of the poor record in intercounty uniformity probably
Some county
can be traced to reasons discussed earlier.
assessors may deliberately under-value property to gain
tax breaks and larger portions of state aid.
Non- uniformity of assessment is a violation of the Equal ProIn Sioux
tection Clause of the United States Constitution.
City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cou nty, 19 the U. S. Supreme Court
held that a taxpayer whose property had been discriminatorily
assessed at full value must be granted a reduction to the_
The disfraction at which other parcels had been assessed.
crimination must be more than incidental to violate the Equal
Protection Clause, however.

This discussion of the major problems facing the assessment
function reveals the political power wielded by the assessor.
Kis day-to-day decisions have enormous consequences.

County Assessors
Article XVI, Section 5 of the Montana Constitution requires
that an assessor "shall be elected in each county" and shall
possess the qualifications for suffrage prescribed in
Article IX, Section 2, and such other qualifications set by
at
law.
The constitutional suffrage qualifications are:
least 19 years old; United States citizenship; residency
within the state for at least a year; residency within the
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town, county or precinct, and absence of a felony conviction,
Although the Constitution states that other qualifications
may be established by the legislature, no such action has
been taken.

At least two state agencies have criticized the lack of required qualifications for county assessors. The Montana
Legislative Council declared that initial assessments are
poorly made because 'unqualified persons often occupy the
office of the assessor" or because "assessors have inadequate staffs and appropriations to do the job properly.
The Council continued:
.

.

20
.

Better initial assessment could possibly be secured
by requiring that county assessors pass examinations
or otherwise qualify themselves and by means of more
If origiextensive state supervision of assessments.
nal assessments were improved, there would be less need
for intra-county equalization. 21
The State Board of Equalization expanded on that suggestion
The Board set
in both its 196 8 and 1970 biennial reports.
down the following plan:
The Legislature could require that the State Board of
Equalization establish the professional qualifications of assessors and county appraisers and certify
candidates as to their fitness for employment on the
basis of examinations, and to revoke such certification for good and sufficient cause.

The machinery for employment of qualified and
certified assessors might be provided as follows:
a. Require by legislation that each assessor's office
If the assessor
have at least one certified person.
is not certified it would be necessary to employ a person who is.
(Oregon has such a law.)
b. Amend the Montana Constitution to eliminate
reference to the elective office of county assessor,
thus permittina certified county assessors to be appointed by boards of county commissioners.
c. Such a change in the Constitution could also be
designed to permit two or more small counties to operate
a consolidated assessment office.

Assessors could be elected or appointed to office
with no requirement of prior county residence, for
.

.

.
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indefinite, rather than fixed terms, and could be
subject to removal for good cause, including incompetence, by the boards of county commissioners 22
.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, in its
report on the property tax, was blunter:
The assessment of property for taxation is a technical
administrative function which can be performed competentlv only by well-trained specialists using all of
the appropriate administrative techniques.
Entrusting
this job to a nonprofessional is like assuming that
almost any reasonably intelligent citizen can audit
a municipality's accounts, handle its engineering, or
administer its public health. 23

Election of assessors is still the predominant method of
selection in the United States, however, despite the manv
calls for reform.
One study put the number of states electing assessors at forty-one. 24 states that provide for their
election by constitutional mandate include: Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas and
In this regard, it should be noted that
West Virginia.
the present Montana Constitution [Art. XVI, Sec. 7] does
allow for systems of countv government under which the assesAlthough this
sor might be appointed, rather than elected.
constitutional authorization has been available for nearly
fifty years, only one county--Petroleum--has adopted a new
form of county government.
The "county manager" system
used in Petroleum calls for an appoin ted, rather than
elected, official to perform the duties of assessor.

Assessor Districts

Another problem facing the assessment function is the constitutional requirement [Art. XVI, Sec. 5] that each county
elect an assessor. That constitutional provision aggrevates
two problems noted by the Utah Legislative Council:
[A] number of counties
efficient units in the
Manv of these counties
the services of a full

are too small to serve as
state's assessment plan.
are thus precluded from having
time, well qualified assessor.

The other factor is the inadequacy of the budgets that
.Under existing budgets,
exist for county assessors.
it is generallv not even possible to comply with the
.
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law, let alone do much about upgrading the assessment
process.
For a tax so important in the State-local
tax structure, equity and efficiency demand more time,
effort and money in securing better original assessments 25

The "county unit" problem can be illustrated another way.
The
Montana Fiscal Affairs Study notes that at least one commentator believes even a minimal-sized jurisdiction would have to
have an annual budget of $60,000 to $70,000 to provide a
Such a budget would
fulltime professional assessment staff.
be less than 1.5 percent of tax collections only in jurisdictions with revenue of $4 million and usually about 40,000
to 50,000 residents.
The Fiscal Affairs Study then compared Montana counties to
those criteria:
In 1956 only three counties could have budgeted $60,000
By 1968 the
for assessment of the property tax.
number of counties that could have budgeted $60,000 for
property tax administration while still remaining at
or below 1.5 percent of property tax collections had
It is interesting to note that in 19 68
grown to seven.
there were forty-six counties that received property
The prospects
tax revenue of less than $3.0 million.
for growth in these forty-six counties to a point
where they could budget enough to support efficient
"good" administration is not high within the near
future.
.

.

.

It seems clear that one of the prime prerequisites for
attracting professionally qualified assessing officers
This is not to be conand staff is the salary level.
strued to mean that some Montana assessors are not
qualified and are not doing a good job. However, it is
clear that Montana counties do not pay their assessing
officers on a scale comparable to those in other states.
Montana ranked fifty among the fifty states in the
average annual salary paid to local assessors in 1966.26

.

Even if Montana were to upgrade its qualification requirements
for the assessor position, it also probably would have to
permit districting of the assessment area on some basis other
Montana's sparse, rural population appears
than county lines.
to be too small to support a professional assessment staff,
unless the assessment function is not boxed in by county lines,
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County Boards of Equalizatio n
County boards of equalization are created by Article XII,
Section 15 of the Montana Constitution:
The board of county commissioners of each county shall
constitute the county board of equalization. The
duties of such board shall be to adjust and equalize
the valuation of taxable property within their
respective counties

....

The office of county commissioner is established by Article
XVI, Section 4 of the Constitution; no specific qualifications for the position are listed.
The county board of equalization's powers have been explained
as follows:

The county board's power to equalize is clear-cut
despite the fact that the part of Revised Codes of
Montana 1947, Section] 84-602 which conveys this
power is not a complete sentence. The county board
can raise or lower the assessment of entire classes
of property.
[

,

As part of its review of the assessment book, the board
may direct the assessor to assess property which has
escaped assessment, or it may direct him to add to the
rolls property omitted because of false or incomplete
property statements submitted by owners. .
.

.

In its capacity as a board of review, the county board,
on its own initiative, can increase individual assess.however,
ments as listed in the assessment book
in its review of assessments the county board cannot
take the initiative in making a reduction of individual
assessments.
The county board can reduce individual
assessments only in its capacity as a board of appeals.
.

.

.

The constitutional provision creating county boards of equalization also sets down their power to adjust and equalize
assessments.
Their function as a review board is established
by statute.
The right of review includes questions of valuaoq
on
tion zo and percentage assignment. v
•

The title, "county board of equalization," is something of a
misnomer. The Montana Legislative Council concluded that the
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county boards do not really exercise their powers of assessment review and equalization, but function solely as boards
of appeal. 3° And one official familiar with property tax
administration in Montana has criticized the theory that
county commissioners should serve as boards of equalization. 31 He has condemned shared responsibility for assessment at the local level on the following grounds:

Duplication of personnel between the county assessor
1.
and the county commissioners.
2.

Difficulty in pinpointing assessment responsibility.

State Board of Equalization must work with two offices
3.
rather than one.

High turnover among commissioners, with many new
4.
commissioners either knowing nothing about their assessment
responsibilities or having negative views like (a) aiming to
cut local Droperty taxes regardless of intracounty or
intercounty equalization, or (b) wanting to cut the local
level of assessments to increase state school aid to their
counties

Commissioners have many other duties besides assess5.
ment and equalization.
6.
In most counties, commissioners only meet a few days
each month, so they are sometimes not close enough to the
assessment problem to provide needed leadership. 32

In summary, it seems doubtful that county commissioners
should be authorized to function as boards of equalization.
However, there does seem to be some support for review of
The Advisory Commission on
assessments at the local level.
Intergovernmental Relations, which has made an extensive
review of property tax administration, says that such review
can dispose of the more readily adjustable grievances of

taxpayers. 33 B U t commentators universally condemn arrangements that combine review powers with the same agency that
supervises the property tax. As the law now reads, county
commissioners enjov both review and supervisory powers.
Even though those supervisory powers are not exercised, they
It is questionable whether an impartial review
could be.
would be accomplished in such a situation.

Other States

At least three other states constitutionally designate the
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county commissioners as countv boards of equalization.
states are Idaho [Art. VII, Sec. 2], Colorado [Art. X,
Sec. 15], and California [Art. XIII, Sec. 9].

The

State Board of Equalization
The State Board of Equalization is created by Article XII,
Section 15 of the Montana Constitution as amended in 1915
and 1922:

The state board of equalization shall be composed
of three members who shall be appointed by the governor,
by and with the advice and consent of the senate.
A
majoritv of the members of the state board of equalizaThe term of office
tion shall constitute a quorum.
of one of the members first appointed shall end on
March 1st, 1925, of another first appointed on March
1st, 1927, and of the third first appointed on March
1st, 1929.
Each succeeding member shall hold his office
for the term of six years, and until his successor
In case of a
shall have been appointed and qualified.
vacancy the person appointed to fill such vacancy
shall hold office for the unexpired term in which the
The qualifications and salaries of
vacancy occurs.
the members of the state board of equalization shall
be as provided by law, provided, however, that such
members shall be so selected that the board will not
be composed of more than two persons who are affiliated
with the same political party or organization; provided,
further, that each member shall devote his entire time
to the duties of the office and shall not hold any
position of trust or profit, or engage in any occupation
or business interfering or inconsistent with his duties
as a member of such board, or serve on or under any
committee of any political party or organization, or
take part, either directly or indirectly, in any
political campaign in the interest of any political party
The state
or organization or candidate for office.
board of equalization shall adjust and equalize the
valuation of taxable property among the several counties,
and the different classes of taxable property in any
county and in the several counties and between individual
taxpayers; supervise and review the acts of the county
assessors and county boards of equalization; change,
increase, or decrease valuations made by county assessors
or equalized by county boards of equalization; and
exercise such authority and do all things necessary to
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secure a fair, just and equitable valuation of all
taxable oroperty among counties, between the different
classes of property, and between individual taxpayers.
Said state board of equalization shall also have such
other powers, and perform such other duties relating
to taxation as may be prescribed by law.
The section originally provided for an ex officio State
Board of Equalization composed of the governor, secretary of
state, treasurer, auditor and attorney general. 34 The section
was amended in 1915 to define the relationship between the
state board and county boards of equalization^ and again in
1922 to replace the ex officio board members with three
members appointed bv the governor for six-year terms
The verbage in Section 15 in its oresent form is almost
Eut
overwhelming, and much of it may be statutory in nature.
the important point is that the State Board of Equalization
was created to administer the property tax. Almost the last
quarter of Section 15 defines the functions of the state
board and all those functions concern the property tax.

—

But the actual duties of the board never have been confined
The board now administers virtually
to the property tax.
The Montana Supreme
the entire tax program for the state.
Court has ruled that the board was not set up solely to
administer the property tax and that it was entirely within
the legislature's power to give administration of other state
tax programs to the state board. The court said:
[I]n conferring specific powers upon the board by
the provisions of section 15 of Article XII of the
Constitution the people simply have named certain
powers which the legislature may not take away;
but by naming certain express powers it was not
intended to prohibit the legislature from adding
others 36
.

The State Board of Equalization is an assessing, administraIts powers and duties can
tive and quasi-judicial agency.
be categorized as follows:

Only beer and
1. Collection of taxes for state purposes.
liquor taxes and licenses, administered by the State Liquor
Control Board, fall outside the Board of Equalization's purview.
2. Supervision of county assessors and county boards of
equalization.
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3. Assessment of the net proceeds of mines and the intercounty propertv of utilities.

4. Equalization of the valuation of taxable property
among counties, classes of property and taxpayers.
5. Review of specific assessments on its own initiative
or by hearing apoeals from findings of county boards of
equalization or apoeals from its own assessment of intercounty propertv.

"Thus," the Legislative Council has noted, "the title 'Board
of Equalization' is not truly descriptive of the many duties
performed by this board. "37 In 19 70, the Commission on Executive Reorganization described the functions of the State
Board of Equalization as follows:

The State Board of Equalization is constitutionally
created as [a] bipartisan Board composed of three members, appointed by the Governor, who serve six year
staggered terms. The Board has constitutional duties
Presently the Board members
and statutory duties.
themselves devote 75 per cent of their time (Board
members serve as full-time state officers) to the
constitutional duties of adjusting and equalizing the
valuation of taxable property in the state, supervising
and reviewing the acts of the County Assessors and
County Boards of Equalization (County Commissioners)
and assessing intercounty property of utilities.

Statutory duties of the Board are numerous and are
performed by an administrator, assistant administrator
The Board members
and 110 full-time staff members.
devote 10 per cent of their time to supervising staff
activities.
The remaining 15 per cent of Board members'
time is spent hearing appeals from their decisions and
from decisions of County Commissioners acting as County
In other words, the efforts
Boards of Equalization.
of Board members themselves are primarily confined to
property tax matters—other Board duties and responsibilities are supervised and performed by the administrator and staff. The administrator and staff collect
and administer the following taxes: personal income;
corporation license; motor fuels; cement dealers;
cement and gvpsum producers; strip coal mines; coal
retailers; electrical energy producers; express companies;
natural gas distributors; telegraph companies; telephone
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companies; public contractors; micacious mineral mines;
carbon black producers; payments in lieu of taxes;
sleeping car companies; freight line companies; metalliferous mines; identification number (boats); store
licenses; public contractors' gross receipts; cigarette
wholesalers and retailers; cigarette; tobacco; and
inheritance and estate. °
The Commission made this appraisal of the board:

At present the duties of the State Board of Equalization
are separated into those involving property tax matters,
which are administered by the Board members themselves,
and the collection of Montana's major sources of revenue,
which is handled bv the administrator and staff.
The
duties now performed by the Board members themselves are
for the most part constitutional duties and must remain
the responsibility of the Board.
The function of hearing
appeals of decisions of County Boards of Equalization is
an important one which must necessarily be performed by
a multi-member body.
On the other hand, the responsibility for collection of Montana's major sources of revenue
which are statutorilv imposed and which, in practice
today, are collected by an administrative unit, not the
State Board of Equalization—should be vested in a
department headed by a single administrator. Furthermore,
the task of preparing revenue estimates (now done out of
necessity by the Budget^Director properlv belongs in a
Department of Revenue. 39
)

The Commission recommended creation, in the executive branch,
of a Department of Revenue to collect Montana's principal
sources of revenue.
The recommendation included provision
for the appointment of a director to serve at the pleasure
of the governor, subject to Senate confirmation.
The Commission also recommended:

That the Department of Revenue assume all duties of the
State Board of Equalization except:
those directly
related to the equalization and adjustment of the value
of taxable property and supervision of County Assessors
and County Boards of Equalization as prescribed by
Article XII, Section 15 of the Montana Constitution;
the duties directly related to the assessment of intercounty property of railroads, utilities, airlines, and
truck fleets as prescribed by Article XII, Section 16
of the Montana Constitution and Sections 84-428, 84-708,
84-801, 84-901, 84-6402, and 84-727, R.C.M. 1947; and
the duties directly related to imposing levies upon
livestock for stock protection purposes as prescribed
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by Article XII, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution.
Essentially, the Department of Revenue would administer
the income and corporation license taxes, the motor fuel
tax and all other miscellaneous taxes now collected by
the State Board of Equalization (the non-constitutional
functions of the Board); but would not absorb the Board's
property taxation powers or the Board's duties relating
to assessment of inter-county properties and livestock
levies.
The latter are, with one exception, constituThe sole exception is the
tional duties of the Board.
assessment of inter-county properties of utilities
Since the Board is required by the
other than railroads.
Constitution to assess the inter-county propertv of railroads, it logically follows that it should continue to
assess the inter-county property of all utilities. 4

The Executive Reorganization Act approved by the 1971 Legishowever, the Board
lature created a Department of Revenue.
of Equalization, rather than a director, was made head of
the department 4 ^
The Montana Legislative Council has recommended more substanThe Council recommended that all reference to
tial change.
the State Board of Equalization be deleted from the Constitution, leaving the legislature free to establish a coordinated
tax department. **2 Perhaps most significantly, State Doard of
Equalization members themselves have stated that constitutional status for the board is unnecessary. 3
The trend in other states appears to be awav from multiheaded tax agencies such as Montana's. At least thirty-five
of the fifty states have provided single administrators for
their principal taxing agencies. 44 The Legislative Council
has noted:

There are several apparent reasons why a single administrator would be superior to a multi-headed board to
administer tax collections and exercise certain equalization functions:
A board of equalization can only be justified as
1.
necessary in a relatively small area in the property
tax field. There are no equalization problems as such
existing in income taxation or the various other fields
of taxation administered by the state taxing agency.
2.
It is offensive to our concept of justice for a
board to hear appeals from its own administrative rulings,
This situation exists in Montana when an owner
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of inter-countv property appeals to the board from the
board's own assessment. There is also a conflict of
interest present where the tax collecting agency passes
on disputes which will directly affect the amount of
revenue collected.

While the apparent intent behind the provisions
3.
establishing the board of equalization was to provide
a quasi- judicial body for equalization and review, the
board actually spends a.
portion of its time as a
multi-headed administrator of the tax collecting department.
From the standpoint of good management, this is
probably a waste of money.
.Taxation is an increasingly complex field and it may be that the State would
benefit by placing the operation of the department in
the hands of a single administrator with considerable
experience in the field of taxation.
In any event, it
is inefficient to vest responsibility for the immediate
management of an operation in a board rather than a
single administrator. A single administrator is able to
make decisions with greater dispatch than a board and
will subsequently accept responsibilities for those
decisions.
Certain valuable and essential services could
still be performed by a lay commission representing the
public interest in the area of review and appeal, even
though responsibility for the operation of the department is vested in a single administrator.^
.

.

.

.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION
If the Constitution were silent on the subject of property

tax administration, the legislature could consider alternative
methods of administration. The Legislative Council has
described the following alternatives:
(1)

Complete centralization;

Complete centralization of assessment administra(2)
tion with tax collection and enforcement handled
locally; and
(3)

Well coordinated joint state-local administration.

Some
The first alternative has been adopted by Hawaii.
states have considered the second alternative but none
has completely accepted it.
Joint state-local administration is the procedure used in most states with
coordination meeting varying degrees of success.
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Complete centralization would place all authority in
a state department.
State employees would perform
initial assessments, compute taxes due, and collect all
property taxes. The broad authority of the State Board
of Equalization would be extended, and this approach
might enhance the possibility of uniform assessment procedures and equity in taxation.
More efficient administration could also reduce administrative costs. The
office of county assessor would be abolished, and it
would be necessary to decide whether tax records should
be maintained locally or in a central state office.
Taxing jurisdiction boundaries might be changed, or they
could remain the same.

Although complete centralization might lead to more
uniformity and equity, the degree of improvement would
depend largely upon how the laws were administered. The
State Board of Equalization now has very broad authority
to standardize assessment procedures and insure equalization.
It might be questioned whether complete
centralization would lead to any marked improvement.
It
is also doubtful whether there would be substantial savings in administrative costs, and if assessment and
taxation procedures remained essentially unchanged, administrative costs might not be reduced.
The second alternative, centralization of assessment
with tax collection and enforcement handled locally, has
some of the advantages and disadvantages of complete
centralization. The degree of centralization is the
crucial factor. An extreme example would be the assessment of all property by state employees.
Or, state
employees might exercise close supervision over local
assessors with authority to define methods, review procedures, and change values as deemed necessary.
Assessment is the most vital part of the taxation process.
If
the state either assessed all property or closely supervised local assessors, this approach would not differ
essentially from complete centralization.

The third alternative, that of joint state-local administration is the method employed in Montana.
If
effective, this method provides uniformity and equity
in taxation, the state assumes its responsibility to
supervise taxation, and considerable authority is vested
in local officials. °
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State Centralization
The first two methods essentially call for centralization of
assessment at the state level. The pros and cons of such
state centralization have been set down as follows:
State agencies have five important advantages over local
agencies
The state government has command over more re1.
sources than any one of its political subdivisions and
can presumably secure better qualified personnel than is
available for local assessing departments.

A statewide assessment district permits a much
2.
higher degree of specialization by employees of the
assessing department than is possible with the limited
number of persons who can find continuous employment in a
single local assessment office.
The application of uniform standards and practices
3.
over a statewide area creates greater uniformity within
a class of property than is likely to obtain with assessment by independent local agencies.
4.
The larger the assessment district, the fewer the
occasions in which a single property lies in more than
one district and the greater the opportunity to assess
each property as a unit.

State officials often have ready access to records
income tax returns) which are unavailable or
not readily accessible to local officials.
5.

(e.g.,

Despite these advantages, the assessment of property
taxes traditionally is a function of local government and
probably will remain a local function for many years to
come.
This allocation of responsibility is not simply
the persistence of an outmoded and discredited institution.
Aside from the virtue of avoiding drastic changes
without having clearly established the superiority of
the proposed system over existing systems, local assessment of property taxes is supported by the following
arguments
1.
Local governments have the largest, and sometimes
the only, stake in the property tax and hence are likely
to attend more carefullv to its administration.
.
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2.
Local officials are likely to have a more intimate
knowledqe of local conditions and resident taxpayers
than state officials.
To overcome this handicap, state
assessing agencies would need to decentralize their
administration to the point where it would in some respects resemble the present system of local assessment
and would therefore lose some of the advantages of
state assessment.
3.
there would be a natural tendency to minimize district offices and to limit the authority of
district representatives with the result that the convenience of local taxpayers would be sacrificed.
.

.

.

4.
tend to become
Large organizations.
cumbersome and expensive than small ones, with
sult that state assessment might prove slower,
economical and less responsive to public needs
assessment.
.

.

more
the reless

than local

5.
An officer or board which controlled all property
would be an extremely
tax assessments in the state.
powerful political figure.
.

.

'

Assessment Review
As previously mentioned, the State Board of Equalization, as
presently constituted, sits in judgment on its own decisions.
This inequitv results because the board performs both administrative and judicial functions.

Review of assessment decisions is required by the due process
clause of the United States Constitution. ° Many states provide this review before an agency s epar at e and distinct from
the administrative agency.
The review Is then more likely to
be objective.
The possible arrangements have been described
as follows:
Frequently, there is a quasi- judicial agency of the
local assessment district that performs the review function and is prohibited from performing the equalization
function, and a state administrative or quasi- judicial
agency that performs both review and equalization
functions.
Alternatively, there may be a quasi- judicial
agency of the local assessment district that performs
the review function and a state administrative or
quasi- judicial agency that performs equalization but not
review functions. Again, there may be opportunities to
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appeal individual assessments through a local review
agency to a state review agency while another state
agency performs the equalization function. ^9
The National Tax Association concludes that separate review
agencies at both the state and local level are steps toward
improved property assessment. °

Examples of Review Agencies
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations gives
the following background on possible structure of review
agencies
So long as assessment administration remains a joint
State- local undertaking there is need for a two-level
review system: agencies at the local level competent
to deal fairly and expeditiously with routine and
less abstruse problems
and thus screen out readily
resolved issues that should not be permitted to encumber the work of the upper- level agency--and an independent, impartial, professionally well-qualif ied
aopeal agency at the State level. Appeals from
this agency to the appellate courts of the State
would be limited to matters commonly referred to as
problems of law. One essential in the creation of such
a system is to avoid its encroachment on the administrative authority that is properly that of the assessors
and the State supervisory agency.

—

Local boards of review
The illusion of permanence
that surrounds traditional political institutions tends
to pervade most present systems of local review boards.
They are something indigenous that may be tinkered
with but not discarded. Many States will face some
difficulty, therefore, in the necessary task of clearing
out all of the local review machinery that does not
work, interferes with competent assessors and impedes
the function of State supervision.
.

Inherent in the general run of local boards of review
The picture may be that
is an element of absurdity.
of an unskilled part-time board correcting the
mistakes of an untrained part-time assessor, i.e.,
of the halt leading the blind; it may be that of a
political board protecting a political assessor against
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uneasy taxpayers; or it mav be that of the hazards
faced by the proficient assessor in defending the product of his systematic appraisals against the opinions
of a professionally unqualified and often politically
minded board that lacks basic information and comprehension of assessment standards. The protection given
the taxpayer by these agencies is limited at best and
negligible more often than not.

With joint State-local assessment administration organized along the lines proposed in this report, the
creation of a simple, effective review system would
become quite feasible. A State's assessment organization would comprise a limited number of professionally
staffed county and multicounty assessment districts
Under this setup
and a central supervisory agency.
the local review agency might well be the assessment
agency itself.
This arrangement would give the
taxpayer a legally safeguarded opportunity to present
his case before a body that was better informed about
taxable values in the local district than most outside
By this means, a procedure,
boards could hope to be.
sometimes designated as the provision of a grievance
period, that already exists in law or practice in
numerous jurisdictions, would become the local component
of the review process.
This arrangement may be criticized for its provision of
a hearing before an agency seeking to defend its own
performance rather than before a separate agency; but
it has certain special advantages and is safeguarded
by the right of appeal to an independent State review
agencv.
Review by the local assessing agency, after
the assessment roll is open for inspection, provides
a direct, simple means of correcting administrative
errors, taking care of minor misunderstandings and adjustments, and dealing with general types of assessment
protests that a competent local assessing organization
is in a better position to handle expeditiously and
knowledgeably than an outside agency. Also, it should
be emphasized, using the assessing agency to initiate
the review process at the local level makes available
the services of a full-time professional organization
for a temporary function in a way that is not feasible
for separate boards of review except in very large
jurisdictions
The taxpayer would be entitled to protest his assessment on grounds of overvaluation, unequal valuation,
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He or his agent would
and illegal valuation procedure.
initiate the proceedings by filing, between specified
dates, an application for review on a form provided by
The application would specify
the assessment agency.
whether a hearing was desired. To reduce the number
of nuisance- type applications for a hearing, a filing
With the applifee of at least $2 should be required.
cation, the taxpayer should be required to present in
writing, for study by the reviewing officers, a reasonably complete summary of the reasons for the protest.
The hearing should be before one or more members of the
orofessional staff of the agency, not including, however, the appraiser who assessed the particular propertv under review— a restriction designed to produce a
The procedure
more detached evaluation of the protest.
should be informal and the taxpayer should be entitled
to appear for himself, with professional aid if he
Under this
wishes, or to be represented by his agent.
procedure, it is easy for even the smallest taxpayer
to obtain a hearing before a professionally qualified
tribunal, and if he is dissatisfied with the ruling
While the
he can appeal to the State review agency.
local assessment department, acting as a review agency,
is not likely to be any more zealous to reduce assessments than are the typical ex officio review agencies
which also represent local governments, it is bound to
be influenced by the fact that it may be required to
defend its rulings before the State review agency.

Only when there has been a suitable reorganization
and professionalization of local assessment districts
Under
in a State is the foregoing arrangement feasible.
generally prevailing conditions reliance would continue
to be placed on separate boards of review as the local
components of a State's review system. That scattered
communities in some of the States have been able to
develop boards of review of some competence suggests
that such boards have a greater potential for taxpayer
protection than they usually demonstrate. Realization
of this potential, however, would seem to depend, first,
on having jurisdictions of sufficient size and resources
Where the township
to support a well-equipped board.
pattern of assessment districts still prevails the
review board usually would need to be on a countywide
basis, and the very many counties that are too small
to support professional assessing also are too small
In the second place,
to support a good review operation.
it would be necessarv to replace ex officio and elective
boards by boards appointed under some system that would
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assure selection of well-qualified members, posing a
In the
problem that has never been widely solved.
third Dlace, a review agency, in order to have some
background of technical information to enable it to
cope with its duties, needs the continuing full-time
services of at least one professional adviser, a requirement that is difficult to meet because of the temporarv
or seasonal nature of the review function unless the
district is large.
In any event, when assessment supervision is vested
properly in a State supervisory agency, the local
agency, the local boards of review, should serve exclusively as quasi- judicial bodies. When they, too, are
made supervisory agencies there is groundwork for confusion and diffusion of responsibility.
The State agency
should be able to supervise local assessing directly,
rather than in conflict with or acting through intermediate aqencies of usually indifferent qualifications
and sporadic concern with the problem.

Review at the local
Independent State review agencies
level can dispose of the more readily adjustable
grievances of the taxpayers, but this screening out
process leaves unresolved issues that emphasize the
need for an impartial, tax-sophisticated State review
agency to which the taxpayers can appeal from the
rulings of local review agencies and the assessments
and some classes of decisions of the State supervisory
agency, and find a speedy, inexpensive means of resolving their assessment controversies.
.

Such a remedy is not provided by appeal to the ordinary
courts of the State, and it also is not provided by
appeal to tax commissions, directors of revenue, and
other agencies whose jurisdiction is confused by
responsibility for passing judgment on the product
As
of their own assessment and supervisory functions.
John Dane has commented, in evaluating the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board, "No single man or group
of men can be expected to be a tax collector and protector of the State's revenue for nine-tenths of the
time and an impartial judge for the other one-tenth."
What is needed is an agency separate and distinct from
the State tax department and outside the regular State
judicial system, concentrating on tax questions and
performing exclusively an appellate function.
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Illustrating the type of State review agency that is
advocated here are the Massachusetts Appellate Tax
Board,
.and the quite similar instrumentalities
envisaged in the model State Tax Court Act developed
by the American Bar Association and made available in
created a State tax court in 1959
Maryland.
1957.
and Oregon followed with provision for a tax court that
became operative in 1962. The last two agencies are too
new to permit evaluation of their work, but the
Massachusetts Board has had a sufficiently successful
operating record over a period of years to give the State
tax court concept more than theoretical attraction.
Whether these tribunals for tax appeals should be called
boards or courts probably is not of great moment so long
as they have the necessary attributes, but the use of the
term "court" may help to distinguish them in the minds of
taxpayers from the various uninspiring boards long
associated with the property tax.
.

.

.

.

These agencies are authorized to pass on appeals not
only from valuations for ad valorem taxation but from
assessments for State collected taxes. The members,
varying in number with the size of the State and prospective case load, typically would be appointed by the
Governor, on the basis of their qualifications for
dealing impartially and skillfully with tax problems,
to serve full-time for relatively long, overlapping
The model State Tax Court Act calls
terms of office.
for five judges, appointed for 9-year overlapping
terms, but three would suffice for some States and a
The court would sit at
few States might need only one.
various places throughout the State for the convenience
of the taxpayers, with authority for a single judge to
hear small, uncomplicated cases providing flexibility
for this purpose.

Appeals to the court or board would be on the basis of
written application and would involve no more than nomiThe proceedings would be de novo, the
nal court costs.
rules of procedure would be more simple than those of the
ordinary courts, and the objective would be expeditious
adjudication, with the court empowered to affirm,
decrease, increase, or cancel assessments, order rebates,
The taxpayer could appear without a
and the like.
Decisions of the agency normally
lawyer if he so wished.
would be final as to the facts, and appeals on questions
of law desirably should be on the basis of the record
to the highest State court.
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The Massachusetts board conforms more closely to these
general specifications than do the Maryland and Oregon
Tax Courts.
Maryland followed the basic principles
where legally feasible; but under its constitution the
only way in which it could establish a tax court was
to make it an administrative agency, which, in turn,
because it was not a constitutional court, precluded
It should
appeals from it to the highest State court.
be noted, in view of Maryland's limitation, that appeals
from the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board, New Jersev
Division of Tax Appeals, and Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
The Tax Court
lie directly to the highest court.
created in 1961 by the Oregon legislature to handle the
appeals of property and other taxpayers is designed to
free the State's regular circuit courts from concern
with technical tax questions, become increasingly expert in the area of taxation, and be of special benefit
Appeals from decisions of the
to small taxpayers.
court may be taken to the State Supreme Court. Departing from the concept of appointive judges, the Oregon
tax court consists of a single judge popularly elected
on a nonpartisan basis for a 6-year term, with the
State Supreme Court authorized to appoint judges pro
tempore as needed.

The creation of good machinery for tax appeals is an
important and necessary step in effectuating remedies,
but even the best machinery for this purpose will not
function well unless it is operated by a highly qualified personnel.
The type of State review agency recommended here has a vast potential for protecting property
owners against inequitable assessment, but only if the
agency is given due prominence in the governmental organization and staffed with people of great integrity and
courage and unquestioned experience and ability in the
field of property valuation. ->1
Mew Jersey Plan
The New Jersey tax department is another
possible model for tax reform in Montana. The system has
been described as follows:
.

In New Jersey a state tax department was created in 19 31
which was directed by law to "exercise all the duties
formerly exercised.
.by the state board of taxes and
assessment, except those relating to the review, hearing
and determination of appeals concerning the assessment,
.

-72-

PROPERTY TAX
collection, apportionment or equalization of taxes,
The chief officer of the department is a state tax
commissioner who is appointed by the governor. The
commissioner has power to order the local assessor
to reassess property and to increase or decrease property assessments for the purpose of equalization.

Each year the commissioner is required by law to determine the percentage of full value at which the real
property in each county has been assessed and to prepare state equalization tables showing the percentage by
which the assessed valuation of the property in each
county should be increased or decreased to correspond to
true value.
He then holds hearings for the purpose of
determining the accuracy of the ratios shown in the
equalization tables and subsequently directs changes in
valuation in accordance with the facts.
The commissioner may file a complaint against an assessor who willfully or intentionally fails to comply with
state laws relating to assessment and collection of
taxes.
A hearing before the supreme court determines
if the allegations of the commissioner are sustained by
the evidence and whether or not the assessor should be
removed.

Any person, taxing district or county aggrieved by any
act, proceeding, ruling, decision or determination of
the state tax commissioner may appeal to the state
board of tax appeals.

The state board of tax appeals is directed by law to
"perform all the acts formerly required by law to be
performed by the state board of taxes and assessment.
relative to the hearing and determination of tax
appeals." The board consists of seven members not more
than four of whom belong to the same political party.
At least two must be lawyers. They are appointed by
the governor for five-year terms.
.

The New Jersey code contains comprehensive provisions
for the procedure of appeal and review.
The board
hears appeals from the tax commissioner and the county
boards.
It may on complaint of any taxing district
or taxpayer, or on its own motion, review the county
or state equalization tables prepared by the commissioner and revise them if found erroneous.

Apparently the only provision in the New Jersey
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Constitution relatinq to taxation is that "Property
shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and
by uniform rules, according to its true value." (Art. IV,
Sec. 7, Paragraph 12) 52

CONCLUSION
The following questions should be considered in the property
tax administration area:
Is it necessary to freeze property tax administration detail
in the constitution?
If so:
1.

Should assessors be elected?

2.
Should minimum qualifications be established for
assessors?
3.

Should assessment districts be defined by county

lines?
4.
Should the county commissioners continue to function
as both a board of equalization and a quasi- judicial review

board?
5.
Should the State Board of Equalization be the tax
administrator for Montana?

6.
Should the state board be confined to property taxation only?
7.
Should the review of assessments continue to reside
in the administrative bodies, or should review and administration be separate functions?
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CHAPTER IV

PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS

MONTANA PROVISIONS
Property exempt from taxation in Montana is listed in Article
XII, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The property of the United States, the state, counties,
cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries shall be exempt from taxation; and such other property as may be used exclusively
for the agricultural and horticultural societies, for
educational purposes, places for actual religious
worship, hospitals and places of burial not used or held
for private or corporate profit, institutions of purely
public charity and evidences of debt secured by
mortgages of record upon real or personal property in
the state of Montana, may be exempt from taxation.
Under that constitutional language, government property is
exempt without any action on the part of the legislature.
The remaining property is exempt only if the legislature grants
The legislature
it tax-exempt status by statutory enactment.
has passed such a provision, Revised Codes of Montana 1947,
Section 84-202:
,

The property of the United
Exemptions from Taxation
States, the state, counties, cities, towns, school
districts, municipal corporations, public libraries,
such other property as is used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for educational purposes, places of actual religious worship, hospitals
and places of burial not used or held for private or
corporate profit, and institutions of purely public
charity, evidence of debt secured by mortgages of record
upon real or personal property in the state of Montana,
and public art galleries and public observatories not
used or held for private or corporate profit, are exempt
from taxation, but no more land than is necessary for
such purpose is exempt; provided, the term "institutions of purely public charity" as used in this act
shall include organizations owning and operating facilities for the care of the retired or aged or chronically
ill which are not operated for gain or profit; provided,
.
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that the terms public art galleries and public observatories used in this act shall mean only such art
galleries and observatories whether of public or private
ownership, as are open to the public, without charge or
fee at all reasonable hours, and are used for the
purpose of education only, and also when a clubhouse
or building erected by or belonging to any society or
organization of honorably discharged United States soldiers or marines who served in army or navy of United
States, is used exclusively for educational, fraternal,
benevolent or purely public charitable purposes, rather
than for gain or profit, together with the library and
furniture necessarily used in any such building, and all
property, real or personal, in the possession of legal
guardians of incompetent veterans of the World War or
minor dependents of such veterans, where such property
is funds or derived from funds received from the United
States as pension, compensation, insurance, adjusted
compensation, or gratuity, shall be exempt from all
taxation as property of the United States while held by
the guardian, but not after title passes to the veteran
or minor in his or her own right on account of removal
of legal disability.

Article XII, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution also can
be interpreted as a form of property tax exemption.
It
creates a special taxation system for mines and mining claims,
and states that they "shall be taxed at the price paid the
United States therefor. ..." In most instances that means
between $2.50 and $20 an acre. A more complete discussion of
Article XII, Section 3 is reserved for Chapter VI. But it
should be noted that Section 3 offers a form of property tax
exemption by preventing inclusion of mines and mining claims
in the usual property valuation method.
Interpretation of the Provisions
Exclusive List
Only the property set out in Article XII, Section 2 may receive tax-exempt status.
The Montana Supreme Court has ruled:

The legislature may extend the exemption to the
property enumerated, but it cannot go further or include
any other.
.expresses the entire will
.
Section 2.
of the people with respect to the property absolutely
.

.

.
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exempt and the extent of legislative power to create
exemptions
.

In other words, no property other than that mentioned in Section 2 can be excluded from taxation. All other property
must bear the burden of taxation in Montana and be included
on the tax rolls.

Educational Purposes
The Montana Supreme Court also has defined "educational purThe court definition is someposes" as used in Section 2.
what broad:
" [E]ducational purposes"
is not, by the weight of
authority, defined in terms of the common scholastic
institutions of grammar school, high school, and
Organizations for the
university or college.
social, intellectual, physical, or religious welfare
The end of the educaof children are exempt equally.
tion may be to develop either the mental, physical,
or moral qualities.
.

.

.

Institutions of Purely Public Charity
The Supreme Court also has supplied insight into the scope
and meaning of the term "public charity." The case involved
Hillcrest Homes, a retirement complex owned by the Bozeman
Deaconess Foundation. Residents of the Home paid occupancy
fees ranging from $7,000 to $32,000 and single monthly
maintenance charges of from $150 to $250. The facility itself
cost $2 million.

The court, in ruling that the Foundation enjoyed tax exempt
status, said:
The concept of charity is not confined to the relief
of the needy and destitute, for "aged people require
care and attention apart from financial assistance, and
the supply of this care and attention is as much a
charitable and benevolent purpose as the relief of
their financial wants." So the charge of fees by such
an institution as a home for the aged will not necessarily prevent its classification as charitable if
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such sums "go to pay the expenses of operation and not
to the profit of the founders or shareholders," for all
persons may "under certain conditions be proper objects
of charity. "^
It may be that appellants feel the standard of care,
the excellence of accommodations, and the mode of life
accorded by this facility, all reflected by the size of
the occupancy and maintenance fees, and the physical
plant and facilities available are inconsistent with
the usual concept of charity.
But "charity" to the law
has a much broader meaning than that accorded it in
common speech. .
The scope of charity and the
standards under which it is administered are not frozen
by the past, but keep pace with the times and the new
conditions and wants of society.
.

.

Based on these two decisions, it appears that the Montana
Supreme Court has given a liberal interpretation to the
property exemptions set out in Article XII, Section 2. Thus,
although that list is exclusive, it has been broadened by the
decisions of the Supreme Court.

Reasoning Behind the Provisions
The exemptions listed in Article XII, Section 2, as far as
they go, are common, appearing in many other state constitutions.
But Montana's Constitution does not include some of
the newer, more innovative types of property exemption contained in other state constitutions. Constitutional exemption evidently has not been used in Montana as a lever for
social change a reform method frequently utilized in other
parts of the United States. As one commentator noted:

—

Exemptions are too important a tool of public policy
to fall into disuse; they can be a powerful lever in
pushing social and economic change.
We have already witnessed the spread of homestead and
veterans' exemptions for the purpose of achieving
One major consocial and economic objectives.
cern of the current age is "business climate," hence
the interest in exempting business personalty.
Other
major concerns today include those for the elderly,
for the poverty-stricken, for the harassed farmer
about to be gobbled up by urban sprawl, for air
pollution, water pollution, for the central city,
.
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and so on.
Each of these has its associated plan
for partial or full exemption from property taxes.
.

.

.

Although Montana evidently is not in the vanguard of this
modern reform movement, its constitutional exemptions also
grew out of a recognition of the need for social reform and
public benefit.
Exemption of Government Property
As noted previously, the Montana Constitution exempts from
taxation "property of the United States, the state, counties,
cities, towns, school districts, [and] municipal corporations.

"

U.S. Property .

The property of the United States has been
immune from taxation since 1819, when the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that taxation by the state interfered with the
sovereignty of the federal government.
Inclusion of federal property on any state tax exemption list is therefore
superfluous and redundant; the recitation of exemption adds
nothing to the already exempt status of the property.

However, Congress has authorized payments in lieu of taxes
in certain instances, lifting the protective veil of immunity from some federal property.
A study for the Hawaii Constitutional Convention noted:

A series of congressional acts requires the payment to
state and local taxing units of a varying percentage
of federal income from the public domain, including
national forests, grazing and mineral lands, and other
large tracts.
This method of percentage in-lieu payments has also been applied to the power facilities
of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
The Federal
Public Housing Authority was directed by Congress to
pay "tax equivalents" to state and local governments
upon its housing projects, and such in-lieu payments
have also been made on the rural settlement centers
developed by the Farm Security Administration.
.

.

.

In addition to Montana, at least ten states have express provisions in their constitutions exempting federal property
from taxation: Arizona, Idaho, Missouri, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming 10
That prohibition has been softened in some constitutions to
permit taxation of federal property when authorized by
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Typical of that kind of provision are the follow-

Congress.
ing:

—

[Federal property],
Washington
[Art. VII, Sec. 3]
may be taxed whenever and in such manner as authorized
or permitted under laws of the United States.
.

.

—

.

[Federal property is].
[Art. VII, Sec. 4]
Idaho
.
exempt, except when taxation authorized by United States.
.

.

Exemption of state and
Other Public Property Exemptions
local government property is justified on the theory that
governments should not tax themselves. One study states that
.

since the only source of revenue for government is
through the taxation of citizens who pay for government, it is impractical for government to tax itself,
since it in effect does not pay its own taxes.

The theory has been criticized, however, on much the same
basis as complaints which led the federal government to ease
its tax immunity.
[T]he theory is not as positive when viewing it as individual units of government. Each unit of government
must depend upon its own taxing powers to generate enough
revenue for the operation of that particular government.
If the tax base within the local unit is diminished
by tax exempt property of other governmental units, it
is easy to recognize that it becomes extremely difficult
for one unit of government to survive when another unit
of government has large exempt holdings within its
jurisdiction. 2
*-

This problem is particularly acute when the exempt property is
leased to private enterprises. Those businesses demand public
services, but no tax income is received from the property.
States, in addition to Montana, that exempt state property
from taxation include Arizona, California, Idaho, Nebraska,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington,
Some
Alabama, Colorado, Missouri, South Dakota and Virginia.
states have tightened the exemption by requiring that state
land is only exempt if used for a public purpose.

For example:

—

Kansas [Art. XI, Sec. 1] All property used exclusively
.be exempted from taxfor state.
.purposes [shall]
ation.
.

.
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Tennessee [Art. II, Sec. 28]--[T]he Legislature may ex.and
cept such [property] as may be held by the State.
used exclusively for public or corporation purposes.
.

—

.the
Wyoming [Art. XV, Sec. 12] The property of.
.when used primarily for a governmental purpose
state.
.shall be exempt from taxation.
.

.

.

.

.

.

County property is exempt from taxation in Arizona, Idaho,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, Alabama,
Colorado, Missouri, South Dakota and California, in addition
to Montana.
A "public or county use" requirement also is
Exemption of city property
imposed in some constitutions.
is constitutionally-required in Idaho, New Mexico, Utah,
California and Colorado, as well as Montana.
Idaho, New Mexico, Utah and Washington, as well as Montana,
exempt school district property. Municipal property is
granted immunity from taxation in Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington,
Alabama, Colorado, Missouri, South Dakota, California,
Nebraska and Virginia, in addition to Montana.

Exemption of Miscellaneous Property
Tax exemptions for certain kinds of property is traditional.
The Montana Constitution [Art. XII, Sec. 2], for example,
exempts property used exclusively for libraries, agricultural
and horticultural societies, educational purposes, places for
actual religious worship, hospitals, nonprofit cemeteries
and institutions of purely public charity. The rationale
behind these types of exemptions has been explained as follows

Property tax exemptions of long-standing are those
granted to nonprofit, charitable, religious, and
educational institutions. The traditional justifications for these classes of exemptions are:
(1) that
some of these institutions perform public services which
otherwise the government would be required to undertake;
(2) that they advance cultural and social causes which
governments often wish to encourage; and (3) that some
of these institutions especially religious organizations--foster morality and other desirable forms of
social behavior which indirectly may reduce government
expenditures

—

Because of the exemplary function of these institutions, most
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But
taxpayers do not object to their tax-exempt status.
some criticism has been leveled recently at these exemptions,
Studies by
particularly when the privilege has been abused.
several states reveal the questionable educational or
charitable nature of certain property. 14 Severe criticism has
been directed at church- related exemptions. One commentator
estimated that church-held properties and investments total
about $102.5 billion, and would have yielded $2.2 billion in
federal, state and local taxes. 15

Criticism of individual exemptions can be explained as
follows:
.can be justly sustained only upon the
Exemption.
principle that the "concession is due as quid pro quo
for the performance of a service essentially public,
and which the state thereby is relieved pro tanto
from the necessity of performing, such as works of
charity and education, freely and charitably be.
Without that concurring prerequisite
stowed.
an exemption becomes essentially a gift of public funds
at the expense of the taxpayer, and indefensible both
under our public policy of equal taxation and our
constitutional safeguard against illegal taxation." 16
.

.

.

,

In response to public resentment and pressure, some taxexempt organizations make in-lieu payments on their exempt
properties. The apparent reason for these voluntary payments
is a belief that it is better to contribute something before
public pressure forces removal of the exemption. i t

Taxation exemptions for churches
Exemptions for Churches
do not violate the establishment of religion clause in the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the argument of a New York taxpayer
that the exemption of church-owned property used solely for
religious worship indirectly required him to make a contribution to religious bodies in violation of the First Amendment. 1 8 The court said:
.

The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since
the government does not transfer part of its revenue
to churches but simply abstains from demanding that
There is no
.
the church support the state.
genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment
of religion. i9
.
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Exemption provisions on libraries are inOther Exemptions
cluded in the constitutions of Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia,
Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, Indiana, Nevada, Kansas,
Tennessee and West Virginia.
.

Illinois, South Dakota, Missouri and Nebraska, in addition to
Montana, provide for the exemption of property used by agricultural and horticultural societies. More than thirty
states include property for educational purposes on their list
About the same number exempt
of permissible exemptions.
property used for religious worship or religious purposes.
"Charitable purpose" property also appears under exemption
provisions in more than thirty state constitutions.

Hospitals are specifically exempted from property taxation in
Minnesota and California, as in Montana. Public, non-profit
cemeteries also enjoy constitutional exemption in at least
twenty-five states.

Exemption of Mortgages
The exemption of mortgages from taxation was added to the
Similar provisions are
Constitution by amendment in 1918.
found in the constitutions of California, Louisiana and
Nevada.

Classification as an Exemption
Although the legislature cannot expand the list of constitutional tax exemptions, the Montana property classification
system 20 operates as a partial exemption system for certain
classes of property. The classification system provides that
different classes of property have different taxable values.
For example, the taxable value of the annual net proceeds on
mines and mining claims is 100 percent of their assessed value;
at the other end of the scale, freeport merchandise is taxable
on only 1 percent of its assessed value.
Property is divided into the following classes under the
classification act:
The annual net proceeds of all mines and
Class 1:
mining claims and the value of any rights of entry for
the purpose of digging, exploring or prospecting for
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minerals have taxable value equal to 100 percent of their
assessed value.
Class 2:
All household goods and furniture, motor
vehicles, boats and harnesses are taxable on 20 aercent
of their assessed value.

Class 3:
Livestock, poultry, and the unprocessed products of both, stocks of merchandise and all furniture
and fixtures used in conjunction with stocks of merchandise and all office or hotel furniture and fixtures are
taxable on 33.33 percent of their assessed value.
Class 4: All land, city and town lots and improvements,
manufacturing and mining machinery, equipment and
supplies and mobile homes are taxable on 30 percent of
their assessed value.
Class 5:
All monies and credits, operating property of
electric and telephone cooperatives, unprocessed agricultural products and residences of disabled veterans
are taxable on 7 percent of their assessed value.
Class 6:
Monies, credits, moneyed capital and bank
shares are taxable in part at 7 percent of their
assessed value and in part at 30 percent of their
assessed value.

Class
old)

7:
New industrial property (less than three years
is taxed on 7 percent of its assessed value.

Class 8:
Improvements on real property valued at not
more than $17,500 which is owned and occupied by certain
widows, widowers and recipients of retirement benefits
are taxable on 15 percent of their assessed value.
Class 9: Freeport merchandise, in transit through the
state, is taxable on 1 percent of its assessed value.
Class 10: All property which is not in the first nine
categories has a taxable value of 40 percent of assessed
value. 21

EXEMPTIONS IN OTHER STATES
The number of tax exemptions in state constitutions is as
varied and extensive as the human imagination. Louisiana
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}

exempts athletic clubs, 22 California excludes grapevines 9
and Florida provides special treatment for movie studios. 24
It would be pointless to cover the policy arguments behind
each exemption, or even to attempt to list the exemptions.
Rather, discussion will be limited to some of the more widelyused exemptions 25
.

It is important to remember that only the property listed in
Article XII, Section 2 of the Montana Constitution is subject
Article XII, Section 1 provides that the legislato exemption.
ture "shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just
valuation for taxation of all property, except that specially
provided for in this article." In other words, as the
Montana Fiscal Affairs Study has noted:

All (other) property in the state which the law does
not specifically exempt is subject to the property
tax.
This includes property which is real or personal
and tangible or intangible. ^6

Under the present Montana Constitution, none of the classes
of property discussed below could be excluded from taxation
unless added to Article XII, Section 2 by amendment.

Household Property
The Montana Legislative Council, in a 1964 report, stated:

The major defects in taxing household goods and similar
property in Montana include:
(1) some persons escape
taxation entirely because they are not listed on
assessment rolls; (2) it is virtually impossible for
assessors to check the property of each person and
consequently self-listing forms are relied upon heavily;
(4) non-uniform
(3) partial listing may be widespread;
listing forms and methods of fixing value probably
result in many inequities; and (5) even if all such
property were reported, it is extremely difficult to
assign values to used furniture and wearing apparel. 27
The Council concluded:
[A] substantial amount of household goods and similar
property escapes taxation entirely. There is little
uniformity in forms used for listing such personal
property, and methods of setting value vary among the
counties.
The tax is difficult to administer
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effectively at a reasonable cost and probably creates
inequities. ... As a first step the Council recommends that the constitution be amended to remove the
requirement that this property be subject to ad valorem
taxation like other property in order to give the
legislative assembly discretion to specify the method
of taxing this property.
The Council's conclusion is not unique. Alexander Hamilton
declared, in the Federalist Papers that personal property
is "too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of
in any other way than by the imperceptible agency of taxes
Household goods particularly fit that
on consumption."
conclusion.
,

One alternative tax on these goods is the sales tax. As one
study noted:
With 42 [now 45] states, the District of Columbia, and
2,300 localities imposing sales taxes, there can be
little doubt that household goods when purchased make
a contribution to the public treasury. ^0
The trend is to exempt personal household items.
Such property is fully exempt in eighteen states, fully taxable in
eight, and subject to local ootion or partial exemption in
Dollar limit exemptions
the other twenty-four states.
are included in several constitutions, ranging from $100 worth
of household articles exempt in California-^ 2 to $1,000 worth
of household goods exempt in Louisiana^ and Tennessee.

Business Personal Property

Property taxation of business inventories is subject to many
of the same criticisms as household property taxation.
Business property is hard to locate, difficult to evaluate
Inventories
and usually taxed on a self-reporting basis.
also fluctuate during the business year, and it is a relatively simple matter to "arrange" for a small inventory on
assessment day. The Tax Institute of America has said:

Valuation of business personal property is the most
challenging task an assessor has to perform. There is
frequently precious little evidence for making a value
Income
judgment.
Comparable sales are hard to come by.
cannot be easily isolated, making the capitalization
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approach difficult. Replacement costs and depreciation
may be more accounting practice than reality in rapidly
changing technology. For these reasons the tax on
business personal property appears less and less feasible of effective administration. 35
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations concluded that:
[I]n framing their business tax policies, States should
give a high priority to eliminating or perfecting the
locally administered tax on business personal property
because it discriminates erratically among business
firms.
Therefore, the Commission recommends that
States eliminate the tax on business inventories and
either move the administration of the tax on other
classes of business personalty (notably machinery and
equipment) to the State level or provide strong State
supervision over the administration of the tax to
insure uniformity.
It recommends further that States
reimburse local governments for the attendant loss
in revenue by making more intensive use of State imposed
business taxes.

Some states that have exempted business inventories have recovered the loss through an increase in the corporate income
tax rate, a statewide sales tax or a gross receipts tax. ^7

Business inventories are substantially covered by property
taxation provisions in sixteen states: Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Partial tax coverage exists
Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.
in twenty-nine states, and complete exemption is permitted in
Delaware, Hawaii, New York, North Dakota and Pennsylvania. 38

Although stocks of merchandise and household property cannot
be exempt from taxation under the Montana Constitution, a
lower taxation rate could be assigned them under the state's
But in 1968,
classification system discussed previously.
an initiative to lower the taxable value of business inventory
and household property failed in a statewide vote by more
than a two-to-one margin.-* 9

Freeport Exemption
Another popular exemption related to business inventories
Freeport exemptions exclude goods,
is the freeport exemption.
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wares and merchandise sold and shipped outside the state.
In states with these provisions, large portions of business
inventories are excluded because of their freeport status.
The exemption is justified on the grounds that such goods are
only temporarily in the state, in transit or in storage for
reshipment. About two- thirds of the states have freeport
laws.
Although such property cannot be excluded from taxation under the Montana Constitution, the 19 71 Legislature
specified that freeport merchandise should be taxable on only
1 percent of its assessed value--the most favorable tax
classification the state offers. 1

Intangible Property
Intangibles are expressly included in the meaning of "property" by Article XII, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution:
The word property as used in this article is hereby
declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks,
franchises and all matters and things (real, personal
and mixed) capable of private ownership.
.

.

.

The problem of including these kinds of property in the tax
base was described by the Montana Legislative Council:

Taxation of moneys and credits presents unique problems
to local assessors.
Although money on deposit in banks
can be verified readily, it is virtually impossible to
discover stocks, bonds, and other types of moneys and
credits.
The property is easily concealed and is
highly mobile. Moreover, a determined effort by
assessors to discover and assess such property could
In
have the effect of driving it out of the state.
fact, some banks now observe a noticeable decrease in
deposits near assessment date.
.

.

.

It is apparent that taxation of moneys and credits in
Montana is not effective. ... it can be estimated that
less than four percent of this type of property is
reported to assessors. Although the property classification law sets a low rate of taxation on moneys and
credits to encourage reporting, this approach has
apparently failed.
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As indicated, "moneys and credits" are taxed at a low rate
to encourage reporting.
The same technique has been utilized
by other states, notably Iowa, Oklahoma and Nebraska. 4 4 However, the most popular trend seems to be exemption of these
intangibles from the property tax, and substitution of some
kind of income tax. Michigan and Ohio impose a special
income tax on the yield of intangibles, and New York and
Wisconsin include them under the general income tax law. 5

Lower rates of taxation for intangible property are justified
on "double- taxation" grounds, too.
Double taxation of such
property is not illegal; the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that a company being assessed on its intangible
property and security owners being taxed on their interests
in the company was not unconstitutional because two different
entities were being taxed on two different objects. 46 Despite
that ruling, double taxation is objectionable and states
have tried to dilute those objections by imposing low taxation rates on intangibles.

About fifteen states have no property tax on intangibles.
At least ten states, Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Tennessee,
Texas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, West Virginia and
Wyoming, include intangibles in the property tax base. 4 8
Other states exempt particular kinds of intangibles or grant
an exemption to a fixed amount of value. 49
'

Veterans' Exemptions
Veterans' exemptions have been explained as follows:

Since 19 45, thirty- two states have granted some form of
exemption for the property of veterans. The fact that
thirty-two states have special provisions of this type
makes this the most widespread exemption in the nation,
and there is no evidence that the exemption is losing
its popularity.
.

.

.

Provisions for property-tax exemption for veterans vary
considerably.
In approximately half the states, the
exemption includes the real and the personal property
of the veterans.
Most of the other states having such
a provision exempt only real property.
In approximately half the states, the exemption applies
only to veterans who are partly or completely disabled.
About one-quarter of the states extend the exemption

-93-

PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS
equally to all eligible veterans, disabled or not, but,
in the remaining states, the exemption is larger for
disabled than for non-disabled veterans.
Several states require that, in order for a veteran to
be eligible for the exemption, his property be valued
at less than a stipulated amount and/or his income
not exceed a certain amount.
.

.

.

In most states, the tax exemption for veterans is applicable to all state and local property taxes.
.

.

.

Most of the exemption laws passed after World War II
limited the property tax exemptions to veterans of World
War II
several states made their exemptions applicable
to surviving veterans of previous wars, however.
Many
states have also revised their laws to include veterans
of the Korean War.
;

In addition to having an honorable discharge, a veteran
must meet two specific criteria in most states to be
eligible for participation in the property-tax-exemption
program.
First, he must, in most states, have been in
the service for a specified number of days during a
period of "national emergency".
.

.

.

Second, to be eligible for the exemption, the veteran
must be a "resident" of the state granting it. Many
states are very specific in their definition of
residency for veterans' tax-exemption purposes. 5 ^

Examples of veterans' exemptions from other state constituSuch exemptions have been
tions are set out in footnote 51.
criticized on at least four grounds:
(1) they reduce the
tax base of state and local governments primarily local
governments; (2) they discriminate against the property less
veteran; (3) the exemption is an inefficient method of rewarding veterans for public service; (4) the exemptions
complicate an already complicated property tax system. 52

—

Senior Citizen Exemotions
Property tax exemptions for senior citizens have been justified on the following grounds: (1) the aged have low incomes;
(2) they spend a larger proportion of their incomes for
housing and, thus, bear a special burden from a tax on housing; (3) the aged tend to oppose levies on their homes when
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they do not benefit directly from certain government expenditures, such as those for schools; their political opposition would be lessened by offering them tax privileges 5 ^

Tax concessions to the aged have been set up, by statute,
in about ten states. Most have income and residency requirements, and almost all limit the property value that may be
exempted. At least three forms of concessions tax exemption, tax credit and tax deferment are offered. 5 ^

—

—

Such "old age" exemptions have been criticized on several
grounds. The elderly are not the only low-income families
Younger persons frequently fall within the United States.
in poverty levels, too.
Home-owner exemptions do not benefit
the renter, who pays the cost of property tax on his building through increased rent.
Income tests utilized in most
exemption laws create a "notch" problem a small increase
in income may put the taxpayer over the line and result in
a denial of the entire property tax exemption.

—

Most commentators agree that property tax exemptions are
not an efficient or equitable way to benefit elderly taxpayers. Almost all studies conclude that increased benefit
payments are a better solution. One study expressed that
idea as follows:
[W]orthy of consideration is the possibility of
raising social security benefits to a level where they
cover at least maintenance needs, and to keep them in
Although social security
line with rising prices.
benefits have been raised a number of times since 1950,
the minimum benefits are still unrealistically low,
and the social security income of the average recipient and his wife is well below the poverty line when
they have no other resources. 55

Homestead Exemptions

Homestead exemptions, a direct result of the depression of
the 1930s, were passed to encourage home ownership.
The first state to pass a homestead law.
.was Texas.
Minnesota and West Virginia quickly followed in
19 33.
By 19 39, the homestead- tax-exemption movement
had spread to Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, Wyoming, Iowa, Alabama, Arkansas, and Georgia.
This movement subsided nearly as quickly as it started,
.
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however.
Since 19 40, only two states, North Dakota and
Wisconsin, have passed such legislation, and Wisconsin's
law was soon repealed.
Wyoming recently repealed its
homestead- tax-exemption law also. There are, therefore,
twelve states that presently [1967] have the general
homestead feature as a part of their tax laws. 5
**

Examples of constitutional homestead exemptions include:

—

Georgia [Art. IX, Sec. 1] Amount of Homestead and
Exemptions.
There is hereby exempt from levy and sale,
by virtue of any process whatever under the laws of this
State, the property of every head of a family, or
guardian, or trustee of a family of minor children, or
every aged or infirm person, or person having the care
and support of dependent females of any age, who is not
the head of a family, realty or personalty, or both,
to the value in the aggregate of sixteen hundred
dollars; and the General Assembly shall have authority
to provide the manner of exempting said property, the
sale, alienation and encumbrance thereof, and to provide for the waiver of said exemption by the debtor.

—

Oklahoma [Art. XII-A.
Exemption from ad
Sec. 1]
valorem taxation authorized. All homesteads as is or
may be defined under the Laws of the State of Oklahoma
for tax exemption purposes, may hereafter be exempted
from all forms of ad valorem taxation by the Legislature; provided, that all assessments, levies, encumbrances and other contract obligations incurred or made
prior to the taking effect of such act of the Legislature shall in no way be affected or impaired by the
exercise of Legislative power as authorized by this
amendment.
,

—

The homestead of each and
Arkansas [Amend. 22, Sec. 1]
every resident of the State, whether or not such resident be married or unmarried, male or female, shall be
wholly exempt from all State taxes authorized or referred
to in Section 8 of Article XVI of the Constitution of
Arkansas in all cases where such homestead does not exceed the assessed valuation of One Thousand Dollars
Where the assessed valuation of such home($1,000.00).
stead exceeds One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) this exemption shall apply to the first One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00) of such valuation.

Homestead exemptions have fallen into disfavor because they
provide a sDecial privilege which cannot be offered to all taxpayers. As a consequence, the tax burden is redistributed
to individuals still subject to tax payment.
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Motor Vehicles, Airplanes, Boats

,

Etc.

A few states provide that motor vehicles, airplanes, boats
and other modes of transportation are exempt from property
taxation.
The exemption is usually included in the constitution so these classes of property can be taxed on a license
basis in lieu of the property tax.
Only five states impose
license taxes which are specifically declared to be in lieu
of personal property taxes.
They are Arizona, Florida,
Indiana, Minnesota and Wyoming.

Other Types of Exemptions
Crops and livestock are a popular exemption, with at least
twenty-eight states offering some kind of tax break to those
classes of property 57s evera i states provide exemptions for
varying periods of time on new plants and equipment, particularly in recent years for pollution-control facilities.
.

THE PROS AND CONS OF EXEMPTIONS
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has
criticized property tax exemptions because they place heavier
burdens on those still required to pay the tax. The Commission has called for a "forthright determination not only of
where it [exemption] should stop but how much of it should
be repealed. "$°
The kinds of exemptions that should be curtailed or
abolished include: (1) exemptions that foster inequity
and special privilege; (2) exemptions which are veiled
subsidies to private interests that would be difficult
to justify as frank state budget appropriations; (3)
exemptions which are an ill-chosen and defective method
of granting subsidies and awards and recognizing needs
that may in themselves have been justifiable; (4) exemptions which unnecessarily and needlessly complicate
the tax system and add to the difficulty and expense
of its administration. 59

Generally, tax exemptions are defended on the grounds that
they:
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Help attain desirable economic and social objectives.

1.

Provide needed tax relief to individuals and organi-

2.

zations
3.

.

Encourage a public service, thereby assisting govern-

ment.

Tax exemptions are criticized because they:
1.

Add to the burden of the remaining taxpayers.

2.

Weaken the revenue base.

3.

Sometimes are of questionable public purpose.

Effects on Present Tax Base
As already noted, all property in Montana is subject to taxation except that specifically exempted in the Constitution. °°
Any expansion of the list of exemptions would cut into the
existing property tax base. The following figures from the
State Board of Equalization give an idea of the assessed value
of certain classes of property that would be withdrawn from
the tax base if exemptions were extended in Montana: 61

Assessed Value

Class of Property

All Livestock
Motor Vehicles
Household Furnishings
Airplanes
Inventories
New Industry
Freeport Merchandise
Watercraf

$

CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES

What should a new constitution say about property tax exemptions? There are three major alternatives:
1.
A constitution could specify certain tax exemptions.
ARGUMENTS FOR: some exemptions have a long tradition; continuation of such exemptions is of fundamental importance to the

.
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existence of the organizations benefiting from the exemptions and to the realization of public purpose objectives.
exemptions should not be frozen in the
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
constitution; the legislature, not the constitution, is
best suited to respond to public attitudes regarding taxation matters.
A constitution could prohibit the legislature from
2.
exemptions have exgranting exemptions. ARGUMENTS FOR:
panded rapidly and the result has been an unreasonable
shift of the tax burden to properties not exempt;
the
overall real property tax base has been weakened by exemptions, and exemptions are nothing more than subsidies to
special interests. ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
legislative control
over exemptions would be in keeping with the traditional
concept of holding the legislature responsible on all matters
of public finance; where exemptions are clearly in the public
interest and where exemptions are needed to bring prompt
relief or to respond to economic urgencies, the legislature
should be free to act quickly and decisively; if exemptions
are forbidden, subsidies would result and subsidies are a
less desireable method of providing assistance, partly because they could o bring about government interference in the
private sector r62
3.
The constitution could take a middle approach,
containing a broad and brief provision setting forth a few
specific mandates on the legislature to grant exemptions or
a few specific restrictions on its power to do so.
The
legislature otherwise would be left free to act under its
general powers.
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Arizona Const. Art. IX, Sec. 2 There shall be further
exempt from taxation the property of widows, honorably
discharged soldiers, sailors, United States marines,
members of revenue marine service, nurse corps, or of
the components of auxiliaries of any thereof, residents
of this state, not exceeding the amount of two thousand
dollars, where the total assessment of such widow and
such other persons named herein does not exceed five
thousand dollars; provided, that no such exemption shall
be made for such persons other than widows unless they
shall have served at least sixty days in the military
or naval service of the United States during time of
war, and shall have been residents of this state prior
to September 1, 19 45.

—

Utah Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 2 Property not to exceed
$3,000 in value, owned by disabled persons who served
in any war in the military service of the United States
or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried widows
and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while serving in the military service of the
United States or the state of Utah were killed in action
or died as a result of such service may be exempted as
the legislature may provide.

—

New Jersey Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 3 Any citizen and
resident of this State now or hereafter honorable discharged or released under honorable circumstances from
active service, in time of war or of other emergency as,
from time to time, defined by the Legislature, in any
branch of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be
entitled, annually, to a deduction from the amount of
any tax bill for taxes on real and personal property,
or both, in the sum of $50.00 or if the amount of any
such tax bill shall be less than $50.00, to a cancellation thereof, which deduction or cancellation shall not
be altered or repealed.
Any person hereinabove described who has been or shall be declared by the United
States Veterans Administration, or its successor, to
have a service-connected disability, shall be entitled
to such further deduction from taxation as from time to
time may be provided by law.
The widow of any citizen
and resident of this State who has met or shall meet his
death on active duty in time of war or of other emergency
as so defined in any such service shall be entitled,
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during her widowhood, and while a resident of this State,
to the deduction or cancellation in this paragraph
provided for honorably discharged veterans and to such
further deduction as from time to time may be provided
The widow of any citizen and resident of this
by law.
State who has had or shall hereafter have active service
in time of war or of other emergency as so defined in any
branch of the Armed Forces of the United States and who
died or shall die while on active duty in any branch of
the Armed Forces of the United States, or who has been
or may hereafter be honorably discharged or released
under honorable circumstances from active service in time
of war or of other emergency as so defined in any branch
of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be entitled, during her widowhood and while a resident of this
State, to the deduction or cancellation in this paragraph provided for honorably discharged veterans and to
such further deductions as from time to time may be
provided by law.

—

California Const. Art. XII, Sec. 1 1/4 The (a) property
to the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000) of every
resident of this State who has served in the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Coast Guard or Revenue Marine (Revenue
Cutter) Service of the United States (1) in time of war,
or (2) in time of peace, in a campaign or expedition
for service in which a medal has been issued by the
Congress of the United States, and in either case has
received an honorable discharge therefrom, or who after
such service of the United States under such conditions
has continued in such service, or who in time of war is in
such service, or (3) or who has been released from active
duty because of disability resulting from such service
in time of peace or under other honorable conditions, or
lacking such amount of property in his own name, so much
of the property of the wife of any such person as shall
be necessary to equal said amount shall be exempt from
taxation; provided, this exemption shall not apply to
any person described in this subparagraph (a) owning
property of the value of five thousand dollars ($5,000)
or more, or where the wife of such person owns property
of the value of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or more;
and (b) property to the amount of one thousand dollars
($1,000) of the widow resident in this State, or if there
be no such widow, of the widowed mother resident in this
State, of every person who has so served and has died
either during his term of service or after receiving an
honorable discharge from said service, or who has been
released from active duty because of disability resulting from such service in time of peace or under other
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honorable conditions shall be exempt from taxation; provided this exemption shall not apply to any widow
described in this subparagraph (b) owning property of
the value of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more, nor
to any widowed mother described in this subparagraph (b)
owning property of the value of five thousand dollars
($5,000) or more; and (c) property to the amount of one
thousand dollars ($1,000) of pensioned widows, fathers,
and mothers, resident in this State, of soldiers,
sailors and marines who served in the Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, Coast Guard or Revenue Marine (Revenue Cutter)
Service of the United States shall be exempt from taxation; provided, this exemption shall not apply to any
person described in this subparagraph (c) owning property of the value of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or
more.
No exemption shall be made under the provisions of this
section of the property of a person who is not legal
No person described in this
resident of the State.
section who has served in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
Coast Guard or Revenue Marine (Revenue Cutter) Service
of the United States, nor a widow, father or mother
of such person, shall be eligible for an exemption as a
result of such service, unless such person was a resident of California either or both (1) at the time of his
entry into such service or (2) at the effective date of
the amendment of this sentence as proposed at the 1963
Regular Session of the Legislature, except that a widow,
father or mother who was eligible for the exemption at
the effective date of said amendment of this sentence
shall not lose his or her eligibility for the exemption
All real property owned
as a result of that amendment.
by the Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic and all
property owned by the California Soldiers Widows Home
Association shall be exempt from taxation.
52.

Sliger, "Veterans' Exemptions," p.

53.

Yung-Ping Chen, "Property-Tax Concessions to the Aged,"
Property Taxation USA ed. Richard W. Lindholm (Milwaukee:
University of V7isconsin Press, 1967), p. 226.

219.

,

234-235.

54.

Ibid

55.

Margaret Greenfield, Property Tax Exemptions for Senior
Citizens (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies,
University of California, 1966), p. 72.

56.

Sliger, "Veterans' Exemptions," p.

.

,

pp.

-106-

213.

NOTES
57.

Lloyd E. Slater, "Tax Incentives of State and Local
Governments," Tax Incentives (Lexington, Mass.: Heath
Lexington Bookie 1971) p. 55.
,

58.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
The Role of the States in Strengthening the Property
Tax VoT~. T~, Report A-17 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), p. 77.
,

59.

Ibid

60.

Montana Const. Art. XII, Sec.

61.

Montana, State Board of Equalization, Twenty-Fourth
Biennial Report (Helena, 1970), pp. 73-81.

62.

Hawaii, Legislative Reference Bureau, Article VI:
Taxation and Finance Hawaii Constitutional Convention
Studies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1968),

.

,

p.

78.

,

pp.

13-14.

-107-

1.

-108-

—

.

CHAPTER V
TAX RATE LIMITATIONS
The Montana Constitution in Article XII, Section 9 limits the
rate of property taxation that may be imposed for state purThat section provides:
poses.
The rate of taxation on real and personal property
for state purposes, except as hereinafter provided,
shall never exceed two and one-half mills on each
dollar of valuation; and whenever the taxable
property of the state shall amount to six hundred
million dollars ($600,000,000) the rate shall never
exceed two (2) mills on each dollar of valuation,
unless the proposition to increase such rate,
specifying the rate proposed and the time during
which the rate shall be levied shall have been submitted to the people at the general election and
shall have received a majority of all votes cast
for and against it at such election

....

The tax rates that may be imposed by counties, cities, towns
and school districts are not specifically limited by the
Montana Constitution, but such limitations can be--and are
set by the legislature.
The legislature is authorized in
Article XII, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution to
"invest in the corporate authorities [of counties, cities,
.powers to assess and
towns and municipal corporations].
collect taxes for such [county, town or municipal] purposes."
In addition, Article XII, Section 5 provides:
.

Taxes for city, town and school purposes may be
levied on all subjects and objects of taxation,
but the assessed valuation of any property shall not
exceed the valuation of the same property for state
and county purposes

TAX LIMITS TODAY

Table 1 illustrates the number of mills levied on property
by the state since 1951. The "General Fund" column shows the
The
mill levy authorized under Article XII, Section 9.
"University Millage" column shows the additional statewide
mill levy approved by the electorate as required in Article
XII, Section 9.
The levy has been used in Montana at varying rates since 1920, and the permissive six-mill rate was
approved by voters in 1948, 1958 and 1968.
In 1968, the
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TABLE 1
MILL LEVIES FOR STATE PURPOSES

Year

I
I-'
I-'
0

I

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

General
Fund
None
None
None
None
None
None
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
.30
2.00
.25
1.75
2.00
2.00
2.00
None

University
Millage
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
5.00
S.75
5.60
5.94
5.56
5. 72
5.75
6.00
6.00
6.00

University
Bonds
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
None
None
1.00
1.00
None
1.00
.13
.35
. 50
.59
.08
.26
.04
None
None
None

Mental
Hospital
Bonds

.so
• 50
• 50
• 50
1.00
.50
.80

.so
. so

None
None
None
.15
.17
.24
.03
• 09
.19
.10
.20
.10

State
Training
School
Bonds
None
None
None
None
• 50
• 50

.so
• so

• 50
None
None
None
None
.08
.14
.02
• 09
.10
.10
.10
None

Source: Montana, University of Montana, Bureau of Business and Economic Research,
Montana Fiscal Affairs Study, prepared for Interim Committee on Fiscal Affairs
(Missoula, 1970), p. 361.

Livestock
4.0
4.1
4.0
4.0
5.9
7.5
6.6
7.1
9.8

a.a

9.0
8.4
8.1
8.4
8.5
9.8
11. 0
11. 2
10.5
10.5
10.0

^

TAX RATE LIMITATIONS

mill levy provided 14.2 percent of the entire University
System budget. ^ The referendum ratified by the voters in
1968 provided:

Upon the approval of the electors of this state, to be
determined by their vote at the general election to be
held in November of 1968, the legislative assembly
shall levy a property tax, in addition to any levy
authorized by section 9, article XII of the Montana
Constitution, of not more than six (6) mills on the
taxable value of all real and personal property each
year for ten (10) years beginning with the year 19 69.
All revenue from this property tax levy shall be
appropriated for the support, maintenance, and improvement of the Montana university system.
The columns entitled "University Bonds," "Mental Hospital
Bonds" and "State Training School Bonds" are all bond
retirement levies approved by the Montana electorate as
required under Article XII, Section 9 and Article XIII,
Section 2 of the Montana Constitution.
The column headed
"Livestock" includes the other state mill levy created by
Article XII, Section 9. That levy is for livestock inspection, disease control and predator control, and is discussed
in Chapter VII.

General Fund Levy

Article XII, Section
nally provided:

9

of the Montana Constitution origi-

The rate of taxation on real and personal property
for State purposes in any one year shall never exceed
three (3) mills on each dollar of valuation; and whenever the taxable property in the State shall amount
to one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000), the
rate shall not exceed two and one-half (2 1/2) mills
on each dollar of valuation; and whenever the taxable
property in the state shall amount to three hundred
million dollars ($300,000,000), the rate shall never
exceed one and one-half (1 1/2) mills on each dollar
of valuation; unless a proposition to increase such
rate specifying the rate proposed and the time during
which the same shall be levied, shall have been submitted to the people at a general election, and shall
have received a majority of all the votes cast for and
against it at such election.
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The section was amended in 1910 because the taxable valuation of the state had reached the $300 million limit and the
one and one-half mill levy was not producing sufficient
revenue for state government. The 1910 amendment permitted
an immediate increase to two and one-half mills, but provided that the limit would be reduced to two mills when the
state's taxable valuation went above $600 million.
That
point has been reached, so the Montana Constitution now
limits the basic statewide property tax to two mills unless
voters specifically approve a higher rate.
The taxable
valuation of the state in 1970 was $952,698,790 and the
amount raised by the two-mill property tax was $1,904,007-*
only 1.14 percent of the total property tax collected in
Montana. 4

—

The two-mill statewide levy authorized in Section 9 now is
used primarily as a stopgap or emergency measure.
Section
84-713 of the Revised Codes of Montana 1947, provides:
,

Between the first and third Mondays of August of each
year, the governor must determine the rate of state
tax to be levied and collected upon the assessed
valuation of the property in the state, which, after
allowing twelve per cent (12%) for delinquencies in
the collection of taxes, must be sufficient to raise
the specific amount of the revenue required by the
legislative assembly for state purposes. The state
board of equalization must immediately thereafter
transmit to the county clerk of each county a statement
of such rate, and upon its receipt the county clerk
must, in writing, notify the state board of equalization thereof.

Prior to a 1969 amendment, the State Board of Equalization,
not the governor, determined the statewide property tax
rate.

The two-mill property tax levy is to be invoked only when
other taxation sources do not produce the revenue anticipated.
But the levy has been imposed frequently during the
last two decades to compensate for the increased demands on
state government so frequently, in fact, that it has become
almost a part of the regular state revenue program. The
two-mill levy was not imposed in 19 71, however, providing an
exception to what was becoming a rule.

—

Even when the two-mill, livestock, University System and
miscellaneous state levies are considered together, property
taxation is not a major revenue source for state government.
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It is, however, of crucial significance to local governments
At the local government level, property taxes
in Montana.
supply about 9 5 percent of total tax revenues 5 and about 61
percent of total government revenues well above the United
States average of 42.5 percent. ° The extraordinary importance of the property tax to local governments in Montana
is traceable at least partly to the limited state aid program for local governments.
In fiscal 1968, state aid to
local governments in Montana accounted for only 18.8 percent

—

of total local government revenues, a figure that puts
Montana forty-fifth in the nation.'

PROPERTY TAX LIMITATIONS AND EDUCATION
As noted previously, the Montana Constitution limits statewide property taxation only and does not limit the use of
local property taxes by individual counties, cities, towns
or school districts. However, a recent California Supreme
Court ruling" concerning local school district property
taxes could have profound effects on the statewide property
tax limitation in Article XII, Section 9 of the Montana
Constitution.

The California court held that that state's method of public
school financing, with its substantial dependence on local
property taxes and resultant discrepancies in school revenue,
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. That decision, now
on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, hits directly
at the heart of Montana's system of financing education.
Montana, like virtually every other state except Hawaii,
depends heavily on local property taxes for support of its
schools.
If the California decision is upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court and if the property tax is to continue as a primary
source of revenue for schools, it might be necessary for the
legislature to impose a statewide uniform levy for public
education.
Such a statewide levy would place the responsibility for education finance on a state-level basis, and
apparently would avoid the allegedly unconstitutional nature
of the California system.

However, under the present property tax restriction in the
Montana Constitution, such a uniform levy would be impossible
without a public vote above the two-mill level.
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Foundation Program
The combined elementary (25 mills) and high school (15 mills)
countywide levies for support of the Montana School Foundation Program virtually constitute a statewide mill levy for
support of education now. The full 40-mill authorization
was levied in all but nine counties in 1969-1970.9 Some
counties impose lower levies because the valuation of property in the county, on a per student basis, is high enough
that lower levies are sufficient to fund the foundation
program schedules. For example, Powder River County levied
only 12.88 mills in 1969-70. 10

OTHER TAX LIMITS
Table 2 sets down tax limitations in effect in Montana. Only
the general fund levy and the livestock levy are created by
The table shows the widespread use of
the Constitution.
statutory property tax limitations in Montana, particularly
The status of such limitaat lower levels of government.
tions in Montana has been explained as follows:
.have existed
Some of the property tax rate limits.
unchanged for many years. However, a large number of
the limits have recently changed and are also of
relatively recent origin. For example, the 19 69
Montana Legislature increased the rate limits on
property taxes imposed for general fund purposes from
20 to 24 mills for cities and towns and from 20 to 22
and 24 mills for counties, with no change in the state
In addition, the 19 69
general fund limit of 2 mills.
legislature enacted legislation that permitted the
creation of "Conservancy Districts" for the conservation and development of the water and land resources
of Montana, the elected directors of which cannot levy
millage rates exceeding 2 mills to meet general obligaThe
tions or 3 mills to pay bonded indebtedness.
creation of new limits and changes in old limits are
common activities for successive Montana Legislatures.
In 1945 Montana property tax law included thirty-six
rate limitations as opposed to the fifty-seven that
exist in 1970. During the past quarter century,
twenty-one new specific limits have been created and
twenty- three changes have been made in the 19 4 5 limits.
.existed
Only thirteen of the fifty-seven limits.
.

.
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TABLE

2

SPECIFIC FUNCTION PROPERTY TAX RATE LIMITS FOR

MONTANA STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1970
Specific Functi

State Taxes
General Fund
University Millage Fund
University Bonds
Hospital Bonds of 1955
Training School Bonds of 1955
Special Livestock Taxes, Total
(a) Support of Livestock
Commission Sheep
All Livestock Except Sheep
(b) Livestock Bounty Fund
Sheep
All Livestock Except Sheep
(c) Livestock Sanitary Fund

City and Town Taxes
General Fund
(a) Support of General Municipal and Administrative
(b)

TAX RATE LIMITATIONS

with the same millage rates in 1945. Consequently,
property tax rate limits in Montana must not be regarded as static.
*-

The point to emphasize about tax limitations in Montana is
that most of them are not established by constitutional manAnd the two tax limits that are set by the Constitudate.
The two-mill
tion are not of overriding significance.
statewide property tax is only a minor component of the state
tax program, and the livestock levy is determined on a
basis that appears to avoid the constitutional limit on the
levy. 12

OTHER STATES
Many other states limit the state property tax rate in
their constitutions. For example, Colorado [Art. X, Sec. 11]
limits property taxation to four mills on each dollar of
valuation; Georgia [Art. VII, Sec. 12 (3)] prohibits a rate
of more than one-fourth mill per dollar; Idaho [Art. VII,
Sec. 9] establishes a ceiling of ten mills on each dollar of
assessed value, and Missouri [Art. X, Sec. 8] places a limit
of 10 cents on each $100 of valuation.
The rate limitations set in state constitutions vary greatly,
One commentator has summed up the extent and nature of the
constitutional limitations in this manner :"
The most drastic tax rate limitations are contained
in the constitution of Arkansas, where tax rates, for
all practical purposes, are virtually frozen at existing levels.
The most usual constitutional tax rate limitations
relate to property taxes. Ceiling rates on levies
for general state purposes are imposed in about onethird of the states. Most provisions for property tax
levies for special purposes call for specific tax
rates or for a ceiling rate, but most of these rates
are at relatively low levels and do not, as a practical matter, seriously limit the taxing authority of
In two states,
the state for general state purposes.
North Carolina and Texas, exceptions from general
The
ceiling rates are made for school purposes.
rate limitation on a state property tax for public
school purposes in Utah is fixed at 56.25 per cent of
a required minimum state aid program, but no limit
is placed on the cost of the minimum school program
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In Montana and New Mexico,
required of the legislature.
the ceiling rate may be exceeded if authorized by
referendum vote. Limited exceptions from general
property tax rate limitations are contained in the constitution of several other states.

The Constitutions of Florida, Missouri, South Carolina,
and Utah limit rates on specified classes of personal
The California, Kentucky, West Virginia
property.
[constitutions], as well as some other states, also
classify property for tax purposes and provide differential rate limitations.
The constitutions of several states limit rates on other
Ceiling income tax rates are imposed in
types of taxes.
Death
Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina.
taxes in Alabama and Florida, as previously indicated,
are limited to amounts that may be credited against
federal estate taxes; specific rate limitations are
applicable to death and gift taxes in Louisiana. The
California constitution specifies the rate for an
in-lieu tax on insurance companies, but provides that
this rate may be changed by a two- thirds vote of the
In Minnesota a referendum vote is required
legislature.
to change the rate of the in-lieu gross receipts tax on
railroads. The severance tax on sulphur production is
limited in Louisiana.
Two important points should be noted from that discussion:
1.
Property tax limitations, similar to Montana's twomill limit, are found in about a third of the state constitutions.
2.
Some state constitutions also limit the rates of
other kinds of taxes, including income, death, inheritance
and severance taxes.
The Montana Constitution, however,
limits only property taxes.

PROS AND CONS OF RATE LIMITATIONS

Tax rate limitations have been defended on the following
grounds
1.
They are an effective way to check government spending; governments have to economize and make better use of

available resources.
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2.
Rate limits expand the tax base by forcing governments to find new or alternative sources of revenue.
3.

Taxpayers are protected from oppressive tax rates.

4.

Tax limitations may attract businesses into an area.

On the other hand, limitations have been criticized on the
following basis:

When governments are forced to find new sources of
1.
revenue, they tend to rely on nuisance taxes and user charges
the result is greater inequity in the tax base.

Constitutional tax limitations are inflexible and
2.
difficult to change.
3.

Taxation rates should respond to changing conditions

4.
Governmental revenue systems should be tuned to
fluctuations in the economy.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional tax rate limitations have been severely criticized by national tax organizations, reform groups and
But such limitations are still a frequent proeconomists.
vision in state constitutions.

Although Montana limits property tax rates for state purposes,
those limitations do not hamper seriously the state revenue
The state does not depend on property taxes as a
program.
major source of revenue, and rate limitations are not a
significant feature of Montana's constitutional fiscal provisions.
However, such limitations are widely used at the
statutory level.
The recent California Supreme Court decision of Serrano v
Priest raises additional questions about the advisability of
retaining the two-mill statewide property tax limit in the
constitution.
.
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CHAPTER VI
MINING TAXATION

MONTANA PROVISION
The procedure for taxing mines and mining claims is specified in Article XII, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution:

All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock
in place, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper,
lead, coal or other valuable mineral deposits, after
purchase thereof from the United States, shall be
taxed at the price paid the United States therefor,
unless the surface ground, or some part thereof, of
such mine or claim, is used for other than mining
purposes, and has a separate and independent value for
such other purposes, in which case said surface ground,
or any part thereof, so used for other than mining
purposes, shall be taxed at its value for such other
purposes, as provided by law; and all machinery used
in mining, and all property and surface improvements
upon or appurtenant to mines and mining claims which
have a value separate and independent of such mines
or mining claims, and the annual net proceeds of
all mines and mining claims shall be taxed as provided
by law

"Net proceeds" is the controversial term in the mining tax
provision.
The Montana Fiscal Affairs Study described the
purpose and effect of the net proceeds tax as follows:

The tax imposed on the net proceeds of mining
operations and on the production of crude oil and
natural gas is frequently thought of as a separate
tax.
In reality, the net proceeds tax is a portion
of the property tax.
Net proceeds are defined as the remainder after subtracting from the gross value of the product: 1) all
royalties paid either in cash or in kind; 2) all expenditures for necessary labor, machinery, and supplies
used in the operations; 3) the cost of improvement,
repairs, and betterments of the property.
Item (3) is
actually deducted over a period of ten years. This
amortized deduction is similar to ordinary treatment
of depreciation.
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Royalties are deducted because they are assessed to the
In the case of oil and gas royalties,
recipient.
the producer pays the net proceeds tax on behalf of the
royalty owner.
The amount determined as being the net proceeds are
placed in Class 1 of the property tax classification
In this class, taxable value is 100 percent
scheme.
The property tax levies in the
of assessed value.
school district where the mineral is mined apply to net
proceeds
It has been
Economic aspects of the net proceeds tax
widely argued that taxation of mineral property is
adverse to the conservation of mineral resources and
retards exploration and development of reserves. When
the value of a resource in the ground is made the subject of taxation, the time pattern of resource exploitation is shifted toward the present, and exploration is
limited since taxation becomes effective immediately
after a mineral deposit is discovered and before producThis is the case
tion and a flow of income commence.
when the full value of the mine is taxed annually at current property tax rates.
.

Montana's net proceeds tax avoids some of these undesirRather than levy a property tax on minable effects.
erals in place, Montana imposes a tax on net proceeds of
Montana's net proceeds
mines, oil wells, and gas wells.
tax comes closer to being a tax on net income under
the existing definition of net proceeds than a strict
Because it is a tax based
ad valorem property tax.
on income operators cannot minimize their tax burden
Montana's net
by rapid depletion of mineral resources.
proceeds tax has a degree of temporal economic neutrality
not attributable to a strict ad valorem "property" tax
on mines
,

•*

.

History of the Provision

Article XII, Section 3 is one of the most controversial proPersons who know
visions in the Montana Constitution.
nothing else about the state Constitution often share a
belief that mining interests get some "special break" in the
18 89 document.
The nature of the "break" seldom is described
in specific terms, but stories of conspiracies, power plays
and special interest politics often are associated with the
However, historimine tax section of the 1889 Constitution.
ans themselves disagree about whether the mine tax provision
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resulted from a "conspiracy."

One historian, John W. Smurr,

has noted:

It is true that from the vantage point of today it would
appear that two economic groups, by nature opposed on
taxation, were then emerging and would soon clash in
Unquestionably the mine owners enjoyed unusual
public.
advantages; and the agrarian elements must have known
these were in part unnecessary and in consequence disIt is customary to jump from these assumpliked them.
tions to a third, namely that the mine owners got wind
of forthcoming resistance and combined to forestall it.

Joseph Kinsey Howard, in Montana: High, Wide, and Handsome
increases speculation about a "conspiracy" with this
description of the mining tax fight in the 1889 Convention:

,

The mine tax provision was submitted to the convention
in virtually the same form as it had appeared in the
proposed 1884 constitution, also drawn by the mining
It read:
interests.
"All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock
in place, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper,
lead, coal, or other valuable mining deposits, after
purchase thereof from the United States, shall be
taxed at the price paid the United States therefor
unless the surface ground, or some part thereof, of
such mine or claim, is used for other than mining
purposes, in which case such surface ground. . .shall
be taxed at its value for such other purposes, as provided by law; and all machinery.
.and all property
and surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines
and mining claims. . .and the annual net proceeds of
all mines and mining claims shall be taxed as provided by law. [Emphasis Howard's].
,

.

"The price paid the United States therefor" was $5 per
claim; in some of these claims, whose surface area
was only 1,500 by 600 feet, copper ore already in
sight underground was worth millions. And while provision was made for taxing machinery and surface property, the constitutional limitation automatically
prevented legislative adjustment of the levy to the
property's increase in value on development as for
instance a farmer's soil increases in value with cultivation, which costs the farmer more in taxes.

—

-123-

MINING TAXATION
The stockmen bellowed, but the miners had them; there
was no formula by which they could assess the probable
value of a mine, admittedly a hazardous operation.
So
the fight centered on the "net proceeds" provision,
the range men and farmers attempting unsuccessfully to
strike out the word "net" or the whole section and leave
determination of how the proceeds should be taxed to
future legislators.
Leader of their fight was W. A. Burleigh, a Republican
lawyer from Miles City, cow country capital.
Most of the
argument occurred in committee of the whole, thus giving
opportunity to [William A.] Clark to take the floor and
unburden his pious soul:
"I stand here today as a

representative of the mining
interests, and I will venture to say that there is no
class of men engaged in any industry in this Rocky Mountain country that has a higher regard for integrity or
is more disposed to make a fair and equitable return of
their property.
.but they do contend that the only way
to reach a fair and equitable assessment of their values
is to base it upon the net proceeds of their mines.
It is the only method whereby the state can secure from
this species of property a reasonable and just revenue,
and at the same time protect those men, those brave
pioneers who have come out here and made the wilderness
blossom as the rose, and opened up these great mountains
and brought their hidden wealth to light; yea, I say,
it is the duty of the members of this convention to
throw such safeguards around this great industry as are
proper and just; this great industry that is the foundation of almost all the prosperity of this country, and
has made all the valleys and mountains of Montana productive. "
.

.

.

Burleigh had yet to see a blossom growing out of a mine
shaft, and he was not impressed.
He offered an amendment to the "net proceeds" provision: "And the legislature shall provide some stringent means to ascertain
the actual income.
No salaries paid officers of the
mining corporations shall be accounted as an expense
or deducted from the gross earnings.
The levy shall
not be less than two per cent of the net earnings."
The amendment was lost.
Burleigh got his wind back
after a while, however, and moved to strike the entire
"net proceeds" section.
He lost, though he finally succeeded in obtaining a record vote in which only nine
stood with him and fifty stood against him. Finally

—
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he showed signs of losing his temper and read his
colleagues a lecture:
"I think this is a matter that should by every principle
known to constitutional law and to other law, be left
in the hands of the people to be exercised by their representatives. ... I know of no reason which would justify
us in legislating upon mines here, prescribing the rules
by which they are to be governed or taxed, any more than
upon stock, cattle or breeding mares, or other species
of property. ... Is it possible that there is an industry in this country that is of so precarious a nature
that the owners and promoters.
.are afraid to submit
[its taxation] to the people to be determined by them?
If so, I would advise all such men to abandon such a
vocation and pursue some calling which is not of so
precarious a nature. ... I know these mines should be
fostered, and I believe the people will foster them so
far as they are entitled to be fostered."
.

It was a gallant but hopeless fight.
It took Montana
more than thirty years to undo the work of Clark and his
lackeys in this constitutional convention, to force even
moderate additional taxation upon the "brave pioneers who
made the wilderness blossom as the rose." A dozen years
after the constitutional convention, as Montana's capitol
was being dedicated, a fearless and farseeing pioneer
named Col. W. F. Sanders took occasion to remind the
citizens of how they had been short-weighted by Clark and
his allies:

"With the courage which was a conspicuous trait in their
character, to assist a hazardous, hopeful industry, they
[the founders of the commonwealth] took upon themselves
a portion of its burdens by absolving it from its share
of taxation.
When thus delivered the interest and
amount involved was small, but it has now grown to colossal proportions.
.but the advantage thus given has not
been relinquished and what was in its nature and purpose
designed to be temporary, by the forethought and adroitness of greed has been taken from the domain of legislation and become interwoven in constitutional enactment
as a permanent policy of the state.
It does not require
a wide knowledge of human nature to discern that when
the ownership of private property does not carry with it
the equal burden which that ownership implies, a disregard of the sanctities of titles is begotten which
may wreak abounding mischief.
Absolute equality of
taxation.
.is primal essential justice unless it is
.

.
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desired to cultivate a superior class to own the property and a proletariat or peasantry to become their
serfs.

"

-*

The "conspiracy theory" has not gone unchallenged, however.
Smurr, after an extended study of the period before and
during the 1889 Convention, concluded that no great conHe is joined in
spiracy surrounded Article XII, Section 3.
that conclusion by a 1968 historical analysis of the Convention. 4

Smurr gives the following reasons for his conclusion:
1.
It was only logical to give mines and mining interThe mining industry was the backests special treatment.
bone of the territory, and would be a significant economic
force in the new era of statehood.

It should be constantly kept in mind that mining had
created a Territory out of nothing, and had it not
been for this as all Montanans knew few would have
We must also
gone there and fewer still remained.
note that the economic base of the region was not as
broad as one might think.
In 1889 the chance was
roughly one-in-two that the average Montanan was a
miner, a farmer, a stockman-herder, or a laborer;
but if he were a laborer he was probably a mining
laborer.
Many who were not connected with the mining
industry had gotten their start in it; some no doubt
had accumulated little nest eggs through mining that
later enabled them to make their start in agriculture
or business.
The most casual perusal of the biographies in the subscription histories shows how often
this was true of the upper crust, if not of everybody.

—

—

As for the seventy-five men elected to the Constitutional Convention in 1889, no subject concerned them
more than mining.
It is a fact that one-half of the
members were associated with mining in an economic
way.
Of the seventy-five, thirty- three may be classified in this manner:
If they were not actually miners
or mine operators, either they held considerable
mining stock, dealt in mining law, speculated in mines,
or in a dozen other ways found their personal fortunes
tied to Montana's greatest industry. As for the others,
one can only observe that farmers sold their produce
to mining towns (sold it primarily because of mining
towns, according to one theory), mercantilists dealt
with the same class of customers, medical men practiced
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on hard-rock diggers as often (or more often) than on
other men, and probably not one lawyer in ten had failed
to get his share of the mining litigation that was
always taking place.

The final vote on the mining provision was relativeIf a great conspiracy existed, the opposition
forces would not have been so large.
2.

ly close.

The result was a near thing, 39 to 30 in favor of the
new exemption.
If this is offered as proof of a quid
pro quo and thus of a "conspiracy," certainly the
closeness of the vote leads to other interpretations.
The minority included almost all the men who had constantly opposed "legislation" in the constitution.
The
majority included those who sponsored the amendment,
those who had supported it, and those who had opposed
other provisions extending special privileges to farmers.
With these facts in mind, the possibility of proving a conspiracy theory is considerably reduced.
,

3.
A conspiracy was unnecessary. Mining interests had
received special tax breaks during territorial days, and no
one really expected that status to be any different after
statehood.

The real question is whether any such thing [conspiracy]
was necessary, for there is little evidence that the
public expected the exemption to be discontinued, and
none that it rebelled when it was not. Most of the
Territorial newspapers were free to make of the issue
what they chose, and we have seen how little they were
concerned with it. The handful of papers which actively
opposed the exemption never completely denied its utility,
and behaved as though they recognized from the start that
they were wasting their time.
Still more important is the
fact that, in a period when each political party needed
an issue, the exemption was not drawn upon for material.
While it is true that most of the issues which arose in
convention were not regarded as suitable for partisan
warfare, those which were selected were of a childish
sort and reveal the thinness of the political mind. One
must of course admit that the desire to obtain statehood
quickly and not to prejudice the case by engaging in controversies without end was a strong one; and yet the
delegates went out of their way, when preparing a public
address on their labors, to show how much stronger the
mining industry would be if the constitution were ratified.
Few other aspects of their work were singled out for
special commendation.
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As one commentator said, the mining provision

was probably suggested by the conditions as they then
existed and was deemed proper, having in view the desire that nothing be placed in the path of the development of the mineral resources of the Territory. 8

Why the Controversy ?
The mining tax clause is controversial partly because of contentions that the mining interests abused their privileged
position.
Granted a break (in effect, almost an exemption)
from property taxation, critics charged that mine owners
often did not pay their fair share of taxes even under the
special constitutional tax system.
The most damning indictment against the mining interests
was prepared in 1919 by Lewis Levine, a professor of economics at the University of Montana. ^ Levine 's acid and frank
expose aroused bitter passions, and left bruises that have
yet to heal.
But his essay also established some telling
points about Article XII, Section 3.

Levine insisted that the net proceeds tax was just another
It
way to determine the taxable value of mining property.
was not, he argued, some special burden tacked on to mining
claims evidently an argument used by mining officials of
the time.
Levine said:

—

The method prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes consists in obtaining the value of a mine by summing
up the price paid the United States for the surface,
the value of the improvements, and the net proceeds
This may be illustrated by the assessment
for one year.
of the mining industry in Silver Bow County for the
In that year, the total assessment of mining
year 1917.
claims in the county was $149,850; the assessment of
improvements was $1,09 8,120; mining and manufacturing
machinery amounted to $2,021,600; while the net proceeds
in the county were $44,282,500; that is, the total
assessment of mining in Silver Bow County in 1917 was
If the net proceeds had been deducted, the
$47,552,070.
assessment of mining property in the county would have
amounted to $3,269,570. That is, the assessment of
mining claims, lands, improvements, and all machinery
in and about the Silver Bow mines in 1917, was a little
over three million dollars.
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According to Mr. Kelly's statement [Kelly was head of
the Anaconda Company].
.when the mines have been
assessed for their surface at a fixed price and for
their improvements, they have been fully assessed as
compared with all other forms of property.
In other
words, three million dollars in his opinion was the real
value of the great mining industry of the Butte District
in 1917, and the taxes paid on every dollar over and
above the three million was an extra burden placed on
the mines in a spirit of discrimination.
The statutes
declare that the true value of property means the amount
at which the property would be taken in payment of a
Do Mr. Kelly and his
just debt due to a solvent debtor.
associates mean to say that they would be willing to
dispose of all the mining property in Silver Bow for
three million dollars?10
.

Levine continued:
The tax on net proceeds is not in addition to the taxes
on surface and improvements.
It is merely a device for
obtaining as nearly as possible the true value of
a mine.
The law simply implies that a mine is a form
of property, totally different from other kinds of
property;
that it is impossible to assess it in the
manner in which land or banks or gas companies are
assessed; and that it is necessary, therefore, to have
recourse to a different device which should be as well
adapted to this form of property as possible. The
device is to assume that the true value of a mine equals
approximately the net proceeds of the year plus the
nominal price paid for the surface and the value of
the improvements.

Levine contended that there were at least five defects in the
"net proceeds" provision of the Montana Constitution:
1.
Only five states prescribed the method of mine taxation in their constitutions Montana, Nevada, Utah,
Wyoming and South Carolina. 12

—

2.
The net proceeds tax is fundamentally different from
other forms of property taxation, thus creating serious inequities
.

Levine wrote:
This "net proceeds" feature of the law has the effect
of adjusting the taxes paid by the mines to their
earnings
When the mines are prosperous and show larger
.
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net proceeds, they pay higher taxes.
When business is
less thriving, net proceeds and the taxes paid by the
mines decrease accordingly.
On the other hand, all
other property in the state has to pay taxes on its
value regardless of its earnings for the year. A farmer may have a crop failure or a business may show a
deficit for the year, yet the assessment of the
farmer's or business man's property would show little,
if any, effect of such conditions. 3
3.
The fluctuating character of "net proceeds" creates
uncertainty and fiscal unreliability at the state level.- 4
1-

4.
The assessment of mines, a job that requires special
training and experience, was left to local assessors.
Levine stated:

As a rule, the county assessors in the state are content
to receive the statements of valuation sent in by the
This practically
officials of the mining companies.
leaves the assessment of mines in the hands of the
owners of the mines and reduces the supervision of the
taxing authorities of the state over mine assessment
to almost nothing. '

The State
This objection has been at least partially met.
Board of Equalization now handles "net proceeds" taxation.
5.
A special tax system should not be frozen in the
constitution. According to Levine:

But the greatest significance of this provision is that
it limits the powers of the legislative bodies of the
state to tax the mines in any way which may be deemed
No other class of property in Montana is
necessary.
protected by such special constitutional enactment.
The general limitations on the taxing power of the
state, such as the requirements of uniformity and equality are considered sufficient for all property in the
state.
The mines alone are accorded special constitutional protection.

^

At the time of Levine' s publication, his comments and obserHis writings are responvations stirred much controversy.
sible, at least partially, for the adoption of the metal
That initiative
mines tax in 1924 by a vote of the people.
measure is now codified in the Revised Codes of Montana
The metal mines tax is levied
1947, Title 84, Chapter 20.
as a percent of the value of the gross product of the company.
All proceeds from the tax are placed in the general
,

fund.
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The campaign for Initiative 28, the metal mines tax, has
been described by one historian, Howard, as follows:

The metal mines' production in 19 22 had been worth
more than $20,000,000, but the net proceeds tax
In contrast,
collected by the state was only $13,559.
the oil industry's gross production had been worth less
than $3,000,000, but it had paid net proceeds taxes
of $28,000.
Coal production had been valued at only
$9,000,000, but coal had paid $147,000, ten times as
much as copper, in proceeds taxes to the state. Oil
was paying 1 per cent of gross production and coal
about 1.5 per cent, whereas on a basis of gross, copper
was paying only .06 of 1 per cent.
The answer, [Gov. Joseph] Dixon said, was a license
tax of 12C a ton on the gross tonnage of ore produced.
This levy, the first striking at gross production of
But,
the mines, he asked the legislature to enact.
under pressure of various kinds from the [Anaconda]
Company lobbyists, the majority which Dixon had counted upon in the assembly faded away and the proposal
was defeated.
The constitution, which had provided for taxation of
the "net proceeds" of mines, had also, in another section, specifically authorized imposition of "license"
taxes on individuals and corporations doing business in
Montana.
Taking advantage of this provision, supporters
of mine tax revision now drafted Initiative No. 28 and
submitted it to the voters of the state at the 1924
election.

Initiative No. 28, exempting
This was the showdown.
mines with an annual gross production of less than
$100,000, established a graduated levy upon production
exceeding that sum, ranging from .25 of 1 per cent to a
It repealed the earlier 1.5 per
maximum of 1 per cent.
Its
cent license tax on each mine's net proceeds.
supporters said it would bring in half a million dollars a year.
Dixon, seeking reelection, campaigned for the InitiaThe voters were reminded that the state tax comtive.
mission had found the mines contributing but 8.79 per
cent of Montana's revenue while the stricken farms paid
32 per cent, livestock more than 10 per cent, and railThey were advised to read Levine's conclusions
roads 17.
on the unreliability of the old "net proceeds" system:
he had found indications that Montana assessors took
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the Company's word for what its "net proceeds" were.
Arizona's mines in 1916, Levine reported, produced a
net of $41,845,604 from a gross of $82,036,342, whereas
Montana's net totaled but $28,605,355 from a gross half
again as large as Arizona s--$146 500 000
Arizona's
assessed mine valuation for tax purposes was $209 for
each $100 of gross proceeds; Montana's was $29. And
some mines in both states were under the sane owner'

ship.

.

.

,

,

.

.

Dixon lost the governorship to a complaisant small-town
lawyer, John E. Erickson; but Initiative No. 28 carried
by more than 20,000 votes.
Dixon said:
"In years to come the people of Montana will gradually
realize the great step forward that has been taken
toward equalizing the tax burden.
With these
things accomplished I have every cause to feel fully
content with my four years' service as governor."
.

.

.

The gross proceeds license tax didn't reach its sponsors' goal of $500,000, but from 1925 on it did bring
in $300,000 to $400,000 annually (in 1942, $382,502),
whereas in 1922, a bad year, "net proceeds" and license
taxes together had only cost the Company $24,527.
It
was in 1922 that John D. Ryan, chairman of the board,
said in Butte:
"No disgrace to this Company could be
as great as to have the majority of Montanans feel that
we had not fulfilled our duty to them, had not done
the fair thing. ..."

The shades of Burleigh and Sanders, chuckling, probably
agreed that while the shame, after 1925, must have
been almost more than the Company could bear, that
difference between $24,000 and $300,000 was going to
.*'
mean a lot to Montana.
.

.

The State Board of Equalization has explained the four major
including the net proceeds tax
taxes on Montana minerals
and the metal mines tax, as follows:
,

At the time of the constitutional convention, in 1889,
Montana's only industries worthy of mention were metal
mining and stock raising, with mining greatly predominant.
Because of the peculiar character of mining
property, and in recognition, perhaps, of the practical
impossibility of intelligently valuing our fissure vein
mines, the delegates to that convention wrote into the
constitution the "net proceeds clause" providing a
Under
special method for the assessment of such property.
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this provision and subsequent legislation, mines are
assessed by the county assessors at the price paid the
Government therefor, and on improvements and machinery
If the surface ground has a separate
of all kinds.
and independent value for some other purpose it is
assessed at its full value for such other purpose. Net
proceeds are assessed by the State Board of Equalization, such assessment being based on verified statements
filed with the board by the producers and certified to
The taxthe counties in which the mines are situated.
able value of the assessment at the price paid the
Government ($2.50 to $20.00 per acre) and of the net
proceeds assessment is 100% of the full and true value.
The taxable value of the machinery, structures and
appurtenances is 30% of full and true value. These
assessments all take the regular levies applicable to
the taxing district in which the property is located.

Coal mines, oil properties, lime rock, gypsum and other
quarries and mines producing precious and semi-precious
gems or stones, or any other valuable mineral or minerals, all come within the provisions of the net proceeds
law and are assessed as outlined above.

Royalties
Oil and gas royalties are assessed in the name of the
operator who is jointly liable with the royalty owner
The tax is payable by the
for the payment of the tax.
operator, who may withhold an estimated amount so paid
Other royalties are
from current royalty payments.
Each royalty is
assessed direct to the royalty owner.
valued at the amount received by the owner, and is
assigned to Class 1, taxable at 100%.

Mines License Tax
In addition to the taxes paid on the assessments listed
above, coal mine operators are required to pay directly
[varying from
to the state treasurer a license tax.
four to ten cents a ton]; oil producers pay 2.1% of the
value on the first 450 barrels of all oil produced and
cement manufactur2.65% on the balance of production;
ers pay four cents per barrel; plaster manufacturers
pay five cents per ton, and metal mines operators pay
annually a tax based on the market value of the metals
produced.
.

.

.

.
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Metal Mines License Tax
The amount of metal mines license tax is determined by
the State Board of Equalization from verified reports
filed by the metal producers, and in this connection the
board has authority to examine the books of smelters and
reduction works if it deems such examination necessary
or advisable.
The first $100,000 of gross production in
each year pays a tax of .15% plus $1.00; the next
$150,000 or portion thereof pays a tax of .75 of 1%; the
next $150,000 or portion thereof pays a tax of .86 of
1%; the next $100,000 or portion thereof pays a tax of
1.15%, and all over $500,000 pays a tax of 1.438%.
In arriving at the market value of the metals, average
quotations in Engineering and Mining Journal are used as
a base, and from these average prices, the Montana value
is determined.
The same average prices govern all assessments.
The amount payable by the metal producers in 1969
was $728,208.
In 1970 the amount payable is $1,440,897.
All of this revenue is credited to the general fund of

the state. 18

Table 3 lists the amount of net proceeds reported by mineral
interests in Montana for the last ten years.

OTHER STATES
The chart below illustrates methods of property taxation for
mineral resources used in several states :^

Basis of Assessment

State

Colorado
Kansas
MONTANA
Nebraska
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming

87.5 percent of market value
30.0 percent of justifiable
value of mineral rights
100 percent of net proceeds
35 percent of market value
50 percent of market value
80 percent of actual value
100 percent of market value

Levine, in his controversial 1919 essay, also suggested
several alternative methods of mining taxation, including
taxes on tonnage, gross earnings, capital stock and ad
valorem property taxes. ^" His purpose was to show that net
proceeds taxation was not the only method of valuing mining
proeproperty for property taxation purposes.
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TABLE 3
NET PROCEEDS FOR MONTANA MINERAL INTERESTS
Metal Mines
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

w

U1
I

Net proceeds

Gross value

Net proceeds

$70,082,082
71,493,748
69,365,711
61,369,699
79,507,890
99,348,675
103,376,354
53,140,563
62,868,427
106,009,001

$ 3,120,927
2,264,918
36,510
6,258
1,206,550
12,669,875
5,663,908

$ 1,072,826
1,092,465
895,308
864,476
888,613
1,070,242
1,213, 401
882,223
1,196,95 6
2,109,874

$ 70,848
165,702
167,590
146,198
176,342
201,065
235,151
215,298
293,248
682,635

6,329
15,465,558

Miscellaneous 1

Oil and Gas

I

I-'

Coal

Gross value

Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Gross value

Net proceeds

Gross value

Net proceeds

$ 75,297,504
75,837,386
78,201,281
75,874,315
75,421,243
80,333,098
87,428,667
88,171,696
123,795,811
125,455,003

$39 I 413 I 638
38,202,701
37,833,641
33,473,130
32,526,621
35,644,583
40,597,611
38,507,590
59,225,451
56,906,431

$13,885,179
12,841,970
14,240,297
16,859,140
19,021,865
18,277,065
23,171,670
22,183,963
24,754,715
24,261,012

$1,974,345
2,241,063
2,728,266
2,302,604
2,445,971
1,558,376
2,609,187
2,640,151
2,237,455
2,609,406

1. Includes talc, lime rock, bentonite, gypsum, cement, phosphate, vermiculite, calcium carbonate
and fluorspar.
Source: Montana, State Board of Equalization, Twentieth, Twenty-First, Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third,
Twenty-Fourth Biennial Reports (Helena, 1961-1970).

MINING TAXATION

CONCLUSION
Article XII, Section 3 raises significant and difficult
Does it provide the best way to handle mining
questions.
taxation? Does it offer an unfair tax break? Or is it an
equitable and practical way to determine the value of
mining property?
The Montana Fiscal Affairs Study concluded:

Without considerably more information on the taxation of mineral resources in the states it is
difficult to determine exactly where Montana stands.
To get an accurate picture of the situation it would
be necessary to determine the total tax bill imposed
in each state through corporation income taxes,
production taxes, property taxes, and conservation
Comparisons among the states of any of these
taxes.
taxes will not be an adequate indicator of Montana's
relative position. 21
This report can only present the basic constitutional conshould one method for taxing mines and mineral
sideration:
claims be frozen in the constitution, thus limiting methods
available to the state? Or should the legislature be free
to develop any method of mineral taxation it wishes, drawing on the experience and know-how of other states?
In
That is the central question facing the Convention.
making that decision, delegates should remember that mines
are the only form of property in the state with a constitutionally prescribed taxation system.
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CHAPTER VII
LIVESTOCK MILL LEVIES

MONTANA PROVISION
A special mill levy on livestock is created in Article XII,
Section 9 of the Montana Constitution:
[I]n addition to the levy for state purposes above
provided for, a special levy in addition may be made
on live stock for the purpose of paying bounties on
wild animals and for stock inspection, protection and
indemnity purposes, as may be prescribed by law, and
such special levy shall be made and levied annually
in amount not exceeding four mills on the dollar by the
state board of equalization, as may be provided by law.

Statutory Provisions
Since the constitutional provision is written in permissive,
rather than mandatory, language, statutory authorization is
necessary before the mill levies can be imposed. The legislature has passed the necessary enactments as follows:
1.
Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Section 84-5211
levies one and a half mills on the assessed valuation of
livestock
,

to aid in the payment of the general expense of the
livestock commission of Montana, including salaries,
office expense, detective expense, expense of prose-

cution, travel, and all incidental expense.

.

.

.

Section 84-5211 also levies one and a half mills on
2.
all livestock for use of the Livestock Sanitary Board
for payment of indemnity for animals slaughtered, and
for salaries and expenses incurred in investigating,
controlling and suppressing diseases, including expenses of quarantine and salaries and expenses incurred
for such purposes, and for laboratory maintenance.
.

3.
Section 84-5214 levies one mill on the assessed
value of livestock

-139-

.

.

*

LIVESTOCK MILL LEVIES
for the purpose of protecting such livestock by all
means of effective predatory animal destruction,
extermination and control, including systematic hunting, trapping in planned campaigns, or otherwise,
and payment of bounties, against destruction, depredation and injury by wild animals.
.

.

.

The three levies total four mills, thus seemingly matching
the constitutional limitation of Article XII, Section 9.

BEYOND THE FOUR-MILL LIMIT

Table 4 lists the actual total mills levied for the Livestock
Commission, the Livestock Sanitary Board and bounty payments.
It is evident that the State Board of Equalization has been
levying more than four mills on livestock for several years.
The authority for that action comes from an attorney general's opinion in 1953.
In that opinion, the attorney general said the Constitution
meant that up to four mills could be levied on the assessed
value of livestock, rather than on the taxable value as is
usually the case.
The opinion noted that the assessed value
is three times as great as the taxable value; therefore
"a levy of one and one-half mills on the assessed value
equals four and one-half mills on the taxable valuation. "^
And since the State Board of Equalization computes the levies
on taxable valuation, up to a total of twelve mills may
be levied four and a half mills each for the Livestock
Commission and the Livestock Sanitary Board and three mills
for bounty payments.
The twelve mills on taxable valuation
raise the equivalent of four mills on assessed valuation.

—

CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY
The Montana Supreme Court has ruled that the special livestock levy allowed in Article XII, Section 9 could not be
levied if it were not specifically authorized in the Constitution
The Court said:
.

Section 9, Article XII, Constitution, was expressly
amended in 1910, whereby a special levy could be made
upon livestock exclusively, for certain purposes, and
without the amendment such levy could not be made.
Any tax levied exclusively upon one class of property,
necessarily in its effect works an exemption of all
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TABLE

4

LIVESTOCK MILL LEVIES

Mill levies

Year

4.0
4.1
4.0
4.0
5.9
7.5
6.6
7.1
9.8
8.0
9.0
8.4
8.1
8.4
8.5
9.8
11.0
11.2
10.5
10.5

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Montana, University of Montana, Bureau of Business
Source:
and Economic Research, Montana Fiscal Affairs Study prepared
for Interim Committee on Fiscal Affairs (Missoula, 1970),
Montana, State Board of Equalization, Twenty-Fourth
p. 361.
Biennial Report (Helena, 1970), pp. 108-109.
,
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other classes, and is therefore void except in the case
of special taxation of livestock as above mentioned.
The Court's conclusion has been explained as follows:

Section 2 of article XII, of the Constitution of Montana,
explicitly provides the property that is exempt and the
kind of property that may be exempted from taxation
The constitutional provisions are mandatory and prohibiIt is obvious that the intention of the contory.
stitutional fathers was to make certain that all
property as defined in section 17 of article XII, be
taxed for any public purpose excepting only such property as set forth and mentioned in section 2 of article
XII. ... It is significant to note, that in order to
make an exception from this well recognized rule, the
Legislature submitted to the people an amendment to section 9 of article XII, of our Constitution, being chapter
4, Laws of 1909, in order to legalize a special levy and
tax upon livestock only, which amendment was approved by
the people and became effective by the proclamation of
Without this amendment
the governor December 6, 1910.
of our fundamental law, such a levy would be void. 4
.

.

.

.

.

,

.

,

CONCLUSION
The livestock levy created by Article XII, Section 9 is confusing because of the distinction between assessed and taxable
value.
An attorney general's interpretation in 19 53 tripled
the amount of revenue that could be raised under the provision, perhaps solving a practical problem of finances but
creating a auestion of legal reasoning and, perhaps,
subterfuge.
It would be easy to argue that the provision should be
removed from the Constitution. On the other hand, if the
levies are to continue in force in their present form, specific authorization for them must remain in the Constitution
because they are imposed on a special class of property to
the exclusion of all others.
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CHAPTER VIII
UNIFORMITY CLAUSES

MONTANA PROVISIONS
A uniformity clause is contained in at least two sections
of the Montana Constitution:

Article XII, Section 1: The necessary revenue for
the support and maintenance of the state shall be provided by the legislative assembly, which shall levy a
uniform rate of assessment and taxation.
.

.

.

Article XII, Section 11: Taxes.
.shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax.
.

INTERPRETATION OF THE CLAUSE

Property Tax Only
The Montana Supreme Court has ruled that the uniformity
clauses in Article XII, Sections 1 and 11 apply only to property taxes. 1 The Court based that decision on the following
grounds
Section 11.
is to be read in connection with section
1 of the same Article, which latter section, after providing for a uniform system of taxation, declares that
"the legislative assembly may also impose a license
tax, both upon persons and upon corporations doing
business in the state.".
.the license or occupation
tax referred to in the last sentence of section 1,
Article XII.
.is not controlled by the uniform clause
.
of section 11
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The Court drew a distinction between the two revenue systems
created in Article XII, Section l--property taxation and
license fees. Since "uniformity" is used only in the property
tax sentence, it applies only to property taxation, the Court
held.
Subsequent use of the term in Section 11 is limited by
that interpretation, too.
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But the "property tax-license fee" distinction is not the
only grounds used by the Supreme Court to limit the uniformThe Court has stated
ity clause to property taxation.
flatly that uniformity of taxation applies cnly to property,
In
an interpretation followed by most other states, too.
other words, the Court did not find it necessary to draw
arammatical distinctions to uphold its reasoning.

Although the court has held that uniformity does apply to
property taxation, it also has stated that the uniformity
clauses do not prohibit classification of property for taxation purposes. 4 Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Sections
84-301 and 84-302, provide a comprehensive classification
system for property and provide varying rates for figuring
Botn of those statutes have been declared
taxable value.
constitutional
,

-

[

Uniformity of property taxation has been defined as follows
by the Court:
[A]ny tax against the same kind of property used for
identical purposes is not uniform when a different
valuation and a different rate is applied to two
distinct taxpayers, separately distinguishable only
."Classification must be based upon subin name.
stantial distinctions which make one class really
different from another." 6
.

.

Other Taxes

Although the Supreme Court has ruled that the uniformity
clauses in Article XII apply only to property taxation, a
degree of uniformity must be maintained in other tax systems,
too.
The Court has said:
[I]t does not follow that in imposing a license tax
the legislature may disregard the principles of
uniformity and equality altogether; it may not resort
It is
to unreasonable or arbitrary discriminations.
true that it is not required to tax all occupations
equally or uniformly. ... In imposing a license tax,
the state may tax all or it may select for taxation
"But
certain classes and leave the others untaxed.
it is generally held that occupation taxes must be
uniform upon the same class of subjects, although proper sub-classification is allowable. ... In order
to render a classification illegal, the business
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discriminated against must be shown to be precisely the
same as that included in the class which is shown to
be favored."'
Income Taxes

Article XII, Section la of the Montana Constitution gives the
legislature authority to impose taxes on income. That section
provides:
The legislative assembly may levy and collect taxes
upon incomes of persons, firms and corporations for the
purpose of replacing property taxes. These income taxes
may be graduated and progressive and shall be distributed
to the public schools and to the state government.

The last sentence is an obvious attempt to remove income taxation from the requirements of uniformity. The words "graduated and progressive" imply a classification system.

Since income taxation is ordinarily not considered a form of
since
property taxation, the admonition seems unnecessary;
income taxes are not property taxes, they are not subject to
The Montana
the uniformity clauses of Article XII anyway.
Supreme Court said as much when it ruled that income taxes
are excise taxes and, therefore, can be graduated. 8

Special Assessments

Special assessments are not subject to the uniformity requirement either. The Court has said such assessments "are not
taxes within the meaning of that term as employed in Article
XII.
.hence the requirement that taxes must be uniform has
no application. "9
.

HISTORY OF UNIFORMITY CLAUSES

Uniformity in taxation was not a requirement of most early
taxation systems.
It was not advocated by European economists
and was unknown in the writings of Adam Smith and John Stuart
Mill. 10

Tennessee's constitution of 1796, contained the first
real uniformity provision, and it related explicitly to
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the Question of how different land was to be taxed
"All lands liable to
The provision read:
equally.
taxation shall be taxed equal and uniform in such manner that no one hundred acres shall be taxed higher
than another except town lots which shall not be taxed
higher than 200 acres of land each." While the wording may
indicate a primary concern for a type of geographical
uniformity, it does show an additional interest in
achieving some kind of balance under a system of taxaIn
tion broad enough to include various kinds of land.
other words, as the tax base of the state was expanded,
inequality inherent in the levying of the tax gave rise
1
to the desire to achieve a semblance of uniformity
-*-

.

The real movement for uniformity limitations started in 1840.
During the next twenty years, eight states previously without
five others inserted constiuniformity rules adopted them;
tutional provisions containing certain elements of the rule. 12
The reasons for the movement have been explained as follows:
.seems to have been
The real source of the development.
the increased fear of the power of the legislatures.
Railroads, land development organizations, corporations,
and many other newly organized institutions produced by
an economy no longer based exclusively on agriculture
had received preferential treatment at the hands of the
legislatures to aid them in the tasks of building the
country required by the times. Too, more and more of
the wealth of the country consisted of intangibles, and
the first classified property taxes were being attempted
All of these
in the quest to reach this new wealth.
conflicting pressures led to a distrust of the people's
representatives, both by the people and by special
interests.
A basic tendency to be distrustful of government conditioned by a long struggle for political
and economic freedom was now turned against the legislatures.
One of the principal techniques used was to
fetter the taxing power with these limitations written
into the constitutions. 13
.

By the time Montana became a state in 1889, uniformity clauses
were the rule rather than the exception.

UNIFORMITY CLAUSES IN OTHER STATES
Table 5 classifies constitutional provisions on uniformity
according to their effect.
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TABLE

5

SUMMARY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES REGARDING
UNIFORMITY OF PROPERTY TAXES
No. of

States in
Group

Nature of Uniformity Clause

Uniformity required for all
property
Without major variation through
broad exemption authorization

States Composing
the Group

Arkansas, Indiana, Illinois, Tennessee, Texas

Subject to major variation
through broad exemption
authorization

Alabama, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Wyoming

Uniformity rule largely limited
to tangible property (with or
without further variation through
exemption authorizations or
special handling of some
particular kinds of property)

Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Maine, Nebraska, Nevada,
South Carolina, Utah

Any reasonable classification
allowed (i.e., basic rule is
uniformity within classes of
property)

22

Any reasonable classification
is allowed except that realty
(or lands) must be treated
uniformly

6

California, Maryland
(lands rather than
realty constitute
minimum class), Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio,
Washington

Constitution itself details
the classification plan

1

West Virginia

Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii,-'- Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, MONTANA, New
Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island,
South Dakota,
Vermont,-'- Virginia

State in which constitution lays down no specific uniformity
rule whatever.
Source:
Illinois, Legislative Council, Constitutional Mandates
for Uniformity of Taxation Publication 134 (Springfield, 1962),
1.

,

p.

9.
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The classification is explained as follows:
1.
Group 1 includes states requiring that all property,
except that put to some enumerated or favored use, must be
subject to property taxation and must be taxed at the same
proportion of value. 14

Group 2 includes states with relatively broad
2.
exemption powers so that the "universality" of application
however, these states do
to all property is not required;
insist on uniform and proportionate taxation of all
property that is subjected to taxation. 15
3.
Group 3 comprises those states in which the rule
of uniformity for property taxation applies only to tangibles,
" [a]
specific though limited relaxation of the rule of
."16
uniformity.
.

.

4.
Group 4 includes the remaining twenty-nine states
which, though their uniformity policies are not identical,
permit any reasonable classification for property taxation
purposes, at least as far as personalty is concerned.
They do not mandate more than uniformity of taxation as to
the separate classes of property (except realty in some
of the states.) "In most of the group, it is conceivable
that even realty could validly be divided into several classes, each having its own tax rate or valuation basis. "I?

At least seven states have no specific uniformity rule. They
are Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, New York, Rhode Island
and Vermont.

Examples of constitutional provisions from the other four
groups include:

—

Indiana [Art. 10, Sec. 1] The General Assembly shall
provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation.
.

.

.

Although the Indiana provision seems no more stringent on its
face than other state provisions, interpretations by the
Indiana courts put that state in the strictest uniformity
category.

Wisconsin [Art. VIII, Sec. Ij--The rule of taxation
shall be uniform but the legislature may empower cities,
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villaqes or towns to collect and return taxes on real
estate located therein by optional methods.
Taxes shall
be levied upon such property with such classifications
as to forests and minerals including ore separate or
severed from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe,
Taxation of merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers'
materials and finished products, and livestock need
not be uniform with the taxation of real property and
other personal property, but the taxation of all such
merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers' materials and
finished products and livestock shall be determined on
Taxes may also be imposed on incomes,
an average basis.
privileges and occupations, which taxes may be graduated
and progressive, and reasonable exemptions may be provided.

—

Florida [Art. VII, Sec. 2] All ad valorem taxation
shall be at a uniform rate within each taxing unit,
except the taxes on intangible personal property may
be at different rates but shall never exceed two mills
on the dollar of assessed value.
.

.

—

Missouri [Art. X, Sec. 4(a)] All taxable property shall
be classified for tax purposes as follows:
Class 1,
real property; Class 2, tangible personal property;
Class 3, intangible personal property.
The general
assembly, by general law, may provide for further classification within Classes 2 and 3, based solely on the
nature and characteristics of the property, and not
on the nature, residence or business of the owner or
the amount owned.

EFFECT OF UNIFORMITY CLAUSES
Uniformity clauses have prevented expansion and growth of
revenue programs in some states.
[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1899 invalidated
an inheritance tax as violating the uniformity provision of that state's constitution, because it included an exemption of $8,000.
In its opinion, the
Court observed that the requirement that "all taxes"
be uniform was applicable to "property taxes, inheritance taxes, succession taxes, and all other kinds
of taxes," thus holding all graduated taxes and taxes
with exemptions to be violative of the constitutional
requirement of uniformity. When the Illinois Legislature sought to levy a sales tax, it found itself
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prevented from doing so by constitutional restrictions.
These were evaded by disguising the tax as an occupaThen, because of the uniformity
tion tax on retailers.
requirement in the state constitution, the court held
that "no retailer, including farmers selling their own
crops, could be legally exempt from the tax."
The State
of Kansas ran into constitutional difficulties in trying to make certain adjustments in the taxation of
automobiles ^-°
.

Perhaps the most widely known example of a state revenue program being thwarted by a uniformity clause involves the Illinois income tax.
At the time of the decision, Illinois was
operating under a constitution that provided "that the mode
of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that every person
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property
he or she has in his or her possession." [Illinois Const, of
1870, Art.

8,

Sec.

20]

In 19 32, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated an income tax
with graduated rates on grounds that "income from property
was but a species of property and could, therefore, be taxed
only on a basis uniform with other property ." 19

Since that decision (and since Table 5 was prepared)
Illinois
has adopted a new constitution.
The new document permits
reasonable classification of non-property taxes and fees, 20
provides that "taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation"
and authorizes an income tax. 22
,

Effects of Montana's Clause

Montana's uniformity clause has not had the limiting effect
experienced in some other states.
In Table 5 Montana is
grouped with states allowing "any reasonable classification."
Other states listed in that group include the seven states
without any specific uniformity rule.

Classification of Montana with the most "liberal" states
probably can be attributed to two factors: (1) the broad
interpretation given to the uniformity clause by the Montana
Supreme Court, and (2) the extensive property classification
system created by statute and declared to be constitutional.
NON-PROPERTY UNIFORMITY CLAUSES
Uniformity clauses have universally been applied to property
taxation, almost to the exclusion of other kinds of taxes.
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But some states do have uniformity clauses that cover other
One study has noted:
taxes.

Mandates for class uniformity that are specifically
applicable to miscellaneous taxes seem to exist only in
from one- fourth to one-third of the other states, with
Arkansas,
the following having been so identified:
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia.

Other states that might be considered part of this group
having specific mention of some uniformity for nonproperty taxes include Massachusetts (with a requirement of reasonableness) as well as Pennsylvania and
other states where the general uniformity clause is
worded in such a manner that it may well apply to property and non-property taxes alike.
No state has a uniformity provision applicable to nonproperty taxes which requires more uniformity than
that "within classes."
On the whole, the role of these uniformity provisions
governing non-property taxes does not seem to be of
major significance. Where the specific limitations
exist, their effect is typically little if any different from that given the equal protection of the laws
and due process of law clauses of the federal constitution and of their counterparts in state constitutions.
Where there is no uniformity clause for non-property
taxes, the courts apply the fundamental constitutional
guarantees mentioned in a way that largely fills the
void.
That is, with or without a uniformity clause
having specific reference to non-property taxes, such
taxes must be based on reasonable classifications of
tax subjects and must also meet other general tests of
validity applied by the courts. 23

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Some commentators question the usefulness or necessity of
uniformity clauses in state constitutions. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits "invidious discrimination" and,
in effect, requires that classification systems be reasonable,
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As one commentator noted:
If there is a trend in the cases as to kinds of uniformit is to turn more and more to the type which

ity,

follows closely the standards required by equal protec4
tion. .
.

.

The constitutionality of an act under the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution, and under the
provision of the State Constitution requiring uniformity
of taxation on the same class of subjects within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax,
is to be determined by the reasonableness of the classification attempted. This idea that the legislature
has as wide a discretion in classification under
uniformity provisions as it has under equal protection
is sufficiently settled to cause an occasional question
as to whether uniformity provisions serve any useful
purpose at all.^5
PROS AND CONS OF UNIFORMITY CLAUSES

Should a state constitution include a uniformity and equality
clause concerning taxation? The arguments have been summarized as follows:

ARGUMENTS FOR: Taxpayer interests would receive the
strongest protection; one of the guarantees, which
should properly be one of the specific guarantees of
the constitution, is that comparable subjects be
treated alike for tax purposes; tax rates which are discriminatory and excessively high would be effectively
prohibited by a uniformity clause.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
Such clauses lead to trouble with
judicial interpretation; protection to taxpayers from
discriminatory taxation is adequately provided under
the traditional guarantees of "due process" and "equal
protection. " 26

CONCLUSION
It is questionable whether Montana's uniformity clause serves
any useful purpose.
Interpretation of the clause seems to
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put it on the same footing as the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution;
if that is the case,
the clause is redundant, if harmless.
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CHAPTER IX

"PUBLIC PURPOSE" CLAUSES

MONTANA PROVISIONS
A "public purpose" clause is included in Article XII, Section
"Taxes shall be levied and
11 of the Montana Constitution:
collected by general laws and for public purposes only."

Other provisions in the Montana Constitution which reflect
that "public purpose" philosophy are:

Article V, Section 26: The legislative assembly shall
not pass local or special laws in any of the following
.for the assessenumerated cases, that is to say.
ment or collection of taxes.
.

.

.

.

Article XIII, Section 1: Neither the state, nor any
county, city, town, municipality, nor other subdivision
of the state shall ever give or loan its credit in
aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or
otherwise, to any individual, association or corporation.

.

.

.

Article V, Section 38: The legislative assembly shall
have no power to pass any law authorizing the state,
or any county in the state, to contract any debt or
obligation in the construction of any railroad, nor
give or loan its credit to or in aid of the construction of the same.
Interpretation of the Clause
The "public purpose" clause of Article XII, Section 11 applies
only to property taxation.
In fact, the Montana Supreme
Court has declared that all of Section 11 including both
uniformity as well as public purpose clauses applies only
to property taxes.

—

—

The State Supreme Court has defined "public purpose" as
follows
The term "public purpose," as used in the Constitution, is synonymous with governmental purpose.
An essential to a "public purpose" is that it shall
.

-159-

.

.

^

"PUBLIC PURPOSE" CLAUSES

affect the inhabitants as a community and not merely
as individuals.
.

.

.

Whether a tax is levied for a public or private purpose is to be determined by the course or usage of
the government, the object for which such a tax has
been customarily and by long course of legislation
levied, and what objects have been considered necessary
to the proper support and the proper use of the government, "and whatever lawfully pertains to this purpose
and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the
people may be said to be for a 'public purpose'".
The true test is whether the work to be done is
essentially public and for the general good of the inhabitants, satisfying their needs or contributing to
their convenience, rather than merely for gain or for
private objects.
.

.

.

The Montana Court also has declared that Article XII, Section 11 and Article XIII, Section 1 (the state's lending
provision) are directed toward the same prohibited act.
The Court has held "if the Act under consideration is not
violative of the one, it is not violative of the other." 3
In an
However, that reasoning was not always followed.
earlier case, the Supreme Court declared that Article XIII,
Section 1 was an additional limitation on the legislative
taxing power that narrowed the scope of "public purpose"
even more. The Court said:
[T]he legislature has authority to appropriate public
money for any purpose for which taxes may be levied
But a
and collected, and for no other purpose.
reference to the history of half a century ago discloses that aid extended to railroads and other like
business enterprises was frequently held to be for a
.and it is made reasonably apparent
public purpose.
that the object of the limitations in section 1,
Article XIII, and in section 38, Article V, of our
state Constitution, was to prevent either the legislature or the courts of this state, including aid
extended to such business enterprises within the
meaning of the term "public purpose," and this is the
.Our Conview heretofore expressed by this court.
stitution.
[has] thus restricted the meaning of the
term "public purpose". ...
.

.

.

.

.

Special Laws
The Montana Supreme Court has laid down certain criteria for
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The definitions are
special, as opposed to general, laws.
important because the public purpose clause states that taxes
The Court has
shall be levied and collected by general laws.
stated:

A special statute is one which relates to particular
.or one made for
persons or things of a class.
individual cases and for less than a class.
.or one
which relates and applies to particular members of a
class, either particularized by the express terms of
the Act or separated by any method of selection from
the whole class to which the law might, but for such
limitation, be applicable.
The test of a special
law is the appropriateness of its provisions and the
objects that it excludes.
It is not, therefore, what
a law includes, but what it excludes, that determines
whether it is special.
.

.

.

.

.

In another case, the Court stated:

A "special law" which falls within the prohibition of
section 26, Article V.
.is defined as one which
relates to particular persons or things of a class, or
one made for individual cases and for less than a class,
or one which relates and applies to particular members
of a class, either particularized by express terms of
the Act or separated by any method of selection from
the whole class to which the law might, but for such
limitation, be applicable.
The prohibition does
not extend to a reasonable classification of persons or
corporations for regulatory purposes.
.

.

.

.

HISTORY OF "PUBLIC PURPOSE" CLAUSES
The public purpose doctrine can be traced to English common
law.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that public
funds derived from tax revenues cannot be expended for private
purposes,' and the doctrine has been specifically imposed on
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Green v. Frazier the Court clearly related this
concept to the fourteenth amendment due process provision
by stating:
,

"Before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
this power [taxation] of the State was unrestrained
by any federal authority.
That Amendment introduced a
new limitation upon state power into the Federal Constitution.
The States were forbidden to deprive persons
of life, liberty and property without due process of
law.

..."
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The due process of law clause contains no specific
limitation upon the right of taxation in the States,
but it has come to be settled that the authority of
the States to tax does not include the right to impose
taxes for merely private purposes.**

Therefore, the public purpose clauses in the various state
constitutions are simply repetition of the Fourteenth Amendment due process requirement. They do not impose any new
limitation on the state taxing power, but simply restate a
principle required by the United States Constitution.

History of Lending Provisions

The real complication is caused by the provisions which prohibit lending of credit to private individuals and associations.
Those provisions are a direct result of fiscal
extravagance and irresponsibility by state governments during
the nineteenth century.
During the nineteenth century it was not uncommon for
municipal corporations to encourage the establishment
of railroad facilities by floating bonds, subscribing
to stock, and making direct appropriations to the
railroad companies.

Aid from states, counties, and municipalities, often
competing with one another, was even more lavish
(than federal aid)
The states often granted taxexemption, protection from competition, and liberal
charters.
Some states lent the roads their credit,
others subscribed outright to the stock of railway
companies. Many states.
.made extensive land
grants.
Counties and municipalities subscribed
liberally to railway stock and often donated money
outright.
Counties and towns of Kentucky incurred a
debt of over thirteen million dollars for railroad
construction; eighty-six counties in Illinois subsidized railroads to the extent of over sixteen million
dollars; the municipalities of Kansas contributed well
over twelve million dollars to the railroads of that
.

.

.

.

.

state.
It was against the background of this growing leeriness
both in judicial decisions and in the public at large
that the states moved to provide additional safeguards;
excessive tax burdens on local communities, attitudes
that it was improper for government to have an interest
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in economic enterprises and fears of abuse by corrupt
public officials precipitated the amendment of state
constitutions with the clear intent of placing more
narrow limitations on municipal power to aid economic
enterprises than had been imposed by judicial application of the "public purpose" doctrine. 9
It is unclear whether constitutional lending provisions prohibit taxation transactions that otherwise would be permisThe provisions
sible under Fourteenth Amendment due process.
may only be a reiteration of the "public purpose" doctrine,
as that concept is defined by the Due Process Clause.

The State Supreme Court,
The confusion is apparent in Montana.
in one case, said that Article XIII, Section 1 (the state's
lending provision) was a limitation on public purpose. 1 ^
A later case said the two provisions were equal, one and the
same.
The problem has been summarized as follows:
[I]t is well settled that state government action
requiring the use of tax funds, derived from any source,
must be for a public purpose. The only remaining
question is whether the public purpose doctrine can be
further applied so as to hold constitutional those
transactions which involve a loan of credit and would
Many, if not a majority,
thus appear to be invalid.
of the state courts have answered this question in the
affirmative. 1*

Interpretation of the "Lending Clause "
State courts have used five general grounds to get around
lending provisions and uphold otherwise "questionable" public
transactions.
They are:
The governmental entity which is lending credit,
1.
expending funds or becoming a shareholder in a corporation is not included among the enumerated entities
prohibited from engaging in such activity.
The private entity which is receiving the funds or
2.
credit is not among the enumerated entities to which
such credit or property may not be given.
The appropriation was not in the form of a pro3.
hibited donation.
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The extension of credit was not made in an improp4.
er manner.
The transaction was not within the policy of the
5.
constitutional restriction.
The five grounds have been explained as follows:

The entity performing the act is not within the
1.
constitutional proscription
.

In one court case, a city had established a pension
its police and firemen, and a board was established
minister the fund. The court upheld a "donation or
from the fund on grounds that the pension money was
property of the fund and not the city.

fund for
to adgrant"
the

[I]n determining whether an act should be attributed
to a municipality when performed by another entity,
the factor considered most significant is the financial
relationship between the municipality and the entity
in question.
Because these courts do not analyze the
relationship in terms of the locus and exercise of
decision making control, it is possible for a municipality to establish a financially independent entity
and engage indirectly in activities which it is prohibited from carrying on directly. **
2.
The recipient of the property or credit is not
within the constitutional prohibition
.

Most of the constitutional lending provisions prohibit aid to
specific recipients, usually individuals, associations or
corporations.
Exceptions have been carved out of those
general categories, as follows:
a. Nonprofit corporations, like sewer or gas
districts.

By this device a city is allowed to incur indebtedness
or extend credit for the purpose of providing such traditional necessities of an urban community as watar, light,
gas and sewage facilities, even though the recipient
*
entities have powers independent of the city.
b.

Public corporations.

In general, courts uphold municipal appropriations to
such public corporations whenever they are engaging in
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types of activity which the court finds that the municipality could perform directly. The theory most often
articulated to sustain city financial participation
that they are quasi-governmental
in such institutions
6
is not without elements of inconsistency.
in nature

—

—

The appropriation was not in the form of a prohibited

3.

donation

.

When the activity of the municipality seems to satisfy
the court's concept of public purpose it will be upheld
with but minimal lip service to the language of the
constitution.
4.

manner.

The extension of credit was not made in an improper
Revenue bonds are an example
.

In recent years many communities have sought to improve
economic conditions in their locality by encouraging
private industry to move into the area. As inducements
to industrial development communities have purchased
or built industrial facilities and have offered to lease
them to private industry at attractive rates.
To avoid this objection that private industry was being
financed out of public funds, communities have financed
industrial development projects through the issuance
of revenue bonds.
Such bonds are issued in the name of
the municipality but are not general obligations of
the municipality, being payable only out of the revenue
received from the operation of the project involved.
When the issuance of such bonds has been authorized
by state statutes most courts have upheld their validity on the theory that the credit of the municipality
was not involved. °
.

.

.

5.
The transaction is not within the policy of the constitutional prohibition
.

The question of whether the prohibition was intended to
.and it perapply is in reality the basic inquiry.
vades all the decisions, although, for this very reason,
it is rarely given as the sole ground for a holding.
When the theory is invoked it frequently proceeds from
the limited proposition that the amendment was "designed
to prohibit governmental grants to railroads" and concludes that "the basic test is whether the municipal
action under attack may fairly be characterized as a
public one." 19
.
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Montana Interpretations
The five exceptions have been used by the Montana Supreme
Court to avoid the literal consequences of Article XIII,
Section 1.
The entity performing the act is not within the
1.
constitutional proscription
.

the Court held
In Thaanum v. Bynum Irrigation District 20
that an irrigation district did not come within the proviThe Court said:
sions of Article XIII, Section 1.
,

Such a district is not the state; neither is it a county,
It is not a municipality, for the term
city or town.
"municipality" refers to a municipal corporation.
and in this state only incorporated cities and towns are
municipal corporations 2 ^
.

.

"[0]ther subdivision of the state" means other subdivision of the state of the same general character as
a county, city, town or municipality, and excludes
an irrigation district which is lacking in practically
every essential element which gives character to any of
the enumerated public corporations. 22
The recipient of the property or credit is not
2.
within the constitutional prohibition
.

The power of the city of Great Falls to loan its credit or
make donations to a housing authority was specifically upheld
in Rutherford v. City of Great Falls 23 The Supreme Court
.

said"!

As to the objection that the city cannot constitutionally loan its credit or make donations to the Housing
Authority to cover the administrative expenses and
overhead of the Authority the first year and from time
.
to time make other donations, we are not impressed.
"The primary purpose of housing authorities is to
In doing so, they lighten
eradicate the slum menace.
the burden of cities in discharging the municipal
duty of protecting all citizens indiscriminately against
It is therefore perdisease, crime and immorality.
fectly clear that, when a city uses public funds for
the establishment of a housing authority, whether the
funds be used for organization expenses or in the purchase of a small percentage of the housing authority's
.
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bonds, the city is performing, indirectly through a
public agency created by the State and sanctioned by
its own governing authority, one of the primary functions of municipal government. " ^4

The appropriation was not in the form of a prohib3.
ited donation
.

^

In Mills v. Stewart
the Court seemed to imply that once it
determined an appropriation was for a public purpose, it was
impossible for the appropriation to be considered a "donation." The Court said:
,

[I]t is apparent
tion is made for
and, conversely,
not for a public
4.

manner

at once that if a particular appropriaa public purpose, it is not a donation,
if it constitutes a donation it is
purpose. 26

The extension of credit was not made in an improper

.

Revenue bonds, as a "proper" form of financing, were specifically endorsed by the Court in Kraus v. Riley 27 The Court
.

said:
It is.
.contended that the issuance of such bonds
for the purpose alleged would amount to a lending of
credit in aid of an association, contrary to section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution.
It is true that the
proposed plan will, in a sense, amount to a loan of
credit to the association.
But the issuance of the
bonds does not constitute the lending of the credit of
the state, county, city, town or other subdivision of
the state within the meaning of section 1, Article XIII.
The bonds are not an obligation of the state, but are
secured "only by the revenues of such works and the
funds received from the sale or disposal of water and
from the operation, lease, sale or other disposition
of the works, property and facilities to be acquired
out of the proceeds of such bonds."
.

The transaction is not within the policy of the con5.
stitutional prohibition
.

The Montana Supreme Court seemed to pay lip-service to this
rationale in the case of Stanley v. Jeffries
where it
said:
,

Section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution was intended
to prevent the extension of public aid to private
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enterprise or that of a semi-public nature, yet having
for its purpose gain to the individual, association or
corporation building it up, and the inhibitions therein
contained do not apply to such enactments as are
.the Workmen's
intended for the relief of the poor.
.or the War Defense Act.
.as in
Compensation Act.
each of these instances the purpose to be served was
found to be a public one, although private individuals
The mere fact that the money
might profit thereby.
raised will go to individuals will not condemn the Act
in question, since the test is not as to who receives
the money, but, Is the purpose for which it is to be
expended a public purpose?-30
.

.

.

The Montana Supreme Court has used many of the same rationales utilized by other states to carve out "artificial exceptions" from the otherwise rigid lending prohibitions.
It is difficult to determine the effect of those numerous
exceptions; certainly they provide loopholes around the
lending proscriptions, and they may render them useless.
All a court need do to avoid the constitutional prohibition
is to declare a program a "public purpose."

OTHER STATES
Public purpose clauses are found in at least twelve state
constitutions: Alaska, Hawaii, Arizona, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, Montana, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, Minnesota
and Oklahoma. An overwhelming majority of the states fortyfive have provisions prohibiting the lending of credit. *

—

—

ALTERNATIVES
Alternatives to present constitutional limits on municipal
lending have been suggested as follows:
If it is accepted that some sort of change is desirable
The first
there are two possible lines of approach.
repeal of the existing type
is constitutional reform:
of amendment and enactment of revised provisions which
would reflect contemporary municipal needs and experiences under the present proscriptions and would
incorporate desired safeguards. The feasibility of
this alternative is doubtful.
.because of the drafting
.

-168-

"PUBLIC PURPOSE" CLAUSES

problems involved in providing the necessary flexibility. ... A second approach places responsibility
upon the state legislatures to supply the safeguards
which were intended to be provided by the current constitutional provisions. Municipal appropriation or
extension of credit must be made under the authority
The legislature thus
of state enabling legislation.
has the opportunity to exercise a preliminary judgement as to the general types of projects which may be
legitimately undertaken. 32
At the state level the following discussion of constitutional restrictions on legislative lending is pertinent:
,

Admittedly, experience suggests the need for some reBut it is doubtful
straint on such legislative action.
that blanket constitutional prohibitions against the
legislature engaging in the practice under any and all
It is
circumstances is the proper or effective answer.
easily conceivable that under some circumstances a state
might find it desirable to loan or pledge the credit of
the state to a private undertaking in order to attract
Where
an important productive enterprise to the state.
it is important to the welfare of the state and its
inhabitants that this be done, the legislature ought
not to be precluded, by state constitutional limitation,
from doing just that.
The problem is to prevent injudicious or corrupt action
That can be accomplished only by sending
in this field.
The
the legislature incorruptible representatives.
responsibility thus falls squarely upon the electorate
which chooses the legislators and no number of constitutional restraints upon legislative authority will ever
prove an adequate substitute for voter responsibility 33
.

Other commentators suggest a "public purpose" test in place
of the lending provisions, arguing that if the state aid is
for a public purpose, it makes no difference that the recipMontana, in
ient is a private individual or association.
Case law interessence, already has a public purpose test.
preting Article XIII, Section 1 has said as much; if the
transaction serves a public purpose, it is not prohibited
by Article XIII, Section 1.
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CHAPTER X
EARMARKING OF REVENUES

MONTANA PROVISIONS
Earmarking is a device which dedicates revenue from a specific
tax to finance particular government functions.
Earmarking
is frequently utilized by states at both the constitutional
and statutory level.
The following constitutional provisions earmark revenues in
Montana:

—

Article XI, Section 2 The public school fund of the
state shall consist of the proceeds of such lands as
have heretofore been granted, or may hereafter be
granted, to the state by the general government known
as school lands; and those granted in lieu of such;
lands acquired by gift or grant from any person or
corporation under any law or grant of the general
government; and of all other grants of land or money
made to the state from the general government for
general educational purposes, or where no other
special purpose is indicated in such grant; all estates, or distributive shares of estates that may
escheat to the state; all unclaimed shares and dividends of any corporation incorporated under the laws
of the state, and all other grants, gifts, devises
or bequests made to the state for general educational
purposes

—

Article XI, Section 12 The funds of the state university and of all other state institutions of learning,
from whatever source accruing, shall forever remain inviolate and sacred to the purpose for which they were
dedicated.
The various funds shall be respectively
invested under such regulations as may be prescribed by
law, and shall be guaranteed by the state against loss
or diversion.
The interest of said invested funds,
together with the rents from leased lands or properties
shall be devoted to the maintenance and perpetuation
of these respective institutions.

—

Article XII, Section la The legislative assembly may
levy and collect taxes upon incomes of persons, firms
and corporations for the purpose of replacing property
taxes.
These income taxes may be graduated and progressive and shall be distributed to the public schools
and to the state government.
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—

Article XII, Section lb No monies paid into the state
treasury which are derived from fees, excises or
license taxes relating to registration, operation or
use of vehicles on the public highways or to fuels used
for the propulsion of such vehicles, except fees and
charges paid to the board of railroad commissioners of
the state of Montana and the public service commission
of Montana or its successor or successors by motor
carriers pursuant to law, shall be expended for other
than cost of administering laws under which such monies
are derived, statutory refunds and adjustments provided
therein, payment of highway obligations, cost of construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of
public highways, roads, streets, and bridges, and
expenses authorized by the state legislature for dissemination of public information relating to the public
highways, roads, streets and bridges of the state of
Montana and the use thereof.

—

.may be
[A] special levy.
Article XII, Section 9
made on live stock for the purpose of paying bounties
on wild animals and for stock inspection, protection
and indemnity purposes, as may be prescribed by law,
and such special levy shall be made and levied annually
in amount not exceeding four mills on the dollar by the
state board of equalization, as may be provided by law.
.

—

Article XIII, Section 2 The legislative assembly
shall not in any manner create any debt except by law
which shall be irrepealable until the indebtedness
therein provided for shall have been fully paid or discharged; such law shall specify the purpose to which
the funds so raised shall be applied and provide for the
levy of a tax sufficient to pay the interest on, and
extinguish the principal of such debt within the time
limited by such law for the payment thereof; but no
debt or liability shall be created which shall singly,
or in the aggregate with any existing debt or liability, exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) except in case of war, to repel invasion or
suppress insurrection, unless the law authorizing the
same shall have been submitted to the people at a
general election and shall have received a majority of
the votes cast for and against it at such election.
This chapter deals almost exclusively with the income tax
and highway fund provisions cited above. Another type of
earmarking that for public schools is required under any
circumstances because dedication of funds to finance public
education was a condition to Montana's admission as a state.

—

—
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Other types of earmarking are discussed elsewhere in this
report public lands and land grants in Chapter XI, the
livestock levies in Chapter VII and debt repayment in
Chapter XIV.

—

SPECIFIC REVENUES
One recent study reported 53 percent of all state revenue in
Montana is earmarked by constitutional provision or statutes.
Table 6 gives a breakdown of the kinds of earmarking.
Of the $33,785,620 in earmarked revenues in Montana in 1963,
73 percent, or $24,724,410, was earmarked by constitutional
mandate; 2 the other funds are earmarked through statutory

enactment. The distinction is important because statutory
earmarking allows flexibility and legislative discretion not
available with constitutional dedication.
Stipulation of
revenues in state constitutions gives added protection and
inaccessibility to the earmarked taxes. Table 7 lists the
amount of revenue which was dedicated by constitutional earmarking provisions in 1969-70.
The 1889 Constitution, in its original form, did not contain
any significant earmarking provisions except for public
schools and that earmarking, as noted earlier, was required
by the federal government.
The four-mill levy on livestock
was added by amendment in 1910, but it accounts for only a
small portion of earmarked funds in Montana.

—

The two major earmarking provisions were added to the Constitution by amendment much later. The income tax clause
[Art. XII, Sec. la] became a part of the Constitution in
1934.
The highway taxes section [Art. XII, Sec. lb], also
known as the anti-diversion amendment, was added in 19 56.
Thus, earmarking, as a major part of the Montana constitutional tax scheme, did not occur until some fifty years after
statehood.

OTHER STATES
Earmarking is a popular device in other states. Tax Foundation, Inc. has conducted two major studies of earmarking in
the United States; in a report on the second study in 19 65,
the Foundation summarized its findings as follows:
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TABLE 6
EARMARKING IN MONTANA (1963)
Collect io n s
(thousands)

State tax
Sales or gross r~ceipts
Tobacco

I

To genera l
fund

6,405

60%

Alcoholic beverages
Insurance compn ny

4,135
2,472

83%
92%

Public utility

$

1,335

100%

Income
Individual
Corporation

13,934
4,723

75%
75%

Highway-user
Motor fuel
Motor vehicle license
Operator license

19,682
4,192
605

85%

6,236

22%

I-'
-..J
O'\

I

Other
Property

Severance
Death and gift
Chain store
Alcoholic beverage license
Hunting and fishi ng licenses
Miscellaneous
Total

1.

2,769 1
2,074
185
995
2,136
1,569
$73,447

97%

Earmarked

40%, veterans' bonus debt
service
17% , local general purposes
8%, firemen's compensation and relief

25%, education
25%, education
97%, highways; 3%, aviation
100%, highways
15%, state police retirement
6%, livestock; 70%, higher
education, 2%, university and public
institution bond debt
service
3%, conservation

100%
100%
100%
64%
46%

100%, fish and game
36%
54%

Exclud e s $1 70,000 of investme nts redeemed .

Source :

Tax Found a tion, Inc., Earmarked State Tax es (New Yor k, 19 65), p . 56.

TABLE

7

EARMARKING IN MONTANA,
BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1970

Amount

Purpose

PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Interest and Income
from public school land funds

1

$7,813,054

PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Income Taxes
25 percent of state income taxes
25 percent of corporate income taxes

2

$9,717,712
$2,383,966

HIGHWAYS
3

Highway User Taxes

$29,009,991

LIVESTOCK
4

Livestock Levies

Sources:

1.

$544,053

Montana, Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Annual Report, Statistical Appendix (Helena,
1971)

,

n.p.

2.

Ibid.

3.

Montana, Office of the Governor, Executive Budget
(Helena, 1971)

4.

,

p.

652.

Montana, State Board of Equalization, Twenty-Fourth
Biennial Report (Helena, 1970), p. 107.
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EARMARKING OF REVENUES
Nearly a decade has passed since the Tax Foundation
published a pioneering study of earmarking of state
taxes.
This study revealed that many of the states
engaged in relatively heavy earmarking and that, for
the United States as a whole, earmarked state taxes
represented 51 percent of total state tax collections
in fiscal 1954.

What has happened since? A new Tax Foundation survey
indicates that the relative significance of earmarking
has declined.
By fiscal 19 63, earmarked taxes as a
percentage of total state tax collections had dropped
to aDproximately 41 percent, still a substantial
figure. At least part of the decline derives from increased rates for nonearmarked taxes plus the introduction of new taxes which have not been earmarked,
In 10
rather than removal of earmarking statutes.
states, in fact, the percent of earmarked taxes increased.
Moreover, the dollar total of earmarked
taxes increased by more than half, from approximately
$5.7 billion in 1954 to $9.1 billion in 1963.
,

Thus, the Foundation found, the percent of state funds earmarked for particular purposes has dropped by 10 percentage
points.
Earmarked taxes declined in thirty-seven states,
including Montana. The drop was relatively insignificant,
however.
The median change was a decrease of 5 percentage
points.
Montana's drop was slightly above that, with a
decline of 8 percentage points. Table 8 shows the nationwide
trend.

In 196 3, Montana ranked seventeenth in the nation in the percentage of state funds earmarked for special functions.
Fiftv- three percent of Montana's funds were dedicated for a
particular purpose. Alabama and Louisiana topped the list
with 87 percent of their state funds earmarked. New Jersey
and Delaware were near the bottom with only 2 percent and
3 percent, respectively.
Georaia prohibits earmarking.
Montana was almost 12 percentaae points above the national
Table 9 gives a percentace
average, which is 41 percent.
breakdown bv states

Earmarked revenues totaled $9.1 billion for the fifty states
in 19 6 3. 4 Part of that earmarking was accomplished by statutes, rather than by constitutional authority.

•178-

TABLE

8

CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF TAX COLLECTIONS EARMARKED,
1954 to 1963
1

Rankings by State
Percentage points
of change,
1954 to 1963

Mexico
North Dakota
Georgia
Colorado
Nevada
West Virginia
Kentucky
Missouri
Texas
N

v

-17
-15
-14
-12
-11
-11
-10
-10

Kansas
Oregon
Indiana
Michigan
Montana
North Carolina
Idaho
Maine
Maryland
South Carolina
Virginia
Arkansas
Iowa
New Jersey
South Dakota
Connecticut
Mississippi
New York
Oklahoma
Vermont
Rhode Island
Wisconsin
Alabama
Massachusetts
Nebraska
Florida
Ohio
Minnesota
New Hampshire
Washington
Louisiana
Delaware
Wyoming
Ari

Dna

Illinois
Tennessee
Pennsylvania

1.

Alaska and Hawaii not included in 1954 survey.

Source:

Tax Foundation,

Inc., Earmarked State Taxes

(New York,
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1965), p.

12.

TABLE

9

PERCENTAGE OF STATE
FUNDS EARMARKED
State
Alabama
Louisiana
Tennessee
Minnesota
Kansas
Texas
Wyoming
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Utah
Wisconsin
Oklahoma
Michigan
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
South Dakota
MONTANA
Nebraska
Arizona
Colorado
Ohio
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
North Dakota

Percentage
87

State

Percentage

.

EARMARKING OF REVENUES
Types of Earmarking Provisions

Earmarking started in the form of special assessments,
utilized by local governments to finance certain kinds of
improvements on property. The benefit theory of taxation was
used to justify the special assessments: "the owner or user
of the property should pay the cost of programs which benefit
him directly, and according to the benefits he receives." 5
This "benefit" principle was used to extend earmarking devices
to somewhat similar government functions, such as highway
construction and fish and game management.
The first statewide dedicated revenue tax was evidently the
state gasoline tax adopted by Oregon in 1919. ^ Since then,
a variety of revenue measures have been earmarked for numerous special purposes.
Table 10 gives a breakdown of the
type of taxes earmarked, and the kinds of activities they
support.
Presumably many of the earmarked revenues listed
are dedicated by statute, rather than by constitutional
provisions

MONTANA'S ANTI-DIVERSION AMENDMENT

Article XII, Section lb, added to the Constitution as an
amendment in 19 56, provides:
No monies paid into the state treasury which are derived
from fees, excises or license taxes relating to registration, operation or use of vehicles on the public
highways or to fuels used for the propulsion of such
vehicles, except fees and charges paid to the board of
railroad commissioners of the state of Montana and the
public service commission of Montana or its successor
or successors by motor carriers pursuant to law, shall
be expended for other than cost of administering laws
under which such monies are derived, statutory refunds
and adjustments provided therein, payment of highway
obligations, cost of construction, reconstruction,
maintenance and repair of public highways, roads, streets,
and bridges, and expenses authorized by the state legislature for dissemination of public information relating
to the public highways, roads, streets and bridges of
the state of Montana and the use thereof.
The Montana Legislative Council in 1968 recommended that this
section be repealed, 7 citing a previous Council study which
stated:
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TABLE 10
NUMBER OF MAJOR STATE TAXES EARMARKED
BY TAX AND BY FUNCTION (1963)

function
Number of sta tes levying taxes
Number of states earmarking tax b

Ge neral
sales or
&rcss
receipts

Tobacco

Alccholic
beverage
excise

Insurance
&rcss
receipts

Publlc
utility

Pari•
mutuel

Individual
income

Ccrporation
income

Property

severance

Corporaticn
license

Death
and
&ill

37
21

47
26

50
24

50
23

38
13

26
17

35
l:i

37
10

45
27

29
19

50
5

49
7

13
5
4

10

7
5

3

2

6
2

4

11

4

8
l
3

1
2

4

2

8
3

7
5

16

4

2

3

2

22

Purpose: c
Education
Welfare
Highways
Veterans' bonuses and services

I
I-'

4
1
8

State and local fairs

CX)

Conservation

N
I

Local general purposes
Debt service

4

6

3

4
1

6

9e

2

5

3
9
5

12
6
2

2
8

3

3

4

Homestead exemptions
Confederate pensions
Other

d

2

a.

Excludes hi.;hway-u ser taxes , distributed entirely for highway purposes in 24 states and partly for highway purposes In 22 states. See Table 3.
l:icludes states earmark,ng only a portion of the tax.
c. e~~ause tax oflen is earmarke d for several purposes, details under purposes may not add to the number of states earmarking.
d. F,rcme:,·s pens,ons, 9. f,re protect,on, 5; industry reculation, 2; miscellaneous, 6.
e. Rac,ng co mm,ss,on, 6; agriculture. 3.
b.

Source:

Tax Foundation, Inc., Earmarked State Taxes (New York, 1965), p. 14.

EARMARKING OF REVENUES
As a means of allocating resources, earmarking is inefficient because it fails to recognize relativity of
needs.
Resources are distributed, not by a conscious
evaluation of the needs of all agencies, but by
arbitrary constitutional and statutory formulas. A
dedicated revenue tends to create a vested interest in
continuing arrangements, which experience and passage
of time may prove to be contrary to the public interEven if there be at first a proper relation between
est.
the proceeds of a given tax and the need for expenditure
for a given service, there is no reason to assume that
the relationship will continue to exist.
Experience
demonstrates that once a dedicated fund has been set
up it is extremely difficult to deal with on its merits.**

The major taxes affected by the anti-diversion provision are:

Registration fees credited to the earmarked revenue
1.
fund to pay the expenses of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.
2.
Gross vehicle weight fees divided 5 percent to the
collecting county and 9 5 percent to the State Highway Department earmarked revenue fund.

Gasoline and special fuels taxes deposited to the
3.
earmarked revenue fund for use by the State Highway Department.

9

Those taxes accounted for the following amount of revenues in
1967 and 1968:

Registration
and G.V.W.

Gasoline and
special fuels

$7,804,000

(1967) 10

$24,363,919

(1968) 11

Operator license fees do not fall under the anti-diversion
amendment and are credited to the General Fund. 12
Money paid for license plates and property taxes on automobiles are not affected by Section lb because those funds are
paid into county treasuries, not the state treasury 13
.

Table 11 is a summary of the highway account of the earmarked
revenue fund and of the federal highway trust account.
Table 12 shows the revenue raised from the gasoline tax since
its inauguration.
Table 13 is a summary of funding for the
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TABLE 11

EARMARKED REVENUE FUND
HIGHWAY ACCOUNT
BUDGET

E

L

nSCAL

OF

™

N

2,190.320

S

29,922.383
3.153.372

Revenue

I"
SS5S«
Source

2,420,187

S

S

31,003,123
35,958

0.827,660

4.157.094

35,753.192

36,702,470

2.672,695

5

»

2.672,695

38,847,135

37,375,687
^

„

1,u *

Other

536,702,470

£37.375,687

5.^847^5

TOTAL RBCEIPTB

S33.075.755

531.040.175

.35.753,192

535,266.075

533.466,362

S41.580.852

540,859,564

540,048,382

541,519.830

TSSStiEF

526,175,070
1:011.932

529,009,991

537,760,456

536,832,718

°

^^

538,324,268

24 571 115
524
»
7
x : 73
448, auu

527.638.702

538.186.869

537,375.687

538.847.135

TOTAL DEDUCTIONSS32, 389. 888

f DUC V fl ro

S

SSSrs.
Other Deductions

OF FISCAL YEAR

:

5

2,426,187

"^

'

,,.o«

426 41

""

,

=

537. 423.758

?»,.»»

.

5,

5

FEDERAL AND PRIVATE REVENUE FUND
Highway Trust Account

E
L
OF FISCAL VEAr5 4,191.750

6,375,320

5

S

3,348,011

5

3,618,579

570.852.308

573,908,152

569,673,695

|7«,|9B,|8|

|74, 470,

|76.»|,JJ7

Vl'?k-?i

553.166.020

571.380.410

572.143,582

573,908.152

5^695

°

S

64,048,829
7.602,149

70,852,308

TOTAL RECEIPTS

552,783,454

"^38,711
$50

571.650,978

IvIiLABlT

S56.975.204

556,514,031

S5i«Transfers

547,546.354
3,053,530

Out

.

1S| .g2S

°

8^

&.»*.& S'24*«

^^ ^ ^

TOTAL DED UCT IONSS30,599.8 8 4

|5| .

O^CA^AR

^^±1 ^3^1^ ^fM^ L^^l

Source.

SJ.375,320

Executivejudoet
Montana, Office of the Governor,
1971)

,

p.

2,327.305
69,673,695

49,126,779
1,011,932

44

Revenue

5

73,908,152

963,481
7.819,973

ADD:

2,327.305

5

656.
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TABLE 12

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF GASOLINE TAX COLLECTED AND THE
NET AMOUNT AVAILABLE FROM GASOLINE TAX SINCE THE
INAUGURATION OF THE FIVE CENT GASOLINE TAX

192 9

$

19 30

X931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
I960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965--1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

TOTAL

2,757,690
3,955,925
3,944,674
3,553,687
3,324,108
3,765,823
4,393,570
4,957,525
5,376,718
5,419,248
5,636,395
6,124,493
6,719,938
6,595,172
5,548,676
5,377,685
5,586,790
7,047,790
8,612,659
9,528,557
10,366,391
12,608,588
13,995,144
14,665,816
15,482,613
16,227,538
17,430,382
20,975,084
19,147,708
17,658,739
16,548,172
16,941,635
17,190,342
17,066,125
19,413,996
18,491,674
18,926,896
19,916,242
20,148,915
22,729,853
23,056,105
25,971,716

$503,186,797

Tax increased July
Tax increased April

Net Amount
Available
Hignwjy Dept.

Tax
Collected

Year Ended
June 3

1,
1,

$

2,237,391
2,968,358
2,979,001
2,732,639
2,578,408
3,080,755
3,629,649
4,048,636
4,576,575
4,474,642
4,462,130
4,983,782
5,322,780
5,176,002
4,149,358
3,820,617
3,872,589
5,126,060
6,445,892
7,047,928
7,651,011
9,697,485
10,725,175
11,544,161
12,213,432
13,185,672
14,253,713
17,086,668
15,773,218
14,311,492
13,936,919
14,165,643
14,541,065
14,508,722
16,683,708
16,206,013
16,408,085
17,259,515
17,402,792
20,151,956
20,296,043
23,554,964

$415,270,644

1949 to six cents.
1955 to seven cents on gasoline, nine cents on diesel fuel.

Tax decreased January 16,

1958 to six cents on gasoline.

Tax increased July 1, 1967 to six and one-half cents.

Tax increased July
Source:

1,

1969 to seven cents.

Montana, State Board of Equalization, Twenty-Fourth Biennial Report
(Helena, 1970), p. 30.

185-

TABLE 13
HIGHWAY COMMISSION SUMMARY OF FUNDING

1969 Biennium
Expended
1969

1968

SUMMARY

1973 Biennium
Recommended
1972
1973

Earwarked Revenue Fund:
Highway Account $ 24,571,115 $

26,175,070 $

29,009,991 $

37,760,456 $

36,832,718 $

38,324,268

~ed e ral & Private
Revenue Fund :
Highway Trust Acct. 47,546,354

53,166,020

71,380,410

72,143,582

73,908,152

69,673,69 5

8!180

0

0

0

0

Federal & Private Grant
Clearance Fund:
Montana Rose Bowl
Entry Account

....I
°'I

1971 Biennium
Expended
1971

1970

TOTAL FUNDING

$

9,781
72,127,250 $

79,349,270 $ 100,390,401 $ 109,904,038 $ 110,740,870 $ 107,997,963

00

Source:

Montana, Office of the Governor, Executive Bud~et (Helena, 1971), p. 652.

^

EARMARKING OF REVENUES
The figures were included in
Montana Highway Commission.
the Executive Budget for the 1971-1973 biennium, and the legislature appropriated the recommended amounts for that period. 14
The Highway Commission appropriation is determined by the
amount of anticipated revenue from the earmarked highway
taxes and the amount of federal aid available.

Other States

Table 14 shows the number of states earmarking funds for highway purposes by constitutional mandate.

MONTANA INCOME TAXES PROVISION

Article XII, Section la of the Montana Constitution provides:
The legislative assembly may levy and collect taxes
upon the incomes of persons, firms and corporations
for the purpose of replacing property taxes.
These
income taxes may be graduated and progressive and shall
be distributed to the public schools and to the state
government.

At present, 25 percent of personal income tax revenue and
25 percent of corporation license tax revenue are earmarked
by statute for state equalization aid to public schools. 5
In addition to the 2 5 percent of income tax and corporate
license tax revenues, the legislature appropriates to public
school equalization aid from the general fund. The 1971
Legislature appropriated $17,575,052 for fiscal 1972 and
In addi$19,631,766 for fiscal 1973 from the general fund.
tion, an estimated $19 million per fiscal year is anticipated
-from the 25 percent of income and corporate license taxes,
an estimate that is difficult to make because of the fluctuation in income tax and corporate license tax revenues.
Table 15 shows the amount of income and corporate license
taxes earmarked for education from 1961 to 1971, and the
additional general fund appropriations for the same years.
In
all years, the funds appropriated from the general fund exceeded the earmarked funds.
Table 16 demonstrates the problems inherent in estimating
the amount of revenue available from "25 percent" of the
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TABLE 14
STATES EARMARKING HIGHWAY FUNDS
Motor Fuel

>1*0
(0

3

Alabama

0)

»

TABLE 15
STATUS OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL EQUALIZATION AID ACCOUNT
1961-62 through 1970-71
Earmarked Revenue

I
I-'

School
Year

25% of State
Income Tax

25% of Corp
License Tax

50% of U.S.
Oil and Gas
Royalties

Total Earmarked
Revenue

1961-62

$ 3,039,231

$ 1,110,245

$

878,500

$ 5,027,976

Legislative
Aoorooriation

Total Public
School Equalization Aid
Account Revenue

$ 8,057.374

$ 13,085,350

1962-63

3,508,303

1,189,468

1,018,866

5,176,637

8,577,137

13,753,774

1963-64

3,674,646

1,262,453

1,003,356

5,940,455

10,000,000

15,940,455

1964-65

4,165,654

1,467,809

1,012,594

6,646,057

12,000,000

18,646,057

1965-66

5,467,467

1,637,930

1,070,302

8,175,699

13,699,646

21,875,345

1966-67

5,968,589

1,901, 952

1,060,613

8,931,154

13,200,000

22,131,154

1967-68

7,393,413

1,832,176

1,111,735

10,337,324

H,711,598

25,04 8,922

1968-69

7,805,798

2,017,481

1,697,365

11,520,644

12,500,000

24,020,644

1969-70

9,717,712

2,383,966

1,488,710

13,590,388

17,150,000

30,740,388

1970-71

10,597,896

2,401,452

1,329,015

14,328,363

15,850,000

30,178,363

00
I.O

I

Source:

Montana, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Annual Report
Statistical Appendix (Helena, 1971), n. p.

TABLE 16
REVENUE FOR FOUNDATIOtl PROGRA!-'1 8UPPORT

State Suor,ort:
Al:tount of
Foundat ton

State
tqual.
Level
(Percent)

Antlcloated vs Actual 1

Interest and Inco"'c
Anticipated
Actual
Payment
Payment

State Eau.11 lzat ton Aid
Anticipated
Actual
P~ymen t
Paymcn ~

County
tquollzotlon

County
Def le !ency

Total
County
Aid

Proportion of
Found at lon
Progra!ll

School
Year

(Dollars)

1961-62

39,582,549

89

4,244,230

4,244,230

13,300,102

13,327,058

16,111,3563

5,926,861 3

22,038,2173

.557

1962- 63

41,168,102

82

4,520,7 67

4,520,767

13,288,946

13,312,103

15,899,0753

70,459 ,314 3

23,358,3893

• 567

1963-64

48,234,835

99+

4,310,740

4,912,755

15,095,147

14,545,885

28,828,948

-0-

28,828,948

.598

1964-65

49,463,813

100

4,650,672

5,236,280

18,941,432

18,949,403

25,871,709

-o-

25,871,709

• 523

1965-66

53,899,812

100

4,855,870

5,136,194

19,821,015

19,831,469

29,222,927

-0-

29,222,927

.542

1966-67

54,906,595

100

5,347,392

5,901,396

18,978,547

19,003,935

30,580,65 6

-0-

30,580,656

• 557

I-'

1967-68

69,261,403

89

5,878,418

8,009,377

24,109,631

24,124,340

31,920,668

7 ,352,686

39,273,354

,567

\0
0

1963- 69

70,970,246

9,304,546

9,219,288

23,751,782

23,775,841

32,531,205

5,382,713

37,913,918

,534

1969· 70

81,639, 484

6,928,282

7,813,054

33,480,075

30,236,571

35,626,286

5,604,481

41,231,127

.sos

1970-71

82,578,392

6,987,364

6,930,139

29,501,806

29,508,395

37,387,479

8,701,723,

46,089,202

. 558

I

Probriilm

I
89

Aid

!.~vy

1Antlclpa ted revenue ls the ·•mount whlch state offlclals (lloard of Equalization, Land Boord and Office of the Superlntendeot of Public Inatructlon)
esticiated at budget tlr:ie <1ould be availabl e for support of public schools during the enaulng school year.
2Le\'les were set to ralae the amounts shown, The amounts of revenue actually collected by the counties vary s011evhat fr0111 the e><pected flgurea ,
Althoui;h no data or,. available on e><actly how much of actual collections of county taxes was applied to foundation program support, the anticipated
se:ount s shown can be consldered to be reliable appr01<imatlons,
31nclude1 some district revenue as provided by the law ln 1961-62 and 1962-63 ,
4,his level <1as not achieved because the amount of car111arkcd revenue was lower than expected; the actual level was 89'1 .

Source: Montana, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Annual Report, Statistica l
Appendix (Helena, 1971), n. p.

EARMARKING OF REVENUES
During the
income tax and corporate license tax collections.
1971 Legislature, a bill was rejected which would have
lowered the earmarked percentage from the present 25 percent
to only 1 percent. 1? The intent was to increase the appropriation from the general fund proportionately to provide
The act might have simplia specific dollar appropriation.
fied the accounting system now required for the two funds
and removed the uncertainty surrounding what money would be
available for schools from the 25 percent earmarked funds.
As a matter of fact, it is questionable whether the constitutional requirement that income tax proceeds must be "distributed to the public schools and to the state government"
requires earmarking a certain percentage to schools as long
as some general fund appropriation is made for that purpose.
Such an appropriation assures that some income tax money
is being distributed to the public schools because the individual and corporate income taxes are the mainstay of the
general fund.

Article XII, Section la raises another problem by earmarking
income tax revenue for "public schools" and "state government." The wording would seem to prohibit the use of income
tax revenue for state aid to local governments unless the
That problem is discussed in
aid is for a state purpose.
Chapter XVI.

—

Other States

At least three other states appear to earmark proceeds from
They are:
the state income tax.

—

Ohio [Art. XII, Sec. 9]
Not less than fifty percentum
of the income and inheritance taxes that may be
collected by the state shall be returned to the
county, school district, city, village, or township
in which said income or inheritance tax originates,
or to any of the same, as may be provided by law.

Colorado [Art. X, Sec. 17] --Income tax. The general
assembly may levy income taxes, either graduated or
proportional, or both graduated and proportional,
for the support of the state, or any political subdivision thereof, or for public schools.
.

.

.

Alabama [Amend. LXI Sec. A] --Beginning October 1,
1947, and thereafter, all net proceeds of such tax
[the income tax] plus the earnings from investment of
,
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the trust funds, must be used only in the manner and in
the order following:
(1) To replace the revenue lost
to the several funds of the state by reason of the
exemption of homesteads from the state ad valorem tax.
All homesteads in Alabama are hereby declared to be
exempt from all state ad valorem tax to the extent of at
least $2,000.00 in assessed value and a sufficient amount
is hereby appropriated from the proceeds of the income tax
in each fiscal year to replace the revenue lost to the
several funds of the state by reason of the homestead
exemption herein declared; (2) The residue shall be placed
in the state treasury to the credit of the Alabama special
education trust fund to be used for the payment of public
school teachers salaries only.
.

.

.

None of the approximately twenty other states that authorize
income taxation in their constitutions earmarks that money.

UNIQUE GEORGIA
Georgia's Constitution is unique among state documents in preventing earmarking of funds.
It provides:

All money collected from taxes, fees and assessments for
State purposes, as authorized by revenue measures
enacted by the General Assembly, shall be paid into
the General Fund of the State Treasury and shall be
appropriated therefrom as required by this Constitution, for the purposes set out in this Section and for
these purposes only. [Georgia Const. Art. 7, Sec. 2
,

(III)]

Georgia is the only state with such a prohibition. All
other state constitutions are silent on the broad question
of earmarking, therefore permitting it by implication. And
even Georgia's "earmarking" record is not completely untarnished,
despite the provision.
Gasoline taxes are paid into [the] general fund and
during [the] year of their collection are available to
meet all state obligations. However, a constitutional
provision uses the rate of collections as a device
for setting the subsequent year's appropriation for
highways.
This is an amount no less than the motor
This is a self executfuel tax collection figure.
ing process and does not depend on the legislative
appropriation process. °
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PROS AND CONS OF EARMARKING
The Tax Foundation has summarized the arguments in favor of
earmarking as follows:

Earmarking makes it possible to require those
1.
who receive the benefits of a governmental service to
pay for it.
When the beneficiaries of a certain public service are
a distinct group, and one which pays a particular tax
or set of taxes, these taxes should, it is argued,
Such application of the
be tied to the special use.
benefit principle appeals on grounds of fairness,
i.e., those who receive the special benefits should
bear the cost, but they should not be required to
The
pay for other services through the special taxes.
clearest cases of this sort are found in financing
social insurance (predominantly Federal) and streets
and highways. The issues involved range far beyond
earmarking as such.
Earmarking assures a minimum level of expendi2.
tures for a desired governmental function.

When legislative support for a public service cannot
be relied upon, earmarking assures at least a minimum
If, for one reason or
outlay for the function.
another, the public does not trust the budgetary
process to provide ample funds in the future for some
service, earmarking may be supported until better
Special groups with a
methods can be developed.
strong interest in, say, education may press for earmarking to assure the continuity of the program
without need for repeated pressure.
Earmarking can contribute stability to the state's
3.
financial system.
A related argument holds that since earmarking provides
a floor to expenditures of a given nature, it may also
reduce fluctuations in spending and hence impart a
degree of stability to the state's financial structure.
4.
Earmarking assures continuity for specific
projects.
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Earmarking provides assurance of the continuity of
The confidence thus
funds for specific projects.
generated tends to make potential buyers of state bonds
willing to accept lower rates of interest than they
would demand in the absence of such assurances. The
certainty of future funds also facilitates long-range
planning, which is particularly helpful when a major
part of the proposed spending is on construction.
It is held that under these circumstances construction
industries are more inclined to invest in specialized
machinery and equipment needed for massive construction projects.
5.
Earmarking can induce the public to support new
or increased taxes.

Earmarking has been utilized frequently as sugarcoating which helps to overcome resistance to the introduction of a new and unpopular tax, or raising the
Some voters who might oppose
rates on an existing tax.
the tax change can be swayed, it is felt, by associating
the tax with a popular public service. 19
On the other hand, the Tax Foundation has noted arguments
against earmarking:
1.
Earmarking, it is said, hampers effective budgetary control, in some cases seriously.

Effective fiscal management depends, among other things,
on a system which permits the entire financial picture
of the government to be shown in one comprehensive
Such a
document, and requires action on all parts.
system enables legislatures to weigh the relative merits
of each state program in terms of the total funds which
But
are available for expenditure on all functions.
the presence of special annexed budgets, independent
of the main budget, creates almost insurmountable obstacles to the determination of optimum levels for
expenditure on various public functions. The fact that
approximately 4 out of every 10 dollars collected in
state taxes were set aside for specific uses in fiscal
1963 may have hampered effective budgeting in many
states
2.
Earmarking leads to a misallocation of funds, giving excess revenues to some functions while others are

undersupported

Maldistribution of revenue is almost unavoidable under
earmarking, since there is no necessary, or even probable,

•194-

EARMARKING OF REVENUES

relationship between the yield from a dedicated source
and the most reasonable level of expenditure on the
designated activity. Waste results in the functions
which receive unduly generous revenues, and the public
is deprived of needed services in cases where amounts
received are relatively meager.
The earmarking of special revenues to the departments
which collect them may conceal wasteful practices in
allocation and/or execution. For instance, a department may report only the excess of expenditures over
the amounts collected, giving the impression since it
may rely very little if at all on revenues from the
general fund that it is operating on an economical
basis.
Another misallocation resulting from earmarking
springs from the tendency for unnecessary balances to
accumulate in special funds.

—

—

3.
Earmarking makes for a troublesome inflexibility
of the revenue structure, with the consequence that
legislatures experience difficulty in arranging suitable
adjustments to changing conditions.

Earmarking, it is argued, imparts an awkward rigidity
to state budgets.
As the relative needs of various
state programs shift, legislatures faced with a heavily
earmarked tax structure find themselves in a trying
position. Earmarked functions may drain off funds
from the most effective revenue sources, and legislatures must face a choice between raising the rates of
existing taxes, introducing new kinds of taxes, or
glossing over the situation in the neglected area. As
a result, non-earmarked revenue sources will tend to
be overworked.
4.
Earmarking statutes tend to remain in force after
the need for which they were established has passed.

—

—

Earmarking statutes as well as other statutes tend to
embed themselves in the governmental structure. For
example, Missouri continues to levy a special property
tax to pay interest on a state debt which has already
been retired. The continued presence in two states of
taxes earmarked for Confederate war pensions also illustrates the long-lived nature of earmarking statutes.
5.
Earmarking infringes on the policy-making powers
of the executive and the legislature, since it removes
a portion of governmental activities from periodic
review and control.
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Lack of control over the state purse--as a consequence
of the preceeding points—vitiates the policy-making
power of executives and legislatures. Earmarking can
remove important areas of government activity from
effective and regular legislative or executive supervision and review, by limiting discretion in the determination of current relative needs of various state
programs and in the allocation of state financial resources to meet those needs. 20
The Montana Legislative Council has made the following statement on constitutional and statutory earmarking:

One argument for earmarking is to implement the benefit
theory of taxation. According to this theory a tax or
charge is "just" or "fair" in so far as it is imposed on
Howthose who benefit from the service it supports.
ever, it is usually not possible to determine who
benefits from a governmental service, or to what degree.
In many instances even those who do not directly benefit
from the manner in which the proceeds of a particular
Even where
tax are spent will receive indirect benefits.
the benefit principle seems applicable it is often nearly
impossible to determine administrative costs precisely
and set the fee or tax accordingly.

The benefit principle and its corollary, special fund
financing, are widely applied to professional occuoational license fees. Members of these groups maintain
that the licenses they pay should be used only to support
Members of such groups
the activities of "their" board.
do benefit from regulatory measures because they are
protected from unfair competition of the unqualified.
But these must be viewed as incidental effects. Where
the powers of government are employed to regulate an
occupational group, the only real justification is the
protection of the public, not the creation of a "guild".
If the regulation is not in the public interest it should
At least ten states finance
not be a state function.
their occupation licensing boards from general fund
appropriations

Another argument for earmarking moneys is that department heads are more likely to be prudent in the management of their "own funds" than general fund appropriations.
However, rather than discouraging spending,
special funds can have the reverse effect. Critics of
special fund financing claim that expenditures of
earmarked revenue sooner or later equal income. Where
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revenue increases at a faster rate than the cost of the
service which it was intended to finance, the administrator will often expand his program to match available
income.

Greater flexibility to meet emergency situations is
another argument often advanced in favor of earmarking.
It cannot be denied that special funds give those
departments with demand type services certain flexibility
to meet unforeseen increases in demands for services.
But a special fund is not the only possible solution.
Where real emergencies are a possibility, contingency
appropriations with adequate safeguards to prevent misapplication could be adopted as an alternative to a
special fund.
Finally, it is often argued that earmarking insures a
The administracertain level of income for a service.
tor who has a special fund to support his program need
not fear that the legislature, either because of adverse
economic conditions or changes in policy, will not
adequately provide for certain services. Providing a
certain and sufficient level of income for state agencies
may have an unwanted effect, however.
State agencies
have a natural and inherent tendency toward autonomy;
where an agency has a special fund sufficient to finance
its programs, any effort to extend controls over it
will be deeply resented and usually unsuccessful. Moreover, the object of securing a certain level of revenue
is sometimes defeated by the very means employed to
insure it.
It is possible to overestimate the amount of
revenue needed to finance a particular service. The
passage of time might produce the same result; what may
have been an adequate rate of income to support the
service may in time come to be less than enough. Finally,
if revenues are more than ample, the administrator may
lack incentive to increase operating efficiency, and
possible savings are not passed on to the consumer of
the services in the form of reduced fees or taxes. 2l
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CHAPTER XI
PUBLIC SCHOOL LANDS, OTHER LAND GRANTS AND LAND GRANT FUNDS

INTRODUCTION
The Congressional Enabling Act admitting Montana to the Union
in 1889 and other Congressional acts granted public lands to
the state of Montana for specified purposes.^- Those lands
still are subject to the conditions specified by Congress in
making the grants. The Constitution of 1889 accepted the
land grants and the conditions set forth in the Enabling Act.
The land grant practice of the United States government dates
back to 1785, when the Continental Congress adopted the
famous Northwest Land Ordinance providing for a survey of
public lands and reservation of section 16 of each township
for the maintenance of public schools.
By the time Montana became a state, Congress was dedicating
two sections-- 16 and 36 of each township to public schools.
In addition, Congress was providing land to the states for

—

universities, normal schools, public buildings, prisons and
charitable institutions. One example is the Morrill Act,
which provided federal land grants for states with the income
and sale proceeds from the land to be used to support public
colleges teaching agriculture and mechanic arts.
As a result of these federal land grant programs, Montana
received more than 5.8 million acres from the United States
government. The total acreage of the federal land grant
amounts to more than 6 percent of the state land area, or
more than 9,000 square miles. 2 As owner of the land, the
state receives income from its use and proceeds from its sale.
Unlike most states, however, Montana has retained the vast
majority of its land grant acreage.

The more than five million acres of trust land still retained
by the state of Montana is a magnificent legacy and an
In the care, management and disposiirreplaceable resource.
tion of all state lands and the funds arising from them, the
legislature has specified:
[T]he guiding rule and principle shall be that these
lands and funds are held in trust for the support of
education, and for the attainment of other worthy objects
helpful to the well-being of the people of this state;
and that it is the duty of the board [of land commissioners] so to administer this trust as to secure the largest
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measure of legitimate and reasonable advantage to the state.
It is the duty of the board to manage these lands under the
multiple-use management concept defined as:
The management of all the various resources of the state-owned
lands so that they are utilized in that combination best
meeting the needs of the people and the beneficiaries of
the trust, making the most judicious use of the land for
some or all of those resources or related services over
areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for
periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs
and conditions; that some land will be used for less
than all of the resources, and harmonious and co-ordinated
management of the various resources, each with the other,
without impairment of the productivity of .the land, with
consideration being given to the relative values of the
various resources.
The land grants and funds are major financial assets of the
state.
The value of all permanent assets of the land grants
and funds is $114, 028, 685. 17, according to the Department of
State Lands.
Interest and income receipts in 1970 from the
lands totaled $10, 531 013 01. 5 Approximately 90 percent of
the receipts belong to the public school fund.
,

.

The land-grant resource should be protected from hasty or
ill-conceived disposition;
the extent to which the Constitution should be utilized as a management tool in the protection and utilization of public lands is a question of major
importance for the Constitutional Convention.

MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
In addition to accepting the land grants and the conditions
set forth in the Enabling Act [Ordinance I, Part 7], the
1889 Constitution provides for the earmarking of the land
qrants for specific purposes [Ordinance I, Part 7; Art. XI,
Sees. 2 and 12];
administration of the land grants by the
Board of Land Commissioners, composed of the governor,
superintendent of public instruction, secretary of state and
attorney aeneral [Art. XI, Sec. 4]; management of the land
grants, includinq leasing and sale of the land [Art. XVII,
Sees. 1,2 and 3];
creation of a public school fund from
proceeds of the sale of public school lands [Art. XI, Sec.
creation of other permanent funds for the other grants
2];
assurance that the public school funds
[Art. XI, Sec. 12];

and other funds will remain forever inviolate, guaranteed
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by the state against loss or diversion [Art. XI, Sees. 3
investment of funds [Art. XXI, Sees. 6 and 8;
and 12];
Art. V, Sec. 37], and distribution of the
Art. XIII, Sec. 1;
income from the lands and interest from investment of the
public school fund [Art. XI, Sec. 5].

Provisions of the Enabling Act and the Constitution affecting
land grants and land grant funds are discussed in this chapter and Chapters XII and XIII.

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION
The Public Land Law Review Commission, established by Congress in 1964 to review the public land laws of the United
States, made the following recommendation in its 1970 report:

Limitations originally placed by the Federal Government
on the use of grant lands, or funds derived from them,
should be eliminated^ [Emphasis added]
Land grants to the states were made for a variety of
The hasty and ill-considered disposition of
purposes.
much of the land included in early grants led Congress
to impose more specific and stringent conditions on
later grants
The earliest, and some of the largest, grants were made
The common school funds
for the support of education.
established as a result of these grants, however, generate only a small fraction of the total amount spent on
education by the past or present public land states.
In no state does the trust fund generate more than 6.8
percent of the total expended, and in all but 4 states
While the Commisless than 3 percent is so generated.
sion does not oppose dedicating grant lands to education,
it favors leaving to the stat e legislatures the decision
as to how and when to apply this policy
.

Lands granted for a particular purpose have been considered to be held in trust by the state for the purIf the lands are disposed of, the
pose granted.
proceeds, in turn, are to be held in trust for the grant's
stated purpose.
In modern times these restrictions have frequently proved
In Ohio, for example,
to be obsolete and burdensome.
a provision which required the state to obtain the consent of the inhabitants of the township in which the land
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was located prior to a sale of school grant lands and
then invest the proceeds for the use of schools in that
township, led the state to seek and secure congressional
relief from the grant restrictions.
Under a 1968 Act of
Congress, the proceeds from such sales may now be used
for whatever educational purposes the Ohio legislature
deems appropriate.

Faced with problems similar to those of Ohio, other
states have acted unilaterally, by amendment to state
constitutions or by state legislation, to relieve themselves of burdensome restrictions.
Such practices are
of questionable legality, however, because the actions
seem to attempt to nullify the cond tions of grants
from the United States.
The Commission believes that lands granted to the
states will better serve the purposes for which they
were granted if unrealistic and narrow restrictions on
the grants are removed.
The disposition and management
of such lands, as well as the funds generated by them,
should now be left to the discretion of the various
state legislative bodies.
In anticipation of such action by Congress, the Constitutional Convention should consider whether limitations on public
land use now imposed by Congress should:
1.
Continue to be incorporated by reference in the
Montana Constitution;

2.

Be specified in the Constitution;

3.

Be left to statutory law where they could be changed-

if Congress authorizes such change.

GRANTS OF LAND

Sections of the Enabling Act granted land to the state for
schools (Section 10); university (Section 14); agricultural
college (Sections 16 and 17); school of mines, normal school,
and public
reform school and deaf asylum (Section 17)
buildings (Sections 12 and 17)
,

For common school support, sections 16 and 36 in each townSome of these sections had
ship in the state were granted.
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been homes teaded, disposed of prior to passage of the Enabling
Act or were within boundaries of Indian reservations. To
make up for this loss, other lands were selected by the state.

Table 17 shows the original grant, the acreage remaining and
the fund for each grant as of June 30, 19 70.

Acceptance of Grants and Conditions
The Constitutional Convention of 1889 in Ordinance No.
Part 7 provided:

1,

The state hereby accepts the several grants of land
from the United States to the State of Montana,
upon the terms and
mentioned in [the Enabling Act]
conditions therein provided [emphasis added]
.

.

.

That Ordinance, under terms of the Enabling Act, is "irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the
."' In other words, the Enabling
people of [Montana].
Act restrictions on the use of granted lands are given
constitutional status in Montana and, furthermore, cannot
The
be changed without the approval of the U.S. government.
provisions of the Enabling Act, therefore, clearly become
a matter of concern for the Constitutional Convention.
.

.

EARMARKING OF GRANTS AND FUNDS
The grant of school lands in Section 10 of the Enabling Act
provides that sections 16 and 36 in each township are "hereby
granted to said states for the support of common schools.
The Enabling Act also dedicated all proceeds from the sale
of public lands.
Section 11 of the Act, as amended, provides in part:
.

With the exception of the lands granted for public
buildings, the proceeds from the sale and other permanent disposition of any of the said lands and from
every part thereof, shall constitute permanent funds
for the support and maintenance of t he public schools
and the various state institutions for which the lands
Rentals on leased lands, interest
have been granted
on deferred payments on lands sold, interest on funds
arising from these lands, and all other actual income,
.
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TABLE 17
ORIGINAL LAND GRANTS, THE ACREAGE REMAINING AND THE
FUNDS FOR EACH GRANT AS OF JUNE 30, 1970

Original
Grant

Acreage as of
June 30, 1970

5,188,000

4,595,406.96

University of Montana _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

46,720

18,160.87

838,833. 67

Montana State University-Morrill Grant _ __

90,000

62,977.31

1,304,654.5 0

Montana State University-Second Grant

50,000

32,632.13

551,091.7 5

School of Mineral Science and Technology _ _

100,000

59,606.22

1,317,6 88 .6 8

State Normal School

100,000

62,890.00

1,156,654.2 9

Deaf and Blind Asylum

50,000

36,235.86

521,177.76

State Reform School

50,000

68,744.01

550,400.3 7

182,000

186,249.56

Fund
Public School

I
N

Fund as of
June 30, 197 0
$

52,907,243. 03

0

0\

I

Public Buildings
Veterans' Home
"Militia Camp" now used as an Agricultural
Experiment Station
Agricultural and Manual Training School
State Penitentiary _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Source:

1,275.61

1,275.61

640.00

640.00

5,000.00

2,000.00

9.75

9.75

Montana, Department of State Lands and Investments, Statistical
Report
(Helena, 1970), p. 1.

8,0ll.64

.
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shall be available for the acquisition and construction
of facilities, including the retirement of bonds authorized by law for such purposes, and for the maintenance
and support of such schools and institutions.
Any state
may, however, in its discretion, add a portion of the
annual income to the permanent funds [emphasis added]
7he 1889 Constitution also provides for the earmarking of
public school funds:

—

Article XI, Section 2 The public school fund of the
state shall consist of the proceeds of such lands as
have heretofore been granted, or may hereafter be
granted, to the state by the general government known
as school lands; and those granted in lieu of such;
lands acquired by gift or grant from any person or
corporation under any law or grant of the general
government; and of all other grants of land or money
made to the state from the general government for
general educational purposes, or where no other special
purpose is indicated in such grant; all estates, or
distributive shares of estates that may escheat to the
state; all unclaimed shares and dividends of any
corporation incorporated under the laws of the state,
and all other grants, gifts, devises or bequests made
to the state for general educational purposes.

Article XI, Section 3--Such public school fund shall
forever remain inviolate, guaranteed by the state
against loss or diversion, to be invested, so far as
possible, in public securities within the state, including school district bonds, issued for the erection of
school buildinqs, under the restrictions to be provided
by law.
In 19 39, as part of a comprehensive amendment incorporating
the land grants into the Trust and Legacy Fund, the following provision was added to Article XXI, Section 8:

All existing constitutional guarantees against loss or
diversion applying to the public school fund, to the
funds of the state university and to the funds of all
other state institutions of learning, shall remain in
full force and effect.
Thus, the public school lands and permanent funds are earmarked by the Congressional Enabling Act, the Ordinances
adopted by the 1889 Constitutional Convention and the Montana
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Constitution. Only Congress can amend the Enabling Act and
the Ordinances are irrevocable without the consent of the
United States and the people of Montana.

LAND GRANT FUNDS
The Enabling Act provides that all money from the sale of
granted lands (except that granted for public buildings) should
be placed in a permanent fund for each of the land grant institutions.
Section 11 of the Act provides in part:

With the exception of the lands granted for public
buildings, the proceeds from the sale and other
permanent disposition of any of the said lands and from
every part thereof, shall constitute permanent funds
for the support and maintenance of the public schools
and the various state institutions for which the lands
have been granted.
Rentals on leased lands, interest
on deferred payments on lands sold, interest on funds
arising from these lands, and all other actual income,
shall be available for the acquisition and construction
of facilities, including the retirement of bonds authorized by law for such purposes, and for the maintenance
and support of such schools and institutions.
Any
state may, however, in its discretion, add a portion
of the annual income to the permanent funds.
The only land grant fund created in the Montana Constitution
However, other
is the public school fund [Art. XI, Sec. 2].
land grant funds are referred to in Article XI, Section 12
and Article XXI, Section 6.
The amount of money in the various funds is indicated in Table 17.
In addition to the proceeds from the sale of public school
lands, Article XI, Section 2 provides that the public school
fund shall consist of:
1.

Proceeds from the sale of lands acquired by gift or

orant.
2.
Proceeds from the sale of other land grants made to
the state from the federal government for educational purposes or where no other special purpose is indicated in the
arant
3.

Escheated estates.
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4.

Unclaimed shares and dividends of Montana corpora-

tions.

All other grants, gifts, devises or bequests made to
5.
the state for general educational purposes.

Article XXI, Section 6 provides that the public school permanent fund and other land grant permanent funds are to be
invested as part of the Montana trust and legacy funds but
that their "separate existence and identity.
.shall be
strictly maintained."
.

The constitutional provisions on the public school fund are
Section 75-7301 of the
bolstered by statutory mandates.
Revised Codes of Montana 1947, provides:
,

The public school fund shall be maintained by the state
treasurer as a subfund in the trust and legacy fund and
the principal amount of such fund shall be irreducible
and permanent.
The following moneys shall be credited
to such fund as an addition to the irreducible and
permanent principal amount:
(1) appropriations and donations by the state
(2) donations and bequests by individuals to the
state or schools;
(3) the proceeds of land and other property which
revert to the state by escheat and forfeiture;
(4) the proceeds of all property granted to the state,
when the purpose of the grant is not specified or is
uncertain;
(5) funds accumulated in the treasury of the state
for the disbursement of which provision has not been
made by law;
(6) the proceeds of the sale of timber, stone, materials, or other property from school lands other than
those granted for specific purposes, and all moneys
other than rental recovered from persons trespassing
on such lands;
(7) the principal of all moneys arising from the sale
of lands and other property which have been and may be
hereafter granted to the state for the support of
common schools;
(8) the amount earmarked for deposit in this fund under
the provisions of section 75-6907; and
(9) such other moneys as may be provided by the legislature.
In addition, the Enabling Act specifies certain revenue for
the permanent school fund in Section 13:

-209-

8

PUBLIC SCHOOL LANDS, OTHER LAND GRANTS AND LAND GRANT FUNDS
[F]ive per centum of the proceeds of the sale of public
lands lying within said states which shall be sold by
the United States subsequent to the admission of said
states into the Union, after deducting all the expenses incident to the same, shall be paid to the said
states, to be used as a permanent fund, the interest of
which only shall be expended for the support of common
schools within said states respectively.
In recent years, contrary to that provision, such funds have
been deposited to the general fund and not to the public
school fund Sums involved since 1965 are:

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

$12,379.68
9,159.68
6,982.27
15,946.83
12,512.09
16,539.07
8,395.65

The Director of the Department of Administration is seeking
an Attorney General's opinion on the future disposition of
these funds.

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FROM SCHOOL LANDS
"Interest and Income" funds may be defined as the money received for the use of state lands and the permanent funds
arising therefrom. This money includes grazing and oil lease
rentals, crop shares and interest on land contracts and on
investments.

Subject to the earmarking provisions indicated above, income
from the lands and interest from the investments of the funds
(except for the public school share) are distributed to earmarked funds for the use of the various institutions.
For nublic schools, the distribution formula is provided for
in Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution:

Ninety-five per centum (95%) of all the interest
received on the school funds of the state, and ninetyfive per centum (95%) of all rents received from the
leasing of school lands and of all other income from
the public school funds shall be apportioned annually
to the several school districts of the state
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in proportion to the number of children and youths
between the ages of six (6) and twenty-one (21) residing
therein respectively, but no district shall be entitled
to such distributive share that does not maintain a
public free school for at least six months during the
The remaining
year for which such distribution is made.
five per centum (5%) of all the interest received on the
school funds of the state, and the remaining five per
centum (5%) of all the rents received from the leasing
of school lands and of all other income from the public
school funds, shall annually be added to the public
school funds of the state and become and forever remain
an inseparable and inviolable part thereof.

Thus, before distribution of public school money, the Constitution requires that 5 percent of the total annual income
Table 18
and interest be deducted for the public school fund.
Shows receipts to the Interest and Income Fund in 1967;
Table 19 shows the distribution of the public school Interest
and Income Fund to the counties.

Based on the constitutional formula, the legislature has provided for distribution of the Interest and Income money
Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Sections 75-6906 to 75-6911].
The superintendent of public instruction divides the income
among the counties on the basis of number of school-age
The county superintendent of schools further dichildren.
vides the amount received among the school districts of the
In 19 69, the distribution amounted
county on the same basis.
to more than $40.17 per child; in 19 70 the amount was more
than $34.10. 9
[

,

The Interest and Income funds are distributed to elementary
school districts only and are the first source of revenue for
The foundation
the elementary school foundation program.
program is designed to equalize the financial burden for
education among the state's wealthy and poor school districts;
however, the constitutionally mandated distribution of the
Interest and Income money does not reflect the equalization
principle.
Interest and Income money, according to the Constitution, is to be distributed among the school districts of
the state in proportion to their population between the ages
of six and twenty-one; the financial status of the district
is not considered.

Partially as a result of that constitutional formula, the
more wealthy counties in the state are not required to make
full use of another major portion of the foundation program
Ten counties probably will not
the 25-mill countywide levy.
have to levy the entire 25 mills in 1971-72. 10 In other words,
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TABLE 18

INTEREST AND INCOME FUND, 1967

SOURCES OF REVENUE

Grazing Rentals

Agricultural Rentals
Grazing Fees

867,522

$

2,408,802

State Forester

,

16 , 267

Interest on Land Sales Contracts

176,060

Interest on Bonds and Certificates

163,918

Montana Trust and Legacy Fund Earned Interest ....

1,764,946

Rentals and Penalties on Oil and Gas Leases

3,121,781

Uranium Leases

6,983

Coal Leases

12,519

Total Earnings
LESS:

5% to

$

8,538,798

Permanent Fund

421,546

Deduction for Resource Development Accn t.
TOTAL

Source:

$

107,875
8,009,377

Montana, Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Biennial Report
(Helena, 1968)
p. 42.
,
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TABLE 19
STATE SCHOOL FUNDS DISTRIBUTED TO COUNTIES, 1967-68*
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taxpayers in certain wealthy counties are not required to pay
the basic millage paid in other, poorer counties for suoport
of public schools; this inequality is compounded by the constitutionally specified procedure for payment of Interest
and Income money.
If the Interest and Income money were distributed according
to the equalization formula, which considers financial need,
rather than the present constitutional procedure, taxpayers
in counties which do not now levy the full 25 mills probably
would see their levy increase one or two mills. Other

counties would witness

a

corresponding reduction.

1

The Constitutional Convention might want to consider removing
the constitutional formula for distribution of Interest and
Income funds, leaving that question to the legislature so the
money could be more equitably integrated into the foundation
program. At the least, the Convention may want to consider
a lesser change in the constitutional provision for distribuThe Constitution now
tion of the Interest and Income funds.
directs that the funds be distributed on the basis of the number
of children between the ages of six and twenty-one; other
equalization funds are distributed on the basis of "Average
Number Belonging (ANB)
the average number of regularly enrolled,
fulltime pupils attending the public schools in a district. 12

—

It can be argued that ANB is a better index of the fiscal
needs of a school district than is the present constitutional
formula based on all children between the ages of six and
twenty-one.

Income From Other Lands

Income from land grants other than those for schools is made
available to assist in operating expenses of the other
institutions.
The income is distributed monthly to earmarked
funds for the various institutions; the interest is distributed Quarterly under the provisions of Article XXI, Section 9.

MANAGEMENT OF THE LAND GRANTS
The Constitution in Article XI, Section 4 creates the Board of
Land Commissioners to manage the land grants:

The governor, superintendent of public instruction,
secretary of state and attorney general shall constitute
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the state board of land commissioners, which shall have
the direction, control, leasing and sale of the school
lands of the state, and the lands granted or which may
hereafter be granted for the support and benefit of the
various state educational institutions, under such regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law.

Section 11 of the Enabling Act provided that the lands can be
disposed of only at public auction after proper advertisement.
This section, as amended in 1948, now provides:
That all lands granted by this act shall be disposed of
only at public sale after advertising—tillable lands
capable of producing agricultural crops for not less
than ten dollars ($10.00) per acre, and lands principally valuable for grazing purposes for not less than
five dollars ($5.00) per acre. Any of the said lands
may be exchanged for other lands, public or private,
of equal value and as near as may be of equal area,
but if any of the said lands are exchanged with the
United States such exchange shall be limited to surveyed,
nonmineral, unreserved public lands of the United States
within the state.

Article XVII of the Montana Constitution provides for the
leasing and sale of public lands; Article XIX, Section 3
provides for state responsibility for fire control on the
lands, and Article XIX, Section 7 grants actual settlers a
preference in disposition of the lands:

—

Article XVII, Section 1 All lands of the state that
have been, or that may hereafter be granted to the
state by congress, and all lands acquired by gift or
grant or devise, from any person or corporation, shall
be public lands of the state, and shall be held in trust
for the people, to be disposed of as hereafter provided,
for the respective purposes for which they have been or
may be granted, donated or devised; and none of such
land, nor any estate or interest therein, shall ever be
disposed of except in pursuance of general laws providing for such disposition, nor unless the full market
value of the estate or interest disposed of, to be
ascertained in such manner as may be provided by law,
be paid or safely secured to the state; nor shall any
lands which the state holds by grant from the United
States (in any case in which the manner of disposal and
minimum price are so prescribed) be disposed of, except
in the manner and for at least the price prescribed in
the grant thereof, without the consent of the United
States.
Said lands shall be classified by the board
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of land commissioners, as follows:

First, lands which
are valuable only for qrazing purposes.
Second, those
which are principally valuable for the timber that is on
them.
Third, agricultural lands.
Fourth, lands within
the limits of any town or city or within three (3) miles
of such limits; provided, that any of said lands may be
re-classified whenever, by reason of increased facilities for irrigation or otherwise, they shall be subject
to different classification.

Article XVII, Section 2--The lands of the first of said
classes may be sold or leased, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law. The lands of the
second class may be sold, or the timber thereon may be
sold, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law. The agricultural lands may be either
sold or leased, under such rules and regulations as may
be prescribed by law.
The lands of the fourth class
shall be sold in alternate lots of not more than five
acres each, and not more than one-half of any one tract
of such lands shall be sold prior to the year one thousand nine hundred and ten (1910)

—

Article XVII, Section 3 All other public lands may be
disposed of in such manner as may be provided by law.

—

Article XIX, Section 3 The legislative assembly shall
enact suitable laws to prevent the destruction by fire
from any cause of the grasses and forests upon lands of
the state or upon lands of the public domain the control
of which may be conferred by congress upon this state,
and to otherwise protect the same.

—

Article XIX, Section 7 In the disposition of the public
lands granted by the United States to this state, preference shall always be given to actual settlers thereon,
and the legislative assembly shall provide by law for
carrying this section into effect.
The Montana Legislative Council,
the Constitution Revision
Commission^ and the Commissioner of State Lands^-^ all have
concluded that these provisions are more properly statutory
The State
and should be omitted from the Constitution.
Forester has suggested that if Sections 2 and 3 of Article
XVII are retained, they should be amended to permit the exchange of all classes of state lands and to permit the leasing of lands classified as timber lands. ^6
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Under the general constitutional directives for management
of state lands, the legislature has created the Department
of Stare Lands and Investments.
The powers and duties of the
department, including selection, classification, appraisal
and exchange of public lands, leasing of lands, sale of lands,
granting of easements, timber sales and oil, gas and mineral
leases,- are codified in Revised Codes of Montana
194 7,
Title 81.
,

Until the Executive Reorganization Act of 1971, the department
was responsible for both the management of land grants and
the investment of the permanent funds arising from the lands
as provided for in Article XXI.
However, the Reorganization
Act transferred the investment responsibility to a separate
Board of Investments within the Department of Administration
and reorganized the previous Department of Lands and Investments as the "Department of State Lands. "^- 7 The Board of Land
Commissioners heads the department; the chief administrator
is the commissioner of state lands, who is appointed by the
governor, subject to confirmation of the senate, and serves
at the governor's pleasure.
The functions and duties of the Board of Land Commissioners,
the Department of State Lands and the Commissioner of State
Lands are discussed in the Report on the Executive in this
series of studies for the Montana Constitutional Convention.

Table 20 shows the classification of public lands as provided
for in Article XVII.
Table 21 summarizes land sales for
1970.
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TABLE 20
TOTAL ACREAGE OF STATE LAND IN SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONS ACCOUNTS
INCLUDING LAND UNDER CONTRACT TO PURCHASE
ACREAGE BY CLASSIFICATION
JUNE 30, 1970
Grazing (including 17,864.79 acres of timber land) _ _ __

4,141,223.72

Agriculture land under cultivation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

509,091.50

Timber (including 17,864.79 acres of grazing land) _ _ __

490,452.49

Lands under Certificate of Purchase

-----------Grants _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

156,811.58

TOTAL ACREAGE
Less duplication of timbe-r-=-1-a-n~d:----------------

5,305,172.00
17,864.79

Special
I

....N

7,592.71

OJ

I

TOTAL NET ACREAGE

Unsold land account, June 30, 1970___,..._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Plus land under Certificate of Purchase
TOTAL NET ACREAGE, JUNE 30, 1970

Source:

5,287,307.21

-----------------------

Montana, Department of State Lands and Investments,
Statistical Report
(Helena, 1970), p. 2.

5,130,495.63
156,811. 58
5,287,307.21

TABLE 21
SUMiMARY OF LAND SALES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,

197D
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CHAPTER XII
MONTANA TRUST AND LEGACY FUND
The final article in the Montana Constitution is devoted to
an extensive and detailed plan for permanent trust funds and
Entitled "Montana Trust and Leginvestment of public money.
acy Fund," Article XXI is unique among state constitutional
No other state establishes
provisions in the United States.
a complete investment plan in its constitution.

PROVISIONS
1 of Article XXI creates three permanent revenue
funds: one for the state; one for the public schools, and
one for the Montana University System and for scientific,
educational, benevolent and charitable work.
The funds are
established by gifts, donations, grants and legacies to the
state of at least $250.

Section

Section 2 establishes the state's covenant to hold the contributions in Section 1 in trust, and to apply the earnings of
the contributions according to the directions of that section.
Section 3 sets down procedures for administration of the funds,
including additions to principal, gift specification and
limitation and rejection of gifts.
Section 4 requires the state treasurer to keep a permanent
record of gifts, legacies, grants and donations. A duplicate
must be filed with the secretary of state.

Section 5 establishes as the administrator of the funds the
same state board and officer who administer the public school
fund.
This section also provides that the three funds shall
be administered and invested as a unit known as the Montana
Trust and Legacy Fund.
Section 6 incorporates the public school fund within the provisions and regulations of the Montana Trust and Legacy Fund.
The public school fund is separate from the fund established
for schools under Section 1.
All other permanent funds
originating in land grants from the United States, which
includes funds for the University of Montana, Montana State
University, School of Mineral Science and Technology, Deaf
and Blind School and normal schools also are included in the
Trust and Legacy Fund by this provision. The section also
authorizes a unified plan for all investment funds within the
state if the legislature authorizes it.
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Section 7 permits the state to accept funds from any of its
political subdivisions for investment in the Trust and
Legacy Fund.

Section 8 limits the kinds of investments that can be made
with Trust and Legacy funds.
The fund money can be invested
only in school district, county and municipal bonds within
the state, bonds of the state of Montana, United States bonds
and federal land bank bonds.
All investments must bear a
fixed rate of interest, and preference is given to securities
payable on the amortization plan or serially with long-term
investments.
Section 9 establishes apportionment procedures for the interBecause all money in the
est earned on the investment fund.
Trust and Legacy Fund is invested as a unit, the money earned
on the investment must be parceled out among the individual
accounts.
Section 10 requires the state treasurer to keep the Trust and
Legacy Fund separate from other funds.
Section 11 permits the money and interest from the Trust and
Legacy Fund to be apportioned among the several accounts
within the Fund without appropriation by the legislature
This provision exempts the Fund from requirements of Article V,
Section 34, which provides that "no money shall be paid out
of the treasury except upon appropriation made by law, and on
warrant drawn by the proper officer in pursuance thereof.
.

.

.

Section 12 requires that all earnings from the permanent fund
created for the state under Section 1 be returned to the fund
until it reaches $100 million. At that time, only l/20th of
the earnings will be retained and the remaining amounts will
be used for general expenses of the state.
Sections 13 and 14 place similar requirements on the other
two funds created by Section 1.
Section 13 requires that all
earnings from the state permanent school fund be returned to
At that point the
the fund until it reaches $500 million.
money is apportioned among the school districts of the state
for educational purposes only.
Under Section 14, the Montana
University System fund must exceed $100 million before it is
apportioned among the units of that system.

Section 15 directs that certain contributions be placed in
the state permanent school fund; for example, those which
cannot be utilized in the manner specified at the time of contribution and those granted without specification are to go
to the school fund.
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Section 16 permits the legislature to stop adding interest to
the three funds as specified in Sections 13, 14 and 15 when
the funds have "become so large that no further increase is
necessary or desireable."

Section 17 designates the Montana Supreme Court as the superThe Court is
visory board for the Trust and Legacy Fund.
granted broad discretionary powers in administering the Fund.
Section 18 authorizes the legislature to enact further legislation to implement Article XXI.

HISTORY

Clearly the Montana Trust and Legacy Fund article with its
eighteen sections is a complicated and specific constitutional
provision.
It can be traced to 1924, when the first portions
of it were added to the Constitution by amendment.
Originally, the article created the three permanent funds set
out in Section 1 and provided for their management and adminThe three funds were to be created by cash beistration.
The funds are distinct
quests, gifts, grants and legacies.
and separate from the public school fund established from fedIn fact, as originally written, the Montana
eral land grants.
Trust and Legacy Fund specifically excluded that public school
The original Section 10 of Article
fund from its provisions.
XXI said: "The provisions of this section shall not apply to
the Public School Fund of the State, which school fund shall
be administered separately as already prescribed by the constitution. "1
The Trust Fund article was amended in 19 38 to include the public school fund.
The 1938 amendment evidently was an attempt
to provide a unified investment plan for all state money.
In addition to including the public school fund in the Trust
and Legacy Fund, the amendment also allowed incorporation
of all state investment funds into one unit upon action by the
Under the original language of Article XXI,
legislature.
other state funds could be incorporated into the Trust and
Legacy Fund only if such action was requested by the
authorities in charge of them.
The reasons for creating the Trust and Legacy Fund and the
attempt at a uniform investment policy undoubtedly were noble.
But the provisions have not lived up to their commendable
goals, and Article XXI stands as one of the most impotent provisions of the Montana Constitution.
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Confusion in Language
Before discussing the effects of Article XXI, a confusion in
terminology should be noted.
The trust fund established from school lands given to the state
by the federal government is denoted in the 1889 Constitution
The Trust and
as the "public school fund" [Art. XI, Sec. 2],
Legacy Fund, as adopted in 1924, correctly identifies the land
grant trust fund as the "public school fund" [Art. XXI, Sec.
But the 1938 amendment to Article XXI rechristened the
5].
"public school fund" the "public school permanent fund" [Art.
XXI, Sec. 6].
This misnomer has caused considerable confusion, since the
original Montana Trust and Legacy Fund article created a separate and distinct "state permanent school fund" to be
established by gifts, donations, grants and legacies to the
Because of the similarity in language, the two funds
state.
But they are separate and distinct:
often are confused.
The "Public School Fund" and the "Public School
1.
Permanent Fund" are the same, established from proceeds of
land given to the state by the federal government for public
education purposes.

The "State Permanent School Fund" was created as a
2.
separate fund, established by gifts, donations, grants and
legacies to the state.
THE FUND TODAY

Table 22 lists the accounts in the Trust and Legacy Fund today.
The most obvious conclusion from this Table is that the
Public School Fund IS the Trust and Legacy Fund, for all
practical purposes. Although several other accounts are administered under the Trust Fund, they amount to only $6.4
million of the $59 million total. Almost 90 percent of the
Fund is made up of public school funds from school lands.
Three Permanent Funds
The most glaring omissions from the list of accounts in the
Trust and Legacy Fund are the absence of a State Permanent
School Fund, a State Permanent Revenue Fund and a Permanent
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ACCOUNTS CONSTITUTING THE MONTANA TRUST AND LEGACY FUND

Amount in Fund
June 30, 1970

Fund

Public School Permanent Fund
University of Montana
Morrill
State University
Second Grant
State University
School of Mineral Science and Technology
State Normal School
State School for Deaf and Blind
State Industrial School
Veterans Home
Childrens Center and P.D. Hospital
Ryman E. & S. Library Account
Ryman Fellowship Account
W. W. Dixon Endowment Fund Account
Senator Walsh Endowment Fund Account
Geddes Bequest Fund
State Prison Inmates Fund

$52,907,243.03
838,833.67
1,304,654.50
551,091.75
1,317,688.68
1,156,654.29
521,177.76
550,400.37
8,011.64
20,948.62
7,500.00
16,976.22
23,170.00
5,000.00
2,500.00
5,000.00

University Scholarship and Prizes Fund:
Abner Memorial
Bennett Prizes
Bonner Scholarships
C. A. Duniway Scholarship
Joyce Memorial
Class of 1904
C. G. Rochon Scholarship
Kellogg Foundation Medical
Scholarship
Olaf J. Bue Fund
Silas R. Thompson Account
Wm. Kohner Bequest Fund

$1,050.00
1,175.00
6,570.00
400.00
251.00
800.00
425.00
1,451.89
1,250.00
5,099.91
7,425.00

$25,897.80

TOTAL FUNDS IN MONTANA TRUST

&

LEGACY ACCOUNT $59,262,748.33

Montana, Department of State Lands and Investments,
Statistical Report (Helena, 1970), p. 7.
Source:
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Revenue Fund for the University System. The Montana Trust and
Legacy Fund was originally created and appended to the Constitution to establish those three funds.
Now they do not exist;
in fact, they never have existed.
The reason for their absence is obvious.
The three funds were
to be created by gifts, donations, grants and legacies to the
state of at least $250.
But before that money could be
actually used for the public school system, the University
System or the state, the three accounts had to reach minimum
levels specified in the Constitution:
1.
The principal in the State Permanent Revenue Fund
had to reach $100 million.

2.
The principal in the State Permanent School Fund
had to reach $500 million.
3.
The principal in the Permanent Revenue Fund for the
University System had to reach $100 million.

In other words, the various gifts and donations would be added
to the specified funds, where they would draw interest.
But
that interest could not be distributed for the benefit of the
state or its educational institutions until the principal had
reached $100 million or $500 million.

No person who wanted to make a gift of money to the state or
its schools would tie up his money by giving it to the three
permanent funds under Article XXI.
It would never benefit
the object of his largesse.
It would sit in the fund like a
forgotten memento, slowly collecting interest but never boiling over to the point where it would be distributed to the
beneficiary. An outright gift to the schools or the state is
the easiest way to benefit those entities.
Designating the
gift as part of the three funds simply ties the money up,
possibly forever.

The impracticality of the three funds can be illustrated
another way. The largest public investment fund in the state
at present is the "Public School Fund" created by proceeds
from school lands.
Yet the principal for this fund, as of
June 30, 1970, totaled only $52.9 million. 3 Thus even this
fund, created by substantial grants of land from the federal
government and in existence since statehood, does not approach
the minimum sum required before distribution for the State
Permanent Revenue Fund, the State Permanent School Fund or
the Permanent Revenue Fund for the University System.
In summary, the three permanent revenue funds created by
Article XXI have never existed.
Sections of Article XXI
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dealing with the funds 4 are vestigial organs, cluttering up
the basic legal document of the state without serving a
The reason for their nonexistence can be
useful function.
In attempting to
traced directly to the Constitution itself.
create a unified investment program for the state, the plan
was thwarted by the ridiculously high "safeguards" in Sections 12, 13 and 14.

Endowment Funds
Several units of the Montana University System have set up
Those funds serve the
their own private endowment programs.
same function as the nonexistent Permanent Revenue Fund for
Gifts and bequests to the individual
the University System.
university units are made to their endowment funds, where
No
the money is invested and distributed to the institution.
money limitation is placed on gifts, and interest is distributed immediately, without restriction on the size of the
The Endowment Funds are not invested as part of
principal.
the Trust and Legacy Fund.

Other Accounts
As already noted, the principal account in the Trust and
That fund is made part
Legacy Fund is the public school fund.
Other
of the Trust and Legacy Fund by Article XXI, Section 6.
accounts for state institutions also were set up by federal
land grants and are incorporated in the Trust and Legacy Fund
Various endowment and bequest
by Article XXI, Section 6.
funds and the University Scholarship and Prizes Fund are invested as part of the Trust and Legacy Fund under Article XXI,
Section 7.

UNIFIED INVESTMENT PLAN
The obvious intent of the Montana Trust and Legacy Fund was to
incorporate all public funds available for investment into
one package.
This is the unwritten objective of Article XXI,
Sections 1 and 2, and the specific objective of Article XXI,
Section 5, which provides: "All these funds shall be invested
as one common fund to be known and designated as the Montana
Trust and Legacy Fund."
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This unification plan was strengthened in 1938 when the Public
School Fund and all other land grant funds were added to the
Trust and Legacy Fund.

Another step in the development of a unified system of public
money investment was taken in 19 53.
Under the authority of
Article XXI, Section 6 the legislature created the Unified
Investment Plan.^ The law placed all public fund investments
in the hands of the State Board of Land Commissioners.
The
background of the law was described as follows:
In its report to the 33rd Legislative assembly the
Commission on Reorganization of State Government of the
State of Montana observed that the following state
agencies were responsible for investing public moneys:
The state land board, the state board of examiners,
the public employees' retirement board, the industrial
accident board, and the state depository board. The
commission stated that further unification of investments would:
1.

Eliminate duplication of offices and personnel.

2.

Provide a better over-all administration and tend

to greater economy in operations.
3. Make it possible to provide at a minimum cost an
adequate investment staff with technical advice, market
data, and financial services.

4. Make possible the pooling of small funds so as to
secure better security and the transferring of a security
from one fund to another when one fund is buying and the
other selling, resulting in greater stability and making
it possible to invest closer to the total amount of money
available.

To this end the commission recommended that authority to
make investments involving all funds available for
investments be deleqated to the state board of land
commissioners.
*>

The major reform resulting from such unification is a ."Larger
Instead of several
return on the public investment dollar.
small funds being invested as individual units, the several
The management of the funds
funds are invested as one unit.
is easier, and investment opportunities are expanded.
Several state
But the 1953 statutory scheme did not succeed.
agencies continued to invest their own funds, using the State
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Board of Land Commissioners as an "after-the-fact" rubber
The investment "system" under the 19 53 act was exstamp.
plained as follows:
The State Board of Land Commissioners, which is vested
with the legal responsibility for supervising investments, has abdicated its last shred of authority under
Each agency invests as it pleases,
the unified plan.
securing the "rubber stamp" approval of the Commissioner
of State Lands and Investments prior to the purchase or
The "rubber stamp" ratification of
sale of securities.
the State Board of Land Commissioners is automatically
obtained after the transaction has been completed. Neither the Commissioner nor the State Board has any voice
in establishing investment policy or supervising investment practices, except in the case of the trust and
legacy fund and a few minor operating and sinking funds.
In fact, the participation of the Board and Commissioner
If
actually impedes good investments administration.
the Commissioner leaves town, one of the investing
agencies might have to delay a major transaction for four
or five days awaiting his approval.

In 1971, another step was taken in the long-sought-after
unification of investment functions. The 19 71 Executive Reorganization Act^ created a Board of Investments, which has
"the sole authority to exercise the investment functions.
No other agency may invest state funds." 9 The Board of
Investments, as part of the Department of Administration, was
activated in August 19 71.
.

.

Perhaps a unified investment program finally has been established.
If so, it would seem attributable more to statutory
enactments than to the detailed constitutional treatment in
Article XXI.
Investment Authority
As noted, the Executive Reorganization Act transferred the
investment function from the State Board of Land Commissioners
The Montana Supreme Court
to the Board of Investments.
previously had ruled that investment responsibility need not
reside in the land commissioners:

Section 5, article XXI, Constitution of Montana, provides that the investment and administration of the
Trust and Legacy Fund shall be vested in the agency
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having the authority with respect to the public school
fund.
However, concerning authority to invest and
administer the public school fund, the Constitution is
silent.
While the State Board of Land Commissioners
is granted authority respecting the "direction, control,
leasing and sale of the school lands of the state"
(Section 4, Article XI, Constitution of Montana), we do
not construe this as tantamount to having charge "of the
investment and administration of the public school
fund." 10
One of the few viable effects that Article XXI still seems to
have on the investment function is authorization to invest
various public money as a single, common fund. Another
important provision which profoundly influences public fund
investments is Section 8, which limits investment opportunities.
That section is discussed in Chapter XIII of this
report.

EFFECT OF OTHER SECTIONS
Section 7 of Article XXI authorizes the state to include funds
from its political subdivisions in the Trust and Legacy Fund
upon request of the local unit's governing body.
But a 19 64
Legislative Council study reported that the provision was not
being used by counties, school districts or municipalities,
which had been given increased investment authority of their
own. 11 The current Trust and Legacy Fund accounts also
reflect the absence of local government funds.
Section 17 of Article XXI designates the Montana Supreme Court
The
as a supervisory board for the Trust and Legacy Fund.
Court is empowered to decide administrative disputes and to
direct administration of the Fund in a careful and wise manner.
The Legislative Council concluded that in this capacity,
the Court
receives annual statements of the status of investments
in the trust and legacy fund but has never exercised
any supervision over the investment program. 12
The Court does issue advisory opinions on the operation of the
Fund, but on an infrequent basis.

Section 11 of the Trust and Legacy Fund article provides that
interest earned by the Fund can be distributed to the various
beneficiaries without legislative authorization. The section
was added to remove Trust and Legacy Fund money from the
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prohibition of Article V, Section 34 which provides: "No
money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriation made by law. ..."
However, the exception is unnecessary, according to the
In State v. State Board of Education
Montana Supreme Court.
the Court held that the education board could expend land
grant income without legislative authorization, apparently
because it is from a special fund earmarked for a particular
purpose by the Enabling Act. According to the court:
Article V, Section 34 applies only to "ordinary revenues of
the state," not to special revenues. 13

,

Although the distinction is somewhat unclear, most if not all
of the accounts in the Trust and Legacy Fund probably would
fall into the "special" category because they are earmarked
At the very least, all of the
for particular functions.
public land funds apparently are exempt from the restriction
of Article V, Section 34 under the reasoning of the Court.

CONCLUSION
The Montana Trust and Legacy Fund article is a battered,
confusing, antiquated provision. At the very least, it stands
as an anomaly, the only investment program of its kind in the
It is a verbose,
United States with constitutional treatment.
complex article, containing sections that have no function
Most significantly,
and regulations that have little purpose.
the investment philosophy of Article XXI has been accomplished
by statute, which probably says more than anything else about
the constitutional value of Article XXI. 14
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proper identity of school funds. This view was further
supported in a second Attorney General's opinion in
194 3 which quoted the advisory opinion of the Supreme
Court. (See 109 Opinions of the Attorney General No. 20
,

,
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CHAPTER XIII
INVESTMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY

INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1970, state investments totaled $221 207, 642 92 1
An intricate web of constitutional and statutory law surrounds
the investment of that state money.
Clarification or deletion of the constitutional provisions will be a major responsibility of the Constitutional Convention.
,

.

Investment of public money involves three principal questions:
1.

Who shall be responsible for investment of public

funds?
2.

Should the various funds be invested as a single

fund?
3.
What limitations should be placed on public fund investment opportunities?

The legislature, attempting to create a unified investment
program, has enacted statute after statute.
But thus far each
plan has failed, circumvented by state agencies or thwarted
by an absence of financial expertise.
The legislature also
has tried to create a unified program by constitutional
revision, first through the addition of the Montana Trust and
Leqacy Fund article in 1924 and again with amendments to that
article in 19 38.
But the constitutional provisions have
been no more successful than the statutes in creating an
orderly investment plan for state funds.

INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
The latest attempt to provide a vigorous, productive and
professional investment program occurred in 1971 when the
legislature created the Board of Investments in the Department of Administration. 2 By law, the board is to be composed
of five members, informed and experienced in the field of
Only the
investments, who are appointed by the governor.
board can invest state funds; the investment functions previously exercised by the State Board of Land Commissioners
The
and other state agencies were transferred to the board.
board was implemented by executive order in August 1971.
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Because the investment function now is centralized under
an experienced board and professional staff and because no
other agency may now invest state funds, the illusive goal
of a unified professional investment program for state funds
finally may have been achieved.

UNIFIED INVESTMENT PLAN
The creation of a central investment agency, with qualified
personnel and concentration of investment functions, is the
culmination of five decades of attempted reform.
The first step was addition to the Constitution of the
Montana Trust and Legacy Fund article in 1924, with its
Section 5 requiring that all funds in the Trust be invested
as one unit.
The legislature passed a statutory scheme for
unified investments in 1929. 3 In 1953 and again in 1963 the
legislature amended that unified investment plan to centralize investment of state money and provide for qualified
investment personnel.
The success of those efforts was
summarized by the Executive Reorganization Commission in
1970:

[T]he only noticeable effect the [Unified Investment]
Plan has had on former investment practices is to add
some superfluous procedural steps, such as sending
notice to the Land Board of investments made and the
automatic after-the-fact approval of the investments
by the Land Board. 4

A 19 38 amendment to the Montana Trust and Legacy Fund provided another opportunity for the legislature to achieve
unified investment.
New language in Section 7 of Article
XXI stipulated that "[t]he legislative assembly may provide
for the investment and administration as a part of the Montana
trust and legacy fund of any other fund subject to its power."

Prior to executive reorganization, the State Board of Land
Commissioners was responsible for investing all state funds.
In practice, however, six agencies made their own investments.
The Executive Reorganization Commission found that
the six agencies followed their own investment practices and
procedures.
None employed an investment specialist, although
one (Teachers' Retirement Board) retained an outside professional investing service.
In addition to the six investinq boards, twelve boards, commissions or councils decided
when, if and to what degree the land board would invest for
them.
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Such decentralization of administration and lack of qualified
investment personnel made the investment process inefficient.
It was difficult to determine exactly how the state's money
Six employees in six different departments
was invested.
were responsible for investments and only as a sideline to
The six agencies had diverse
their other responsibilities.
Individualized accounting and
procedures and standards.
bookkeeping methods made it difficult to accurately compute
Of the thirty-three accounts
a rate of return for the funds.
invested, a yield was reported for only four; the state
had no idea what kind of total return it was making on its
investments

Only the Trust and Legacy Fund was invested as one fund, with
interest distributed pro-rata to each account within the
fund.
The accounts in the Long Term Investment Fund and the
Short Term Investment Fund were invested separately, even
though as early as 1934, when consolidation of all investments was proposed, the Commissioner of State Lands and
Investments, I. M. Branjord, said:
.does not represent a
The unified investment plan.
new-fangled idea;.
.it is a tested plan that has
been followed by every bank and banker throughout
How could a banker
civilization for centuries.
transact business if he had to find a suitable investment for each separate deposit?^
.

.

The Executive Reorganization Commission found that the major
deficiencies in the state investment program have remained
The Commission quoted a 1964
unchanged for twenty years.
Legislative Council report that concluded:
The two most apparent deficiencies in the state's
(1) the decenlong term investment program are:
tralization of administration, and (2) the lack
of professional, qualified investments personnel.

Hopefully, the new Board of Investments will remedy these
deficiencies.

Recent Investment of Funds
As of January 1, 1970 (a year and a half before activation of
the six agencies handling state
the new investments board)
investments were caring for the funds as follows:
,
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--The Land Board had invested $71,214,334 from 24 separate
accounts.
Although Section 79-1202, R.C.M. 1947 gives
the Land Board authority to invest in corporate securities, of the 24 accounts invested by them only one, the
Highway Patrol Retirement Board account, holds corporate
securities, and these corporate securities amount to only
15 per cent of the total investment from this account.
All other investments made by the Land Board are in
lower yield U.S. Government securities and the 1969 yield
figures are not known.

--The Board of Administration of the Public Employees'
Retirement System had invested a total of $59,056,495.91
from three separate accounts.
The PERS account was invested 50 per cent in public utility bonds and 36.6 per
cent in mortgages; the Game Wardens' account had 7 6 per
cent invested in public utility bonds and the Judges'
Retirement System had 80 per cent invested in public
utility bonds.
The 1969 yields for these three accounts
were 5.05, 4.48, and 4.83 per cent, respectively.

— The

Social Security Division had invested $3,106,403.65
from one account, all in Federal National Mortgage Association discount notes.
Because all of its investments
are short term, yield is not figured for this account.

— The

Industrial Accident Board had invested $14,989,554.24
from four accounts: the industrial insurance account was
invested 60 per cent in U.S. Government bonds and 2 3 per
cent in triple A utility bonds; the occupational disease
account, second injury account and the volunteer firemen's compensation account were all invested in U.S.
treasury bonds or notes.
No yield figures are available.

—

The Teachers' Retirement Board had $53,885,570.12 invested from one account; 50 per cent in corporate bonds
The 1969 yield figure was
and 45 per cent in mortgages.
5.22 per cent.

—

The State Treasurer had invested a total of $19,155,285
of surplus treasury cash; 51 per cent in U.S. Treasury
bonds and bills and 49 per cent in certificates of deposit, with no yield figures available.'

INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS

Article V, Section 37 of the Montana Constitution appears
to prohibit the state from investing any public money classified as "trust funds" in stocks and bonds of private
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corporations. Article XIII, Section 1 appears to prohibit
the state from becoming "a subscriber to, or a shareholder
in any company or corporation. ..."
Article XXI, Section
8 has been interpreted administratively as prohibiting the
state from investing money from the Trust and Legacy Fund
in securities other than those specified in that section;
thus, the state is prevented from investing Trust and Legacy
Fund money in stocks and bonds of private corporations.
The
prohibitions in Article XIII, Section 1 and Article V, Section 37 apparently apply to all state money; the prohibition
in Article XXI, Section 8 appears to apply only to money in
the Montana Trust and Legacy Fund
However"^ none of these
constitutional provisions has been construed by the Montana
Supreme Court, so the scope of their limitations remains
uncertain.
.

In any case, administrative and legislative practice has been
to ignore the apparent prohibitions in Article V, Section 37
and Article XII, Section 1 and to honor the prohibition in
Article XXI, Section 8. Thus, the legislature has enacted
a law which provides that certain public money may be invested in "first mortgage bonds, debentures, notes and other
evidences of indebtedness issued, assumed or guaranteed by
any solvent and operating corporation. " 8 And in practice,
millions of state dollars, primarily retirement trust funds,
are invested in corporate bonds.
The schedule printed
earlier in this chapter shows the extent of that investment.

The Executive Reorganization Commission noted the possibility
that the state investment law might violate Article V, Section 37, which forbids trustees to invest in the bonds or
stock of any private corporation, and Article XIII, Section 1,
which provides that the state shall never become a subscriber
Indeed,
to, or shareholder in, any company or corporation.
the effects of those provisions have never been determined,
and the Constitutional Convention may want to consider the
propriety of retaining them.

—

The three provisions Article XXI, Section 8; Article V,
Section 37, and Article XIII, Section l--are discussed in
more detail below.

Article XXI, Section
Article XXI, Section

8

of the Montana Constitution provides:

The Montana trust and legacy fund shall be safely and
conservatively invested in public securities within the
state, as far as possible, including school district,
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county and municipal bonds, and bonds of the state of
Montana; but it may be partly invested in bonds of the
United States, bonds fully guaranteed by the United
States as to principal and interest, and federal land
bank bonds. All investments shall be limited to safe
loan investments bearing a fixed rate of interest.
In
making long term investments preference shall be given
to securities payable on the amortization plan or
serially.
The legislative assembly may provide additional regulations and limitations for all investments
from the Montana trust and legacy fund.
Apparently, only money in the Trust and Legacy Fund is subject
to those restrictions.
That Fund constitutes about 26 percent of total state investments, $58 million of the total
$221 million in investments.
The other 74 percent appears
to fall outside the restrictions of Article XXI, Section 8,
but could be placed under them at any time by the legislature.

The Trust and Legacy Fund was invested as follows on June 30,
1970: 10

U.S. Government Bonds

Federal Land Bank Bonds
Cash Balance with State Treasurer
TOTAL

$47,679,000.00
11,504,000.00
79,748.33
$59,262,748.33

Table 23 itemizes the investments of the Montana Trust and
Legacy Fund by type of security, par value, interest rate
and date of maturity.
Total interest earned on the Trust
and Legacy Fund in the fiscal year ending June 1970 was
$2, 482, 383. 09, 11 representing a rate of return of 4.19
percent.
It is difficult to judge whether that rate of return is satisfactory.
Several other state investment programs enjoy a
One source in Montana
return of well over four per cent.
has noted:

The apparent rate of return on the investment of
Montana's trust and legacy fund was about 2.8% for
As a general statethe years 1956, 1957 and 1958.
ment it would be fair to say that the state is not
doing too badly in its investment of the Montana
Because of the inherent
trust and legacy fund.
differences between government and private business,
the state may never realize a rate of return on its
investments eaual to that of insurance companies,
banks and mutual funds, and perhaps should not be
expected to.
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Interpretation of Section

8

Section 8 was added to Article XXI by amendment in 19 38.
As previously noted, it limits the types of investments that
can be made of Trust and Legacy Fund money.
The legislature and the Board of Land Commissioners have
consistently interpreted Section 8 to mean that investment
of the Trust and Legacy Fund is limited to only those types
of securities specifically enumerated in the section.
Consequently, the Trust and Legacy Fund has been invested in
only the most conservative of securities. The Executive
Reorganization Commission report explained:
Under the rule of construction "ejusdem generis" (general
words following enumeration of particular things are
applicable only to the things of the same general nature)
the words "all investments shall be limited to safe loan
investments" are applicable only to the specific investment media enumerated or investment media of the same
general nature.
The application of the rule "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius" (mention of one thing
in a law implies the exclusion of things not mentioned)
would lead to the conclusion that Article XXI, section 8,
sets forth specifically the only permitted investment
media for the Trust and Legacy Fund to the exclusion
of all others not mentioned, such as stocks and bonds
of a private corporation.^-^
The Montana Legislature follows this interpretation.
81-1001, Revised Codes of Montana 1947, provides:

Section

,

Investment of permanent funds. All moneys belonging to
the public school permanent fund and to the other
permanent funds of the educational, charitable and penal
institutions of the state, and all permanent funds
subject to the administration of the board under article
XXI of the State Constitution, shall be carried by the
State Treasurer as subfunds in the trust and legacy fund,
.in bonds of school
and shall be safely invested.
districts within the State of Montana; in bonds of several counties and cities of the State of Montana; in
bonds of the State of Montana or of the United States;
bonds fully guaranteed by the United States as to principal and interest; in capitol building bonds of the
State of Montana, now issued or which may hereafter
be issued; in bonds issued by the federal land banks,
in interest-bearing warrants upon the general fund of
the State and in interest-bearing warrants upon the
.
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general fund, the poor fund, the road fund, or upon the
bridge fund of the several counties of the state of
Montana; all of such investments to be subject to the
regulations and limitations of this act.
However, the Executive Reorganization Commission suggested
that Article XXI, Section 8 could be given a much less
restrictive construction:

Article XI, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution was
the investment authority for the public school fund
before the school fund was included in the Trust and
Legacy Fund under the Article XXI amendment.
Article XI, Section

3

reads:

"Such public school fund shall forever remain inviolate, guaranteed by the state against loss or diversion,
to be invested, so far as possible, in public securities
within the state, including school district bonds
issued for the erection of school buildings, under the
restrictions to be provided by law. (Underscoring
,

supplied.

)

In State ex rel. Evans vs. Stewart
53 Mont. 18,
161 P 309, [1916], the Court said, "The language of
section 3, Article XI.
.when read in connection with
other provisions on the Constitution, particularly the
terms of section 12 of the same Article, the purpose to
confide to the lawmakers a wide discretion in the investment of all permanent school funds is apparent "14
,

.

.

If this same reasoning was applied to Article XXI, Section
8, it might permit investme
s other than those enumerated.

Article V, Section 37
Article V, Section 37 of the Montana Constitution states:
No act of the legislative assembly shall authorize
the investment of trust funds by executors, administrators, guardians or trustees in the bonds or
stock of any private corporation.

The section would appear to prohibit the state, as a trustee,
or any other trustee from investing in corporate stocks
or bonds.
However, the Montana Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the question and, as noted earlier, actual
practice does not reflect such a prohibitory interpretation.
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Other States
Four other states have had provisions similar to Montana's
Article V, Section 37. Alabama's provision is contained in
the first sentence of Article IV, Section 74.
In 1939, the
following amendment was added to that sentence:
[P]rovided, however, that unless otherwise provided
by the legislature, any of said mentioned trust funds
may be invested in corporations or institutions,
investments in which are guaranteed as to principal
by the United States Government or insured as to
principal by any instrumentality or agency thereof,
provided such investments shall not exceed the amount
insured by any such instrumentality or agency.

The Wyoming Constitution [Art. Ill, Sec.

38]

reads:

No act of the legislature shall authorize the investment of trust funds by executors, administrators,
guardians or trustees, in bonds or stock of any
private corporation.

Alabama and Wyoming cases construe the constitutional provisions as prohibiting only special legislative acts
authorizing investment in the bonds or shares of particular
corporations 15
.

Until 1933, the Pennsylvania Constitution provided in
Article III, Section 22:
No act of the General Assembly shall authorize the
investment of trust funds by executors, administrators,
guardians or other trustees, in the bonds or stock
of any private corporation and such acts now existing
are avoided saving investment heretofore made.
In interpreting that provision, the Pennsylvania court held
that a corporate bond, secured by a mortgage on real estate,
is a permissible investment 16 The court, in effect, said
that such a bond was an investment in a mortgage of real
estate and thus was not prohibited by the constitutional provision.
In 1933, the Pennsylvania provision was amended to
provide:
.

The General Assembly may, from time to time, by law
prescribe the nature and kind of investments for trust
funds to be made by executors, administrators,
trustees, guardians and other fiduciaries.
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Montana's Article V, Section 37 presumably was taken from
Article V, Section 36 of the Colorado Constitution.
However,
Colorado's section was amended in 19 50 to read:
The General Assembly shall, from time to time enact laws
prescribing types or classes of investments for the
investment of funds held by executors, administrators,
guardians, conservators and other trustees, whose
power of investment is not set out in the instrument
creating the trust.
No Colorado cases were found construing the original constitutional provision. I?

Article XIII, Section

Article XIII, Section
vides

1

1

of the Montana Constitution pro-

:

Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, municipality, nor other subdivision of the state shall ever
give or loan its credit in aid of, or make any donation
or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual,
association or corporation, or become a subscriber to,
or a shareholder in, any company or corporation or
joint owner with any person, company or corporation
except as to such ownership as may accrue to the state
by operation or provision of law [Emphasis added]
,

That section may or may not prohibit the state from investing in corporate stocks.
It has never been interpreted by
the Montana Supreme Court.

Other States
However, two recent court decisions in other states have
concluded that constitutional provisions similar to Article
XIII, Section 1 do prohibi t the purchase of corporate
stocks with state money. 18
In some other states, courts in construing the sections have
turned to the historical setting in which the provisions
were adopted. They have confined the constitutional restriction to those expenditures or investments by the state
designed to foster and promote private enterprise, as distinguished from the mere investment of state money in
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well-established companies. The Montana Supreme Court, in
fact, applied such a distinction to uphold seed grain loans
as relief measures and not loans in aid of business enterprises !9
.

Purpose of the Provision
The Montana Supreme Court also has described the purpose of
Article XIII, Section 1:
It represents the reaction of public opinion to the
orgies of extravagant dissipation of public funds
by counties, townships, cities and towns in aid of
the construction of railways, canals, and other like
undertakings during the half century preceding 1880,
and it was designed primarily to prevent the use of
public funds raised by general taxation in aid of
enterprises apparently devoted to quasi-public purposes, but actually engaged in private business. 20

The Constitutional Convention will want to consider whether
this provision should be retained and whether the state
should be permitted to invest in corporate stocks and bonds

COMMENTS ON INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
The Montana Legislative Council, which has made at least
two studies of public funds in the state, quoted a former
commissioner of State Lands and Investments in emphasizing
the importance of the public funds:

Every dollar of the income [from state lands and
investment funds] accrues to the benefit of the public schools, the State itself and its various institutions, and it takes the place of another dollar
which otherwise would have to be raised through
direct taxes upon the peoDle of the State. 21

Expanding on that "benefit by replacement" theory, the
Legislative Council in 1964 called for repeal of constitutional restrictions on investments and a broadening of
permissible types of investments 22 The Council suggested
a constitutional amendment to Article XIII, Section 1 to
eliminate all prohibitions against corporate stock ownership and recommended repeal of Article XXI, Section 8.2 3
.
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The Council's recommendation was based on several factors.
Public funds are not growing as rapidly as they could if
Minimal growth of
no investment limitations existed.
investment accounts can have a degrading effect, particularThe Council concluded in
ly during periods of inflation.
its 1964 study that while the public school fund tripled
over the past thirty years as a result of the sale of state
lands, oil royalties and other income, interest income in
constant dollars (adjusted to reflect loss of purchasing
power) decreased by almost one-third. 24 The Council noted:
"Inflation can diminish the principal just as a bad investment can. "25
Some commentators argue that the reasons for "fearing" stock
ownership are no longer valid. Competent, knowledgeable
investment in corporate stocks is not a dangerous or risky
business venture. As already noted, Article XIII, Section
1 can be traced to a period in United States history when
state and local governments invested heavily in private
stock primarily to encourage the growth of the transportation industry.
Unfortunately, many of those companies went
The
bankrupt, leaving the governments with useless stock.
Depression also left its stigma on private stock ownership,
particularly in cautious government circles.
[F]ailure to understand the reasons for individual
losses in 1929 has resulted in much of the suspicion
People "got burnt" in 1929 for
in common stocks.
a number of reasons, among which are:
1.

Failure to diversify.

2.

Trading for short term market savings.

3.

Buying on low margins.

4.

Wholesale distress selling at low point.

5.

Buying highly speculative stocks.

6.

Failure to pay reasonable prices for securities.

7.

Failure to analyze securities or retain professional counsel. 26

Public investment funds are different fundamentally from
individual investment plans, also.

There is unanimous agreement among experts that a
longterm holder of common stocks such as a public
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retirement or trust fund, can ride out storms and
stresses, disregard intermediate market swings, and
ultimately receive its compensation in the form of
substantial income from dividends and market appreciation.
A permanent fund is never faced with the
necessity of selling its assets to cover marginal
requirements or to buy groceries. 27
The Council noted the lucrative nature and stability of
common stocks as illustrated by an extensive study by the
Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago:
The findings demonstrate that common stocks held
through booms and depressions, through war and peace,
are far and away the most productive source of income,
having provided rates (compounded annually) of return
of greater than 10 per cent for most of the periods
covered by the study and of greater than 6 per cent
for two-thirds of the periods.
The study was not
confined to a selected list of "blue chips," but was
applied to all companies having common stocks listed
on the New York Stock Exchange. 28
The Trends

Most state constitutions do not contain provisions similar
to Article V, Section 37;
however, the overwhelming majority retain provisions similar to Article XIII, Section 1.
One study puts the number of state constitutions containing
such provisions at forty-one. 29 But a majority of those
states have confined the constitutional restriction to
investments in aid of any cornoration, as distinguished
from investments of state money as a simple business transaction. 30

Table 24 shows the wide variety of investments made with
state funds.
The number of states that permit investment
in corporate bonds and stocks is particularly significant
in view of the fact that most states have provisions similar
to Article XIII, Section 1.
It is difficult to find any "trends" surrounding the kind of
investment limitations contained in Article XXI, Section 8.
The reason is simple:
Section 8 is part of the unique

Montana Trust and Legacy Fund article. While many states
have placed safeguards around their public funds, particularly their public school funds, they have not found it
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TYPES OF INVESTMENTS, STATE FUNDS

Type

No.

of states
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necessary to place those safeguards in their constitutions.
Statutory specifications have been found adequate;
Montana
is the only state with a constitutional investment scheme
of which Section 8, with its enumerated list of investment
opportunities, is a part.
That is not to say that investment programs in other states
are not restricted.
They are restricted, but the restrictions generally are statutory.
For example, the Model
Investment of State Funds Law, prepared by the National
Municipal League, contains a provision permitting only 25
percent of any one fund to be invested in securities of
private corporations.-^ Utah provides that only 10 percent
of the Uniform School Fund can be invested in common or
preferred stock of private corporations. 32 B U t such restrictions are part of the statutory investment programs and
have not been raised to the status of constitutional lav;.
The Prudent Man Rule

Another alternative to specific constitutional provisions on
investment opportunities is the "prudent man rule." The rule
has been put into suggested constitutional language by the
Montana Legislative Council as follows:
Such public school fund.
.shall be invested under
Investment of
restrictions to be provided by law.
moneys in the public school fund, other trust funds
originating in federal land grants, and all other
moneys in the custody of a state, county or municipal
agency, shall be made with that degree of judgment
and care, under circumstances then prevailing, which
men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise
in the management of their own affairs, not for
speculation but for investment, considering the probable
safety of their capital as well as the probable income
to be derived.
No provision of the Constitution shall
be interpreted as prohibiting the investment of moneys
in the custody of a public agency in the bonds or stock
of a private comoration. 33
.

Such a provision would provide the same standard for the
investment of public funds as is required of trustees of
private trusts in many states.
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Municipal, State and Federal Bonds
Municipal, state and federal bonds provide substantially lower
returns to investors because their income is tax-exempt.
That exempt status is a major advantage for private investors,
but no such advantage accrues to the government as investor
because the income for the government would be tax-exempt
Many commentators and investment
under any circumstance.
authorities have criticized government investment in government securities for that reason. Their criticisms are worth
considering, especially when such bonds are given preferential treatment in the Montana Constitution.
LAND GRANT FUND GUARANTEE
The various land grant funds are protected against loss by
Article XI,
two provisions in the Montana Constitution.
Section 3 provides in part: "Such public school fund shall
forever remain inviolate, guaranteed by the State against
loss or diversion."

Section 12 of that Article says practically the same thing
for other public funds:
The funds of the State University and of all other
State institutions of learning, from whatever source
accruing, shall forever remain inviolate and sacred
The
to the purpose for which they were dedicated.
various funds shall be respectively invested under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law, and shall be
guaranteed by the state against loss or diversion.
The interest of said invested funds, together with the
rents from leased lands or properties shall be devoted
to the maintenance and perpetuation of these respective
institutions
Those guarantees would not be destroyed by the absence of
constitutional limitations on investments. Though related,
the guarantee that funds remain inviolate and the limitations on investments are distinct constitutional provisions;
either type of provision can exist without the other.
It should be noted that no specific limitations were placed
around funds in the sections providing that funds remain
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inviolate.
Instead, both provisions leave the question of
investment plans to the legislature.
Sale of Stocks

Some state courts have ruled that stocks in various public
funds cannot be sold for less than face value.
The basis for
those decisions usually was the guarantee clause that
surrounded public school funds. A "less-than-value" sale
would violate that guarantee, the courts have held.
However, the Montana Supreme Court has not followed that
reasoning, and its decision provides additional freedom and
discretion in public fund investment. The Court said:
[W]e do not construe the word "inviolate" [referring
to Article XI, Section 3] as prohibiting the sale
of securities at less than purchase price or face
value or the purchase thereof at a premium, provided
the income gain resulting from such transactions is
partially used to restore the temporary loss of

principal. 34

Important to the scope of public investments, the case
also provides some definition for the word "inviolate."
The guarantee provided by that word is not an absolute but
evidently includes aspects of good investment policy.

CONCLUSION
Conditions have changed and the needs of the public have
increased since many of the constitutional limitations on
investment policy were first developed. The modern philosophy concerning public fund investment is best summarized
as follows:
Overall investment policy should be highly flexible.
Conforming to the objective of balancing safety of
principal with income will not allow a stringent policy
as to the proportion of investments in government
This depends
securities, corporate bonds and stocks.
upon the offerings and market prices at a given time.
No single rigid investment formula is always best for
One authority
the fund as a whole or to the components.
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speaking on the bond segment alone stated for example
that a bond investment policy appropriate for 19 57
would not have been appropriate for 19 5 8 and statutory
restrictions placing money in tight compartments will
not permit the most efficient management.
.Since
market conditions for each media change, such restrictions can preclude the maximum productivity otherwise
available through a highly flexible authority such as
the prudent man rule. 35
.
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CHAPTER XIV

STATE DEBT

MONTANA PROVISIONS
Limitations on state debt are established in Article XIII
of the Montana Constitution:

—

Article XIII, Section 2 The legislative assembly shall
not in any manner create any debt except by law which
shall be irrepealable until the indebtedness therein
provided for shall have been fully paid or discharged;
such law shall specify the purpose to which the funds
so raised shall be applied and provide for the levy of
a tax sufficient to pay the interest on, and extinguish
the principal of such debt within the time limited by
such law for the payment thereof; but no debt or
liability shall be created which shall singly, or in
the aggregate with any existing debt or liability, exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)
except in case of war, to repel invasion or suppress
insurrection, unless the law authorizing the same shall
have been submitted to the people at a general election
and shall have received a majority of the votes cast
for and against it at such election.

—

Article XIII, Section 3 All moneys borrowed by or on
behalf of the state.
.shall be used only for the purpose specified in the law authorizing the loan.
.

—

Article XIII, Section 4 The state shall not assume the
debt, or any part thereof, of any county, city, town or
municipal corporation.
Montana's debt provision is typical of limitations in other
state constitutions:
1.
It requires that all debts be created by laws that
cannot be repealed until the debt is extinguished.
2.

It requires that the purpose of the debt be identi-

fied.
3.
It requires that a tax sufficient to pay off the
principal and interest of the debt be levied.

4.
It requires that the debt be paid off within
period specified by law.
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It sets a ceiling for legislatively created debt,
5.
but allows exceptions to that ceiling.

It requires public ratification of additional debt
6.
beyond the specified ceiling.

HISTORY OF STATE DEBT LIMITATIONS
State debt limitations developed during the early nineteenth
century in reaction to fiscal irresponsibility and overextended borrowing programs. The atmosphere leading up to
the limitations has been described as follows:

During the 1820' s and 1830' s state governments began
for the first time to issue long-term debt in substan.The purpose of these debt issues
tial quantities.
was to finance public works, principally those related
The first such project to be
to transportation.
financed in this way was the Erie Canal in New York.
The subsequent success of this venture induced other
states to construct canals and later highways and railways.
.

.

In the late 1830' s, several factors combined to place a
number of state governments in financial difficulties.
Some of their transportation ventures proved to be
financially unsuccessful or only marginally successful.
The 1837-1839 depression, protracted beyond expectations, provided additional pressure that eventually led
the weak governmental units into default and debt repudiation.
In addition, many states had only partially
completed projects at the beginning of the depression;
revenues had not yet materialized but debt-servicing
In spite of the economic downcosts had already begun.
There was a
turn, these states continued construction.
general consensus that the economic downturn would be
short-lived, and the result was that the state borrowing
and construction did not abate with the beginning of the
1837-1839 depression.
Bond sales finally reached a peak
during 1838 and remained high until late 1839.

With renewed economic decline in 1839-1840, project revenues
fell while the high fixed-cost requirements, including
debt-servicing costs, remained stationary. Some of the
state governments at that time found that they were
hopelessly overextended. They were unable (or unwilling)
to meet these project deficits with general fund
revenues.
Nine state governments repudiated portions of
their outstanding debt.
Many other states were having
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difficulty servicing their outstanding debts. Fiftythree percent of state government debt outstanding was
in default during 1842-1843.
The ultimate dollar loss
of principal and interest amounted to approximately 6
percent of state government debt outstanding. The
broad political reaction to this experience was the
enactment of legislation placing permanent restrictions
on the debt-incurring powers of state legislatures.
TYPES OF DEBT LIMITATIONS
By the time Montana joined the Union in 1889, debt limitations were the rule rather than the exception in state constitutions. That remains true today: only nine states have
no limitation on state indebtedness in their constitutions.

Those states are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Tennessee and
Vermont. 2 Table 25 lists the debt limitations for the fifty
states.

From that information, it is obvious that a fixed-dollar
amount, like Montana's provision, is the most popular form
of state debt limitation.
The amount varies from a high of
$2 million in Idaho, Maine and North Dakota, to a low of
$50,000 in Oregon and Rhode Island. Montana's figure of
$100,000 is relatively low compared with those of other
states.
Specific dollar limitations have come under sharp criticism
in recent years, essentially because the amounts often have
nothing to do with the fiscal capacity and repayment ability
of the state.
Other yardsticks for debt limitation have
been developed, and are defended on grounds that they more
accurately reflect the state's ability to pay. Those
devices are:
1.

tion.

Debt limitation as a percentage of property valuaExamples include:

—

Utah [Art. XIV, Sec. 1]
Fixing the limit of the state
indebtedness. To meet casual deficits or failures in
revenue, and for necessary expenditures for public
purposes, including the erection of public buildings,
and for the payment of all Territorial indebtedness
assumed by the State, the State may contract debts, not
exceeding in the aggregate at any one time, an amount
equal to one and one-half per centum of the value of
the taxable property of the State, as shown by the last
assessment for State purposes, previous to the incurring
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25

STATE INDEBTEDNESS PROVISIONS

Limitati

State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

Limitation

5300,000
Vote required; no limit
5350,000
Vote required
5300,000 plus voted debt
5100,000
None

New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

(2)

Prohibited
S500.000
None
5 2,000,000 plus voted debt
S25p,000 plus voted debt
Prohibited
5250,000 plus voted debt
51,000,000 plus voted debt
5500,000 plus voted debt
Prohibited
52,000,000 plus voted debt
None
None
Vote required
None
None
51,000,000 plus voted debt
5100,000 plus voted debt
5100,000
1 percent

New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

None
1 percent of appropriation for fiscal year
plus voted debt
5200,000 plus voted debt)
also state and county
debt may no', exceed
1 percent
Vote required
Vote required; no limit
S2,000,000 3
5750,000
Vote required
550,000
51,000,000*
550,000 plus voted debt
Vote required
5100,000 plus 0.50 percent to develop resources
None
5200,000
1.50 percent
None
1 percent; vote required
5100,000 plus voted debt
Prohibited
S100.000
1 percent; vote required

1.

When the debt limit is expressed as a dollar amount, this amount is usually an authorization
of debt to meet casual deficits.
In addition. State constitutions almost universally
authorize unlimited debt "to repel invasion or suppress insurrection."

2.

A proposed amendment relates the debt limit to the revenues of the State.
Debt service on all
debt must not exceed a certain percentage of the State's revenues.
The percentage declines
from 30 percent of gross revenues in 1963 to 20 percent after 1971.

3.

Proposed amendments would authorize State debt equal to 5 percent of the taxable value of the
property within the State and would raise the debt limit of subdivisions to 7 percent. An
incorporated city would be allowed to incur an additional 4 percent debt if voted and school
districts an additional 6 percent. Any city could also incur debt up to 5 percent of taxablevalue for water and sewer purposes.

J

4.

Since this table was drawn up, Pennsylvania has changed its constitutional debt limitation.
The state debt limit now is 1 3/4 times the average revenues of the last five fiscal years,
plus voted debt.
Hawaii, Legislative Reference Bureau, Article VI; Taxation and Finance,
Constitutional Convention Studies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1968)
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But the State shall never contract
of such indebtedness.
any indebtedness, except as in the next Section provided,
in excess of such amount, and all monies arising from
loans herein authorized shall be applied solely to the
purposes for which they were obtained.

—

State indebtedness:
Limitations
Nevada [Art. 9, Sec. 3]
and exceptions.
The state may contract public debts;
but such debts shall never, in the aggregate, exclusive
of interest, exceed the sum of one per cent of the
assessed valuation of the state, as shown by the reports
of the county assessors to the state controller, except
for the purpose of defraying extraordinary expenses, as
hereinafter mentioned.
2.
Debt limitation as a percentage of average revenues.
Examples include:

—

New Jersey [Art. VIII, Sec. II] The Legislature shall
not, in any manner, create in any fiscal year a debt or
debts, liability or liabilities of the State, which
together with any previous debt or liabilities shall
exceed at any time one per centum of the total amount
appropriated by the general appropriation law for that
fiscal year, unless the same shall be authorized by a law
for some single object or work distinctly specified
therein.

—

Pennsylvania [Art. VIII, Sec. 7(4)] Debt may be incurred
without the approval of the electors for capital projects
specifically itemized in a capital budget if such debt
will not cause the amount of all net debt outstanding to
exceed one and three-quarters times the average of the
annual tax revenues deposited in the previous five fiscal
years as certified by the Auditor General.
Those methods were developed to establish debt limits that
change with the fiscal capacity of the state. The set dollar
amounts were established in a different economic era, and
often were set arbitrarily, without reason or rationale.
Sliding percentiles, tied to some index of fiscal measurement, provide a more logical maximum debt limit.
Use of such
measurements is relatively rare, however.

EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE DEBT LIMITATIONS
Table 26 shows the outstanding debt in the fifty states at the
end of fiscal 1968. When the total debt figures in column 1
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STATE DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OF FISCAL YEAR,
BY STATE:

1968

(In thousands of dollars)
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of that Table are compared with the specific debt limitations for each state in Table 25, it is obvious that the
states are ignoring or avoiding the constitutionally proThe reasons have been described by
scribed debt limitations.
one commentator as follows:

Compared with present-day conditions, debt provisions
were framed with reference to small annual government
budgets, little demand for public goods, and a low price
level.
As state and local government expenditures particularly capital expenditures increased, government
officials sought methods of bypassing the impinging debt
limitations. The principal finding of this study is that
the debt restrictions were not significantly changed
(by repeal or revision of the laws) when subsequent deInstead,
mand pressures exceeded debt limitations.
financial innovations i.e., "extralegal" methods were
The principal thesis of
employed to bypass the laws.
this study is that these "extralegal" methods in effect
served to repeal the restrictive laws, but not without
certain political and economic costs and other conse-

—

—

—

—

quences.-*
"

Extralegal" Methods

At least four "extralegal" methods are used by states to
Those deavoid constitutional debt limitation provisions.
vices are:
1.

Revenue bonds and the special-fund doctrine

.

[R]evenue bonds may be defined as "bonds of political
units that are payable as to principal and interest exclusively from the earnings, or (in the case of a sale
of the property) from other non-contributed assets,
of a specified revenue-producing enterprise, for the
acquisition, construction, improvement, or operation
The
of which enterprise the bonds were issued.".
special-fund doctrine generally holds that debts
which are not serviced out of general funds, and are not
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the issuing
political unit, are not debts in the meaning of constitutional restrictions. Thus, under this doctrine,
revenue bonds are not debt within the meaning of state
constitutions
.
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2

Public corporations, authorities and commissions

.

In states where the special-fund doctrine in its more
strict sense did not meet the courts' approval, the
states adopted a "new conception" and "more subtle subterfuge" in the public authority.
Basically, the public
authority is a corporate body created to serve a public
purpose and empowered to issue revenue bonds to be
serviced and secured by the income of that body.
For
the most part, courts have ruled that authority debt
is not public debt.
3.

Lease-purchase agreements

.

In substance the technique might work as follows:
the
state legislature creates a public, nonprofit corporation
for the special purpose of constructing a state building.
Officials of the corporation might be the governor, state
treasurer, head of the department using the building,
and other officials appointed by the governor to administer the operation.
The state sells or leases a building
site to the corporation which issues revenue bonds for
construction of a building on that site. The corporation
then leases the building and site back to the state at a
rental sufficient to maintain the building and corporation and to amortize the revenue debt incurred, the rental
revenue acting as security for the revenue bonds. The
lease stipulates that title to the building [will] revert
to the state government after the debt is amortized.
Normally the public corporation then becomes inactive
until another project comes along.
4.

Delegation of state functions to political subdivisions

When a state is faced with a debt limit, and local units
have more freedom to borrow, the state can finance particular government functions by delegating those functions
to local units.
This may be done explicitly because of
the debt-limit problem; but, more commonly, the debt
problem is but one of the factors involved.
Some functions are clearly proper (within our political framework)
for the state government to provide.
Others are clearly
within the province of local units. There exist, however, a host of functions that may well be performed by
either the state or its political subdivisions. When the
problem is resolved, one of the factors that undoubtedly
enters is the borrowing capacity of the political units
involved.

-268-

°

STATE DEBT
The effect of these court-created exceptions is difficult to
assess.
One writer, in a comprehensive study of debt limitations, concluded:
The courts' sanction of revenue bonds, public authorities,
lease-purchase agreements, and reimbursement obligations
as legitimate methods of state borrowing despite constitutional debt prohibitions has radically changed the
structure of state debt. These innovations in state
finance have enabled states to borrow for almost any purpose regardless of constitutional provisions.
It seems
reasonable to conclude that constitutional debt restrictions are no longer accomplishing that which they were
originally intended to accomplish.
It also seems clear
that debt restrictions do have an important impact in
that they force restricted states to use other than fullfaith and credit borrowing.

Revenue bonds are frequently turned to in lieu of full faith
and credit financing.
And revenue bond financing has an adverse side effect:
Since the bonds
higher interest rates.
are not backed by the full faith and credit of the state,
bond holders require larger interest payments to protect their
investment. The problem has been explained as follows:

Evidence of significantly higher interest costs for
nonguaranteed issues is substantial. [One] study of
state government issues found that nonguaranteed issues
carry higher interest costs than general obligations.
This differential was 0.56 percent in 1957, 0.48 percent
in 1958, and 0.66 percent in 1959.
Over the life of an
issue, this represents a considerable difference in
interest costs. For example, a 0.50 percent difference
(from 3.00 to 3.50 percent) in the net interest cost of
a thirty-year, level-payment, serial bond raises the
aggregate interest cost by 19 percent.
The reason for differences in interest payments, according to
one commentator, is:
[I Investors normally prefer the security of an unlimited
government tax guarantee to the specific pledge of
special taxes, user charge revenues, or rental revenues
which commonly apply to revenue bonds. ... If investors
at large were convinced that nonguaranteed obligations
were the equal of general obligations, individual investors would be quick to buy revenue bonds as soon as their
yield rose substantially above the yield on comparable
general obligations, a move which would tend to negate
the price differential. °
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EFFECTIVENESS OF MONTANA'S DEBT LIMITATIONS
Table 27 illustrates the amount of full-faith and credit debt
in Montana since 1923.
State indebtedness during the last
five decades was considerably more than the $100,000 limitation.
However, the state's general obligation indebtedness
presently is at its lowest point during that period.
The $395,000 of indebtedness in 1970 has been approved by the
Montana electorate in referenda, as required by Article XIII,
Section 2 of the Constitution.
Referendum 57, adopted in
November, 1954, authorized the issuance of $2 million for
State Hospital bonds; Referendum 58, adopted the same year,
authorized the issuance of $1.5 million in State Training
School bonds.
The state has been paying on that $3.5 million
total over the past sixteen years until only $395,000 is
left outstanding on the obligation.
The information in Table 27 indicates the state has been observing its indebtedness limitation. Montana voters have
approved debt referenda above the $100,000 limit, in conformity with Article XIII, Section 2.

Table 2 8 shows the amount of revenue-bond financing for
Montana as of June 30, 1970. With exaggerated understatement,
it can be said that Montana makes "good use" of one of the
"extralegal" loopholes discussed earlier in this chapter.
Revenue bonds have become an important part of Montana's
fiscal system, providing an expressway around the $100,000
limitation.
The first two items in Table 28 are the bond referenda
approved by the voters in November, 19 54. A three-cent tax
on every pack of cigarettes, approved by voter referendum in
1966, is used to finance the long-range building program.
The other bond issues listed in the Table have not been
approved by the Montana electorate. They fall under the revenue bond classification.

Revenue Bonds
The Montana Supreme Court has ruled that revenue bond-backed
indebtedness is valid without prior voter approval.* 2 The
Court concluded that the bonds are not an obligation of the
state and do not tie up state tax funds to honor the
indebtedness. Quoting from a Minnesota court case, the
Court explained its reasoning as follows:
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TABLE 27
STATE OF MONTANA INDEBTEDNESS

Sinking

Outstanding

TABLE 28

STATEMENT OF SPECIAL BONDS AS OF JUNE 30, 1970

30. 1970

$

Training School

u.c.c
Vet.

Comp

WW
WW

11

Comp.
Land Acquisition
Long Range Scries #1
Long UaDgG Series MZ
Long Range Series #3
Eastern Montana CoUege
Vet.

1

Capital

M.S.U. 1966
M.S.C. 1933
College Dormitory
College Faculty Housing
College PL. Center.
M.S.C. 1900
M.S.C. 1903
M.S.C. 1903-13
M.S.C. 1904
_
M.S.C. 1903-A
M.S.C. 1903
M.S.C. 1939-13
M.S.U. 1970
Mineral Science & Tech.

.

.

.

W.M.C. 19G6-D
W.M.C. Ser. A 1907
W.M.C. Ser. B 1907
W.M.C. Ser. A 1966
W.M.C. Ser. B 1906
W.M.C. Ser. C 1906
N.M.C. Armory Cym

N.M.C Cym

Ser.

Ser.

A

B

M.S.U. Women's Dorro
University Residence, M.S.U
U. of M. 2nd Ser. 64
U. Field House A & 11
University llealtli Center A
U. of M. 60 2nd Series
University Housing 1956
M.S.U. 1961
M.S.U. 1939
M.S.U. 2nd Scries 1957
M.S.U. Student Building Fee 1900.
M.S.U. 196.3
M.S.U. 1963 A
M.S.U. 1963-B
U. of M. liev. 1965
U. of M. 1906

TOTALS

2,000,000

Ouliiond.m
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"The board proposes to finance the building of the
dormitory by using the net earnings of the dormitory,
the campus rentals, and the earnings of the press, and
to anticipate earnings to the extent of $215,000 by
undertaking to apply them as received for money now to
It is its plan to issue under a trust agreebe advanced.
ment what it terms 4 1/2% Dormitory Serial Gold Bonds,'
engraved or lithographed like other bonds.
Externally
these writings have the appearance of bonds with which
Inwardly they are a pledge
the public are familiar.
of the income stated and an undertaking to apply it.
No debt is created.
It is specified in detail and with
some repetition that neither the dormitory, nor the land
upon which it is built, nor other property of the university or the state, saving the income mentioned, shall
be security; and no personal or debt liability rests
upon the state, the board, the university, or an officer."
*

Bonds Retired by Ad Valore m Taxes

The Montana Supreme Court closed an important loophole in the
state debt limitation provision in 1971 when it ruled that
all bonds over $100,000 financed by state tax revenues
from whatever source had to be approved by the Montana electorate prior to their issuance.
That decision, on November 23,
1971, overruled a policy followed by the state since 1958
when the Montana Court declared that only bonds financed by
property tax revenues had to be approved by the electorate.
The effect of the 1971 ruling was to eliminate the state's
method of financing its long-range building program.

—

The sequence of events went like this in 1958, the Montana
Supreme Court ruled that the provisions of Article XIII,
Section 2 applied only to state indebtedness retired by ad
valorem taxes. -^ Thus, approval of state debt by the Montana
voters, above the $100,000 limitation, was only required when
the debt would be repaid by property tax revenue.

The Court's reasoning followed a two-step process. Voter
qualifications are established in Article IX, Section 2 of
the Montana Constitution, which provides, in part:
If the question submitted concerns the creation of any
levy, debt or liability the person in addition to

possessing the qualifications above mentioned [19-yearsold, United States citizenship, Montana residency, local
residency], must also be a taxpayer whose name appears
upon the last preceding completed assessment roll, in
order to entitle him to vote upon such question.
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The Court, in construing that provision, held in Cottingharr
v. State Board of Examiners
:

The construction which appeals to an innate sense of
justice and fairness is that section 2 of Article IX,
in adding the property holding qualification to
votinq on debts or liabilities, confined the additional qualification to only those debts or liabilities
In
which look to ad valorem taxes for their retirement.
this way we avoid an unreasonable construction and arrive
at a just, and we believe, correct interpretation of
It logically follows that section 2 of
that section.
Article XIII, insofar as there is a "debt" or "liability"
limitation imposed, refers to only those debts or
liabilities which look to the property or ad valorem taxes
for their retirement, and that onl y those debts or
liabilities must first be presented to the "people," now
restricted to taxpayers.

section 2, Article IX, amended the words
"debt or liability" as they appear in section 2, Article
XIII, and has effectively confined them to debts or liabilities which must be retired out of ad valorem taxes.
In this manner we avoid a conflict and unreasonableness.
In effect,

Looking now to the instant case, we find that the bonds,
assuming they create a "debt or liability," do not
create the type of "debt or liability" which section 2,
Article XIII, proscribes, since in this case retirement
of the bonds looks to the levy of an excise tax without
the taxpayer being enrolled on the assessment rolls.
In other words, the state could go into debt past the $100,000
limitation if the debt was repaid from a source other than

property tax revenue.
Prior approval by the Montana electorate was not necessary in such circumstances.
The reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court came under attack
in the fall of 1971, in the case of S tate of M on tana v.
Anderson. 16 Plaintiffs in that case argued that the voter
aualif ication provision in Article IX, Section 2, quoted
above, is now unconstitutional.
In the case of the City of P hoenix v. Ko lodzi ejksi
the United States Supreme
399 United States 20 4 (19 70)
Court held that the provisions of the Arizona Constitu,

,

tion and statutes excludinq non-property owners from
elections for the approval of the issuance of general
obligation bonds violated the equal protection clause of
In other words, the United
the Fourteenth Amendment.
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States Supreme Court completely invalidated the.
portion of Article IX, Sec. 2 referred to above. 1?
.

.

If the portion of Article IX, Section 2 is now unconstitutional, the plaintiffs argued, then the reasoning of the
Cottingham case no longer is valid. Any indebtedness above
the $100,000 limitation, including debt paid by non-property
taxes, must be approved by Montana voters, they concluded.
The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff s--it
overruled the Cottingham decision and declared that voter
approval was reauired on any state indebtedness above $100,000
despite its source of financing.

The decision did not affect revenue-bond financing by the
state, but it did nullify two 1971 legislative authorizations
for $13.2 million in bonds for the Long-Range Building Program
and a highway headquarters complex.
Those two bond issues
were to be financed by revenues from the income tax, corporate license tax, cigarette tax and gasoline license tax.

Other "Extralegal" Methods
Montana does not utilize the "public authority" or "leaseback agreements" to avoid its debt limitation.
Local
government debt limitations, which sometimes are instrumental in another "extralegal" method of state debt limitation avoidance, are discussed in Chapter XVII.

RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING DEBT LIMITATIONS
Most commentators agree that debt limitations have a mild
moderating or restraining influence. That conclusion has
been explained as follows:
[D]uring fiscal 1956, seven states accounted for more
than 70 percent of state borrowing in the United States,
In three of these, borrowing above a very nominal sum
was made possible only by approval in a popular referenIn two
dum, (California, Illinois, and New York.)
(Louisiana and Ohio) it reauired constitutional amendment, approved by the voters, and in only two of the
seven states (Connecticut and Massachusetts) did the
It is suggested
authority reside in the legislature.
that neither constitutional restraints nor the requirement of a popular referendum are sufficient to avoid
Again, Vermont, with no
the creation of a state debt.
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constitutional restraint on the power of its legislature
to borrow, has a lower per capita state debt than forty
other states.
On the other hand, Delaware, with the
highest per capita state debt, likewise has no effective
constitutional restraint on the power of its legislature
to incur debt.
Neither do Connecticut, Massachusetts
and Maryland, which rank next in order in the size of
their per capita state debts.
In 1941, Duke University Press published what appears to
be one of the most comprehensive studies yet made of
public debt in American states, entitled American State
Debts by B. U. Ratchford.
.Mr. Ratchford found
.
that from every point of view--total debts incurred, per
capita debts and debt burdens--" constitutional debt
limitations have some effect in restraining borrowing."
He concluded that some constitutional debt limitation
was therefore desirable for many states, while admitting
that some states would perhaps do as well without them
since their legislatures have demonstrated the capacity
to "exercise the borrowing power with discretion," but
he considered a revamping of existing constitutional
limitations a necessitv if such limitations were to be
retained.
.

,

.

.

.

[I]f the sole criterion by which one is to be guided is
the desire to keep total state debt low, all of Professor Ratchford' s data will suggest that constitutional
debt limitations will tend, as a general thing, to keep
state debt lower than will the absence of such restraints
upon legislative power.
It may well be questioned
though whether the gain in slightly lower public debt
may not be outweighed in the loss of legislative flexibility, where the incurring of debt must be submitted to
a referendum, or be dependent upon constitutional amendment.
Again, lack of consistency in correlation, both
in Professor Ratchford s data, and in more recent data,
between constitutional limitations and the size of state
debts, suggests strongly that if the incurring of oublic
debt is symptomatic of something wrong, there is indication that the larger difficulty goes beyond the legislature, and that constitutional restraints alone are not
sufficient to solve the more fundamental problem with
which states are confronted in this respect. 13
'

James Heins in his comprehensive 1963 report on state debt
limitations, concluded:

A.

,

[I]t is in the public interest to restore full borrowing
power to state leqislatures with no referendum provisions, nor any other restriction commonly found in
,
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state constitutions. This conclusion was reached on
the basis of the following observations:
1. State constitutions do not effectively restrict
state legislatures as to the amount or purpose of
The only real restrictions on the
state borrowing.
amount of state borrowing are the moral and political
obligations of state legislators, which would exist in
the absence of constitutional provisions.

2. Present restrictions reduce the number of options
available to state legislatures in the planning of a
If borrowing is to be done in resound debt policy.
stricted states without costly referendums or constitutional amendments, it must be done via one of the
nonguaranteed methods.
3. Nonguaranteed borrowing involves higher interest
To
costs because of the greater risk lenders assume.
the extent that states intend repaying such loans
regardless of the outcome of the project for which the
funds were borrowed, but which because of constitutional
restrictions are unable to make this intention known to
lenders, the higher interest cost reflects a fictitious
shift of risk from the public to the lenders, and hence
becomes a real cost to the public.
4. The administrative procedures required to satisfy
the courts that nonguaranteed borrowing is not state
debt are often more costly than comparable administration
of full-faith and credit debt. 19

Echoing that conclusion, William E. Mitchell, in a 1967
study, proposed:
One student of state and local debt financing has
suggested "That full borrowing power be restored to state
legislatures, with no referendum requirements, nor any
other restriction currently found in state constitutions.'
This proposal would not give governments any more
ability to issue debt than they already possess, but it
would increase the alternatives available to governmental units in the formulation of a sound and desirable
Nonguaranteed bonds, used for reasons of
debt policy.
shifting the locus-of-risk or shifting risk in excess
But
of some prescribed limit, would still be issued.
those nonguaranteed bonds, formerly issued solely to
circumvent legal limits, would then be issued as general
obligations, with lower interest costs.
.

.

.
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This proposal shifts the focus of the safeguarding
function from formal, inflexible laws to legislative
"qood sense." There would appear to be no loss of control
(cost) in making this adjustment, since essentially no
control formally existed.
The benefits would be lower
capital costs and a more desirable composition of debt
outstanding.
Control of mismanagement in either case
ultimately lies in (a) choosing high-quality, responsible
government decision-makers who will be responsive to the
wishes of the electorate and (b) adopting sound auditing
procedures. ... If the adoption of a policy to allow
comnlete freedom to borrow is politically infeasible, a
second-best solution involving some diminution of legal
restraints would at least represent a movement in the
_.
right direction.
.

PROS AND CONS
The decisions surrounding debt limitations and the kind of
safeguards to include in a constitution are largely policy
ouestions.
For that reason, the following alternatives,
with the positive and negative effects of each, are set out. *

Eliminate all constitutional controls over state

ARGUMENTS FOR: (1) The legislature should be given full
authority on matters of public finance; to the extent that
the legislature's authority is restricted, its ability to
shape financial policy and to respond to changing economic
conditions is likewise restricted.
(2) Controls do not
effectively limit debt, but only make borrowing somewhat more
difficult. (3) Restrictions force the state to use more
expensive methods of financing, such as revenue bonds.
(4) Debt practices of the state still would be conditioned
by the effective restraint of conditions of the municipal
bond market and the assessment of the state's debt position
by lenders.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
(1) There is no guarantee that
legislatures will act prudently.
(2) Debt controls are
traditional in state constitutions. (3) Elimination of debt
controls may be ouestioned by lenders and raters of municipal
bonds and may adversely affect the state's credit. (4) Some
controls are better than no controls at all.
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2.

Eliminate the fixed dollar limitation

.

ARGUMENTS FOR:
(1) Most fixed dollar ceilings have not
(2) Nothing is gained by preserving in
met the test of time.
the constitution a provision that no longer has application.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
(1) A fixed dollar limit is simple
and easy to understand. (2) It at least brings into operation legislative authorization for excess debt.
3.
Increase the maximum debt limit by using a ratio of
net assessed valuation of real property or by using some
other formula
.

ARGUMENTS FOR:
(1) If the state is to proceed with
further development of capital improvements, it should have
(2) The
additional general obligation bonding capacity.
state will have to resort to more expensive financing, such
as revenue bonds or authority financing, if the limit is
not increased.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
(1) The state already has adequate
borrowing authority. (2) The value of property is not a good
yardstick to measure debt limitation standards, since property no longer is a major component of the state revenue
program.
4.
Change the formula for computing the debt limit by
relating it to the revenues of the state
.

ARGUMENTS FOR:
(1) The state derives very little
revenue from real property, so a debt limit which is tied to
the real property base does not measure the state's
borrowing and repayment capacity; it is questionable also
whether a constitutional limitation should be related to the
vagaries of assessment practices. (2) Since all debt must be
repaid from the revenues of the state, a limitation which is
expressed as a portion of total state revenues would be
more meaningful and provide a direct relationship between
debt and resources.
(2) The capacity of the state to incur
debt would increase as its revenues increase and decrease if
revenue decreases.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
(1) A more traditional method of expressing constitutional debt limitations is use of real property base. (2) It would be difficult to define which revenues
should be included in computing the debt limit; any definition
of the revenue base and decisions as to what constitutes a
proper debt or debt service ratio would ultimately be arbitrary decisions. (3) In the event of economic recession or
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depression, the state may wish to take countercyclical action
by increased borrowing and injecting additional funds into
the economy.

Provide for popular referenda for all proposed
5
borrowing or for all borrowing in excess of a basic limit

.

ARGUMENTS FOR:
(1) Actions of a single legislature can
obligate the taxpayers of the state for many years to come;
because of the long-lasting impact and effects of borrowing,
voters should reserve to themselves the basic decision as
to the burden of debt they are willing to assume.
(2) Such
referenda are common in other states.
(3) They generate
public interest in government programs.
(4) Marketability
and rating of bond issues are strengthened if supported by
the aoproval of voters.
(5) The administration and the
legislature would be more selective in proposing and authorizing projects if voter approval were required for such
projects

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
(1) Referenda run counter to the
generally accepted principle of providing the legislature
with full decision-making powers in matters of finance.
(2) They are cumbersome and take time.
(3) Timeliness often
is of the essence in the bond market.
(4) States have circumvented the requirement of a referendum by utilizing various nonguaranteed borrowing devices; the net result has been
higher interest rates and higher costs to the public.
6
Bring all nonguaranteed borrowing, including revenue
bonds, under constitutional debt control
.

ARGUMENTS FOR:
(1) Revenue bond financing should be discouraged because interest costs are higher with revenue bond
financinq than with general obligation financing. (2) Substantial administrative costs are incurred in preparing a
revenue bond offering.
(3) Projects financed by revenue
bonds would compete for priorities on the same level with
(4) Revenue
projects financed by general obligation bonds.
bonds would not have a natural advantage because of their
exemption from the debt limits.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
(1) Revenue bonds are not backed by
the full faith and credit of the state and do not constitute
an obligation of the taxpayers; therefore, they are not
legally an indebtedness of the state.
(2) Inclusion of
nonguaranteed borrowing under debt controls would place additional pressure on any constitutional debt limit and would
result in the state's debt position appearing worse than it
actually is.
(3) If the state were to rely exclusively on
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general obligation financing for all its future capital needs,
its full faith and credit debt would be pushed to an inordinately high level, and an adverse reaction in the municipal
bond market might follow.
7.

is not

Exclude from debt controls all indebtedness which
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the state

.

ARGUMENTS FOR:
(1) The state should have flexibility
to issue revenue bonds without regard to debt limit; design
of the most advantageous and marketable revenue bond instruments would be insured.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
(1) If the objective is to increase
borrowing capacity, a more forthright approach would be to
permit greater general obligation financing.
Include special legislative requirements for debt
8.
authorization
.

ARGUMENTS FOR:
(1) Such requirements help ensure careful legislative consideration of borrowing.
(2) An
extraordinary majority—perhaps two-thirds or three-fifths
of the leqislature would be required for approval of debt;
partisan influences would be held to a minimum, since
legislators of both parties probably would have to support
each borrowing program.
(3) Whenever new debt proposals
were pending, the need to marshal overwhelming support
would create a suitable occasion for a re-examination of the
state debt.
(4) As a variant of the special majority procedure, debt authorization might be subject to the actions
Through such a
of two successive legislative sessions.
requirement, hasty borrowing would be curbed and legislators
would have an opportunity to inform themselves of voter
sentiment between legislative sessions.

—

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
(1) Special procedures would be an
ineffective deterent by comparison with the referendum requirements.
(2) If a majority is secured without difficulty,
the only check on the creation of debt would be the need to
If, on
obtain the votes of several additional legislators.
the other hand, a minority of legislators is able to block the
creation of debt, the state and the people will have been denied the opportunity to authorize borrowing for desired
purposes.
(3) If two successive legislative sessions were
required for approval of state debt, necessary borrowing
would be delayed and it would take twice as long to decide
the state's debt policy.
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.

Permit debt author iz atio n laws to b e passed for

m ulti-purposo reasons

.

ARGUMENTS FOR:
(1) A single purpose, if interpreted
broadly, could be public works or transportation or social
welfare; accordingly, very little is achieved by limiting a
bond issue to a single purpose.
(2) The main effect of the
single purpose limitation is to fragment the state's borrowing policy.
Each purpose and bond must be planned and
funded in isolation from the other borrowing activities of
the state.
(3) Capital construction proceeds on an uneven
basis, depending on the availability of funds for each
particular purpose; while surplus debt authority might be
tied up for one purpose, capital construction for some
other purpose might be suspended because of a lack of money.
(4) The state ought to be able to ask the voters for
authorization to sell bonds to finance a program for economic development or economic recovery or economic expansion
without having to establish a blueprint for the use of the
bond proceeds before the issue is authorized.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
The phrase "single work or
(1)
purpose" is broad enough so that an educational facilities
bond issue could be authorized rather than needing a
separate bond issue for work at each educational institution.
(2) Multi-purpose debt does not give the people an
opportunity to choose the specific things they want done,
nor does it prevent the state from borrowing for purposes
which the people would not approve if they had an opportunity to express their views.
(3) The concept of a bond
issue referring to a single work or purpose is designed to
prevent the state from lumping three or four different purposes into a single bond issue in order to gain enough
support from adherents of each to approve the bond authorization.

CONCLUSION
The effect of the $100,000 debt limitation on state finance
is difficult to assess.
At least one state official has
stated that the limitation has had no adverse effect on
Montana's fiscal affairs. 2 The Montana Supreme Court's
decision throwing out the "property- tax, non-property tax"
distinction may have extremely adverse effects. Certainly
that decision does not affect revenue-bond financing, but
it does close the door to a once important exception to the
debt limitation.
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CHAPTER XV
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION'

INTRODUCTION
[?]he lion's share of the money is in Washington,
the authority under which local governments must
operate is at the State Capitol, and the primary
role of supplying public services is at the local
level.

That statement concisely and accurately depicts the ironic
Saddled
financial dilemma facing local governments today.
with a relatively unresponsive tax source, counties and
municipalities are faced with galloping demands for services
at the same time that the cost of just standing still is
In many states, local governments have won insoaring.
creased authority to run their own affairs, only to discover
"All too often," one
they lack the financial power to act.
commentator has noted, "local governments have more home
rule authority than they can finance through 'home rule'
tax resources." 2 The result has been cities fighting for
more local autonomy on one hand, yet begging for more state
and federal financial aid on the other to help support that
autonomy
Saying that taxes are unpopular is like saying that water
But the rancor against increasing taxation—the sois wet.
called "taxpayers' revolt" often seems most obvious on the
Perhaps it is because the tax decision-makers
local level.
are closer at hand; perhaps it is because the taxpayer has
more frequent opportunity to express his dissatisfaction on
local taxes through mill and bond levy elections.

—

No assumption is more dangerous than that a new constitution
can somehow solve the financial problems besetting local
It can,
governments and, more important, local taxpayers.
however, perhaps furnish a better framework in which those
problems can be met.
The cost of local government nationally has been increasing
steadily at a rate of about 6.7 percent a year since 1902.
But the expenditures of local government as a percentage of
total local, state and federal spending have dropped

*This chapter originally was written for the study on Local
Government in this series of reports for the Montana Constitutional Convention.
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considerably from a 58 percent share in 1902 to a present
25-27 percent share of the total.- Put another way, about
25 cents of every dollar spent by all governments is soent
by local governments—schools, cities and towns, counties
and special districts.
1

In 196 8, local governments, including school districts, had
direct expenditures of nearly $72 billion nationally. Of
that total, about $26 billion was in intergovernmental revenuethat is, state and federal aid; $11 billion was from charges
and miscellaneous general revenue.
But the bulk nearly $35
billion was from local taxation. And local taxation means
the property tax.
In 1968, nearly $30 billion of the $35
billion tax total came from taxes on property.
Always the
major taxation revenue source for local government, property
taxes now account for well over 80 percent of the local tax
take nationally. 5

—

—

The reliance of local governments on the property tax has
not been one of choice.
James A. Maxwell, an authority on
state- local finance, has written:

The extreme dependence of local governments on the
property tax rests upon one ineluctable fact lack
of option.
No other tax is available for productive
use.
Local taxation of income, sales, or business
would induce shrinkage in the tax base, and, therefore, bring serious injury to the locality.
But
real property is quite immobile:
differential
taxes of some severity will not induce migration
out of a local geographic area.
Workers must reside
close to their work; retail outlets must locate
close to consumers; manufacturing establishments,
once committed, tend to stay put, since even severe
property taxes are a modest part of their total
costs.
In short, real property offers a base upon
which local governments can safely levy taxes

—

.

Virtually all units of local government across the nation
are authorized to levy property taxes 7 qu ^ despite its
wide use, the property tax is the most criticized of the
major forms of taxation. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations states that the oroperty tax has been
attacked as "regressive, inequitable, and impossible to
administer." 8 L. L. Ecker-Racz, assistant director of the
ACIR, has noted the crucial role defects of the property
tax play in the local government revenue problem:
.

Since local government's expenditures tend to
grow nearly twice as fast as the national
economy while property tax collections do well
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to keep pace with economic growth, local budgets
Since revenue
suffer from chronic imbalance.
requirements rise faster than the yield of existing
taxes, the deficiency grows progressively wider
and can be bridged only by additional taxation
and increased intergovernmental aid. The 115
percent increase in local tax collections during
the past 10 years was achieved only with benefit
of new tax enactments and higher tax rates.

Some of the "new tax enactments" Ecker-Racz speaks of are
the local- level use of general sales taxes, income taxes
and selective sales and gross receipts taxes on motor
fuel, alcohol, tobacco, admissions and utility services. *-®
General sales taxes are authorized for local use in at
least twenty-six states and are used to a considerable extent in several of them.
Local income taxes are used in
at least nine states. ^ In 1968, nationwide, nonproperty
taxes raised about $5 billion for local governments.^--*
*-

TAXATION IN MONTANA
Local government expenditures in Montana are increasing rapidly,
In 1967, the direct general expenditure of local government minus education was $79 million
in Montana; ten years earlier, the comparable figure was $49
million. 14
as are those nationally.

—

—

Montana also follows the national trend in that the property
tax is the mainstay for local governments.
Of the $20 3 million
in general revenue for Montana local government and schools
in 19 67-6 8, more than $12 5 million came from property taxes
compared to only $5.3 million from other tax sources, $43
million from intergovernmental revenue and $29.5 million in
charges and miscellaneous general revenue. '
But trends clearly forecast trouble for counties and municipalities in terms of continued reliance on property as virtually
their only tax source. The recent Montana Fiscal Affairs Study
found that public education is "preempting" the property tax
at the expense of other local functions in Montana.
"With
each passing year," the study noted, "public education stakes
out a larger claim on the local property tax. "16 The result
is that less and less property tax money is being left for
municipal and county functions. The report found that the
city and county share of all general local property taxes has
been whittled down from 49 percent in 1947 to only 40 percent
in 1967; correspondingly, the school share has increased from
51 percent to 60 percent (see Table 29)That factor,
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however, is not the only one limiting the use of property
taxes by municipal and county governments. The legislature in Montana traditionally has imposed tight restrictions
on the amount of property tax that can be levied by local
governments. Counties, for example, may levy up to 2 4 mills
for current general expenditures; 1 ^ up to 17 mills for the
care of indigent sick and other dependent poor, 1 ^ and up to
15 mills for the road fund. 20
In addition, separate levies
are authorized for purposes varving from a purebred livestock show^l and extermination of insects22 to maintaining
an airport*^ and repairing public bridges. 24 The legislature also has imposed limits that seek, with certain exceptions, to limit county spending to an increase of no more
than 5 percent of what was spent the year before. 25

Montana municipalities, since the 19 69 legislature, have been
given more freedom. They now are authorized to use an "allpurpose" mill levy of up to 65 mills, covering all items except bonded indebtedness, judgments and special improvement
district revolving funds for which separate levies outside
the 65-mill limit may be made. 26 The "all-purpose" levy
may be adopted by a city or town council as an alternative
to a budgeting system similar to that provided for Montana
counties, in which individual limits are set on individual
In other words, a limit on total spending is subfunds.
stituted for several limits on spending for individual funcThe aim is more flexibility on the local level; the
tions.
legislative control of total local spending remains.
Despite legislative attempts to control property taxes in
Montana, they have continued to increase. For example,
county taxes were up $2.52 per $1,000 of taxable valuation
in 1970-1971 over the previous year; city and town taxes,
during the same period, increased an average of $1.02. But
the big gainer again was schools, which jumped a total of
$7.17 (see Table 30)
The increasing difficulty of relying on the property tax
has yet to force the legislature to provide other means of
financing local government, however. As is noted below,
the Montana Constitution considerably limits state aid to
local governments. Another alternative authorizing local
governments to levy major taxes other than propertv taxes
simply has not been used in Montana.

—

—

For example, unlike many cities and counties across the nation,
those in Montana cannot levy local sales or income taxes.
However, Montana municipalities do possess power to license
businesses and occupations .27 The exercise of that power may
result in additional funds for the city, although the Montana
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Supreme Court has held that theoretically such licensing is
for police and regulation purposes, not raising revenue. °

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORT
The problems of local government taxation have caused some
states to seek partial solutions through constitutional
language.
In the absence of any language to the contrary,
the legislature has total control over local government
taxation. ^° Thus, unless the constitution provides otherwise, units of local government have only that taxing power
that the legislature wishes to give them.
Such total legislative control over local government taxation
The Montana
is the case in many states, including Montana. ^
Constitution states in Article XII, Section 4 that the legislature "may by law invest in the corporate authorities" of
cities, towns and counties "powers to assess and collect
taxes." That language, however, appears to be excess constitutional baggage; the legislature would have the power to
authorize local governments to tax even without the constitutional provision. 31

Leaving the entire matter of local taxation to the legislature can be defended on the basis that it allows a flexible
approach to the issue. The legislature thus is allowed to
supervise not only statewide taxes, but also local taxes
and theoretically at least, can balance taxes to make sure
that no single segment of the economy is over- or undertaxed.
It should also be noted that legislative control over
taxation does not require the setting of specific mill-levy
limits, such as now is done in Montana.
The legislature, if
it wished, could simply grant to counties and municipalities
the authority to levy property taxes, letting each local unit
set its own tax limit.
Similarly, the legislature could grant
local governments broad powers to levy various kinds of taxes
such as was done in Pennsylvania under the so-called "taxeverything" act.
Such broadened taxing powers would not have
to be granted to all units of local government, but could
be restricted to larger ones or, perhaps, those that have
adopted their own charters. 32

Opposition to complete legislative, rather than constitutional,
control over local taxing power comes from both directions. On
one side are those who believe a constitution should specifically
limit the taxing powers the legislature can offer local governments; on the other side are those v/ho believe the constitution
should bypass the legislature and directly authorize local
governments to decide their own taxation questions.
-293-
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Constitutional Limits on Taxation
A comprehensive 1962 study reported that twenty-one states
have constitutional Drovisions restricting the propertv tax
In sixteen of the states,
levying powers of local governments.
the limitations were comprehensive--that is, they applied to
In the other five states, the
all units of local government.
constitutional limits applied to only one class of local

covernment 33
Of the states with comprehensive constitutional limitations,
the maximum property rates were stated either as an overall
tax rate, applicable to all property taxing jurisdictions,
or as restrictions on specific classes of local government
units. ^ Two of Montana's neighboring states provide examples.
The Washington Constitution [Art. 7, Sec. 2] limits "the
aggregate of all tax levies" by tax districts to no more
than forty mills on each dollar of assessed valuation.
Thus,
the total taxes levied by all political subdivisions cannot
exceed that amount.

Wyoming, on the other hand, uses specific constitutional
limitations.
Its constitution provides [Art. 15, Sees. 5
and 6] that the property tax shall not exceed twelve mills
for counties, including general school taxes, and eight mills
for municipalities.

The use of constitutional limitations on property taxation
has been widely attacked.
One observer, calling the limits
"relics of bygone days," suggests they "should now be relegated to the archives of historical museums. "35 He continues:
The 1960's bear no resemblance to the environment
which generated tax and debt limits. The quality
of local government leadership is incomparably
better.
Standards prescribed for the conduct of
municipal affairs and controls established to
enforce the standards are incomparably more effective.
Most important of all, the public is more
alert to the conduct of its local government
affairs and holds its public officials responsible.

Legal limitations on debts and taxes are, at best,
the codification of informed thinking of what is
reasonable at the time the limits are being prescribed and will inevitably grow obsolete because
over time the responsibilities placed on government
by its citizens move but in one direction--they
expand. 36
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The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has
proposed lifting all constitutional and statutory restrictions on local property taxing powers, calling such limitations "inimical to local self-government." 37 Constitutions,
the ACIR states, "should be limited to governing principles,
to the exclusion of administrative detail." 38

he argues, involves "dozens of years extending indefinitely,"
and therefore should not be left to the whim of legislators
or local government officials. 3 ^ Harriss states:

Annual attention by legislatures and city councils-year-to-year decisions— cannot be counted upon to
consider the longer-run aspects adequately. Constitutional limits, however, can help assure that longerrun considerations play an influential role in decisions. ^0
Harriss also counters the theory that state legislatures should
be given final authority over local property taxation without
constitutional limitation, as is now the case in Montana:

Those in control of state legislative processes
are not necessarily the groups who will be responsible for bearing the cost of local taxes
and putting up with their other adverse effects.
The interests of taxpayers in some localities
may not, in fact, be adequately protected in
the state legislature.
State action authorizing
a tax rate increase may, of course, seem to be
merely permissive, with no tax (or debt) decision
taken until local officials act.
Yet spending
pressures (to some extent state-mandated) combined
with failure of the legislature to allow revenue
alternatives or to provide grants may in fact
constitute state compulsion to raise property tax
rates (or add to debt)
If there is freedom
within the constitution to raise property tax
rates, the legislature can as a practical matter
force some localities to act in ways they would
not truly prefer.
.
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N onproperty Tax Limitations

In addition to limits on the
power of local governments to tax property, several state
constitutions restrict which nonproperty taxes may be authorized by the legislature for local use.
Such restrictions are
relatively rare, however. ^
.

At least two state constitutions appear to directly prohibit
jn
the legislature from authorizing local income taxes. 43
addition, the wording of some so-called "home rule amendments"
may serve to prohibit the local imposition of some nonproperty
For example, the Ohio Constitution in Article XVIII,
taxes.
Section 3 provides that "home rule" units mav exercise oower
"not in conflict with general law." The Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations reports that this provision
has been held by the courts to mean "preemption--that any
tax upon a subject by the State precludes a similar local tax.' 44
On its face, the Montana Constitution does not directly limit
the legislature from authorizing nonproperty taxes for local
governments. However, Article XII, Section la, which was
added in 1934, could cause problems should the legislature
wish to authorize local governments to levy graduated income
taxes on the local level.
The problem is that the section
specifies that the legislative assembly may "levy and collect"
graduated income taxes and that proceeds from the taxes "shall
be distributed to the public schools and to the state government." The wording could be held to prohibit the legislature
from authorizing local government units to levy graduated
income taxes for local purposes.

Constitutional Grants of Taxing Power
Debate concerning what a constitution should say about local
taxation can be pictured as a three-stage affair. The first
stage, discussed above, is represented by those who believe
state constitutions should contain provisions limiting the
property taxing powers of local government by setting millage
limits in constitutional granite.
The middle stage is represented by those who would leave the
entire question of local government taxation up to the legislature.
For this to occur, a constitution would not have to
say anything about local taxation; the legislature would be
left free to grant--and restrict--the taxing powers of counties
and municipalities.
In general, Montana's Constitution of
1889 provides for this arrangement.
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The third stage of the taxation debate is represented by
those who believe that the constitution should directly
grant taxation powers to local government units. For
example, the 1948 edition of the Model State Constitution
using the allocated method of determining local powers
would give cities the power:
(see Chapter III)

,

,

To levy, assess and collect taxes, and to
borrow money and issue bonds, and to levy
and collect special assessments for benefits conferred. 4 ^

Under such authority, cities could levy different kinds of
taxation without prior legislative authorization to do so.
California "home rule" units are said to have such power. 46
The latest edition of the Model State Constitution also
would give local government a direct grant of local taxation power, but does it under the shared powers concept:

A county or city may exercise any legislative power or perform any function which
is not denied to it by its charter, is
not denied to counties or cities generally,
or to counties or cities of its class, and
is within such limitations as the legislature may establish by general law. 4 ?
Thus, a city or county could levy whatever taxes it wished
unless the legislature or the local charter had specifically
restricted it in using such authority. In other words, the
present presumption that local governments can levy only
those taxes specifically authorized by the legislature would
be reversed.
In some states, units of local government may be granted
taxing authority through their own charters thus bypassing
the legislature. Alaska, which uses the shared powers method
discussed above, in effect allows home rule charter units to
levy any tax not prohibited by law or charter [Art. X, Sec. 11]
The new Illinois Constitution [Art. VII, Sec. 6] gives "home
rule units" the power to tax, but provides that the legislature, by a three-fifths vote, may deny or limit the local
taxing authority. The Michigan Constitution [Art. VII,
Sees. 2 and 21] grants cities, villages and charter counties
the power to levy nonproperty taxes, subject to restrictions
stated in the constitution or statutory law.
,
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On the other hand, other constitutions—including several
of the more recent ones--specif ically retain total legislative control over local taxing powers, even while extending local autonomy in other areas. For example,
Massachusetts, which switched to the shared powers concept
in 1966, specifically withholds broad taxation power from
The Florida Conlocal government [Art. LXXXIX, Sec. 7].
stitution, extensively revised in 1968, similarly retains
substantial legislative control over local taxing powers
[Art. VII, Sec. 9],
The Hawaii Constitution clearly provides for complete legislative control over taxation and
finance:
The taxing power shall be reserved to the State
except so much thereof as may be delegated by
the legislature to the political subdivisions,
and the legislature shall have the power to
apportion state revenues among the several
[Hawaii Const. Art. VII,
political subdivisions.
Sec.

3]

Should units of local government be given a constitutional
grant of taxing power? Proponents of such provisions argue
that increasing local autonomy means little unless local
government can raise funds to use their new power. The
power to tax may well be the power to destroy, but as far
as local government is concerned, it also is the power to
survive, some would argue.
The Public Administration Service, in a report prepared for
the Alaska Constitutional Convention, supports local fiscal
authority and attacks head-on the contention that it would
be abused:
It may well be pointed out that the authority
to tax one's self is seldom a dangerous authority.
It is likely that the legislature will have just
as effective control and fewer troublesome local
taxation problems to face if it allows local units
to tax all that is not prohibited by law rather
than restrictina them to only those taxes specif ically authorized by law. HO

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has
given strong support to the general thesis that so-called
"home rule" units of local government should have broader
taxing authority:

Home rule property embraces the responsibility
for financing local government services, including
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the obligation to determine locally the degree
of responsibility delegated to the elected
officials and the limitations imposed on their

taxing powers
It follows that wherever local governments have
been granted home rule powers, their right of
self-determination implicit in such a grant
should not be abridged by saddling £hem with
statewide property tax limitations *9

Proponents of giving more fiscal independence to local governments generally can use the standard arguments favoring any
increased authority for the local units (see Chapter III)
Similarly, critics of such fiscal independence can use the
same general counter arguments. For example, the opponents
of giving constitutional taxing powers to local government
can argue that the power would be misused because local governments are ill-equipped to exercise it. Taxation, they might
contend, is clearly a matter of statewide concern and local
autonomy in the matter could create havoc. Harriss of
Columbia University has noted:
No geographical area anywhere in the United
States can any longer be said to have fiscal
independence in a meaningful sense. The
larger the population of a school district,
town, county, city, or state, the more its
fiscal affairs blend (harmonizing and conflicting) with those of its neighbors, the
state, and the national government 50
.

The arguments against extending the taxing authority of local
governments are well summed up by Larry M. Elison, a University
of Montana law professor.
Elison states:

Should cities be given increased authority to
tax?
I do not think they should.
I think the
city, particularly in Montana, is verv poorly
situated and organized to raise money
Property tax administration should be a state
responsibility. The assessment and collection
inequities are beyond the capacity of local
politicians and have important repercussions
beyond the jurisdictional confines of local
boundaries. Cities should not be given the
power to levy local income taxes. They present too many administrative problems and

....
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there is too much opportunity for evasion
Sales taxes should be
at the local level
permitted only on a uniform state-collected
.

and state-administered basis.
Other relatively
insignificant nonproperty local tax levies
such as license taxes, gross receipt taxes,
admission and amusement taxes, cigarette and
tobacco taxes, alcoholic beverage taxes, deed
transfer and poll taxes, and public utility
taxes are questionable as to their political
and legal availability, their administrative
feasibility and their productivity. They
offer little hope for real relief for strained
city budgets.
I do not favor such grab-bag
taxes or carte blanche authority for a city
to levy such taxes.^
But if local government's fiscal fate is to be left in the
hands of the state legislature, some believe the legislature,
in effect should be f orced to be responsible.
For examDle,
the American Municipal Association, now the National League
of Cities, has suggested the following constitutional provisions
:

State legislation requiring increased municipal
expenditures may not become effective in a municipal corporation until approved by ordinance enacted by the legislative body of the municipal
corporation, unless the legislation is enacted
by two-thirds vote of all members elected to each
house of the legislature or funds sufficient to
meet the increased municipal expenditure are
granted to the municipal corporation by that
legislation or separate legislation enacted at
the same session of the legislature 52
.

In a sense, the provision tells the legislature to either
p ut up more money, or shut u p in terms of requiring action
on the part of local government.
The provision clearly aims

at halting the legislative practice of requiring local
governments, for example, to pay their employees more money,
take on new functions and perform additional services but
not providing any more money to meet the mandate. On the
other hand, the provision possibly could be used by a
recalcitrant municipality to thwart legitimate legislation
that only incidentally costs money.
It could result in a
situation where local governments would be powerless to

—
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act without legislative authorization, and the legislature
would be hesitant to demand action because of the possible
cost to the state.

The suggested provision has been weakened considerably in an
adaptation in the Alaska Constitution. Article II, Section
19 of rhat document provides that no local or special law
requiring an appropriation can become effective until it has
been approved by a majority of the qualified electors affected
voting on the question.
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CHAPTER XVI
STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

MONTANA PROVISION

Article XII, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution effectively limits state aid to municipal and county governments by
the following language:
The legislative assembly shall not levy taxes upon
the inhabitants or property in any county, city,
town or municipal corporation for county, town, or
municipal purposes.
.

.

.

In other words, any state tax devised to provide revenue for
counties and municipalities for local purposes is specifically
prohibited.

MONTANA'S PERFORMANCE
The Montana constitutional provision circumscribing state
aid to counties and municipalities remains operative at a
In
time when such revenue sharing is of major importance.
fiscal 1969, for example, states distributed $9.8 billion in
state revenue to local governments, not including aid to
education. *

Montana is one of only four states providing no general
The other states are Delaware, Illinois
local government aid.
The average per capita general state aid
and West Virginia.
to local government is $10.6 2; Wisconsin tops the list for
Montana does provide some
the fifty states with $82.25.
state aid for special services, such as highways and public
welfare, but only three states provide less than the Montana
per capita figure of $5.98. Those states are Texas, $2.40;
West Virginia, $5.08, and Kentucky, $5.91. The per capita
In other words, Montana
average for all states is $49.33.
is forty-seventh among the fifty states in its per capita
state aid to counties and municipalities.
Table 31 lists per capita state aid to county and municipal
governments by major purpose.
In 1951, Montana counties received $1.2 million in state aid
By 1967, county aid had
and cities received $100,000.
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TABLE 31
PER CAPITA STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
BY MAJOR PURPOSE, 1969
tenet

United States,
Total
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
..
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts....
Michigan.
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire....
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina...
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina...
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia. ...
Wisconsin
Wyoming

$49.3

i

LO

54. V*

10.50
1R.20
19.79
25.5

)

25.3'.
42. 5H
4

6.41

46. CJ
5.91
31.451

7.4 V
69. OS

40.85
51.9
95. 2 J

22.0!
7.12
.

>

;
'

50.6"/

29.4

'

8.4
37.1'!

15.4?
147. 9'.;
3U.0C
26.66
J2.22
2b. 8 1
4 6.3"
L7.45
L8.4i
I'/.H,
10.4''

23.

7ii

/. 4i)

9.83
2

I

.

1

J

.80
5.

OS

I

Si.',

il

"

STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

increased to $2.8 million and city aid to $600,000. 3 Table
32 illustrates the trends in state aid to local governments
in Montana since 1951.

License Tax Loophole
The state is providing this trickle of state aid to counties
and municipalities through a loophole in Article XII,
Section 4 of the Constitution. The Montana Supreme Court
ruled in 1896 that that provision did not prohibit the
state from levying license taxes for county or municipal
purposes.
In retrospect, the Court's reasoning in State v
Camp Sing seems strained. The Court stated that taxation
systems and license systems were separate, distinct revenue
programs.
Both are created by Article XII, Section 1 of the
The Court
Constitution, and each has its own vocabulary.
said "levy" and "assess" apply to taxation, "impose" applies
to licenses.
Since Article XII, Section 4 speaks only in
terms of "levy," it was meant to prohibit taxes, not licenses, the Court concluded.
.

Although the Camp Sing case concerned only revenue raised
by state statute and retained by counties, its language is
broad enough to cover municipalities, too. At least the
decision never has been limited to counties only.
The decision is not an enormous loophole, however.
Courts
and the legislature have been struggling ever since with the
meaning of "license tax" as opposed to a "taxation tax."
One decision in 1919 stated flatly that the Camp Sing decision meant Section 4 imposed restrictions on property taxation only.
Another case tried to distinguish betv/een the
two as follows:
"The taxing power is exercised for the purpose of
raising revenue.
.while the police power is exercised only for the purpose of promoting the public
welfare, and, although this end may be attained by
taxing or licensing occupations, yet the object must
always be regulation and not the raising of rev.

enue.

"
.

.

.

Despite these attempts at clarification, the Court has simply
had to live with the "taxation v. license" dichotomy, making
the distinction on a case by case basis and not without
contradiction. ' At the present time, the state imposes five
taxes, all labled license taxes, which raise revenue for
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32

STATE OF MONTANA INTERGOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURE
BY RECEIVING UNIT FOR SELECTED YEARS 1951-68

Fiscal
Year
Ending

Total
School
Intergovernmental
Expenditure
Counties Cities Districts

Other

(Millions of Dollars^)
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1968

11.0
15.5
14.3
14.2
17.9
21.2
23.5
30.0
37.7
44.1

1951-68
1961-68

8.5
11.0

1.

1.7
2.8

1.0
0.6

34.5
40.1

0.5
0.5

:
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counties and municipalities. Additional state funds have been
distributed to counties for welfare purposes, and the 19 71
Legislature authorized aid for pollution control.
Types of State Aid to Counties and Municipalities
The types of state aid to Montana counties and municipalities
are as follows 8

License Taxes
1.
Liquor License Tax Revised Codes of Montana 1947,
Sections 4-240 and 4-241]
Source: 4 percent tax on the
retail sale price of liquor. Allocation:
to counties according to amount of liquor sold in each county;
the county
keeps one-fourth and the remaining three-fourths is apportioned among the municipalities according to gross sales
within the municipality. Function:
law enforcement and
regulation and control of the sale and use of liquor.
,

[

.

2.
Insurance License Tax Revised Codes of Montana
1947, Sections 11-1919 to ll-1929~n
Source:
license fees
on insurance risks. Allocation:
first and second class
cities, 10 percent of annual compensation of firemen; third
class cities and towns, fire portion of direct premiums,
with a minimum payment of at least $100. Function:
fire
[

,

department relief association.
Source: premium tax on motor vehicle insurance sold
to cover certain specified risks.
Allocation:
same as
above, but for policemen.
Function:
police reserve fund,
or if no such fund exists, for police training or to purchase pensions for members of the police department.
3.
Beer License Tax
Sections 4-317, 4-324 and
on beer.
Allocation:
75
on population.
Function:
the transportation system

[

Revised Codes of Montana 1947,
4-347]
Source:
barrelage tax
percent to municipalities based
law enforcement, maintenance of
and public health.
,

.

4.
Gasoline License Tax Revised Codes of Montana 1947,
Sections 84-1801 to 84-1844].
Source:
up to $3 million of
the revenue from the license tax on each gallon of gasoline
refined, manufactured, produced, distributed, used, sold,
etc. by gasoline dealers.
Allocation:
counties receive
40 percent and municipalities 60 percent of the tax; that
sum is further allocated on a population and alley and
[
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Function:
construction and repair
street mileage basis.
of streets and alleys or for matching federal road funds.
5.
Motor Vehicle License and Registration Fees Revised
Codes of Montana 1947, Sections 32-3701 to 32-3707].
Source
license fees from registration of motor vehicles. Allocation:
apportioned between counties and municipalities on
a ratio of the total number of miles of public streets and
highways within municipal limits and the total number of
miles of streets and highways outside those limits;
ButteWalkerville and Anaconda also are authorized to keep 50 and
25 percent, respectively, of the license fees collected in
those municipalities.
Function:
construction, repair and
maintenance of highways and streets.
[

,

State Purpose Grants
Two state aid programs to counties apparently are based on
a "state purpose" concept on the premise that the wording
of Article XII, Section 4 only prohibits aid for local purposes
:

1.
Welfare Aid Revised Codes of Montana 1947,
Section 71-311]
The state has obligated itself to pay
county welfare costs in excess of the amount raised by seventeen mills within each county.
From 1951 to 1967, those
state payments ranged from $200,000 to $700,000.9 The funds
come from the state's general fund and apparently are considered funds for a state purpose not a county purpose.
However, the Montana Constitution, in Article X, Section 5,
seems to make "welfare" a county function although the
service may be regulated by the legislature:
[

,

.

,

The several counties of the State shall provide
as may be prescribed by law for those inhabitants,
who, by reason of age, infirmity or misfortune, may
have claims upon the sympathy and aid of society.
2.
Water Pollution Control Aid [19 71 Laws of Montana
Appropriation Measures, House Bill 476]. The 1971 Legislature appropriated $4 million from the general fund to the
State Board of Health to provide matching funds to local
governments for construction of water pollution control
facilities
,

A review of the present state aid programs shows that all
As was
the aid now is earmarked for specific functions.
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noted earlier, Montana is one of only four states not granting general aid to local governments.
F ederal Funds Channeled through State

The state treasury is a conduit for federal grants to counties
and municipalities for planning, zoning, land use control,
The state government acts as
police, hospitals and welfare.
an agent for the federal government in distributing the
funds and, in some instances, allocates the funds and exerThese funds do
cises supervision over their expenditure.
not fall within the prohibition of Article XII, Section 4
because they are from federal, rather than state, tax revenues
.

OTHER STATES
Only four other states have provisions in their constitutions
similar to Article XII, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution.
But in those states Colorado, 10 California,
Utah, 12
and Idaho 1
judicial interpretation has softened the restrictive nature of the provisions.
In 19 69, general state
aid to local governments, exclusive of aid to education,
in those states was as follows:
Colorado, $115 million;
Idaho, $18.4 million;
California, $2.1
Utah, $10.3 million;
billion.
Montana contributed $4.1 million during the same
year.
-*

—

—

H

Idaho makes the same "taxation vs. license" distinction that
Montana does; 1 ^ Utah courts also seem to use that rationale to
uphold distribution of license tax proceeds to local governments 1-6
.

But Colorado and California have adopted a much more liberal
approach to state taxes for local purposes.
Both states
permit any tax that is distributed to local governments for
a "state purpose," including welfare, transportation, state
pension funds, police protection, highways and education. 1-7
The "state purpose" doctrine seems to permit more flexibility
than the "taxation-license" distinction.

PURPOSE OF THE MONTANA PROVISION
There was no debate in the 1889 Convention concerning Article
XII, Section 4, which may have been copied from the Colorado
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The "ontana Fiscal Affairs Study not;::

During the past two decades, the nest difficult fiscal
problem to emerge in the American fiscal system has been
the fiscal imbalance between rapidly rising local
revenue requirements and the lirited taxi -7 capacity of
During this period, when the problen
local governments.
has come so sharply to our attention—especially ir.
heavily populated states— the usual response r.a = been
that of placing ever increasing pressure on the local
r.roperty tax.
.With these high property tax loads,
the defects of the property tax, such as unequal assessments, its regressive impact, and land use distorticr.s
have been magnified and have seriously undermined the
property tax as the prime fiscal underwriter of education and general local government revenue needs.
.

.

.

In one sense, Montana is fortunate that the fiscal
crisis has not reached the decree of severity that is
apparent elsewhere in the United States. But, the
fiscal crisis is developing in Montana, and it cannot be
ignored.
Because of the emerging problems associated
with state- local fiscal relations in Montana, there is
a need for an appraisal of the State aid system in
Montana. 22

The Fiscal Study continued:
The broad implications of the syster of State aid to
local schools are that public education is preerrting
the property tax at the expense of other local functions
With each passing year, public education stakes out a
larger claim on the local property tax.
Continuously
increasing education costs in local public schools ar.d
relatively moderate increases in State aid force more
and more reliance on the property tax for the support
of public education.
.

.

.

In 1947, local schools claimed 51 percent cf the property
tax levied.
Ten years later, in 19 57, the share of
local schools in the property tax dad -rev.— 5 2 percent.
By 1962, local public schools claimed 56 percent of property taxes levied for general purposes; in 1967, the
local school share was 60 percent.
The rate at which
local schools have increased their claim on the property
tax has been more rapid during the 1960's than during
the Deriod from 1947 to 1962.
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On the other hand, the share of the cities and counties
in the property tax had fallen from 49 percent in 1947
The significance of all this is
to 40 percent in 1967.
that property taxes, which are now high, but in the
future, it seems, will need to be higher, are meeting
qrowing resistance by the taxpayers; hence, the prospects
for expanded use of the property tax to underwrite the
increasing fiscal needs of all local governments are not
bright
This conclusion raises some important questions regardinq
increased State participation in the funding of local
Several alternapublic services as well as tax reform.
tive approaches exist.
These approaches fall into the
following categories:
(1) State grants-in-aid to local
governments, (2) tax sharing, and (3) new local
.3
taxes.
.

.
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CHAPTER XVII
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT*

INTRODUCTION
Even the best possible systems of taxation and state aid to
local governments would not halt the need for the third major
component of a local government financial network the power
to sell bonds and go into debt to finance long-term projects.
In 1968-69, the total debt of local governments, including
school districts, across the nation was nearly $94 billion;
The fact
$86 billion of that amount was long-term debt.
that more than twice as much new long-term debt was issued
during 1968-69 as was retired illustrates local government
debt not only is huge, but that it is continuing to grow.

—

The swift upward trend of local indebtedness nationally has
during
been interrupted only twice during this century:
World War I and the depression and war years from 19 31 to
1946.2
Those interludes, however, had little overall impact
on the total local government debt, which, in 1960, was more
When put in perthan 62 times as great as it was in 1880.
spective, however, the growth in local government debt is
considerably more modest. Local debt may have been 62 times
as great in 1960 as it was in 1880, but the gross national
product multiplied 55-fold during the same interval.

Local government debt also is a substantial financial factor
in Montana.
The 1967 Census of Governments reported Montana's
fifty-six county governments had nearly $9.9 million in debt
outstanding at the end of fiscal 1966-67; the state's 126
incorporated municipalities had nearly $47.8 million in outstanding indebtedness on the same date.
Special districts
in the state accounted for more than $26 million in debt, more
than one-fourth of which was attached to the Greenfield Irrigation

*This chapter was originally written for the study on Local
Government in this series of reports for the Montana Constitutional Convention.
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District in Teton County; ^ topping the indebtedness scale
were the state's 713 school districts, with a total debt of
$71 million. 6
Per capita debt per county area also is increasing in Montana,
rising from a state average of $151.42 in 1957 to $199.14 in
During that ten-year period,
1967, an increase of $47.72.
twenty-five county areas registered decreases in per caDita
general debt; the remaining thirty-one saw their per capita
debt figures increase.
Some of the debt, both in Montana and nationally, is being
paid off through property taxes; major portions of it, such
as that for the Greenfield Irrigation District mentioned
previously, are being retired through user charges and soecial
assessments. Nationally, most of the local borrowing is for
capital expenditures--that is, for roads, buildings, public
service enterprises, etc. 8 And most of the local debt is
attached to cities and towns; municipal government debt
ordinarily is several times as great per capita as comparable amounts for counties, school districts and special
districts .9

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Current state constitutional restrictions on local debt
largely are a product of the 1870s and 1880s, springing
from a sharp depression and numerous defaults on local
bond payments. *** The restrictions generally are of two
types
1.
Specific constitutional limits on indebtedness,
usually expressed as a percentage of the local government's propertv base. For example, a municipal debt
limit might be set at 4 percent of the assessed value
of property within a city.
2.
Constitutional requirements that voters, in a
referendum, approve the proposed debt, often by more than
the usual majoritv.

A recent comprehensive study by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations found that thirtv-four of the
fifty states constitutionally spec: fv some percentage
limit.it.ioMs i>n outstanding debt of their local government
units in relation to the property tax base; six of the
tlii rty-four
however, apply the limits to onlv a single
,
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type of local government or to debt of a particular purpose.
Therefore, twenty-two states were described by the ACIR as
"entirely or nearly free of .this type of specific limitation
on local government debt."H

The twenty-eight states that did set general local debt
limits in their constitutions at the time of the ACIR
study cannot be easily divided into neat categories or
even intelligently compared because of their great diverMany of the constitutional restrictions are supsity.
plemented by statutory law and charter provisions. In
addition, most of the restrictions are based on assessed
valuation, which in turn represents a limited fraction
of the market value of taxable property a fraction that
varies from state to state. 2 The commission, figuratively
throwing up its hands, stated:

—

^-

If a 2 percent limit on city debt in Indiana has
any rationale, what is the logic underlying the
5 and 10 percent levels allowed municipal governments in numerous other States, or the 19 percent
maximum permissible in Arizona? If 10 percent of
the tax base is a reasonable limit for school
district debt in the various States where this
percentage applies, what can be said for the 5
percent school district limits of numerous other
States, or the 2 percent limits of Indiana and
Kentucky? Such questions are not answered by
differences in the level of assessment from one
State to another. Even when these are taken into account, a tremendous range of "effective
rate" percentages is still to be found, as well
as many interstate differences that challenge
logical explanation. For example, the constitutional limits set on school district debt by
six neighboring Midwestern States ranged in 1956
from about 1.1 percent up to 2.9 percent of the
approximate market value of taxable property .13

The other major type of restriction on local government debt-the requirement for voter approval also varies considerablv
from state to state, but is included in most state constitutions.
The ACIR study reported nineteen state constitutions
include no provision for popular referenda on local debt
issuance; two others have limited provisions for public vote,
and six applv the referendum only to bond issues above a
certain amount.

—

However, when statutorv provisions are considered along with
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the state constitutions, all or nearly all the states make
some use of referenda in connection with local debt issuance. l->

Again, variety is the key word.

According to the ACIR report:

Differing provisions may apply to various types
or sizes of local governments, or for proposed
In some instances
bonds for various purposes.
a borrowing government can elect to act under
alternative procedures that call for differing
In other instances
levels of popular majority.
a "step" approach is used, with more stringent
requirements for a bond issue that would raise
the government's debt above some stated percentage of its property tax base. 6
In summary, a majority of state constitutions limit local
(1) A maximum
indebtedness in at least one of two ways:
level of debt is set, usually stated as a percentage of the
property value; (2) approval by local voters is required

before the debt can be incurred. For both types of restrictions, the specific state constitutions vary greatly.
The Montana Situation

Montana's Constitution imposes both of the restrictive deIt states:
vices.

No county shall be allowed to become indebted in
any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate,
exceeding five (5) per centum of the value of
the taxable property therein, to be ascertained
by the last assessment for state and county taxes
previous to the incurring of such indebtedness,
and all bonds or obligations in excess of such
amount given by or on behalf of such county shall
be void. No county shall incur any indebtedness
or liability for any single purpose to an amount
exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) without the approval of a majority of the electors
thereof, voting at an election to be provided
by law.
[Montana Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 5J
No city, town, township, school district or high
school district shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an
amount, including existing indebtedness, in the
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aggregate exceeding five per centum (5%) of the
value of the taxable property therein, to be
ascertained by the last assessment for state and
county taxes previous to the incurring of such
indebtedness, and all bonds or obligations in
excess of such amount given by or on behalf of
such city, town, township, school district or
high school district shall be void; and each
school district and each high school district
shall have separate and independent bonding
capacities within the limitation of this section;
provided, however, that the legislative assembly
may extend the limit mentioned in this section,
by authorizing municipal corporations to submit
the question to a vote of the taxpayers affected
thereby, when such increase is necessary to construct a sewerage system or to procure a supply
of water for such municipality which shall own
and control said water supply and devote the
revenues derived therefrom to the payment of the
debt.
[Montana Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 6].

These provisions impose three major conditions on county
and municipal debt:
1.
Generally, the legislature may not authorize any
city or town to incur total indebtedness that exceeds 5 percent "of the value of the taxable property therein."
2.
The legislature may allow municipalities, with the
approval of their voters, to exceed the 5 percent limitation
to construct a sewer system or to procure a water supply.

3.
No county may incur "any indebtedness or liability
for any single purpose" in any amount exceeding $10,000 without the approval of a majority of the electors voting on the
issue. 17

The first of the two provisions, Section 5, remains in the
same form as it was adopted in 1889; Section 6 has been
amended twice, once in 1950 when the original 3 percent
limitation was increased to 5 percent *" and once in 1958
when school districts and high school districts were given
separate bonding capacities. 19 In all, the legislature has
considered at least seventeen proposals to amend the two
sections. 20
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Base of Restriction

The two sections also have been the subject of frequent
judicial interpretation. Obviously begging for interpretation are the identical phrases in the two sections that
debt shall not exceed 5 percent "of the value of the taxable
property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment
for state and county taxes previous to the incurring of
such indebtedness." Does that mean the 5 percent limit is
to be applied against the actual cash ("market") value of
the property? Or does it refer to the assessed value of
property, which in Montana is 40 percent of the cash value?
Or, finally, does it mean that the limit is based on taxable
valuation of the property, which is a fraction of the assessed
value?
The Montana Supreme Court, in a 1919 case involving the
county debt limit, held that the expression "value of
taxable property" means "assessed valuation. 21 But the
court then equated "assessed valuation" and "cash value"-an incorrect evaluation since even at the time the two
were different. 22 At present, the assessed value of
property is figured at 40 percent of the cash value.
So the question remains: is the debt limit 5 percent of the
cash value of property, or 5 percent of the assessed
value of propertv? If it is based on the latter, as it is
the debt maximum will be 60 percent less
in most states, 2
than if it is based on cash value.
'

-^

The court has never ruled squarely on the issue. However,
Attorney General opinion, concisely reviewing the
a 19 7
problem, states that the debt limitation is to be applied
against assessed valuation. 24 The opinion apparently
substantiates the manner in which the limitation is being
applied in practice. 2 ^

The restrictive nature of the local debt limitation sections
also has been increased in another manner. The court has
held that the 5 percent constitutional debt limit is only
In other
the maximu m limit that the legislature mav set.
words, the legislature by law may set a limit lower than
At present, munithat prescribed in the Constitution. 26
cipalities are allowed by law to go into debt to the full
5 percent constitutional maximum; 2 ^ the statutes repeat
but also provide that
this maximum figure for counties, 28
the outstanding bonds and warrants of counties except
for certain purposes generally are limited to a total
of 2.5 percent. 2 ^

—

—
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Referendum Requirement
Perhaps the most troublesome constitutional debt limitation has been the recruirement in Article XIII, Section 5
that "any [county] indebtedness or liability for any
single purpose to an amount exceeding ten thousand dollars"
must first be approved by the voters. As noted previously,
constitutional requirements that certain debt be preceded
by voted approval are not rare; but the Montana provision,
because of its extremelv low limit, is the exception,
rather than the rule. 30
The $10,000 restriction has
spent much of its life in court or in the Attorney General's
office, as county officials sought legal ways around it.

Their attempts have resulted in some success and considerable
confusion. For example, the $10,000 provision applies only
to an indebtedness or liability for any "single purpose,"
thus inviting contention over what is, and what is not, a
single purpose." Court and Attorney General rulings on
the subject are numerous. An indebtedness of $15,000 to
make general welfare relief payments to 931 persons in
Yellowstone County was held not to be a "single purpose ;"31
similarly, the court has ruled that no public vote was
necessary in Beaverhead County when the commissioners purchased in one dav from one firm, three auto patrols to do
road work in the county. 2
On the other hand, the court
held that total bills exceeding $10,000 for acquisition of
land for a new courthouse, the plans for the building and
the actual construction of the building constituted a single
purpose, and therefore had to be approved by the voters.^
And in a ruling that seems somewhat contradictory to the
one concerning welfare relief payments, the court held
tnat incurring an indebtedness greater than $10,000 to buy
seed grain to distribute to needy drought-stricken farmers
constituted a single purpose, and therefore required a public
"'

vote.-34

Many other cases could be cited, but they would serve
little purpose other than to underline the difficulty
the court has had in setting a clear rule concerning what
constitutes a single purpose a difficulty encountered
frequently because of the low $10,000 limit the Montana
Constitution imposes along with the single-purpose wording.
Ironically, in some counties conducting an election to authorize
a modest debt might cost almost as much as the debt itself.

—

Both recent studies of the Montana Constitution have recommended changing the provision that any countv " single
purpose" debt of more than $10,000 must be submitted to the
voters for approval. The Montana Legislative Council
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concluded that "if $10,000 was a reasonable amount in 1389, it
certainlv is unrealistic today" and recommended that the
$10,000 figure be deleted and the limit be fixed by lav;. 35
Similarly, the taxation and finance subcommittee of the
Constitution Revision Commission recommended rewording
the provision as follows:
No county shall incur any indebtedness or
liability for any single purpose to an
amount exceeding the sum set by law without the approval of a majoritv of the
electors thereof, votina at an election
to be provided by law. 3 "
A constitutional amendment which would have accomplished
the recommendations of the Legislative Council and the
Revision. Commission subcommittee was placed on the 1950
It was defeated 71,648 to 81,135 at the same
ballot. 37
time voters were anproving increased debt limits for cities
and school districts 3y

Common Problems With Debt Limitations
The two problems just discussed--the $10,000 countv debt
limitation without a vote and the question of terminologv-But
are to some degree unique to the Montana Constitution.
the major problems with the Montana provisions are shared
with most other states in the nation.
As noted previously, about two-thirds of the states, including Montana, constitutionally limit local debt by expressing the maximum allowable amount as a percentage of
But critics question
the local government's property base.
if property value is a legitimate measure of a localitv's
ability to safely go in debt. The Advisorv Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations has recommended repeal of constitutional and statutorv provisions which base local debt
The Commission states:
limits on proDertv
.

[T]o the extent that a particular government
also has other kinds of revenue which are
not entirelv subject to some sort of carmarking or "fixed charge-" commitment, its
debt carrying capacity is inadequately
measured by reference to its property tax
resources

-326-

—
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT

The use of the assessed value of property as a base for
determining debt limits also is criticized because of the
extent to which assessment procedures and percentages vary
Use of assessed
from state to state and within states.
valuation figures, such as is done in Montana and most
other states, may lead to debt limits that are "imprecise
and potentially discriminatorv " according to the ACIR.
To mitigate this factor, some states are basing their
debt limits on marked or "cash" value of property, rather
than assessed value. ^2
,

Another criticism of the common constitutional provisions
regulating local government debt is that they do nothing
Under
to control the real problem--overlapping debt.
Montana's constitutional provision, for example, the
limitations apply to individual governmental units; each
county, city and school district can go in debt up to the
full amount, without regard to what other units using the
same property base have done.
For example, consider city
"A" located within school district "B," which, in turn,
Each of the three units could be
is within county "C."
in debt up to the full constitutional allowance, creating
Or, on the other
a sizeable burden on local taxpayers.
hand, the city could be up to its constitutional debt
limit and unable to meet additional legitimate needs, even
though the county and school district were debt free and
the total debt load on the property base was not unreasonable
The answer in both instances often has been to create still
another unit of government a special district, perhaps
with indebtedness limitations of its own. The ACIR has

—

noted:

These circumstances put a premium on local
government fragmentation, by providing an
incentive for the establishment of new
special districts with their own separate
debt ceilings (or, depending uoon legal
provisions and their interpretations, none
at all)
and by handicapping any effort to
achieve a simpler local government structure
throuqh consolidation of diverse existing
J
units
,

.

.

.

.

A possible solution to the problem is to impose an overall
debt limitation—one which would place a ceiling on the
combined debts of the local government units within an
area.
The South Carolina Constitution [Art. X, Sec. 5] sets
such an aggregate limit in addition to limits for specific
types of local government units.
Such a provision could be
criticized, however, on the grounds that it simplv adds
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another level of inflexibility to the constitution.

Another criticism of constitutional debt limitations such
as Montana's is that they do not regulate all forms of
indebtedness.
In most states, the restrictions apply only
to local government issuance of full faith and credit debt,
rather than so-called "non-guaranteed" debt such as revenue
bonds payable solely from pledged specific sources.** 4
This distinction has been adopted by the Montana Supreme
Court, which has ruled, for instance, that special improvement district bonds are not a general obligation of a
municipality, and therefore are not part of its indebtedness.^
The court, in a 1970 case, stated:
There is a long history in Montana of the
financing of various projects by revenue
bonds as distinguished from general obligation bonds payable out of ad valorem
property tax receipts. These have uniformly
been held not to create a debt or liability
within the meaning of Article XIII, Sec. 5
of our Constitution.
Nationally, the use of revenue bonds by local governments
is increasing rapidly, and the increase has been attributed
at least in part to state-imposed restrictions on other
forms of debt. ^7
j n total, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations estimates that at least a third
of all outstanding bonded debt of local government is outside the scope of state-imposed debt limits, and that more
than one-fourth of all local debt^for general government
purposes is outside those limits. 4 8
The increased use of revenue bonding and other nonguaranteed
financing alarms some observers because of evidence that
the interest costs for nonguaranteed issues are significantly
higher. 4 ^
In fact, several states have taken action constitutionally to assure full faith and credit backing for
certain revenue bonds in order to obtain lower interest
rates. 50
Should revenue bonds be considered part of local government's indebtedness? A Pennsylvania study reports that
advocates of constitutional limitation on municipal debt
generally agree that such limitation should not apply to
bonds issued to finance self-supporting projects because
the debt will be paid from the facility's earnings, rather
than from the government's general revenues.
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If the present form of constitutional debt limitations is
to be retained in Montana, perhaps the most difficult
problem will be determining the form and level of those
limits.
Because of differences in the levels of assessed
valuation from state to state, it virtually is impossible to
compare the limits. However, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations has found that those constitutional provisions, such as Montana's, that impose a uniform
limit on all government units can be particularly dis-

criminatory

:

Such uniformity is likely to discriminate
against the most populous local governments of various types, or against those
operating in major urbanized areas, since
a metropolitan community requires more
varied and intensive public services than
smaller cities and towns, and a relatively
greater investment
in local government
."
facilities
Is the 5 percent level limitation causing problems for
Montana counties and municipalities? Certainly it has
caused occasional problems in the past, as is illustrated
by the number of court decisions and Attorney General
opinions on the matter. On the other hand, the widespread use of revenue bonds and formation of special
districts have given local governmental units wavs to
avoid the debt limitations. For example, in 1967, $28.2
million of the $47 million in long-term municipal debt in
Montana was in nonguaranteed form and presumably not
covered by the constitutional limitation.
Special
districts, again outside the debt limitations had outstanding debt in 1967 of $26.4 million. 54

"

,

A comparison of actual county debt with the constitutional
limitation shows that as of 1967 no county was close to the
limit (see Table 33).
Similar figures for the state's larger
cities indicate the debt limit may be creating a more immediate
problem for some of them (see Table 34). Comparable calculations were not available for smaller municipalities but
clearly the 5 percent debt limitation means for some of them
that virtually no project can be financed by general obligation bonds.
For example, a town with an assessed valuation
of $500,000 would have a general bonding authorization of
only $25,000.
,
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TABLE

33

CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATION AND ACTUAL DEBT FOR
MONTANA COUNTIES, 1966-67

TABLE

33

(Continued)

Assessed
Value
Sanders

Constitutional
Debt
Limit

Actual
Debt

TABLE

34

CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATIONS AND ACTUAL DEBT FOR
LARGEST MONTANA MUNICIPALITIES, 1966-67
Asse ssed Value

City

Anaconda
Billings
Bozeman
Butte
Great Falls
Havre
Helena
Kalispell
Missoula

1.

$

18,967,123
190,312,069
36,109,442
64,417,520
170,017,778
25,534,735
64,800,830
33,961,670
82,586,498

$

Basic
Debt Limit 1

Full Faith and
Credit Debt 2

948,356.15
9,515,603.45
1,805,472.10
3,220,876.00
8,500,888.90
1,276,736.75
3,240,041.50
1,698,083.50
4,129,324.90

$

829,000
(See Note

3)

265,000
2,246,000
341,000
2,553,000
60,00C
1,935,000

The basic debt limit was figured as 5 percent of the
assessed valuation and does not take into consideration
the extra indebtedness a municipality may incur for water
By law,
and sewer purposes under Article XIII, Section 6.
this extra indebtedness is limited to an additional
(See Revised Codes
10 percent of the assessed valuation.
1947, Sec. 11-2303.)
of Montana
,

2.

3.

Full faith and credit debt figures may include general
Such
obligation bonding for sewer and water facilities.
bonding may be in addition to the 5 percent indebtedness
limitation stated in Article XIII, Section 6.

The Census of Governments data listed full faith and
That
credit debt for Bozeman at $3,209,000 for 1967.
would have placed the city over the constitutional debt
However, Bozeman City Manager Harold Fryslie
limit.
states that full faith and credit debt in Bozeman in 1967
amounted to only approximately $400,000 well within the
constitutional limitation and the remaining debt was in
(Conversation with Harold Fryslie, city
revenue bonds.
manager of Bozeman, Montana, October 12, 1971). The
difference apparently results in varying ways of defining
full faith and credit debt.

—

—

Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
1967 Census of Governments Montana Vol. 7, State Reports
No. 26 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970),
p. 50, and information from city and county officials.

—

,
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What Sh o uld the Constitution Say?

There appears to be general agreement that serious defects
plague the type of limitations on local debt included in
tne constitutions of Montana and many other states.
The
Acviscry Commission on Intergovernmental Relations found:
[T]he present maze of constitutional and statutory restrictions upon local government
borrowing constitutes a serious impediment to
effective local self-government in the United
These restrictions handicap selfStates.
reliance of local communities and governments,
and impel them toward increased financial
dependence on State and Federal Government
resources.
In many States, present provisions
have contributed to complexity and deviousness
in local debt operations
The Commission
believes that State action to remedy this
situation is necessary and urgent, and should
be designed to relate any State regulation of
local debt more realisticallv to the ability
of local governments to service such debt. 55
.

More specifically, the ACIR recommends repeal of constitutional and statutory provisions that limit local government debt bv reference to the local property tax base. 56
And noting that nearly a third of all state constitutions
entirely or substantially omit provisions regarding debt
and borrowing power of local governments, the ACIR states:
No evidence has been found that this lack of
constitutional specification has been accompanied by difficulties or abuses that might
have been avoided by more detailed provisions
in the constitutions of the States concerned .57
The ACIR further recommends that authority to issue bonds be
legally vested in local governments, subject to a permissive
referendum only on petition. Mandatory referendum requirements, it states, should be eliminated not only because of
their "widely undesirable effects on local debt practices"
but also "because thev contradict sound principles of representative local government." 5 8
In lieu of constitutional debt limitations, the ACIR

recommends that states consider regulating long-term
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borrowing statutorily by reference to "the net interest cost
of prospective bond issues in relation to the currently prevailing interest rate on high quality municipal securities."^
For example, a state law might provide that no local government may issue bonds at a net interest cost of more than 1.4
times the current yield rate of the highest grade municipal
securities; if the yield rate for such securities is 3 percent,
the best bid at the bond sale would have to be 4.2 percent or
less. 6°
The ACIR also recommends that states make technical
and advisory assistance available to local governments on
debt matters, but cautions against too much state control
and detailed supervision. 61
The National Municipal League also would remove local debt
restrictions from state constitutions. The League's Model
State Constitution does not mention local debt but provides
under the shared powers doctrine, that the state may limit
by general law the powers of local government units. 62
Thus, the legislature would be able to limit local government debt by general law. Such apparently also is the case in
a third of the fifty states that do not constitutionally
set debt limits.
The taxation and finance subcommittee of the Montana Constitution Revision Commission was critical of basing the debt limits
on assessed valuation of property, and as a minimum, recommended
that the Montana Constitution be revised to allow the.legisThe
lature to set the limit of county and municipal debt. 63
Montana Legislative Council took a somewhat different approach,
suggesting that consideration might be given to allowing the
legislature, by an act approved at two successive sessions,
to increase the constitutional debt limitation for municipalities
and school districts. 64

Although it may be true that "nearly all of the critics
agree" that local debt limits "should not be written into
state constitutions," 65 many states continue to do so.
One advocate of such constitutional debt limits is C.
Lowell Harriss, a Columbia University economist. Such
constitutional restrictions, Harriss believes can help
protect some local governments from unwise actions by
others. 66
He states:
In the absence of constitutional restrictions
which require special caution, neither economic
nor political restraint on the growth of local
government debt will be as effective as desirable
over the long run. 6 ?
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It is those "long-run" effects of local debt that worry
Harriss the most. Government borrowing and debt, he believes,
have a "time horizon" that require constitutional control:

Future taxpayers cannot be assured of adequate
representation through the normal, year-toyear, processes of local and state government
elections and decision-making. Our procedures
need to include some force for assuring that
the longer view gets attention, taking the
fullest account we can of both benefits and
costs. 68

Supporters of constitutional debt limitations can point out
that some studies show the amount of guaranteed municipal
debt per capita is lower in those states with constitutional
debt restrctions. But one observer suggests that may be
because constitutional limits encourage local governments
to use nonguaranteed forms of debt, which are not subject
to the constitutional limits. 69
But if constitutional restraints on local government debt
are necessary, on what should they be based? The Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reported in 1961:

No single legal formula now in effect appears
to provide a reasonable and equitable measure
of the "safe" debt-carrying, capacity of individual local governments.'
Even Harriss acknowledges that the constitutional details
on local debt which "will serve best
are not so
clear" and that experience "does not indicate clearly
which types of borrowing limitations will best serve the
public over the long run."' 1
The Virginia Commission on
Constitutional Revision, after a careful study of local
debt, found that "the assessed value of local real estate,
rather than some other base, such as gross or net revenues,
continues to be the most valid indicator of local wealth"
and recommended that it continue as the basis for the debt
limitation.
Several recently enacted constitutions
also continue using property value as the basis for debt
limitation; the Hawaii Constitution [Art. VI, Sec. 3] is
an example.
.

.

.

On the other hand, several new state constitutions adopt
new bases for local debt limitations. The Pennsylvania
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Constitution [Art. IX, Sec. 10] directs the legislature
to use a percentaac of the local government unit's total
revenue as a base for the limit on indebtedness. The
Pennsylvania document further provides that debt for selfliouidating projects and debt specifically approved bv
public vote shall not be included within the limitation.
The new Illinois Constitution [Art. VII, Sees. 6 and C]
denies local units the power to incur debt payable frcr
Droperty tax receipts maturing more than forty years froT
the time the debt is incurred.
The Alaska Constitution [Art. IX, Sec. 9] avoids the
question of determining a proper basis for local debt bv
stating that local units may contract only that debt t^ at
is for capital improvements and is authorized both by tie
local governing bodv and a majority vote of the local
residents

— 3 36-
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CHAPTER XVIII
PUBLIC AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

MONTANA PROVISIONS
At least three provisions in the Montana Constitution deal
with state aid to parochial schools:

—

Article III, Section 4 The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed, and no
person shall be denied any civil or political right or
privilege on account of his opinions concerning religion,
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not
be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations,
excuse acts of licentiousness, by bigamous or polygamous
marriage, or otherwise, or justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace, or safety of the state,
or opposed to the civil authority thereof, or of the
United States.
No person shall be required to attend
any place of worship or support any ministry, religious
sect, or denomination, against his consent; nor shall
any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.

—

Article V, Section 35 No appropriation shall be made
for charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent
purposes to any person, corporation or community not
under the absolute control of the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution or association.

—

Article XI, Section 8 Neither the legislative assembly,
nor any county, city, town, or school district, or
other public corporations, shall ever make directly or
indirectly, any appropriation, or pay from any public
fund or moneys whatever, or make any grant of lands or
other property in aid of any church, or for any sectarian
purpose, or to aid in the support of any school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other literary,
scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part
by any church, sect or denomination whatever.
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Before considering the effect of Montana's provisions concerning state aid to parochial schools, it is important to
understand the federal-state relationship.

-343-

^

^

^

PUBLIC AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

Doctrines established in the United States Constitution are
the supreme law of the land, superior in scope and effect to
One of those docany law created by state constitutions.
trines is the Freedom of Religion Clause in the First Amendment:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
The First Amendment freedoms are specifically protected from
But since the 1920s,
abuse by the United States Congress.
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that those freedoms
cannot be abused or denied by the states, either. Those
rights and liberties are so fundamental and personal that
they fall under the due process clause of the Fourteenth AmendReligion
ment, which is directed specifically at the states.
was included in 19 40 in the list of protected freedoms
as well as Congress,
In effect, that means that now the states
"shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
.

,

The Supreme Court has been faced with several cases involving state activities allegedly in violation of the Establishment of Religion Clause. The most controversial cases
declared that prayers^ and Bible readings 3 in public schools
were unconstitutional if supervised or supported by the state.
The Court also has had to rule on cases involving forms
It has found
of state financial aid to non-public schools.
certain kinds of state aid constitutional:
1.
Reimbursement to parents of non-public school
children for transportation.
2.

Loan of public school textbooks to non-public schools.

The Court has used several theories to uphold these forms
of state aid:
1.
The "child-benefit" theory which holds that the
state is aiding the child, not the school which he attends.
2.
A welfare theory based on contentions that the state
programs promote health, safety and education of children,
not the instruction of religion.
3.

Claims that the state aid is secular, not religious,

in nature.

A trend seemed to be starting toward public aid to private
schools.
But in the summer of 1971, the U. S. Supreme Court
established a new test and ended, in the opinion of many
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observers, the movement toward public assistance to private
schools
The Court faced its most direct example of state aid to
parochial education in the 1971 case, Lemon v. Kurtzman 6
The case involved state aid programs from Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island.
.

In Pennsylvania, the state reimbursed non-public elementary
and secondary schools for the cost of teachers' salaries,
textbooks and instructional materials in specified secular
subjects; in Rhode Island, the state paid a 15 percent
supplement on salaries to all instructors, public and nonpublic alike.
In declaring both state programs unconstitutional, the Court
If
laid down a new test, termed "excessive entanglement."
the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising
under the state statutes involves excessive entanglement
between government and religion, the statutes are unconstiClarification of those rather
tutional, the Court stated.

broad phrases must await further decisions.
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that
states can provide transportation aid to parochial school
children; they can lend textbooks to non-public schools.
But they cannot give direct money aid to parochial school
teachers or for secular textbooks and instructional materials.
State programs that fall somewhere between those
extremes are subject to debate.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS

While the decisions discussed above provide some guidelines
for state legislatures, they do not supply all the answers,
because state constitutions may establish more rigid
standards than the federal requirements.

Interpretation of the Montana Provision
Only one case has reached the Montana Supreme Court under
In
Article XI, Section 8 of the Montana Constitution.
that 1970 decision, the Montana Court struck down a plan
by School District No. 10 in Deer Lodge County to hire school
teachers to teach secular subjects in the parochial high
school of the county.
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The Court said:

Returning to Section 8 of Art. XI, it cannot be
asserted that this section is ambiguous or indefinite
and thereby open to interpretation since it clearly
states in no uncertain terms that no school district
can directly or indirectly appropriate or pay from
public funds to aid the support of any school conor in part by any church, sect or
trolled in whole
°
denomination.
The Court continued:
[T]he constitutional provisions of this state prohibit
a public school board from making a levy for, or
expending funds for the employment of teachers to
teach in a parochial school.

The attempted aid program in Deer Lodge County would appear
to fall within the doctrine established by Lemon v. Kurtzman
the U.S. Supreme Court decision that nullified Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island programs to parochial schools.
In other
words, the type of aid involved in the Deer Lodge case
apparently would be unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution, even without the provision in the Montana Constitution.
Thus the Montana Supreme Court holding, although
it applied to the state rather than the U. S. Constitution,
cannot be cited as a stricter limitation on state aid to
private schools; rather, it seems to fall in line with
federal constitutional requirements. xu

,

However, although the case concerned only compensation of
parochial school teachers, its implication was that no pubThe
lic aid is permitted under the Montana Constitution.
Court, in declaring the Deer Lodge program unconstitutional,
referred to an Attorney General's opinionll which seems to
establish more rigid requirements for Montana than are set
down in the U.S. Constitution. That opinion ruled that
transportation aid to parochial school children was permissible under the Montana Constitution, as long as the
child rode the public school bus and his parents paid a
proportionate part of such transportation. 12

That kind of transportation aid is radically different from
the kind of aid approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson
v. Board of Education
The program upheld in that case
reimbursed the parents of parochial school children for
transportation costs. The kind of aid in the Montana
opinion required reimbursement on the part of parents.
.
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The Attorney General's opinion seems to imply that, had the
former type of aid program been established by the state, it
would have been unconstitutional.
If that is a correct
interpretation of the opinion, Montana's constitutional provision is, indeed, more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution.
The Opinion states:
It is my opinion public school moneys may not be
expended to pay transportation to a student attending
a private or parochial school.
.No public school
money is to be spent for private school pupils either
directly or indirectly 3
.

.

.

Other State Constitutions
It is difficult to classify the various provisions in state
constitutions limiting aid to denominational schools. The
following classification was made in 19 70:

New York's "Blaine Amendment" is perhaps the best
known of the rigorous interdictions against assistance
to religiously affiliated schools:
"Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall
use its property or credit or any public money, or
authorize or permit either to be used, directly, or
indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution
of learning wholly or in part under the control or
direction of any religious denomination, or in which
any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught."

Other states with overtly severe prohibitions of this
type are Georgia, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
Prohibitions that seem somewhat less severe in wording are
found in the constitutions of Arizona, California,
Hawaii, and Utah.
Maryland and Vermont have no explicit ban against aid to nonpublic schools.
In verbal
terms, relatively mild restrictions are found in the
following constitutions:
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
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Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. 14

Examples of constitutional provisions may illustrate the
basis for that classification:

Overtly Severe Provisions

—

Nebraska [Art. VII, Sec. 11] No sectarian instruction
shall be allowed in any school or institution supported
in whole or in part by the public funds set apart for
educational purposes, nor shall the state accept any
grant, conveyance, or bequest of money, lands or other
property to be used for sectarian purposes. Neither
the State Legislature nor any county, city or other
public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation
from any public fund, or grant any public land in aid
of any sectarian or denominational school or college,
or any educational institution which is not exclusively
owned and controlled by the state or a governmental
subdivision thereof. No religious test or qualification shall be required of teacher or student, for
admission to or continuance in any public school or
educational institution supported in whole or in part
by public taxation.

—

South Dakota [Art. VI, Sec. 3] No money or property
of the state shall be given or appropriated for the
benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institution.

—

South Dakota [Art. VIII, Sec. 16]
No appropriation
of lands, money or other property or credits to aid any
sectarian school shall ever be made by the state, or
any county or municipality within the state, nor shall
the state accept any grant, conveyance, gift or bequest
of lands, money or other property to be used for
sectarian purposes, and no sectarian instruction shall
be allowed in any school or institution aided or
supported by the state.
Less Severe Provisions

—

Hawaii [Art. IX, Sec. 1] The State shall provide for
the establishment, support and control of a statewide
system of public schools free from sectarian control,
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state university, public libraries and such other
educational institutions as may be deemed desireable,
including physical facilities therefor.
There shall be
no segregation in public educational institutions
because of race, religion or ancestry; nor shall public
funds be appropriated for the support or benefit of any
sectarian or private educational institution.
a

—

Utah [Art. X, Sec. 13]
Neither the Legislature nor
any county, city, town, school district or other public
corporation, shall make any appropriation to aid in
the support of any school, seminary, academy, college,
university or other institution, controlled in whole,
or in part, by any church, sect or denomination whatever.

Mild Provisions

—

Oregon [Art. 1, Sec. 5] No money to be appropriated
for religion.
No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury for the benefit of any religeous [sic] or
theological institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for the payment of any religeous [sic] services
in either house of the Legislative Assembly.
,

—

Wyoming [Art. 1, Sec. 19] Appropriations for sectarian
or religious societies or institutions prohibited.
No money of the state shall ever be given or appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or institution.

—

Wyoming [Art. VII, Sec. 8]
[N]or shall any portion
of any public school fund ever be used to support or
assist any private school, or any school, academy,
seminary, college or other institution of learning controlled by any church or sectarian organization or
religious denomination whatsoever.
Montana
It is difficult to fit Montana into one of the categories.
Virtually every state has different wording in its constitution, and the precise effect of those provisions is not
known until the courts have interpreted them.
Two states
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may have very similar provisions but in one state, the
courts may give the provision a liberal interpretation;
in the other, the court may give a strict interpretation.

Montana's present provision has not been challenged in the
But it is probably safe to say
courts with any regularity.
that the provision is more restrictive than the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court.

STATISTICS
The following indicates the scope of parochial education
Enrollment in parochial elementary and secondin Montana.
ary schools for 1969-70 was 11,645 students 15 or 6.3 percent
of the total student enrollment of 186, 177. 16 Enrollment in
the three denominational colleges in Montana in the fall of
1970 was 2,775, 17 or about 10 percent of the total college
population of 26, 887. 18

POLICY ARGUMENTS
The following arguments have been used for and against state
aid to parochial schools:
Pros
1.
Twenty-seven states already have some kind of aid
program for parochial schools, providing services like free
busing, textbooks, hot lunches and health care. 1 ^

Parents with children in private schools have to pay
2.
tuition to private schools and taxes to support public
schools, a double burden.
3.

Private schools absorb students who otherwise would
thereby decreasing the

be forced to attend public schools,
costs of public education.

4.
Parents should enjoy freedom of choice in education
of their children; such freedom of choice should not become
a burden because of the non-action of the state.
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Cons
It is impossible to separate the secular from the
1.
sectarian in parochial education; advancement of a particular
religious philosophy and tenet is the fundamental purpose
of parochial education.

State aid to parochial schools could "polarize" the
2.
nation, threatening the integrity and quality of the public
school system.
State aid could mean excessive state controls over
3.
private and parochial schools.
4.
The public school system is still the backbone of
the education system in the United States, and should be
the primary concern of the state.

CONCLUSION
The Convention has at least three alternatives:
1.
Inclusion of a provision that prevents all state aid
to denominational schools.

Insertion of a provision that would permit aid as
2.
authorized under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, an area that is still open to interpretation.
Silence on the subject, which would accomplish the
3.
same thing as alternative 2.
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CHAPTER XIX
THE STATE BUDGET AND REPORTS

THE BUDGET

The following description of the budget, taken from the
Hawaii Constitutional Convention studies, explains the purposes and functions of that basic state document:
The Role of the Budget
Theoretically, every
budget system serves three basic purposes:
control,
management and planning.
.

Control
A budget acts as a control by placing
limits on the amount of money to be spent and by
specifying what it may be spent for. Accounting
systems are established which record actual expenditures and alert the responsible officials when
limits are about to be reached.
1.

.

2.
Management
A budget facilitates management
by grouping expenditures by functions and organizational units and by describing the things which
are to be done.
Managers of government programs
thus know the resources which are available for the
pertinent fiscal period and the amount of work
which they are expected to accomplish. Scheduling
and management of the year's activities are made easier,
.

3.
Planning
The budget serves a planning purpose,
because it necessitates thinking in terms of what
should be achieved in the future.
It does this by
requiring estimates to be made of money requirements for future time periods, and program managers
are compelled to think of what the needs of the
community will probably be and what ought to be
done by government to meet those needs.
.

The purposes of the budget are also related to the
needs of different groups of individuals.
Upon its
adoption, executive branch personnel are guided by
its provisions in the implementation of government
programs.
Legislators utilize the budget to become
informed about government programs and to make
basic policy decisions associated with the distribution of funds to the various programs. Also relying
on the budget are the general public and the organized interest groups who use it for current information
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as to what their elected officials have done and plan
to do with public resources.

The question as to what a budget should contain and
how it is to be presented relates to the degree
of emphasis which may be assigned to its three basic
If the intent is to emphasize the budget
purposes.
as a control device, then the data will be in the form
of detailed tabulations of the hundreds of items required to operate the units of government.
This is
commonly known as a line-item budget, or an objectoriented budget. The executive branch proposes and
the legislature approves or disapproves each specific
item.
Performance is measured by the degree to which
expenditures comply exactly with the objects approved.
If the budget is to serve as a management-oriented
device, the data will be presented in the terms of
the activities or functions being performed.
The
items for which the money is to be spent are categorized and grouped according to the work being done.
The legislature gives its approval to the work which
it wants done, rather than to the objects which will
be purchased, and performance is measured in terms
of how much work was in fact accomplished.
Finally,
if the budget is intended to emphasize planning, such
a budget requires the identification of goals and
objectives to be achieved, descriptions of the
possible alternative ways by which these end products
can be accomplished and the anticipated relationship
between the cost and the benefit expected. Performance is measured in relation to whether the goals
were in fact achieved.

Montana's budget appears to emphasize the management function.
Data are presented in terms of the activities and
functions being performed.

Executive Budget
The Montana Constitution does not specifically name the
governor as the chief budget officer of the state.
However,
it does suggest that preparation of a budget is one of his
responsibilities. Article VII, Section 10 provides:
He [the governor] shall also at the beginning
of each session present estimates of the amount
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of money required to be raised by taxation for

all purposes of the state.
The legislature, by statute entitled the Budget Act,
established the governor as the chief budget officer of the
state.
Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Section 79-1012
provides
,

The governor shall be the chief budget officer of
tne state and shall appoint a director of the budget,
who shall hold office at the pleasure of the
governor, and whose duty it shall be to carry out
the provisions of this chapter.

Other States

Preparation of the budget is assigned to the governor in
an overwhelming majority of states.
Table 35 shows budget
responsibility in the fifty states.
Responsibility for budget preparation usually is established
Less than fifteen states assign executive
budget responsibility in their constitutions. The trend in
the newer state constitutions, however, is to include a
section on the budget, outlining budget preparation and
procedures.
Examples include Hawaii [Art. VI, Sec. 4]
Alaska [Art. IX, Sec. 12]; Illinois [Art. VIII, Sec. 21;
Michigan [Art. V, Sec. 8], and Georgia [Art. VII, Sec. IX la}
by statute.

Those provisions are similar to the budget language proposed in the Model State Constitution
:

The governor shall submit to the legislature, at a
time fixed by law, a budget estimate for the next
fiscal year setting forth all proposed expenditures
and anticipated income of all departments and
agencies of the state, as well as a general appropriation bill to authorize the proposed expenditures
and a bill or bills covering recommendations in the
budget for new or additional revenue.

That provision suggests the three essential elements of a
budget:
(1) the budget message, with summaries of the
state's financial condition and proposed fiscal policy;
(2)
a balanced statement of proposed expenditures and estimated
income, and (3) drafts of appropriation and revenue bills
necessary to put the budget into operation.
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TABLE 35
STATE BUDGETARY PRACTICES

Dair cslimalts
Slolt o,-

Dudgt/-rual.-i"t

olhtr juri.sJfrlion

outhonty

0//iciol

nr agency

prrparing budtcl

Dalt sub,.,ittrd

miol bt submilltd
by dtpt. or ogtncus

to l,tgislature

ALABA!\IA .. ....... .

Governor

Did•ion of the lludget in Dept. or Fin.1n1..·t"

Feb. I pre<eding each

By the 5th da>· r~i:u•

regular se-s~ion

Jar bu~iness session

ALASKA ...•.••.••••

Governor

1)1\•; ... inn

~ov. 1 in even years

3rd legislative day

of

Hudi::tt

and ~lana~ement.
Df't,t. of .\<lminjstra-

or

Pou:cr of Ugislalu,e
lo cho11tt bud,c1•

P01ur or
t1tlc,

F1unf-ytar

bt.:,ns

Frn;utncy
of buJ,ct

Oct. I

Biennial

Yes

July I

Annual

t:nliinited
Unlimited

0

s/tm

by G~rrnor

session

t1on

ARIZO:-.: A ..•.••..•.•

Governor

Det,l. ol Finance

Sept. I each yea r

By the 5th day of

Unlimited

Yes

July I

l..,cislative Council

Budi;:et and .\ccountin,: Di\·ision in State
A<l1nini .. tration Dept.
Rucl~<·t Division. un.
dt:r Uir~ctor oi Fi•
nance

Sept. l in even years

regular ses~ion
Date or conve ning
session

Annual

ARKA!'-SAS ........ .

Unlimited

Yes

July 1

Biennial

1\'"ov. 17

Within first JO days

Unlimited

Yes

July I

Annual

Aug. 25

10th day of session

Unlimited

Yes

July I

Annual

ht ~cic:'-ion day afte r
F eb. H
lly 5thdayof,ession

Unlimited

Yes

July I

Bicnnial(a)

t:nlimited

Yes

July I

Annu:.1

Feb. IS each year

t•nlimited

\'es

July I

Annu,1

By 5th day ol ses•

Unlimited

Yes

July I

Bi,onial

CALIFOR:-.:IA .••••..

Governor

COLORADO .•.•.•...

Governor

State Budget Director . Offire of Plannini:
ani:i BuJget Sen·ices,
Dept. of Administn.ltion

I

w

co:-.::-ECTICUT .••••

Governor

Director oi Budget

Sept, I

ex:,

DELAWARE ........ .

Governor

Sept. IS ;
Oct. IS

u,

I

schools,

FLORIDA .......... .

Governor

Office oi Budget Director
Secretar}·, Dept. of

GEORGIA .......... .

Governor

Admini .. tration
Bu<lcet Bureau

HAWAII ............ .

Governor

Budi;et Division,
Dept. of Budget and
Finance:

Oct. I

3rd Wed. in Jan., 20
da}·~ in advance to

Unlimited

Yes

July I

Annual (b)

ID.\11O ............ ..

Governor

Administrator. Diviaion ol the Budget

Aug. IS before Jan.
session

J\'ot later than 5th
dar of sos.ion. Bud-

t.:nlimited

Yes

July 1

Biennial

t:nlimited
Unlimited

v••

July I
Jul y I

Annual
Bic-nnial

July I
July I

Annu ... J

ILLl:-O1S .......... .
l!'iDIANA ... ...... ..

Nov. 1 each year

Sept. I

~ion nr isooncr

Governor
Governor

Budae t Bureau
lludgc t Agency(c)

members or Lc~isla•
ture

Jan. IS
Sept. 1 in even years.
flexible 1,olicy

get rccomn1cn<lations an<l es t im:1.tcs
1naclepulJlicoo!'-ov.
20 preceding rf"gu lar
Jan.~c:,sionor Ll'gislaturc
,\pnl t in ad<l years

Within the 1st two

weeks after the s~ssif)II COll\ e11es (ti)
Feh. I or hcfore
t:nli mi ted
\\'itfiin .~ wcc-k!'l;aftt-r Unlimited
COll\'t"nin"' o( ~(":,,~ion
in orJ<l ) cau :111d
witliin 2 cla)'!'I ;i. ill'T
con\ ,·:1in.: ,,i ~l' .. ..,ion

No

0

IOWA .............. .
KA:-S.\S ........... .

Governor
Governor

Comptroller
Bu<lriet Division of

Sept, I
&1,t. IS before even-

De:Jt, oi
Adr.11nistration

yPar ses~1on-.; Oct. l

helnre o<ld-yea r sess ions

IU \'\'l"ll )t•.,r'4

No
Yes

Dic:'\nial

TABLE 35 (continued)

KE:S:TCCK Y..... . . . .

Governor

LOCISI.-\SA .........

Governor

MAl:-;E ............ ,.

Governor

Division of Budge:t.

During 1st two we:e:ks

As Governor d,~ires

Cnlimitec!

y.,

July I

Il 1ennlal(a)

Dept. of Finance
Bud~et Section of

of 1'ov.
Jan . I 5 b,(ore
nual ~ssion.

Not later than ~e-v ~

1..,"nli:r.lted

Ye,

July I

Annual

l,;nlimited

No

July I

Dic:mial

Ye,, sup-

July I

Annual

July I

Annual

Da·ision or Administn1tion

Bureau of the Dudget, De1:t. of Finance

Sept. in cve:n years

Sccretar~·. Dept. of
Du,lgel and Fiscal
Plancing

Sept. 1

enth day o( each
res:ulc1r se!l-"inn. ~ew
Gov,-rnor-eJect. five
day grace 1,criod
Eud of 2nd week of
.te!- ~iun or Le( ore

nnd Adminic;tration
:l,1AR \'LA:-;D . . • . . . ..

MASSACIIL"SETIS ..

Governor

Governor

:O,.IICHICA:-; .........

Governor

Ml:-.-:SESOTA ..... .. .

Governor

MISSISSIPPI........
:O,.IISSOt;Rf ..........

Commission of Budget and Acoounting(e)
Governor

w

:l,IO:-:TA!',;A .. ,., ... ,,

Governor

IJl
I.O

:-:EB RASKA .........

Governor

I

I

l-"E\'ADA... .. .......

Governor

;-.;EW HA:l,IPSHIRE. .
:-;EW JERSEY . . .....

Governor
Governor

Budget Director
Bu dget Division of
Executive Office
Budget Div ision,
Dept. of Administration
Commission or Budget and Accountin&

annually

Sept. IS
Set by administrative action
Oct. I preceding convenini of Legislature
A use. 1 prcccdin,: convcn!ng of Ltgislaturc

Sept, l

Oct. 1 in even years

Oct. I

countin~.or Dept, of
the Trcarnry

JSEW :l,IEXICO......

Governor

B u<lgct-Fi na ncial
Control Division,
Dept. or Finance and
Administration

JSEW '\'ORK ... ,, ... ,

Governor

Division of Budget

Limited: Legislature
may decrease but
not increa~ excevt

for

Division of Budget Oct. l
and Comptroller
Budget Di,·ision, Aug. I of year before
Dept. or Administra- each session
tion
Bud~et Officer of Not l:itcr than Sept,
Dept. ol .\,l mini !.tra- 1S in c,·,n years
tive Services

Budget Director,
Bu<lgt'.l D1vi1; ion.
Dept. o! Admin is tration
Comptroller
Dirc,:tor 0£ Divis ion
of Hud~et and Ac-

3rd \\"ed. of Jan.,

Sept. 1

O\\"U

operating

plcmentary
appropriation bills

bu,Jget
L"nlimited

Yes

General Court
10th day or session

l,;nlimited

Yu

July I

Annual

Within 3 weeks after

Cnlimited

Yes

July 1

Biennial(a)

Within 3 weeks after
convening of the

inauguration
Governor
Dec. IS

or

Unlimited

Yes

July I

Annual

By the 30th day

Unlimited

Ye,

July l

Biennial(()

1st day of session

1...'nlimited

y.,

July I

Biennial

30th day of regular

Limited: Two-third•

Ye,

July I

Biennial

~ession

vote !'e rjui r~d to inc:-c:i ~e (;o ver11or's
r~cC\m:-ttc ndat ion1t;
~ . ...i j,Jri: >"
..-ote rer:1 :1r1~.-f to rcJcct or
dec rC",t--r ~uch items
t.." 11:1 1;-!i te d

No

July I

Biennial (a)

L"nlimited
Cnlimited

No

Ye,

July I
July I

Annual

l,;nlimited

Ye,

July I

Annual

Lim ited : May ,trike

Ye,

Aprill

Annual

10th cay or ses,ion
or before
Feb. IS in odd rears
Th ird Tucsday~rter

B ie nn ial

opening of session

On or before 25th
day o{ regular s,5.
sion

Sept. 5

Sccnnrl Tuesday rot• lowini: the first day
of the annual se s•
!tion. ex,·e1.1t on or
before Feb. I in
years follow;nt;: gu.
bernatori.Jl election

out items. redu ce
items or a,ld sep:i-

r.it, iten1s of expenditure

TABLE 35 (continued)

Slalt or

Budftl-makini

Official or agtncy

olh<T juruJfrtion

aurho,ity

prtporin& budgtl

NORTH CAROLl:-.A.

Governor

1'ORTH DAKOTA .. ,

Governor

OHIO . • . • . • • . • • . • . • .

Governor

Budget Division.
Dept. of Admini~tra•
tion
Director of Accounts
and Purchases by
virtue of his office is
Budge t Dire<ctor
Executi,·e Affairs Di•
vi!tion. Dept. of Fl•

Datt tslimatu
must bt submitltd
by dtpl. or ottntits

Sept. 1
session

preceding

Datt submitted
la Ltgislaturt

Powtr of Ltzisloturt
to cl1an,e budftt•

fltlo by C1J11trnor

Pcr.1·cr of ittm

Fiscal ytar
bttins

Frt'lutncy
of budtd

1st week of session

Unlimited

Jllo

July 1

BiennW

July 15 in even years;
may extend 45 days

December l, prior
to biennial session

Unlimited

y...,

July 1

Bitonial

Nov. 1

3rd week in J3n. in
od<l yc:ars

Unlimited

Yes

July 1

Biennial

Immediately

t:nlimited

Yes

July 1

Annual

Yes

July 1
inodJ

Bieonial

nance-

OKL.\HO'.\-IA . •..•. .••

Governor

Director of State Fi-

September 1

after

conve11ing of r<'J.:U•

OREGOX .........•.•

Governor

Bu dget Section. Fisca l ~1anageme.nt Di•

PE:-."'SYLVANIA .•.•
I

w

°'
0
I

Governor

RHODE ISLAND .•• •

Governor

SOUTH CAROLINA .

Sta te Budget and
Control Board(i)

SOUTH DAKOTA ... .
TENXESSEE ......... .

Governor
Govcrnor

TEXAS......... ... ..

Governor. Legislative Budget Board

UT.\H...............

Governor

VER:11O:-.'T .... . , . . . .
VIRGl:--IA ..........

Governor
Governor

WASlll:',;GTO:,(., .. ...

Governor

vision, Executive
D ept.
Budget Secretary

Division of Budget,
D epartment of Administr;ition
Finance Division of
St~te Budget and
Control Boa rd
State Budget Officer
Commissioner of Finance and Administration
Budget Director, and
Legi s lative Budget
Board
Division of Budget,
Dept. of Finance

Sept. 1 in even year
preceding legislative
year
:Kov. 1. each year

lar l1•~h,l..i.t1, I.!' '<'(.•don;
:ln inco:111ng Guvt.-r•
nl,r, foUo,,ing inau•
gur-il
Dec . 1 in even yea r Unlimited
JJreced ing leGislative
year

As soon as possible
after organization of
General Assembly
Hth day of session

Sept. 15 or discretion
of Board

2nd Tues. in Jan.

Oct. 1 S
Dec. I

5 daysbeforesession Unlimited
Jan. 14 orbeforeun- Unlimited
le sschangei n Gover•
nor; then Mar. 1 or
before
5th day of session or Unlimited
before

Aug. 31

Unlimited

years

Yes

July 1

Annual

Unlimited

:-.o

July I

Annual

Unlimited

Yes . in appro,._pr.;.tioru b;ll

July 1

Annual

Yes
Yea

July 1
July I

Annual
Annual

D a te set by Budget
Director and Leaisla•
tive Board
Sept. IS
After convening of Unlimited
Legislature. 3 days
regular se~sion; l
day budcct session
Budget Director
Sept. 1
3rd Tues.
Unlimited
Director. Division of Au11. IS in odd years Within S dai·s after Unlimited
the Budget. Office of
conv. of re~ular sesAdminbtration
sion on 2nd \\'ed. in

Ye•

Sept . 1

Biennial

Yu

July 1

Annual

No
Yes

July 1
July 1

Annual(h)
B1onnw

Yr~

J.I;· I

u,~nn j:J

Jan. ln C'\'t:n Y4:dTS

Budi::;et Director

Date set by Governor 5th rl...t.Y after conv.
of ~e,;1. nr bd ore

Uuli mited

TABLE 35 (continued)

WEST VIRGl:\"IA . ..

Govcroor

Division of Budc:ct.
D ept. or Finance and
Ad ministration

WISCO:-iSIN. • . • • . • •

Governor

WYOMING ... .......

Governor

Bureau or Budget
andfManagcment.
Dept. of Administration
Assistant Budi:et
Officer

Aug. IS In year pre- 10 days after con- Limited: May not
ceding: annual session v~ning of session or increase ite ms or
·before
budget bill except
appropriations for
Legislature and judiciary
Date •ct by Director. Feb. I In odd years Unlimited
Bureau of Budget or before
and Manag~m~nt
Oct. I preceding scssion in Jan.
·

•Limi tations list~ In thla column relate to lca:hlatlve power to increase or d ec rea !!lc budget
item• a:ienerally. SDecific limitatione, 1uch ae con9litutionally earmark~ fundA or requirement
to en a ct revenue mcaeures to cover new e,i:penditure ltem!!I, are not includffi.
(aJ The followin1 State, have report~ annual budR:el~ are adoptttl biennially: Conncctkut,
Kentucky, M1nnc 90ta, Nevada. Thie practice may be followffi in other Stat,.!!i, but was not
■ i>ec1fically rtoortcd.
(b) Annual through Fl&eal 1971. Biennial In odd yean beeinnln~ July l, 1971. locr~•t• or
dccreat11ce may be made in tven year aeseione.
(c) Rud,;:tt Committte aervee in advi90ry capa.clty.
(d) Finl Thurlday after ht Monday in Jan. in odd yea.re.

Within 5 days after
beginnio& of session

t

Unlimited

Yes

July t

A nnual

Yes

July t

Biennial

Yet

July I In Biennial
odd years

(e) Co m po.!!iition of Comm iHl on : Govtrnor a e ex officio chai rma n, L t . Govtmo r , Ch airman

n':-8t~ ~t:t"asn~:~~m~i:t;:,mp~~!l3:iif ~~~T:~ ~ru~n~ftrc~~i~ ~ ann ~°n~~i~~ r;tri! ~~~
Committee, ont mtmbtr of Senate appointffi by Lt. Gove rno r, Speak , r of H o u 5e, two H o use
membtrs appointed by the Speaker.
(f} Statutee require a bitnnial budge t but do not pro hibit annual bude-et!!I. Annual b ud ee t.a
bave been submittffi £or last S ytan .
(g) Composition of Board: Governor a, Chairman. Treaeurer. ComDt roller ~ ntral, Chair•
mao Senatt Financt Committee, Chairman House Wayt and Means C ommittee:.
(h) Effective Fiocal 1971.
0

0

8

I

w
CTI

I-'

I

Source: Council of State Governments, The Book of the States (Lexington, Ky.,
1970), pp. 156-159.
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Detail on budget torn and content is left to statute in
most states, but newer state constitutions follow the example
of the Model State Constitution by incorporating some
It has been noted:
information in their basic documents.

The essential features of a budget document are
reasonably well established by modern practice so
that detailed constitutional specification may be
considered unnecessary. 5

Conclusion
The governor ordinarily is responsible for budget preparation.
Newer state constitutions include "executive budget" provisions emphasizing the governor's role in budget preparaMost states, including Montana, establish budget
tions.
Such enactments are more flexible
procedures by statute.
and evidently just as viable as constitutional provisions.

Annual v. Biennial Budgets
The Montana Constitution only hints at the kind of budget
Article VII, Section 10 provides:
to be used by the state.
[the governor] shall also at the beginning of
each session present estimates of the amount of
money required to be raised by taxation for all
purposes of the state.

He

That section implies that the budget should be biennial,
since the legislature meets only every other year.

That law
The Budget Act** provides for a biennial budget.
defines the provisions and responsibility for a state
budget in terms much more specific than the oblique constiSection 79-1015 of the Act states:
tutional language.
The governor shall.
.have prepared a budget for
the ensuing biennium and shall submit said budget
to each member of the legislative assembly at the
time of the convening of the legislative assembly.
.

The word "biennium" is used throughout the Act, giving the
impression that the budget is biennial in scope. Other
provisions in the Act confuse that impression, however.
Budget form snecif ications using both "biennial" and "fiscal
year" language, nrovide that the budget set forth:
,
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The revenues from all sources including appro1.
priations for each fiscal year of the last completed
biennium, for the completed fiscal year of the
current biennium, and appropriations and estimated
revenue from other sources for the current fiscal year
Revenue shall be classified by organizain progress.
tion units, sources, accounts and funds.
2.
Expenditures during each fiscal year of the last
completed biennium, expenditures for the completed
fiscal year of the current biennium and estimated expenditures for the current fiscal year in progress.
These expenditures shall be classified by organization units, objects, accounts and funds.

The amount approved by the governor as necessary
3.
for the carrying out of the work of each department,
office or institution itemized as to the purpose for
each fiscal year of the ensuing biennium."

Table 36 illustrates the organization of the budget. Although the Montana budget is biennial in scope, it is broken
down into annual appropriations.
In other words, it must
cover two years of state operations because the legislature
only meets once every two years.
But the suggested programs
and appropriations for each biennium are divided into two
fiscal years.

—

Ordinarily, annual budgets are used in states with annual
legislative sessions and biennial budgets in states with
biennial sessions.
The relationship between how often the legislature
meets and the period covered by the budget is almost
With only two exceptions, it can be
a perfect one.
said of the 50 states that annual and biennial
legislative sessions mean, respectively, annual and
biennial budgets. 1"

More current information reveals that seventeen states use
biennial sessions;
thirty- three states meet annually.
Five of those "annual session" states spend every other
session considering budget matters only, however. 12 Hawaii
adopted an amendment in 19 6 8 [Art. VI, Sec. 4] to replace
its annual budgeting with biennial budgets.
These statistics are cited to indicate trends only. The
question of annual v. biennial budgets is primarily a
policy decision made after the form of legislative sessions
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THE STATE BUDGET AND REPORTS
A complete discussion of legislative sessions
is decided.
is contained in the study on the legislature in this series
of reports for the Montana Constitutional Convention.

Although the decision to budget annually or biennially
probably will be determined by the type of legislative
sessions adopted, the following arguments are presented as
additional considerations.
Arguments for Annual Budgets
1.

Need for more frequent budgets and sessions.

The problems facing today's state government are not
only increasing and becoming more complex, but are
The
also requiring rapid action by the legislature.
Council of State Governments observed that "The
important consideration is that the legislature be
enabled to meet as often and as long as, in the
judgment of its leaders, its responsibilities require.
.
.

.

"The need for legislation does not arise once in two
years, or from January to March of each year. ..."
2.

Greater flexibility and accuracy.

Just as legislators can adjust to changes quickly by
holding frequent sessions, they can also make changes
under annual budgeting as conditions warrant rather
than waiting.
The budget is more accurate because the period
which must be estimated is shorter. A biennial
system would compound the problem of making accurate
budget projections because of the unknown factors
which can only be estimated.
.

.

.

The difficulty in properly allocating budget funds
over a two-year period would also be a problem.
The result would probably be either an under or over
allocation of funds.
3.

Greater control over expenditures.

The legislators' desire to review expenditures
annually so that they can adjust to changing conditions
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In
is a major reason given for annual budgeting.
this way, they can check on the State's fiscal heartbeat and assure a positive control over expenditures

....

Because biennial budgeting may more often
deficiency appropriations, it weakens the
appropriations act and makes it difficult
(from the budget document alone) how much
money was spent.
4.

require
original
to see

and where

More economical in the long run.

Since the legislators have a more current approach
to all problems, annual sessions make better legislation possible and this, too, saves money in the
Better budgets and better legislation
long run.
reduce waste, and more frequent meetings and reviews
bring this about.
5.

The trend is toward annual budgeting.

Although most of the states have biennial budgets
and sessions, the trend is in the direction of
In recent years,
annual or even continuous sessions.
the number of states switching to annual budgeting
In 1941, only four
[has] been rapidly increasing.
Today, [19 68] there are
states budgeted annually.
21 with possibly more before the end of this year.
Arguments for Biennial Budgets
1.

Too much time spent on budget.

Generally speaking, the process of budgeting consists
of three parts: preparation, adoption, and execution.
Under the annual system, a disproportionate
The
amount of time is devoted to preparation.
regular departmental work routine is disrupted.
.

.

A budget prepared for a two-year period would give
department personnel and legislators more time to do
their own work; budget making should not be so time
consuming and continuous.
2.
Biennial budgets are accurate and can meet
change.
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Budgets prepared annually are not necessarily more
accurate and flexible than those prepared biennially.
A good biennial system allows adjustments to be
made without delay.
.

.

.

Since only the immediate year is examined, the annual
system might be more inflexible and restrictive than
Thus, in the long run biennial
the biennial.
budgets may be preferable to those prepared annually.
.

.

.

No loss of control.

3.

".
.the checks and balances now existing in the
Executive Branch of the government are sufficient to
control the amount and rate of expenditures to make
Furthermore, the State
a biennial system workable.
Legislature would continue to be able to keep abreast
of the State's finances, program appropriations,
and expenditures through annual and more frequent
reports, both written and oral, submitted by departments
.

.

.besides making reports
[The legislative auditor]
and investigations as directed by the Legislature,
."post-audits of all transactions
also conducts.
and of all accounts kept by or for all departments,
offices and agencies of the State and its political
subdivisions, to certify to the accuracy of all
financial statements issued by the respective accounting officers and to report his findings and recommendations to the Governor and to the legislature at such
times as shall be prescribed by law." The duties
of the Legislative Auditor, providing an excellent
check on the accuracy of revenues and expenditures
would not be changed under biennial budgeting.
.

.

.

4.

Biennial sessions and budgets more economical.

First, the meetings would cost less as fewer meetings
mean less pay and per diem for legislators and their
staffs.
In addition, neither the permanent staff now
assigned to the legislators nor the budgeting department need be as large.
.
.

.

Second, by not having to deliberate and defeat unsound
measures every year, the legislators can spend more
The present stress
time on careful fiscal planning.
of annual preparation and reporting makes developing
a thoughtful budget difficult.
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5.

Biennial system more prevalent among the states.

Although the present trend [1968] is towards annual
sessions and budgets, 29 states still hold biennial
legislative sessions and budget every two years. This
isn't accidental, since most of their legislatures have
either experimented with or have carefully analyzed
the annual method and believe that the biennial system
is best for them."
Other States
The type of budget for Montana is established by statute.
Historically, state budgets were not provided for in state
constitutions. Originally only alluded to under provisions
similar to Montana's Article VII, Section 10, budgets have
only recently received specific treatment in new constitutions.
Typical of those provisions are:

—

Alaska [Art. IX, Sec. 12] The governor shall submit to
the legislature, at a time fixed by law, a budget for
the next fiscal year
.

.

.

.

—

Within such time prior to
Hawaii [Art. VI, Sec. 4]
the opening of each regular session in an odd-numbered
year as may be prescribed by law, the governor shall
submit to the legislature a budget.
.

.

.

—

The Governor shall prepare
Illinois [Art. VIII, Sec. 2]
and submit to the General Assembly, at a time prescribed by law, a State budget for the ensuing fiscal
Y ear
-

—

Michigan [Art. VI, Sec. 18] The governor shall submit
to the legislature at a time fixed by law, a budget
for the ensuing fiscal period
.

.

.

.

All those provisions specify the kind of budget to be used
in each state.

Conclusion
The budgeting system in Montana is established by statute.
Newer state constitutions have included a section on budgets,
specifically denoting the type of budget to be used. The
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problem with such constitutional provisions is that they
can be changed only by amendment, a more difficult task than
Hawaii faced that problem
changing statutory enactments.
in 1968, when it decided to amend its constitution to provide for biennial, rather than annual, budgets.
"Balanced Budget" Provision

Article XII, Section 12 of the Montana Constitution provides:
No appropriation shall be made nor any expenditures
authorized by the legislative assembly whereby the expenditures of the state during any fiscal year shall
exceed the total tax then provided for by law, and
applicable to such appropriation or expenditure, unless
the legislative assembly making such appropriation
shall provide for levying a sufficient tax, not exceeding the rate allowed in section nine (9) of this
article, [referring to the state property tax] to pay
such appropriations or expenditures within such fiscal
year.
This provision shall not apply to appropriations
or expenditures to suppress insurrection, defend the
state, or assist in defending the United States in time
of war.
No appropriation of public moneys shall be
made for a longer term than two years.

That provision requires the legislature to balance estimated
revenue with actual appropriations.
However, it does not
require the state to operate on a balanced budget because
there is no guarantee that estimated revenue actually will
In
equal appropriations authorized by the legislature.
fact, state agencies are not required to reduce spending
from authorized appropriations when actual revenues are less
than anticipated by the legislature. A step toward such a
requirement was turned down in 19 71 when the legislature
decided not to implement a recommendation from the State
Budget Office. The office had suggested that the governor
be authorized to reduce any legislative appropriation by
up to 15 percent, except appropriations for payment of
interest and retirement of the state debt, operation of the
legislature, public schools, the judiciary and salaries
of public officers.

"

At least six other states constitutionally limit legislative
appropriations to revenue for each fiscal year; 15 two
states direct the legislature to levy taxes to cover all
expenses *•*
.
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Gubernatorial Veto
The gubernatorial veto of appropriation measures and items
is provided for in Article VII, Sections 12 and 13 of the
Section 12 provides:
Montana Constitution.

Every bill passed by the legislative assembly shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor.
If he approve, he shall sign it, and thereupon it
shall become a law; but if he do not approve, he shall
return it with his objections to the house in which
it originated, which house shall enter the objections
at large upon its journal and proceed to reconsider
If then two-thirds of the members present
the bill.
agree to pass the same, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other house, by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two- thirds of the members present in that house, it
shall become a law notwithstanding the objections of
In all such cases the vote of each
the governor.
house shall be determined by yeas and nays, to be
If any bill shall not be
entered on the journal.
returned by the governor within five days (Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the
same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed
it, unless the legislative assembly shall by their
adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall
not become a law without the approval of the governor.
No bill shall become a law after the final adjournment
of the legislative assembly, unless approved by the
governor within fifteen days after such adjournment.
In case the governor shall fail to approve of any bill
after the final adjournment of the legislative assembly
it shall be filed, with his objections, in the office
of the secretary of state.

Section 13 provides:
The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item
or items of any bill making appropriations of money,
embracing distinct items, and the part or parts
approved shall become a law, and the item or items
disapproved shall be void, unless enacted in the manner
following:
If the legislative assembly be in session
he shall within five days transmit to the house in
which the bill originated, a copy of the item or items
thereof disapproved, together with his objections
thereto, and the items objected to shall be separately
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reconsidered, and each item shall then take the same
course as is prescribed for the passage of bills over
the executive veto.
The Montana Supreme Court has held that the item veto created
in Section 13 does not include the power to reduce appropriations. ^' The use of the item veto is further limited
by Montana's current budget practice of making lump sum
appropriations to agencies, instead of item appropriations.

The executive item veto has become an integral part of the
powers of the governor in most states. According to the
Model State Constitution forty-one states provide the item
veto on appropriation bills, even though the extent of its
use varies tremendously *-° Many new state constitutions
include such a power, notably: Alaska [Art. II, Sec. 15];
Connecticut [Art. 4, Sec. 16]; Hawaii [Art. Ill, Sec. 17];
Illinois [Art. IV, Sec. 11(d)];
Michigan [Art. V, Sec. 19],
and Virginia [Art. IV, Sec. 6]
,

.

The Model State Constitution provides for an item veto,
with power to strike or reduce items in appropriation bills.
The section reads as follows:

The governor may strike out or reduce items in
appropriation bills passed by the legislature and
the procedure in such cases shall be the same as
in case of the disapproval of an entire bill by
the governor. 19

A more complete discussion on executive item vetoes is contained in the study on the executive in this series of
reports for the Montana Constitutional Convention.

Appropriation and Expenditure Powers
The Montana Constitution contains numerous provisions that
regulate or limit the state appropriation and expenditure
process. The sections below are examples:

—

Article V, Section 21 No bill for the appropriation
of money, except for the expenses of the government,
shall be introduced within ten days of the close of
the session, except by unanimous consent of the house
in which it is sought to be introduced.

—

Article V, Section 32 All bills for raising revenue
shall originate in the house of representatives;
but
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the senate may propose amendments, as in the case of
other bills.

—

Article V, Section 33 The general appropriation bills
shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the
ordinary expenses of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the state, interest on the
public debt and for public schools. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each
embracing but one subject.

—

Article V, Section 34 No money shall be paid out of
the treasury except upon appropriations made by law,
and on warrant drawn by the proper officer in pursuance
thereof, except interest on the public debt.

—

Article XII, Section 10 All taxes levied for state
purposes shall be paid into the state treasury, and no
money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance of specific appropriations made by law.

—

Article XII, Section 12 (in part)
No appropriation
of public moneys shall be made for a term longer than
two years.

The Convention may want to consider leaving these provisions,
in general, to be enacted as procedural rules by the legislature itself.

"Appropriations Made by Law "

Article V, Section 34 and Article XII, Section 10 contain
well-established safeguards for public money payment into
the state treasury and withdrawal only upon specific appropriation by law.
But in fact, not all state funds are paid
into the state treasury, and funds frequently have been
expended without appropriation by law.
The Montana Legislative Council has noted:

—

The Council has discovered many instances of moneys
In
spent without specific legislative appropriation.
some cases this is the result of negligence some funds
are lost in the shuffle of preparing appropriation bills,
When an appropriation has been inadvertently omitted,
executive officers have been faced with the alternatives
of ceasing certain operations, seeking a special session
of the legislature, or ignoring the constitutional

—
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provision requiring legislative appropriation of
In the past they have understandably chosen
moneys.
the last alternative.
Revenues are sometimes collected and spent without any
form of legislative sanction or knowledge.
The Poplar
armory fund, engineering fund, and water analysis fund
are examples of funds which are not appropriated or
reviewed by the legislature. Other special funds admittedly have been established as a means of evading
the restrictive effects of appropriation bills.
Thus,
in some instances legislative control of the purse
strings is a fiction. 2 ^
The Treasury Fund Structure Act, 21 enacted in 1963, provides
greater legislative control over public money through a
unified fund structure. The legislative auditor position
has also increased legislative expenditure control.

Money from the sale and rental of public lands is constitutionally and judicially exempted from the "specific appropriation" provisions of the Montana Constitution.
Article
XXI, Section 11 provides:

All money in any of the separate and integral funds
constituting the Montana trust and legacy fund and
the interest apportioned therefrom, shall be subject
to payment to the person, institution or other entity
entitled thereto, without appropriation by the legislative assembly, upon proper authorization as provided
by law.

The exemption is unnecessary, however, since the Montana
Supreme Court has ruled that land grant income can be expended without appropriation regardless of the special constitutional provision.

Statutory provisions also establish funds that can be withTwo of
drawn without specific legislative appropriation.
these statutes are:

Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Section 79-415. Appropriation and disbursement of moneys from the treasury.
(1) Moneys deposited in the general fund, the earmarked
revenue fund, the revolving fund, and the federal and
private revenue fund, with the exception of trust
income, shall be paid out of the treasury only on appropriation made by law.
(2) Moneys deposited in the
,
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federal and private grant clearance fund, the sinking
fund, the bond proceeds and insurance clearance fund,
the trust and legacy fund and the agency fund may be
paid out of the treasury under general laws, or
contracts entered into in pursuance of law, permitting
such disbursement.

Sunport
Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Section 79-601.
For the support and endowment
of state institutions.
of each and every of the state institutions of the
state of Montana now existing or hereafter to be
,

created there is annually and perpetually appropriated
respectively:
1.
The income from all permanent endowments and
All moneys
from all land grants as provided by law.
received or collected by all higher educational institutions, reformatory, custodial and penal institutions,
state hospitals, and sanitariums, for any purpose whatever, except such as may have been heretofore pledged
to secure the payment of principal and interest of
bonds issued in connection with the construction of
buildings, or which may constitute temporary deposits,
all or part of which may be subject to withdrawal or
repayment, shall be paid over to the state treasurer
who shall deposit the same to the credit of the proper
,

fund.

The Model State Constitution contains a "specific appropriation" provision:
No money shall be withdrawn from the treasury exceot
in accordance with appropriations made by law, nor
shall any obligation for the payment of money be
incurred except as authorized by law. J

The recently adopted Virginia Constitution contains a orovision similar to Montana's present Article XII, Section 10.
That section provides:

—

Virginia [Art. X, Sec. 7]
All taxes, licenses, and other
revenues of the Commonwealth shall be collected oy its
No
proper officers and paid into the State treasury.
money shall be paid out of the State treasury exceot
in pursuance of appropriations made by law.
Deposits

Article VII, Section

4

of the Montana Constitution provides,

in part:
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[A] 11 fees fixed by law for the performance by any
officer of any official duty, shall be collected
in advance, and deposited with the state treasurer
quarterly to the credit of the state.

The legislature, by statute, requires that all departments
located at the Capitol deposit daily with the state treasurer
all money, credits, evidences of indebtedness and securities. 24 This statutory requirement clearly provides better
control over state funds than the quarterly deposits required by the Constitution.

REPORTS
The Constitution requires various reports from state officers
and agencies.
But for the most part, the reporting provisions are ignored and, in effect, have been superceded by
legislation requiring more frequent and comprehensive reporting of agency activities and finances.
Such reporting procedures, made possible through modern technology, are
necessary for modern accounting and management practices.

Reports to the Governor
The Montana Constitution, in Article VII, Section 10, provides for reports to the governor:

The governor may require information in writing from
the officers of the executive department upon any
subject relating to the duties of their respective
offices, which information shall be given upon oath
whenever so required; he may also require information
in writing, at any time, under oath, from all officers
and managers of state institutions, upon any subject
relating to the condition, management and expenses
of their respective offices and institutions, and
may, at any time he deems it necessary, appoint a
committee to investigate and report to him upon the
condition of any executive office or state institution.
The governor shall at the beginning of each
session, and from time to time, by message, give to
the legislative assembly information of the condition
of the state; and shall recommend such measures as he
shall deem expedient.
He shall also send to the
legislative assembly a statement with vouchers of the
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expenditures of all moneys belonging to the state and
He shall also at the beginning of
paid out by him.
each session present estimates of the amount of money
required to be raised by taxation for all purposes
of the state.
The power to require information in writing from all executive officers is important to the governor's supervision
The Executive Reorganization Act
of the executive branch.
of 1971 requires all department heads to provide the governor with information at any time he requests on the operation of their departments.^ 5 The Model State Constitution
contains constitutional language aimed at the same goal:
He [the governor] may at any time require information,
in writing or otherwise, from the officers of any
administrative department, office or agency upon
any subject relating to their respective off ices. 26

The governor's "state of the state address" to the legislature, also authorized in Article VII, Section 10, is discussed in the study on the executive in this series of
reports for the Montana Constitutional Convention.

—

Another constitutionally required report "a statement with
vouchers of the expenditures of all moneys belonging to the
state" and paid out by the governor apparently has not
been prepared in recent years. 27 However, monthly financial
reports, prepared by the state controller, treasurer and
auditor provide data on the fiscal transactions of the
governor's office.

—

Financial Reports

Article VII, Section 19 of the Montana Constitution,
requires the following financial reports:
An account shall be kept by the officers of the executive department, and of all public institutions of
the state of all moneys received by them, severally
from all sources, and for every service performed,
and of all moneys disbursed by them severally, and a
semi-annual report thereof shall be made to the
governor, under oath; they shall also, at least
twenty days preceding each regular session of the legislative assembly, make full and complete reports of their
official transactions to the governor, who shall
transmit the same to the legislative assembly. 28
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The procedures required in that section in fact have been
replaced by statutory enactments covering agency expenditures, accounting and reporting.
The director of the Department of Administration has authority to prescribe a
uniform accounting and reporting system for all state agencies. 29 The 1969 Legislature appropriated funds to finance
the development and installation of a uniform statewide
budgeting and accounting system. Preliminary planning has
been completed, and the system will be implemented during
At present, monthly financial
the next two fiscal years.
reports, prepared by the state controller, treasurer and
auditor, provide current financial data on all fiscal
transactions by state agencies. These reports are prepared
under statutory, rather than constitutional, authorization.
The reports include:

— Governmental Expenditures by Department;
— Report of Unpaid Encumbrances;
— Monthly Account Report;
— Monthly Appropriation Report;
— Warrants Issued, and
— Budget Status Report.
When the statewide budgeting and accounting system is
implemented, additional financial reports will be available. -^
Despite Article VII, Section 19, the executive officers
seldom make semi-annual financial reports to the governor
under oath.
However, that information is available monthly
from the central financial records of the state. The 19 69
Legislature established uniform biennial report requirements
for all state agencies; in 1971, the statute was amended to
require annual reports. The reports describe activities
of the state agencies and contain recommendations for program improvements. The governor then prepares a report
for the legislature from the reports submitted by the state
agencies. 32

Financial Reports of Treasurer
Article XII, Section 13 of the Montana Constitution provides
The state treasurer shall keep a separate account of
each fund in his hands, and shall at the end of each
quarter of the fiscal year report to the governor in
writing, under oath, the amount of all moneys in his
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hands to the credit of every such fund, and the place
or places where the same is kept or deposited, and the
number and amount of every warrant paid or redeemed
The governor, or other
by him during the quarter.
person or persons authorized by law, shall verify said
report and cause the same to be immediately published
in at least one newspaper printed at the seat of
government, and otherwise as the legislative assembly
may require.
The legislative assembly may provide by
law further regulations for the safe keeping and
management of the public funds in the hands of the
treasurer; but notwithstanding any such regulations,
the treasurer and his sureties shall in all cases be
held responsible therefor.
The accounting system and financial statements of the state
treasurer are discussed in detail in a recent study by the
Montana legislative auditor. 3 For years, the treasurer has
prepared one periodic financial report, a monthly statement
entitled the "State Treasurer's Trial Balance." The
auditor's report questioned the completeness of the report,
and recommended changes to accurately and fully portray
the financial conditions of the treasury. 34 The auditor
noted:

Although we question the accuracy of the [State Treasurer's Trial Balance] report, we sympathize with the
treasurer in that nowhere were we able to find a clear
delineation of the type of reports required of the
treasurer. To the contrary, we found an abundance
of confusing and conflicting constitutional and statutory reporting requirements.
Various sections of the
Constitution and law require the treasurer to prepare
financial reports of some nature. For example, Article
XII, Section 13, of the Constitution as well as Section
79-806, R.C.M. 1947 [now repealed], require quarterly
reports to the governor under oath while Section
79-705 [now 59-705] specifies a semiannual report under
oath.
In contrast, Section 59-701, requires that the
treasurer prepare and submit an annual report to the
state controller, with no mention of oath, while
Section 79-201 [now amended] requires a report in
compliance with statutes which have been repealed. The
content and format of the required reports also vary
widely.
In one case, the treasurer is required to post
on his door a list of all outstanding warrants (Section
79-801, R.C.M. 1947 [now repealed]), while in another,
the treasurer is supposed to prepare a "balance sheet"
showing a summary of accounts and the identity of all
warrants paid (Section 79-806, R.C.M. 1947 [now repealed]) 35
,
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Apparently, the treasurer is now required to prepare and
submit (1) an annual report to the state controller Revised
Codes of Montana 1947, Sec. 59-701);
(2) a semiannual
report under oath to the governor Revised Codes of Montana
1947, Sec. 59-705 and Montana Const. Art. VII, Sec. 19);
(3) a quarterly report to the governor (Montana Const.
Art. XII, Sec. 13), and (4) an annual report to the governor
Revised Codes of Montana 1947, Title 82, Ch. 40).
In
practice, the treasurer prepares the monthly trial balance
and an annual report to the governor.
The trial balance
is not delivered to the governor's office, nor has it been
published in a Helena newspaper for many years despite the
provisions of Article XII, Section 13. The confusing
statutory and constitutional provisions concerning treasurer's reports suggest that perhaps financial reporting requirements should be left to the legislature.
Reporting
needs then could be coordinated with the state's accounting
and data processing system.
(
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CHAPTER XX
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
This chapter is devoted to several unrelated, but important,
provisions that appear frequently in state constitutions.
Discussion of the provisions is limited, but their importance
as constitutional or statutory alternatives should not be
overlooked.

"SURRENDER" PROVISIONS

—

Montana Constitution [Art. XII, Sec. 6]
No county, city,
town or other municipal corporation, the inhabitants
thereof nor the property therein, shall be released
or discharged from their or its proportionate share of
state taxes.
Montana Constitution [Art. XII, Sec. 7] --The power to
tax corporations or corporate property shall never be
relinquished or suspended, and all corporations in this
state, or doing business therein, shall be subject
to taxation for state, county, school, municipal and
other purposes, on real and personal property owned
or used by them and not by this constitution exempted
from taxation.
Constitutional provisions prohibiting the surrender of taxation powers developed during the period of railroad expansion across the United States.
Many states enticed railroad
companies into their territory by offering special tax
breaks or incentives.
The period was marked by graft and
corruption, and anti-surrender provisions were a direct
response to those influences.
About twenty-seven states have constitutional provisions
forbidding the legislature to surrender all or part of its
taxing powers.
Most of the new state constitutions contain
such a provision.
Examples include:

—

Michigan [Art. IX, Sec. 2] The power of taxation
shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted
away.

—

Alaska [Art. IX, Sec. 1] The power of taxation shall
never be surrendered. This power shall not be
suspended or contracted away, except as provided in
this article.
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DISCHARGED STATE TAXES

—

Montana Constitution [Art. V, Sec. 39] Except as hereinafter provided, no obligation or liability of any
person, association or corporation, held or owned by
the state, or any municipal corporation therein, shall
ever be exchanged, transferred, remitted, released
or postponed, or in any way diminished by the legislative assembly; nor shall such liability or obligation
be extinguished, except by the payment thereof into
the proper treasury.
It shall however be lawful for the legislative assembly,
in such manner as it may direct, to authorize the
cancellation of any personal property taxes which are
not a lien on real estate and which have been delinquent
for ten (10) years or more.
It shall also be lawful for the legislative assembly,
in such manner as it may direct, to authorize the cancellation of any contractual obligation owed to or held
by a county, for seed grain, feed or other relief, the
collection of which obligation is barred by the statute
of limitations.

That constitutional provision would seem to prevent the state
from writing off bad or uncollectible debts.
Despite that
fact, however, cancellation procedures for accounts receivable were established by statute in 1971.
Revised Codes of
Montana 1947, Section 82-110 (c) provides:
,

The controller may establish procedures for canceling
and writing off accounts receivable carried on the
books of various state agencies which are uncollectible
or the continued pursuance of the collection thereof
would cost the state more than the amount collected.
Such procedures shall include the reporting of such
canceling and writing off of accounts receivable to the
next session of the legislative assembly.
The constitutionality of that statute can be seriously
questioned in view of Article V, Section 39.
But the advisability of that constitutional provision also can be
questioned. Certainly the state is bound to have some obligations it simply cannot collect.
Sound business practice
supports provisions for writing off bad debts.
Why the same
practice, regulated by legislative enactment, is not open
to the state is questionable.
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
LOTTERIES

—

Montana Constitution [Art. XIX, Sec. 2] The legislative
assembly shall have no power to authorize lotteries, or
gift enterprises for any purpose, and shall pass laws
to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise
tickets in this state.
Lotteries, as a revenue measure (or for any other purpose),
However, at
are prohibited by this constitutional provision.
least five states in recent years have created state-run
lotteries to supplement their fiscal program.

Since its
New Hampshire created its lottery system in 1964.
inception, the lottery has netted $11 million for state coffers.
All of the money is earmarked solely for public education.

New York, the second state to establish a lottery, went into
the "gambling business" in 19 67.
Since that time, the revenue
measure has pulled in $208 million for the state's public
education system.
The New Jersey lottery, enacted in 19 69, is probably the
most successful and innovative of all the state-run programs.
That state expects to bring in $70 million for the 1971 fiscal
year alone. The New Jersey lottery money also goes to public
education, with state institutions also sharing in the largesse,

Massachusetts and Pennsylvania are joining the list of
states utilizing the statewide lottery system to supplement
other state revenue programs. Although the lottery games
were not set up in the two states as of late 1971, the money
from the programs will be used to provide property tax relief
for the elderly in Pennsylvania; in Massachusetts, cities
and towns will be the beneficiaries of the state lottery.
In most of these states, the constitutions were silent on
the subject of lotteries, so the state legislature was free
New Jersey
to enact that kind of revenue-generating program.
had to amend its constitution before the legislature could
act, however.
At least one other state recently moved in
that direction. Virginia's new constitution removes all
constitutional barriers against a state-run lottery.

The advisability of a state-operated lottery system in
Montana is beyond the scope of this study.
But constitutional
authorization or prohibition of lotteries, or silence on the
subject, is a matter that should be considered by the Constitutional Convention.
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SUPPLY PURCHASES

Montana Constitution [Art. V, Sec. 30J--A11 stationery,
printing, paper, fuel and lights used in the legislative and other departments of government, shall be
furnished, and the printing, and binding and distribution of the laws, journals and department reports and
other printing and binding, and the repairing and furnishing the halls and rooms used for the meeting of
the legislative assembly, and its committees shall be
performed under contract, to be given to the lowest
responsible bidder below such maximum price and under
No member
such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
or officer of any department of the government shall
be in any way interested in any such contract; and all
such contracts shall be subject to the approval of
the governor and state treasurer.
The legislature has created a state purchasing bureau within
the department of administration, ^ which is responsible for
almost all state printing and purchasing. Article V, Section 30, is codified in Revised Codes of Montana 1947,
Section 82-1909, and the responsibility for such purchases
is placed with the state purchasing agent.
,

In 1968, the Montana Legislative Council recommended that
this section be repealed because "[sjubjects such as this
are statutory rather than constitutional in nature." 4 Since
1969, the legislature has duplicated its internal documents,
a practice that has been questioned as violating Article V,
Section 30.
Session laws and the legislative journal are
still put out to bid for printing.
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APPENDIX A
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON TAXATION AND FINANCE

ARTICLE XII
REVENUE AND TAXATION
Section 1. The necessary revenue for the support and maintenance of the state shall be provided by the legislative
assembly, which shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and
taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure
a just valuation for taxation of all property, except that
The legislative
specially provided for in this article.
assembly may also impose a license tax, both upon persons and
upon corporations doing business in the state.
The legislative assembly may levy and collect
Section la.
taxes upon incomes of persons, firms and corporations for the
purpose of replacing property taxes. These income taxes may
be graduated and progressive and shall be distributed to the
public schools and to the state government.

Section lb. No monies paid into the state treasury which
are derived from fees, excises or license taxes relating to
registration, operation or use of vehicles on the public highways or to fuels used for the propulsion of such vehicles,
except fees and charges paid to the board of railroad commissioners of the state of Montana and the public service
commission of Montana or its successor or successors by motor
carriers pursuant to law, shall be expended for other than
cost of administering laws under which such monies are derived,
statutory refunds and adjustments provided therein, payment
of highway obligations, cost of construction, reconstruction,
maintenance and repair of public highways, roads, streets,
and bridges, and expenses authorized by the state legislature
for dissemination of public information relating to the public
highways, roads, streets and bridges of the state of Montana
and the use thereof.
Section 2. The property of the United States, the state,
counties, Cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries shall be exempt from taxation;
and such other property as may be used exclusively for the
agricultural and horticultural societies, for educational purposes, places for actual religious worship, hospitals and
places of burial not used or held for private or corporate
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profit, institutions of purely public charity and evidences
of debt secured by mortgages of record upon real or personal
property in the state of Montana, may be exempt from taxation.

Section 3. All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock
in place, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper, lead,
coal or other valuable mineral deposits, after purchase thereof from the United States, shall be taxed at the price paid
the United States therefor, unless the surface ground, or some
part thereof, of such mine or claim, is used for other than
mining purposes, and has a separate and independent value for
such other purposes, in which case said surface ground, or
any part thereof, so used for other than mining purposes, shall
be taxed at its value for such other purposes, as provided by
law; and all machinery used in mining, and all property and
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines and mining
claims which have a value separate and independent of such
mines or mining claims, and the annual net proceeds of all
mines and mining claims shall be taxed as provided by law.
Section 4. The legislative assembly shall not levy taxes
upon the inhabitants or property in any county, city, town,
or municipal corporation for county, town, or municipal purposes, but it may by law invest in the corporate authorities
thereof powers to assess and collect taxes for such purposes.

Section 5. Taxes for city, town and school purposes may be
levied on all subjects and objects of taxation, but the
assessed valuation of any property shall not exceed the valuation of the same property for state and county purposes.
Section 6. No county, city, town or other municipal corporation, the inhabitants thereof nor the property therein,
shall be released or discharged from their or its proportionate share of state taxes.

Section 7. The power to tax corporations or corporate property
shall never be relinquished or suspended, shall be subject to
in this state, or doing business therein, shall be subject to
taxation for state, county, school, municipal and other purposes, on real and personal property owned or used by them and
not by this constitution exempted from taxation.
Section 8.
Private property shall not be taken or sold for
the corporate debts of public corporations, but the legislative
assembly may provide by law for the funding thereof, and shall
provide by law for the payment thereof, including all funded
debts and obligations, by assessment and taxation of all private property not exempt from taxation within the limits of
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the territory over which such corporations respectively have
authority.

Section 9. The rate of taxation on real and personal property
for state purposes, except as hereinafter provided, shall
never exceed two and one-half mills on each dollar of valuation,
and whenever the taxable property of the state shall amount
to six hundred million dollars ($600,000,000.00) the rate shall
never exceed two (2) mills on each dollar of valuation, unless
the proposition to increase such rate, specifying the rate
proposed and the time during which the rate shall be levied
shall have been submitted to the people at the general election
and shall have received a majority of all votes cast for and
against it at such election; provided, that in addition to the
levy for state purposes above provided for, a special levy
in addition may be made on live stock for the purpose of paying bounties on wild animals and for stock inspection, protection and indemnity purposes, as may be prescribed by law,
and such special levy shall be made and levied annually in
amount not exceeding four mills on the dollar by the state
board of equalization, as may be provided by law.
Section 10. All taxes levied for state purposes shall be paid
into the state treasury, and no money shall be drawn from the
treasury but in pursuance of specific appropriations made by
law.

Section 11. Taxes shall be levied and collected by general
laws and for public purposes only.
They shall be uniform upon
the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of
the authority levying the tax.
Section 12. No appropriation shall be made nor any expenditures authorized by the legislative assembly whereby the expenditures of the state during any fiscal year shall exceed
the total tax then provided for by law, and applicable to
such appropriation or expenditure, unless the legislative
assembly making such appropriation shall provide for levying
a sufficient tax, not exceeding the rate allowed in section
nine (9) of this article, to pay such appropriations or
expenditures within such fiscal year. This provision shall
not apply to appropriations or expenditures to suppress
insurrection, defend the state, or assist in defending the
United States in time of war.
No appropriation of public
moneys shall be made for a longer term than two years.
Section 13. The state treasurer shall keep a separate
account of each fund in his hands, and shall at the end of
each quarter of the fiscal year report to the governor in
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writing, under oath, the amount of all moneys in his hands
to the credit of every such fund, and the place or places
where the same is kept or deposited, and the number and
amount of every warrant paid or redeemed by him during the
quarter.
The governor, or other person or persons authorized
by law, shall verify said report and cause the same to be
immediately published in at least one newspaper printed at
the seat of government, and otherwise as the legislative
assembly may require. The legislative assembly may provide
by law further regulations for the safe keeping and management of the public funds in the hands of the treasurer; but
notwithstanding any such regulations, the treasurer and his
sureties shall in all cases be held responsible therefor.

Section 14. The governor, state auditor and state treasurer
are hereby constituted a state depository board with full
power and authority to designate depositories with which all
funds in the hands of the state treasurer shall be deposited,
and at such rate of interest as may be prescribed by law.
When money shall have been deposited under direction of said
depository board and in accordance with the law, the treasurer
shall not be liable for loss on account of any such deposit
occurring through damage by the elements or for any other
cause or reason occasioned through means other than his
own neglect, fraud or dishonorable conduct.
The making of
profit out of public moneys, or using the same for any purpose not authorized by law, by the state treasurer or by any
other public officer, shall be deemed a felony, and shall be
punished as provided for by law and part of such punishment
shall be disqualification to hold any public office.

Section 15. The board of county commissioners of each county
shall constitute the county board of equalization.
The duties
of such board shall be to adjust and equalize the valuation
of taxable property within their respective counties, and all
such adjustments and equalizations may be supervised, reviewed,
changed, increased or decreased by the state board of equalization.
The state board of equalization shall be compoped of
three members who shall be appointed by the governor, by and
with the advice and consent of the senate. A majority of the
members of the state board of equalization shall constitute
a quorum.
The term of office of one of the members first
appointed shall end on March 1st, 1925, of another first
appointed on March 1st, 1927, and of the third first appointed
on March 1st, 1929.
Each succeeding member shall hold his
office for the term of six years, and until his successor
shall have been appointed and qualified.
In case of a vacancy
the person appointed to fill such vacancy shall hold office
for the unexpired term in which the vacancy occurs.
The
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qualifications and salaries of the members of the state board
of equalization shall be as provided by law, provided, however, that such members shall be so selected that the board
will not be composed of more than two persons who are affiliated with the same political party or organization; provided,
further, that each member shall devote his entire time to the
duties of the office and shall not hold any position of trust
or profit, or engage in any occupation or business interfering
or inconsistent with his duties as a member of such board, or
serve on or under any committee of any political party or
organization, or take part, either directly or indirectly, in
any political campaign in the interest of any political party
or organization or candidate for office.
The state board of
equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation of taxable
property among the several counties, and the different classes
of taxable property in any county and in the several counties
and between individual taxpayers; supervise and review the
acts of the county assessors and county boards of equalization;
change, increase, or decrease valuations made by county assessors or equalized by county boards of equalization; and exercise such authority and do all things necessary to secure a
fair, just and equitable valuation of all taxable property
among counties, between the different classes of property,
and between individual taxpayers.
Said state board of equalization shall also have such other powers, and perform such
other duties relating to taxation as may be prescribed by law.
Section 16. All property shall be assessed in the manner prescribed by law except as is otherwise provided in this constitution.
The franchise, roadway, roadbed, rails and rolling
stock of all railroads operated in more than one county in this
state shall be assessed by the state board of equalization and
the same shall be apportioned to the counties, cities, towns,
townships and school districts in which such railroads are located,
in proportion to the number of miles of railway laid in such
counties, cities, towns, townships and school districts.
Section 17. The word property as used in this article is
hereby declared to include moneys, credits, bonds stocks,
franchises and all matters and things (real, personal and
mixed) capable of private ownership, but this shall not be
construed so as to authorize the taxation of the stocks of
any company or corporation when the property of such company or corporation represented by such stocks is within
the state and has been taxed.
r

Section 18. The legislative assembly shall pass all laws
necessary to carry out the provisions of this article.
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ARTICLE XIII
PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS

Section 1.
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town,
municipality, nor other subdivision of the state shall ever
give or loan its credit in aid of, or make any donation or
grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual, association
or corporation, or become a subscriber to, or a shareholder
in, any company or corporation, or a joint owner with any
person, company or corporation, except as to such ownership
as may accrue to the state by operation or provision of law.
Section 2. The legislative assembly shall not in any manner
create any debt except by law which shall be irrepealable
until the indebtedness therein provided for shall have been
fully paid or discharged; such law shall specify the purpose
to which the funds so raised shall be applied and provide
for the levy of a tax sufficient to pay the interest on,
and extinguish the principal of such debt within the time
limited by such law for the payment thereof; but no debt
or liability shall be created which shall singly, or in the
aggregate with any existing debt or liability, exceed the
sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) except in
case of war, to repel invasion or suppress insurrection,
unless the law authorizing the same shall have been submitted to the people at a general election and shall have
received a majority of the votes cast for and against it
at such election.
Section 3. All moneys borrowed by or on behalf of the state
or any county, city, town, municipality or other subdivision
of the state, shall be used only for the purpose specified
in the law authorizing the loan.

Section 4. The state shall not assume the debt, or any part
thereof, of any county, city, town or municipal corporation.
Section 5 No county shall be allowed to become indebted in
any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate, exceeding five (5)
per centum of the value of the taxable property therein, to
be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county
.
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taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, and
all bonds or obligations in excess of such amount given by
No county shall
or on behalf of such county shall be void.
incur any indebtedness or liability for any single purpose
to an amount exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) without tha approval of a majority of the electors thereof,
voting at an election to be provided by law.

Section 6. No city, town, township, school district or high
school district shall be allowed to become indebted in any
manner or for any purpose to an amount, including existing
indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum
(5%) of the value of the taxable property therein, to be
ascertained by the last assessment for state and county
taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, and
all bonds or obligations in excess of such amount given by
or on behalf of such city, town, township, school district
or high school district shall be void; and each school district and each high school district shall have separate and
independent bonding capacities within the limitation of this
section; provided, however, that the legislative assembly
may extend the limit mentioned in this section, by authorizing municipal corporations to submit the question to a
vote of the taxpayers affected thereby, when such increase
is necessary to construct a sewerage system or to procure
a supply of water for such municipality which shall own
and control said water supply and devote the revenues derived therefrom to the payment of the debt.
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ARTICLE XXI

MONTANA TRUST AND LEGACY FUND
Section 1. The state of Montana does hereby agree and covenant to accept from any natural person, or persons, from
inside or outside the state, gifts, donations, grants and
legacies in any amount or value not less than two hundred
fifty ($250.00) dollars each, for the creation of a state
permanent revenue fund, for the creation of a state permanent school fund, for the creation of a permanent revenue
fund for the university of Montana, and for the benefit of
scientific, educational, benevolent and charitable work,
subject, however, to all the provisions and limitations of
this article.
Section 2.
The state further agrees and covenants to hold in
trust all such contributions (gifts, donations, grants and
legacies), to administer the same perpetually, and to apply
the net earnings thereof as therein directed, subject, however, to the provisions and limitations of this act.

Section 3. The original amounts of all contributions for
the state permanent revenue fund, for the state permanent
school fund, and for the permanent revenue fund for the
university of Montana, shall be added to such funds respectively and become inseparable and inviolable parts thereof.
Contributions for other objects may contain a provision to
the effect that the net earnings thereof, or part of the
net earnings, shall be added to the principal for a certain
length of time, or until it has reached a certain amount,
or until the happening of a certain event, but such contingent event shall not be more remote than permitted by the
laws effecting perpetuities; but no contribution containing
such provision as to accumulation shall be accepted by the
state until it has been approved by the supervisory board
hereinafter constituted, which board shall have power to
reject any such contribution that it may deem unwise.
Section 4. The state treasurer shall keep a permanent record of all such gifts, donations, grants and legacies,
showing the names of the givers, the purpose of the contribution, and other essential facts relating thereto. A
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duplicate of this record shall be kept by the secretary of
These records shall be preserved perpetually as a
state.
lasting memorial to the givers and their interest in society.
The legislative assembly shall from time to time make provision for suitable publicity concerning these benefactors
of their fellowmen.
Section 5. The same state board and officers that have
charge of the investment and administration of the public
school fund of the state shall have charge of the investment
and administration of all the funds administered under this
article. All these funds shall be invested as one common
fund to be known and designated as the Montana trust and
In case any contribution is in some other form
legacy fund.
than cash, such board shall convert it into cash as soon as
practicable.
Section 6. The public school permanent fund, the other permanent funds originating in land grants from the United
States for the support of higher institutions of learning,
and for other state institutions, subject to investment,
shall be invested as parts of the Montana trust and legacy
fund; so also all other funds in the custody of any officer
or officers of the state, subject to investment, that the
legislative assembly may prescribe. The separate existence
and identity of each and every fund invested and administered
as a part of the Montana trust and legacy fund shall be
strictly maintained.
All investments belonging to the public school permanent
fund, except investments in state farm mortgage loans, and
all investments belonging to the said land grant funds, shall
be transferred to the Montana trust and legacy fund at the
full amounts of the unpaid balances of such investments.
Section 7. The state shall accept for investment and administration as parts of the Montana trust and legacy fund,
sinking funds, permanent funds, cumulative funds and trust
funds belonging to or in the custody of any of the political
subdivisions of the state when requested to do so by the
governing board of such political subdivision, subject, however, to such limitations as the legislative assembly may
prescribe.
The legislative assembly may provide for the investment and administration as a part of the Montana trust
and legacy fund of any other fund subject to its power.
Section 8. The Montana trust and legacy fund shall be
safely and conservatively invested in public securities
within the state, as far as possible, including school
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district, county and municipal bonds, and bonds of the
state of Montana; but it may also be partly invested in
bonds of the United States, bonds fully guaranteed by the
United States as to principal and interest, and federal land
bank bonds. All investments shall be limited to safe loan
investments bearing a fixed rate of interest.
In making long
term investments preference shall be given to securities
payable on the amortization plan or serially.
The legislative
assembly may provide additional regulations and limitations
for all investments from the Montana trust and legacy fund.

All existing constitutional guarantees against loss or
diversion applying to the public school fund, to the funds
of the state university and to the funds of all other state
institutions of learning, shall remain in full force and
effect.

Section 9. On the last day of March, of June, of September
and of December of each year, the state treasurer shall
apportion all interest collected for the Montana trust and
legacy fund during the three month period then terminating
to all the separate and integral funds which constitute
such fund on the day of such apportionment and which constituted parts of the fund on the first day of the three
month period then terminating. The basis of apportionment
shall be the average amount of each such fund between the
first day and the last day of the three month period.

Section 10. The state treasurer shall keep all deposits of
money belonging to the Montana trust and legacy fund separate and distinct from other deposits of money in his keeping.
Section 11. All money in any of the separate and integral
funds constituting the Montana trust and legacy fund and the
interest apportioned therefrom, shall be subject to payment
to the person, institution or other entity entitled thereto,
without appropriation by the legislative assembly, upon
proper authorization as provided by law.
Section 12. All the net earnings accruing to the state
permanent revenue fund shall annually be added thereto
until it has reached the sum of one hundred million dollars
($100,000,000.00).
Thereafter only one twentieth of the
annual net earnings shall be added to the fund itself, and
the remaining nineteen twentieths of the net earnings shall
be used for the general expenses of the state.
Section 13. All the net earnings accruing to the state
permanent school fund shall annually be added thereto until
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it has reached the sum of five hundred million dollars
Thereafter only one twentieth of the
($500,000,000.00).

annual net earnings shall be added to the fund itself, and
the remaining nineteen twentieths shall annually be apportioned to the school districts of the state on the basis of
the aggregate actual school attendance in each district
during the preceding school or calendar year by persons
between the ages of six and eighteen years and shall be used
exclusively for educational purposes, subject to such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law.

Section 14. All the net earnings accruing to the permanent
revenue fund for the university of Montana shall annually be
added thereto until it has reached the sum of one hundred
million dollars ($100,000,000.00). Thereafter only one
twentieth of the annual net earnings shall be added to the
fund itself, and the remaining nineteen twentieths shall be
apportioned to all the educational institutions then comprising the university of Montana, on the basis of the
aggregate actual attendance in each institution during the
preceding school or calendar year, and may be used for all
purposes properly connected with the work of these institutions, subject, however, to such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law.
Section 15. , Whenever the purpose for which a certain contribution was made has been accomplished, or can no longer
be ascertained or followed, then the total amount of such
fund shall be transferred to the state permanent school
fund and become a permanent and inviolable part thereof.
All contributions without a specified purpose shall be
credited to the state permanent school fund.
Section 16.
Should the time ever come when any of the three
aforesaid permanent funds become so large that no further
increase is necessary or desirable, then, in such case, the
legislative assembly shall have power to provide for the use
of all of the net income from such fund for the purpose for
which it was created, or it may use the one twentieth of
the annual net income which was to be added to the fund itself for the creation of other permanent revenue funds, or
for any other public purpose that it may deem wise; provided,
however, that none of the foregoing provisions of this
section shall apply to any of these funds until it has reached the specific amount fixed by this article.
Section 17. The justices of the supreme court of the state
of Montana are hereby made and constituted a supervisory
board over the entire administration of all the funds created
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or authorized by this article and the income therefrom.
During January of each year, this board shall review the
administration for the preceding year.
It shall decide all
uncertain or disputed points arising in the administration
of the funds whenever requested to do so by a beneficiary,
by a state official charged with some part of the administration of the fund, or any other interested party; and it
may do so upon its own initiative.
It shall be the duty of
the supervisory board to do and perform all acts and things
that it may deem necessary in order to cause the board and
officers having direct charge of these funds to administer
the same carefully and wisely in full compliance with the
provisions of this article and such further legislation as
may be enacted relating thereto. The clerk of the supreme
court shall be ex-officio clerk of this supervisory board.

Section 18. The legislative assembly shall from time to
time enact such further legislation as it may deem necessary
to carry into effect the provisions of this article.

-402-

.

APPENDIX B
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON PUBLIC LANDS

ARTICLE XVII
PUBLIC LANDS
All lands of the state that have been, or that
S ection 1.
may hereafter be granted to the state by congress, and all
lands acquired by gift or grant or devise, from any person or
corporation, shall be public lands of the state, and shall be
held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as hereafter
provided, for the respective purposes for which they have
been or may be granted, donated or devised; and none of such
land, nor any estate or interest therein, shall ever be disposed of except in pursuance of general laws providing for
such disposition, nor unless the full market value of the
estate or interest disposed of, to be ascertained in such
manner as may be provided by law, be paid or safely secured
to the state; nor shall any lands which the state holds by
grant from the United States (in any case in which the manner
of disposal and minimum price are so prescribed) be disposed
of, except in the manner and for at least the price prescribed
in the grant thereof, without the consent of the United States.
Said lands shall be classified by the board of land commissioners, as follows:
First, lands which are valuable only for
Second, those which are principally valugrazing purposes.
Third, agricultural
able for the timber that is on them.
lands.
Fourth, lands within the limits of any town or city
or within three (3) miles of such limits; provided, that any
of said lands may be re-classified whenever, by reason of
increased facilities for irrigation or otherwise, they shall
be subject to different classification.
Section 2. The lands of the first of said classes may be
sold or leased, under such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by law. The lands of the second class may be
sold, or the timber thereon may be sold, under such rules
and regulations as may be prescribed by law.
The agricultural lands may be either sold or leased, under such rules
The lands of
and regulations as may be prescribed by law.
the fourth class shall be sold in alternate lots of not more
than five acres each, and not more than one-half of any one
tract of such lands shall be sold prior to the year one
thousand nine hundred and ten (1910).
Section 3
All other public lands may be disposed of in such
manner as may be provided by law.
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